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In the course of their long intellectual history, emotions have been identified with items as 
diverse as perceptions of bodily changes (feeling tradition), judgments (cognitivist tradition), 
behavioral predispositions (behaviorist tradition), biologically based solutions to fundamental 
life tasks (evolutionary tradition), and culturally specific social artifacts (social constructionist 
tradition). The first objective of my work is to put some order in the mare magnum of theories of 
emotions. I taxonomize them into families and explore the historical origin and current 
credentials of the arguments and intuitions supporting them. I then evaluate the methodology of 
past and present emotion theory, defending a bleak conclusion: a great many emotion theorists 
ask “What is an emotion?” without a clear understanding of what counts as getting the answer 
right.  I argue that there are two ways of getting the answer right. One is to capture the conditions 
of application of the folk term "emotion" in ordinary language (Folk Emotion Project), and the 
other is to formulate a fruitful explication of it (Explicating Emotion Project). Once we get clear 
on the desiderata of these two projects, we realize that several long-running debates in emotion 
theory are motivated by methodological confusions. The constructive part of my work is devoted 
to formulating a new explication of emotion suitable for the theoretical purposes of scientific 
psychology. At the heart of the Urgency Management System (UMS) theory of emotions I 
propose is the idea that an “umotion” is a special type of superordinate system which instantiates 
and manages an urgent action tendency by coordinating the operation of a cluster of cognitive, 
perceptual and motoric subsystems. Crucially, such superordinate system has a proper function 
 iv
by virtue of which it acquires a special kind of intentionality I call pragmatic. I argue that 
“umotion” is sufficiently similar in use to “emotion” to count as explicating it, it has precise 
rules of application, and it accommodates a number of central and widely shared intuitions about 
the emotions. My hope is that future emotion research will demonstrate the heuristic fruitfulness 
of the “umotion” concept for the sciences of mind. 
 v
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PREFACE 
 
 
 
I decided to devote my dissertation to the study of the emotions when Paul Griffiths joined 
the History and Philosophy of Science Department at the University of Pittsburgh. Initially, my 
idea was to use the emotions as a Trojan horse to enter the citadel of morality. I soon realized 
that I could not find the entrance to the horse. Three years later, I am still looking for it, but I 
feel the journey has been worth it. The emotions have proven to be a fascinating topic in their 
own right, and a profoundly challenging one. I am more convinced than ever that they hold the 
key to understanding a number of phenomena we care deeply about, including morality, art, 
mental disorder and rational decision-making.   
There are several people I would like to thank, starting from my co-directors, Paul 
Griffiths and Peter Machamer. Without Paul, this dissertation would simply not have been 
written. He has been a terrific and highly engaged advisor, and a true friend. I learned a great 
deal from his work on the emotions, and his philosophical talent, quick wit, and prodigious 
memory have been a continuous source of inspiration for me. I will always treasure the 
memory of our regular discussion meetings at the Coffee Tree in Squirrell Hill.   
Peter Machamer has been a co-director in the last, and crucial, year and a half of the 
dissertation, offering a great deal of excellent philosophical advice, both verbally and in 
writing. Peter’s influence is especially evident in my attempt to articulate a notion of 
affordances suitable for shedding light on the intentionality of emotions.  Peter has been a 
teacher of life as well as philosophy. He has taught me by example the values of tolerance, 
generosity and communal living. I have been a guest at Peter and Barbara’s house many times, 
and I have always gone home with a warm feeling of gratitude and joy. I will miss Peter and 
Barbara’ friendship enormously.  
Bob Brandom has taught the course from which I have learned the most in graduate 
school, namely Metaphysics and Epistemology. I highly recommend taking this course with 
him. I can’t imagine a better way to be introduced to the foundational questions in M&E than 
through the secure guidance of Bob Brandom. The rigor of his philosophical thinking is what 
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lies at the foundation of his talent as a teacher. I am grateful for all I have learned throughout 
the years from Bob’s courses, articles and books. 
Ruth Millikan has been wonderful in her availability to me. I met her through my dearest 
friend Bruno Galantucci a few years back. I still remember our first philosophical conversation 
- on pushmi-pullyu representations - by a placid lake in Storrs, Connecticut. What was most 
inspiring about it was Ruth’s openness towards me, then a perfect stranger. She did not make 
me feel like I was wasting her time, even though I am afraid I was. Her exemplary generosity 
has shined through in the following years. Ruth has given me some of the most detailed, 
probing and philosophically brilliant comments I have ever received on my work. A number of 
the central ideas of my dissertation have emerged from reflecting on her comments, and trying 
to deal with the difficulties they raised. All of this, Ruth has always done with a smile and with 
the utmost kindness and consideration.  
I also want to thank the History and Philosophy of Science Department, which has been a 
great home for me, and the Philosophy Department, which has been essential to my 
philosophical upbringing. Many thanks also to Rita Levine and Joann McIntyre for many years 
of much appreciated help, and to all HPS graduate students, a wonderful group of friends and 
fellow travelers I will miss a lot. Finally, I want to express my deep thankfulness to my father 
Franco, to my mother Adriana and to my brother Davide, for a lifetime of unconditional love 
and support. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. WHAT IS AN EMOTION? 
Until very recently, a common incipit for a book or article on the emotions took the form of a 
complaint: Why have the emotions been neglected for such a long time? The complaint was 
followed by a statement to the effect that this was indeed a shameful state of affairs, because the 
emotions mattered a lot in the theorist’s field of expertise. This sort of incipit has now become 
anachronistic. The emotions have indisputably become an object of intense interest in a spate of 
disciplines. This is testified by the constant output of new conferences, handbooks, 
monographies, journals and articles devoted to them. The shared insight is that emotions hold the 
key to understanding a number of phenomena we care deeply about. Just to mention a few, the 
emergence of morality (Gibbard 1991, Nussbaum 2001, Haidt 2000), the perception of art (Kivy 
1989, Laver and Hjort 1997, Matravers 2001), the evolution of minds (Ekman 1999b, Tooby and 
Cosmides 1990, 2000), rational decision-making and mental disorders (Damasio 1994, 1999), 
and the neurobiological bases of behavior (Le Doux 1996, Panksepp 1998). 
But what is an emotion? In 1884, William James asked this very question in the title of a 
celebrated essay in which his theory of emotions as perceptions of bodily changes was first 
introduced. It seems fair to say that James’ question has yet to be satisfactorily answered. This is 
certainly not for lack of trying. Before the relative neglect to which they were subjected in the 
first seventy years of the 20th century, the emotions have been an object of intellectual 
speculation for centuries, ever since Aristotle and the Stoics began developing complex accounts 
of their nature and value. The cumulative effect of these efforts is a dazzling range of answers to 
James’ question. Just to mention a few especially popular ones, emotions have been 
characterized as judgments, perceptions of bodily changes, behavioral predispositions, 
biologically based solutions to fundamental life tasks, and culturally specific social 
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constructions. According to some researchers, on the other hand, emotions have nothing in 
common other than being designated by the term “emotion” in English. Under this view, trying 
to theorize about “emotion” writ large is a waste of time.   
It is hard not to feel overwhelmed by the sheer variety of answers and approaches to James’ 
question, and skeptical about the possibility of an emerging consensus. After all, the emotions 
have been studied since Ancient Greece, and the antagonism between competing research 
programs does not seem to have abated through time but, if anything, increased. To apply 
broadly conceived Kuhnian categories to today’s debate, emotion theory can be described as 
being in a state of crisis. An old paradigm, embodied by the cognitivist tradition, dominated from 
the early 1960s to the early 1990s. According to this paradigm, emotions are essentially 
judgments or appraisals of a particular kind. Although well-known researchers such as Robert 
Solomon (2003) and Martha Nussbaum (2001) still work within this tradition, in the last twenty 
years the central commitments of cognitivism have all been progressively undermined. 
Cognitivists have been accused, persuasively in my view, of having overintellectualized the 
emotions, and failed to account for some of their most important phenomenological and 
motivational features (Griffiths 1997, Delancey 2001). 
 At the same time, no new paradigm has yet emerged to substitute the old one. Paul Ekman’s 
(1999b) and Carrol Izard’s (1992) affect program theory, Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003) 
and Jesse Prinz’s (2004a, 2004b) Neo-Jamesianism, and Brian Parkinson (1995, 2005) and Paul 
Griffiths’ (2003, 2004) transactionalism are arguably the three most influential contemporary 
alternatives to cognitivism. Each of them, however, faces its share of substantive objections, and 
it is unclear that any of the competing accounts currently on the table has the resources to 
overcome them. 
The main objective of this dissertation is to put some order into what appears to be an 
intractably chaotic domain of investigation, and offer a tentative way out of the state of crisis I 
described by offering a novel theory I call the Urgency Management System (UMS) theory of 
emotions. My strategy relies on three main moves, which I carry out respectively in the 
Historical Part, in the Methodological Part and in the Constructive Part of my dissertation. Let us 
briefly consider what each part aims to achieve. 
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1.2. HISTORY 
 
A careful analysis of the history of emotion theory reveals that, despite the existence of 
significant differences between research traditions, there is more common ground between rival 
theories of emotions than it may at first appear. Five main traditions, I argue, have battled for the 
soul of emotions in the last 2,500 years, emerging at different times in the history of the subject. 
I call them the feeling tradition, the cognitivist tradition, the behaviorist tradition, the 
evolutionary tradition and the social constructionist tradition. Each of them comes in many 
flavors, and several authors belong to more than one tradition at the same time. Each tradition 
can be usefully characterized in terms of a cluster of core intuitions about the emotions, and of a 
specific sensibility for what is theoretically interesting about them. The historical investigation I 
propose tries to recover the contours of an area of consensus across distinct traditions, and learn 
from the insights and mistakes of each tradition. Some aspects of this consensus are worth 
maintaining, and represent the positive legacy of centuries of investigation. Here is a short 
summary of a few of them. 
At this stage of research, emotion theorists of all stripes agree by and large that emotions 
have intentionality, even though the proper characterization and explanation of such 
intentionality are very much up for grabs. Also, most emotion theorists agree that some emotions 
exist not only in adult humans but also in animals and infants. Moreover, in the last twenty five 
years the idea that emotions are elicited - at least some of the time - by a mechanism which is 
fast, mandatory, and cognitively impenetrable has gained wide currency. It is an open question 
whether we should call an input system with such features a module, but it is certainly the case 
that any good theory of emotions should account for their peculiar elicitation and relative 
insulation from cold-blooded reflection. Finally, emotion theorists share an understanding of 
what we may call the marks of emotionality, by which I mean the prototypical components 
involved in instances of prototypical emotions such as anger, fear, sadness, or disgust. Such 
components comprise an evaluation, a suite of physiological responses, a conscious experience, 
and a behavioral action tendency manifested by physical actions, mental actions and expressions.  
The distinctions between rival theories of emotion emerge when it comes to putting such 
components together in the form of an answer to the question: “What is an emotion?”. My 
investigation of past and present emotion theories indicates that the attempt to answer such 
 3
question always ends up encountering the same problem, which is that there seem to be items we 
call emotions in ordinary language which fall outside the purview of the theory, and items which 
we don’t call emotions which fall within it. The common reaction to this problem is to go back to 
the drawing board, and try to formulate an account of emotions which eliminates the existing 
counterexamples without encountering any new ones. But is this an interesting project? And 
under what conditions can it be successful? These are some of the questions the Methodological 
Part of my dissertation has tried to address. 
 
 
1.3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The history of emotion theory presents us with a vivid portrayal of what generations of emotion 
theorists have tried to achieve. Two aims stand out because of their ubiquity. The first is that of 
ordinary language compatibility. As I mentioned, emotion theorists of all ages have strived to 
offer an account general enough to encompass all and only those things that are called “emotion” 
(or “anger”, “fear”, “shame”, etc.) in ordinary language. The second aim is that of theoretical 
fruitfulness. Emotion theorists have aimed to develop accounts of emotions which can further our 
understanding of their value, function, control, origin, and relation to other faculties of 
theoretical interest (e.g. rationality).  
My central point is that the project of achieving ordinary language compatibility and the 
project of achieving theoretical fruitfulness should be divorced from one another. Not only do 
they have distinct desiderata and require a distinct methodology, but it is very unlikely that they 
can be fulfilled by one and the same account of emotions. This is because, as I will argue, folk 
emotion categories are too heterogeneous and vague to allow for anything more than a family 
resemblance account, which is unlikely to be theoretically fruitful. The job of articulating a 
family resemblance account of emotion and its subordinate categories is left to what I call the 
Folk Emotion Project. If an emotion theorist is instead primarily interested in theoretical 
fruitfulness, she should “explicate” folk emotion categories, roughly along the lines first 
established by Rudolf Carnap (1950) for this intellectual endeavor. I call this the Explicating 
Emotion Project, which is the project I am personally interested in.  
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Once the desiderata for these two projects are elucidated, it appears clear that some of the 
debates in which emotion theorists engage are based on methodological confusion. One form of 
confusion is to try to offer a definition of emotion in the context of the Folk Emotion Project, 
namely a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for something to count as 
an emotion in the ordinary sense. If folk emotion categories are heterogeneous and vague as I 
claim, this project is bound to fail no matter how many times we try to carry it out successfully. 
The other form of confusion is to assume that only one definition of emotion can be offered in 
the context of the Explicating Emotion Project, and that it must avoid ordinary language 
counterexamples in order to be good.  
However, when we engage in the activity of explication our fundamental objective is to 
endow the explicandum with fruitfulness relative to the objectives of a theory. We can 
provisionally understand the fruitfulness of what I will call the explicatum in terms of its 
suitability for being embedded in the classificatory, explanatory and predictive activities of a 
given theory. As I will argue, the explicatum of a folk emotion category only needs to achieve 
“similarity in use” with the explicandum. The payoff for giving up a portion of ordinary uses is 
to endow the explicatum with a fruitfulness lacked by the explicandum. Crucially, the same folk 
emotion category can give rise to many good explicata, each of which will be fruitful with 
respect to the distinct theoretical objectives of some theory T, but none of which will be 
insulated from all ordinary language counterexamples. 
  
 
1.4. THEORY CONSTRUCTION 
 
The objective of the Constructive Part of my dissertation is to propose a new explicative theory 
of emotions fruitful relative to the objectives of scientific psychology. At the heart of the 
Urgency Management System (UMS) theory of emotions I introduce and defend is the idea that 
an “umotion” is a special type of superordinate system which instantiates and manages an urgent 
action tendency by coordinating the operation of a cluster of cognitive, perceptual and motoric 
subsystems. Crucially, such superordinate system has a proper function by virtue of which it 
acquires a special kind of intentionality I call pragmatic. I call it “umotion” to signal that I am in 
 5
the business of explicating emotion rather than capturing all and only the meaning of emotion, 
and that I take Urgency to be the fundamental feature of the explicatum I offer. 
There are two main novelties to the UMS theory. The first is a new account of the vehicle of 
emotional representation, and the second is a new account of the representation relation between 
an emotion and what the emotion is about. Consider the two most popular theories of emotion in 
contemporary philosophy, namely cognitivism and Neo-Jamesianism. According to cognitivism, 
the vehicles of emotional representation are judgments. Under this view, an emotion such as fear 
can be identified with the judgment that danger is present, and it represents in the same way in 
which judgments represent. This approach, among other things, overintellectualizes the 
emotions, and it fails to account for their motivational dimension. According to Neo-
Jamesianism, an emotion is a perception of bodily changes. The representation relation is 
explained in teleosemantic terms, by arguing that what such changes represent is what they have 
the function of carrying information about. Under this view, an emotion such as fear is to be 
understood as a perception of fear-typical bodily changes with the function of being elicited by 
danger. The problem is that many emotions lack concomitant bodily changes, and that it is 
unclear what function the correlation between states of affairs and perceptions of bodily changes 
as such could possibly serve. What is missing, once again, is an appreciation of the motivational 
dimension of emotions, namely of the fact that emotions correlate with features of the 
environment and provide behavioral guidance at the same time. 
According to the UMS theory, the vehicles of emotional representation are urgency 
management systems, i.e. umotions, namely systems which offer global coordination of 
organismic resources in situations which demand the pursuit of high priority goals.  The classic 
criticism of views of this sort is that they fail to account for the intentionality of emotions, 
namely for the fact that emotions appear to have constitutive conditions of appropriateness.  
To respond to this criticism, I provide a new theory of the representation relation between 
the emotional vehicle and what the emotion is about. I argue that emotions are intentional 
pushmi-pullyu representations, which combine descriptive and directive purposes into an 
undifferentiated whole. This idea is borrowed from Ruth Millikan’s (2004) theory of 
intentionality, but applied to emotions in novel ways. Under the view I propose, an emotion such 
as fear is to be identified with an urgent avoidance tendency with the proper function of being 
elicited by danger. This approach brings the motivational dimension of emotions center stage, 
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and allows us to appreciate that the potential benefits generated by emotions are primarily related 
to the special action control structure they embody.   
 
 
1.5. PLAN 
 
Part 1, from chapter 2 to chapter 7, aims to shed light on the understanding of the emotions 
favored by the five main traditions which I take to have shaped the history of emotion theory. 
Given the extent of the period covered, I had to make some difficult choices concerning whom to 
focus on and whom to neglect. The overarching criterion for my choices has been the degree of 
influence on the emotion theorists that followed. The authors I focus on have all either 
significantly changed or revolutionized the history of the subject. Here is a summary of the basic 
tenets associated with each tradition, jointly with an example of their application and a few 
representative authors:1  
                                                 
1 Although some of the representative authors belong to more than one tradition (e.g. Griffiths belongs to both the 
evolutionary and the social constructionist traditions), I disregard this complication for the sake of simplicity. 
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TRADITIONS An emotion is 
essentially… 
Example Authors 
Feeling  
tradition 
… a special 
state of 
consciousness/ 
bodily state 
Anger is a state of high 
and unpleasant autonomic 
arousal characterized by 
increased heart beat, blood 
pressure, rate of respiration, 
and gastric activity, decrease 
in saliva flow, trembling, etc. 
Aristotle, R. 
Descartes, D. Hume,  
S. Freud, W. James, 
A. Damasio, J. Prinz 
Behaviorist 
tradition 
…a special 
disposition to 
behave 
Anger is a disposition to 
attack the object of anger 
J. B. Watson, B. 
F. Skinner, G. Ryle, 
N. Frijda 
Cognitivist 
tradition 
…a special 
way to appraise 
Anger is the appraisal 
that a slight has been 
committed against me 
Stoics, M. 
Arnold, R. Solomon, 
M. Nussbaum, R. 
Lazarus 
Evolutionary 
tradition 
…a special 
way of dealing with 
fundamental life 
tasks 
Anger is the adaptive 
solution to the life task of 
fighting for survival 
C. Darwin, S. 
Tomkins, R. Plutchik, 
P. Ekman, C. Izard, J. 
Tooby and L. 
Cosmides 
Social 
constructionist 
tradition 
…a special 
way of playing a 
social role 
Anger is a social role in 
which one engages when 
wanting to be justified in the 
exercise of aggression 
J.-P. Sartre, J. 
Averill, C. Lutz, R. 
Harre’, P. Griffiths, 
B. Parkinson  
Figure 1: Five traditions in the study of emotions 
 
According to the feeling tradition (chapter 2), which finds its roots in common sense and is 
well exemplified by the likes of Aristotle, Rene Descartes, David Hume and William James, the 
emotions are essentially ways of feeling, i.e. special states of consciousness. For example, anger 
could be defined by a feeling theorist as the perception of a state of unpleasant arousal 
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characterized by trembling, increased heart beat, blood pressure, and breathing rate. The feeling 
theory was taken largely for granted in emotion theory roughly until the beginning of the 20th 
century. Updated versions of the feeling theory, which try to accommodate some of the 
criticisms launched against it in the course of the 20th century, have recently been proposed by 
Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003) in neurobiology and Jesse Prinz (2004a, 2004b) in 
philosophy.  
According to the behaviorist tradition (chapter 3), developed at the beginning of the 20th 
century by the psychologist John Broadus Watson (1919, 1925) and further articulated by 
Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1953) in psychology and Gilbert Ryle (1949) in philosophy, the 
emotions are essentially dispositions to behave. A behaviorist may define anger as a disposition 
to attack or otherwise harm the object of one’s anger. Even though purely behaviorist theories of 
the emotions collapsed together with behaviorism around the mid-1950s, traces of a behavioristic 
understanding of the emotions can be found in several contemporary theories. The psychologist 
Nico Frijda (1986), for example, defines the emotions as action tendencies of a particular sort. 
Frijda’s account will be the main inspiration for my own theory of emotions, which I present in 
the constructive part of this work (chapter 10).  
According to the cognitivist tradition (chapter 4), anticipated by the Stoics but articulated 
mostly in the 1960s and 1970s by philosophers such as Anthony Kenny (1963) and Errol 
Bedford (1957) and psychologists such as Magda Arnold (1960), Stanley Schachter and Jerome 
Singer (1962), the emotions are essentially ways of cognizing the world, commonly spelled out 
in terms of judgments or thoughts or appraisals. For example, under this tradition anger may be 
defined as the appraisal that one has been slighted. Updated versions of this approach, still very 
popular in emotion theory although under siege, have been offered among others by Robert 
Solomon (2003) and Martha Nussbaum (2001) in philosophy and Richard Lazarus (2001) and 
Klaus Scherer (2001) in psychology.  
According to the evolutionary tradition (chapter 5), pioneered by Charles Darwin (1872) 
and brought to fruition in the 1960s by Silvan Tomkins (1962), Robert Plutchick (1980) and the 
affect program group gathered around Paul Ekman (1969, 1987, 1992, 1999b), the emotions are 
essentially mechanisms to deal efficiently with fundamental life tasks. For example, this tradition 
may identify anger with an adaptation to deal with recurrent conflict situations.  
 9
Finally, according to the social constructionist tradition (chapter 6), which emerged in the 
1980s with anthropologists such as Catherine Lutz (1988), philosophers such as Rom Harre’ 
(1986) and psychologists such as James Averill (1980, 1986), emotions are essentially culturally 
specific social roles. For example, a social constructivist may hold that anger is a social role 
taken on to be justified in the exercise of aggression. By being overcome by anger, people 
manage to get away with violating norms against aggression for the sake of norms that entitle 
them to the protection of their rights (Averill 1980, 66).  
Updated versions of this theory have been offered by the psychologist Brian Parkinson 
(1995, 2005) and by the philosopher Paul Griffiths (2004a), who has integrated social 
constructionism with insights from the ethological literature. Their approach, which I label socio-
evolutionary, combines insights from evolutionary and social constructionist traditions.  
In chapter 7, I consider the two most popular theories in contemporary philosophy of 
emotions, namely Nussbaum’s (2001) and Solomon’s (1976, 2003) cognitivism and Prinz’s 
(2004a, 2004b) and Damasio’s (1994, 1999, 2003) neo-Jamesianism. I argue that they make the 
same mistake, namely trivialization by overextension. This mistake results from trying to fulfill 
at the same time two desiderata that are better kept apart, namely ordinary language 
compatibility and theoretical fruitfulness.  
The first seven chapters of this dissertation make it apparent that every attempted definition 
of emotions offered within the five main traditions of research on emotions can be met by 
counterexamples. These counterexamples are commonly dealt with in one of four ways. 
Counterexamples consisting of purported cases of emotions which fail to meet the proposed 
definition are dealt with by arguing either that the definition, once properly interpreted, is in fact 
met, or that the purported case of emotion is in effect not an emotion. Counterexamples 
consisting of purported cases of non-emotions which meet the proposed definition are dealt with 
by arguing either that the definition, once properly interpreted, is in fact not met, or that the 
purported case of non-emotion is in effect an emotion. My diagnosis of these argumentative 
strategies is that they are entirely ad hoc, and stem from failure to understand the ground rules of 
the activity of theorizing about emotions.  
The original sin of emotion theory, as I see it, is lack of methodological self-consciousness. 
Part 2 of my dissertation is an attempt to offer a methodology for emotion theory. I begin in 
chapter 8 with an investigation of the empirical literature on emotion concepts, namely on mental 
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representations of folk emotion categories. This literature reveals that folk emotion categories are 
highly heterogeneous and vague. This conclusion ought to be the starting point for theorizing 
about emotions, namely the realization that emotions as ordinarily understood comprise all kinds 
of items, and admit of borderline cases whose membership to folk emotion categories, or lack 
thereof, no amount of investigation will settle. 
In chapter 9, I discuss what I take to be the desiderata for two central projects in emotion 
theory, namely the Folk Emotion Project, which aims to offer a descriptive account of categories 
such as “emotion” and “anger”, and the Explicating Emotion Project, which aims to offer 
explications for them. I argue that a folk emotion theorist ought to aim for a cluster account, 
which makes explicit the properties such that fulfilling enough of them provides membership to 
the folk category. A cluster condition of membership strikes me as the best way to accommodate 
the sorts of empirical facts which led me to conclude (in chapter 8) that folk emotion categories 
are highly heterogeneous and have blurred edges. A theorist engaged in explication, on the other 
hand, ought to achieve similarity in use between his favorite explicatum and the folk 
explicandum, and in the process either reduce vagueness or increase fruitfulness or both. My 
account of the desiderata of explication follows to a large extent Carnap’s (1950) original 
treatment, although with a couple of twists (chapter 9). 
I am personally interested in the Explicating Emotion Project, because I am interested in 
scientific psychology, and I argue in chapter 9 that folk emotion categories are not natural kinds 
with respect to the explanatory and predictive practices of scientific psychology. This view has 
been prominently advocated by Griffiths (1997). I argue that Griffiths’ adversaries have not fully 
understood what is implied by the claim that emotions are not natural kinds. 
In chapter 10, I present the Urgency Management System theory of emotions, according to 
which an “umotion” is a special type of superordinate system for the management of situations 
of urgency endowed with pragmatic intentionality. I develop my theory of emotional 
intentionality from Millikan (2004), although the application to umotions I propose is new.  
According to the UMS theory of emotions, emotions can be type-identified by a 
combination of an action tendency with control precedence and the conditions of appropriateness 
for the mechanism producing it. The history of selection of this mechanism is what establishes 
what the “umotion” represents, along the lines of teleosemantic theories of content. 
In chapter 11, I offer a brief recap of what has been achieved, and a conclusion. 
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2. EMOTIONS AS FEELINGS 
 
 
One of the most widely shared intuitions about the emotions is that they are passively 
experienced feelings, special states of consciousness by which emoters are overcome. I consider 
this intuition misleading, most importantly because it prevents us from appreciating the 
important agential dimensions of emotions around which I will ultimately construct my own 
theory. The influence of the feeling theory on the history of the subject cannot be overestimated. 
Practically everyone since Ancient Greece to the beginning of the 20th century was a feeling 
theorist.2 20th century emotion theory, in turn, can best be understood as a sequence of reactions 
to perceived shortcomings of the feeling theory. To understand contemporary debates, in which 
intuitions of passivity still loom large, we need to get a handle on the deep roots of such 
intuitions, and explain the grip they still have on us.  
Studying the history of the feeling tradition also allows us to appreciate what problems the 
assimilation of emotions with feelings has encountered throughout the ages, and what arguments 
have been proposed to solve them. At the end of our exploration, we will be able to distinguish 
what should be retained of the feeling tradition from what we ought to get rid of.  
Since the feeling theory has monopolized emotion theory for approximately 24 centuries, I 
can’t offer anything more that a few highlights from this long and reputable history. The criterion 
of choice I employ is prominence. I take Aristotle, Descartes, Hume and James to be the four 
most influential thinkers within the feeling tradition. In the contemporary literature on emotions, 
they are commonly cited and discussed. More often than not, however, they appear under the 
guise of caricatures. This approach hides both the true shortcomings of their views and the 
insights worth gleaning from them.   
 
 
                                                 
2 Arguably, the Stoics are an exception, although they gave an important role to feelings in their theory. See Sorabji 
(2000) for a masterful treatment of emotions in the Ancient World. 
 12
 2.1. FEELINGS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 
 
2.1.1. Aristotle 
In an influential paper, Cooper (1999, 407) states that the Aristotelian theory of the emotions is 
best understood as a “preliminary…investigation that clarifies the phenomena in question and 
prepares the way for a philosophically more ambitious overall theory”, which “as far as we 
know” Aristotle never got around to provide. This is not to say that Aristotle does not have many 
interesting things to say about the emotions, scattered among his ethical treatises (Nichomachean 
Ethics, Eudemian Ethics), his book on the nature of the soul (On the Soul), his writings on poetry 
(Poetics), and most prominently his work on the art of public speaking (Rethoric).  
The most influential of Aristotle’s ideas about the emotions is undoubtedly the general 
characterization of the category of emotion as passion (pathe’) in the Nichomachean Ethics. 
Pathe’ are contrasted by Aristotle with praxeis, namely actions, in the form of a dichotomy 
which, to all intents and purposes, is still with us. This dichotomy is grounded on the idea that 
whereas actions are things we do, “in respect of the passions we are said to be moved”.  
As pointed out by Kosman (1980), the distinction between praxeis and pathe’ in Aristotle is 
a “special instance or a more general structural duality, that of poiein and pashein, doing and 
being done” (105). The same duality appears in the Categories, where doing and being done are 
characterized as two of ten possible modes of being. The core idea at the heart of the notion of 
passion is therefore that passions are those things which happen to us, or that we are acted upon 
by, or that we undergo, or that we cannot voluntarily control.  
“We feel anger and fear without choice”, writes Aristotle, whereas “we are masters of our 
actions from the beginning right to the end” (1114b31-32). An important caveat is added, namely 
that although our passions are not expressions of choice, the dispositions to undergo them are. 
This is because such dispositions are associated with character, something that according to 
Aristotle can be voluntarily shaped in time by means of a process of habituation (ethismos, 
1103a28).  
The idea that the emotions are things we are acted upon by appears over and over in the 
history of emotion theory, and it is embedded in the very metaphors we still use to speak about 
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them. For example, “we ‘fall’ in love, are ‘consumed’ by envy, ‘haunted’ by guilt, ‘paralyzed’ by 
fear” (Averill 1980, 267). Many of the adjectives we deploy to refer to the emotions are “derived 
from participles” (Gordon 1987, 373) - frightened, surprised, joyed, irritated, upset –, another 
sign of how ingrained the idea of passivity is in our ordinary conceptualization of the emotions.3  
To say that the emotions happen to us, however, is not yet to have provided a viable identity 
condition for them, because there are innumerable happenings which are not emotions. If I am 
hit by a meteorite, or if I fall into a hole, something happens to me, but it is not an emotion (even 
though an emotion may follow such happenings). For several centuries, the task of emotion 
theorists has been finding a way to distinguish passions from other happenings.  
The core intuition of representatives of the feeling tradition is that the emotions are those 
happenings characterized by a special conscious experience or sensation or subjective quality or 
what-it-is-like aspect. Most commonly, this conscious experience has been labeled as feeling, a 
term which comes from the Middle English “felen”, a derivation from the Indo-European root 
“pal-”, from which the Latin “palpare”, i.e. to touch. Two features of this conscious experience 
have been singled out as crucial for the instantiation of an emotion. The first is the valence of the 
experience, namely whether it is pleasurable or painful. The second is the bodily character of 
the experience, namely the fact that it is accompanied by bodily sensations. Consider the 
following passages: 
By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, 
friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the 
feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain (Nicomachean 
Ethics, 2.5. 1105b19-24) 
The passions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect 
their judgments, and that are also attended by pain [lupe] or 
pleasure [hedone] (Rhetoric 2.1 1378a21-22)    
In the first passage, Aristotle characterizes the passions as those feelings that are pleasurable 
or painful, whereas in the second passage he adds that such feelings are accompanied by 
dispositions to mental actions, i.e. judgments. Aristotle’s interest in how passions influence 
judgments was related to his rationale for studying them. Although Aristotle discussed the 
                                                 
3 In the history of emotion theory, the idea that emotions “happen” to emoters has often being followed by a 
corollary, namely that they are irrational. Starting with the Stoic account of the passions, emotions have been 
assimilated with disruptive happenings, which a wise man ought to get rid of. Notably, this was not Aristotle’s view, 
since he believed that virtue demanded both doing the appropriate kinds of actions and undergoing the appropriate 
kinds of feelings (Nicomachean Ethics, 2.6. 1106b15-1106b30).  
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passions in several of his works, his most comprehensive account of individual passions was 
presented in the Rhetoric.  
The practical objective of the Rhetoric was to help public speakers become more persuasive, 
especially in the context of political oratory and lawsuits. The ability to control his own and the 
audience’s passions, Aristotle thought, will make the orator more effective. This is because the 
passions influence the way the persuasiveness of a speech will be judged. As he put it, “our 
judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile” 
(Rethoric, 1356a14-15). Aristotle discusses in some detail the following twelve passions: anger, 
calmness, friendliness, hatred, fear, confidence in the face of danger, shame, kindness, pity, 
indignation, envy, and emulation.  
Aristotle aimed to provide a characterization of them that would be of help to the orator, 
who will be able to maximize his persuasiveness by learning (1) what kind of frame of mind is 
typical of people who experience a certain passion, (2) what kinds of people are such that a 
certain passion is generally experienced towards them, and (3) what kinds of circumstances 
characterize the experience of a passion. This will give the orator a way to exercise strategic 
control on the passions. Three further passions are given a more perfunctory treatment, namely 
shadenfreude, described in association with envy (1386b34-1387a3), contempt, described as the 
opposite of emulation (1388b22-28), and a “feeling of satisfaction” elicited by assisting to the 
distress of people who deserve to be distressed such as murderers (1386b25-33).  
Even though Aristotle is interested in the impact of the passions on judgment, the 
fundamental feature that characterizes the passions is that they are attended by pleasure and 
pain. Cooper (1999) remarks that “lupe [pain] and hedone [pleasure] indicate…the character of 
the emotions as psychic disturbances in which we are set psychically in movement, made to 
experience some strong affect” (416). He suggests that pain and pleasure, used in a variety of 
different ways in the Aristotelian body of work, should not be understood in the Rhetoric as mild 
attitudes of liking or disliking. Rather, they should be understood as a form of intense feeling, 
sometimes associated with bodily symptoms (e.g. throbbing, gnawing, contracting, etc.).  
In On the Soul, Aristotle explicitly states that “all the affections of soul involve a body-
passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent 
affection of the body” (On the Soul 1.1 403a16-19). The feeling of pain characterizes for 
Aristotle the following passions: anger, fear, shame, pity, indignation, envy and emulation. 
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Pleasure is mentioned in the discussion of shadenfreude, and with respect to the “feeling of 
satisfaction” for someone else’s deserved distress. However, not all passions end up being 
explicitly associated with either pain or pleasure. For example, Aristotle does not explicitly 
indicate in what sense friendliness, kindness, confidence in the face of danger, contempt and 
hatred involve either pleasure or pain. In some cases, the context clarifies that the lack of 
mention is a probably an oversight (e.g. confidence in the face of danger clearly presupposes 
pleasure in Aristotle’s account), whereas in other cases the issue is open for interpretation (e.g. 
the cases of hatred and calmness).  
What seems certain is that pleasure and pain, jointly with their bodily underpinnings, play a 
key role in the Aristotelian theory of the passions, especially with respect to passions which are 
also prototypical emotions (e.g. anger, fear, shame, pity, indignation, envy, shadenfreude, and 
contempt). It would be a mistake, however, to enlist Aristotle as a proponent of the idea that the 
passions are mere feelings of pleasure and pain. This is because Aristotle considers the passions 
to be an inseparable combination of matter and form. A thorough analysis of these two notions, 
and of the role they play in Aristotle’s metaphysics, lies outside the scope of this dissertation (see 
e.g. Modrak 1983, Witt 1987). The basic idea is that the form of an entity is what causes its 
underlying matter to be what it is. The relevance of this distinction for our purposes is that 
Aristotle applies it to distinguish between two possible approaches to the definition of the 
emotions. Writes Aristotle:  
Hence a physicist would define an affection of soul differently 
from a dialectician; the latter would define e.g. anger as the 
appetite for returning pain for pain, or something like that, while 
the former would define it as a boiling of the blood or warm 
substance surrounding the heart. The latter assigns the material 
conditions, the former the form or formulable essence (On the 
Soul, 403a29-403b2) 
When it comes to providing his own definition of anger, however, Aristotle combines an 
account of the material and formal aspects of anger with an account of what causes it, showing 
that he thinks “anger should be defined as a certain mode of movement of such and such a body 
(or part or faculty of a body)) by this or that cause and for this or that end” (403a25-28). In the 
Rhetoric, Aristotle writes: 
Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a 
conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without 
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justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what 
concerns one’s friends (Rhetoric 2.2 1378a31-1378b1) 
This definition illustrates that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately a very rich hybrid that 
combines several of what in chapter 1 I called the marks of emotionality. Anger is defined as 
being caused by an emotional appraisal of “a conspicuous slight directed without justification 
towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s friends” accompanied by pain (a 
conscious experience with a bodily underpinning, e.g. the boiling of a “warm substance 
surrounding the heart”) and by a behavioral disposition (an impulse to a conspicuous revenge).  
If we consider that Aristotle previously characterized the passions as “all those feelings that 
so change men as to affect their judgments”, we realize that his definition of the passions also 
comprises dispositions to mental actions (e.g. judgments of persuasiveness).  
Aristotle’s definitions of the other twelve passions I listed before is as meticulous as his 
definition of anger, even though the account of anger is the only one in which Aristotle makes 
explicit what the relevant behavioral dispositions associated with the passion are (i.e. acting so 
as to get conspicuous revenge). This is instead left implicit – but clearly suggested - in the 
treatment of the other passions. For example, fear is defined as “pain or disturbance due to 
imagining some destructive or painful evil in the future” (1382a23), shame is defined as “pain or 
disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past or future, which seem likely to involve 
us in discredit” (1383b15), envy is defined as “pain excited by the prosperity of…people who are 
like us or equal with us.”  
I spent some time emphasizing the feeling component of the Aristotelian theory because 
Aristotle is often co-opted by contemporary cognitivists as their earliest honorary ancestor.  The 
preliminary account I provided should be sufficient to show that, although Aristotle did give a 
prominent role to appraisals, he characterized the passions as being essentially feelings caused by 
appraisals and leading to actions.  
Aristotle’s least successful characterization seems to be that of passion as a superordinate 
category. When he speaks about passions in general, rather than of specific passions, Aristotle 
offers three characterizations: (a) they happen, (b) they are either pleasant or pleasurable, and (c) 
they tend to modify judgment. This account is not narrow enough, however, because there are 
many things which have these properties and are clearly not passions.  
This is the case, for example, for sensory perceptions and bodily perceptions, which happen 
to us, can be either pleasant or painful and tend to influence judgment. Moreover, Aristotle’s 
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account left it an open question why we should think that the passions are feelings of pleasure 
and pain in the first place. 
Later representatives of the feeling theory tried to better characterize the class of passions 
within the class of sensations and to explain why a passion should be thought of as a sensation of 
a particular kind. I have chosen three authors to illustrate the developments of the feeling theory: 
Rene Descartes (1650), David Hume (1739), and William James (1884, 1890, 1894). Their 
theories well illustrate some of the difficulties of the feeling theory that ultimately led to its 
demise after the mid-20th century. 
 
 
 
2.2. FEELINGS IN THE MODERN WORLD 
 
 
Descartes (1650/1955) and Hume (1739/1992) both defined the passions as special kinds of 
conscious experiences, and tried to distinguish them from two other species of conscious 
experiences, perceptual experiences and bodily sensations. Their accounts are often singled out 
by critics as good examples of the incapacity of feeling theorists to understand that the emotions 
have intentionality. This criticism, as I will argue, is well-deserved, even though it should not 
blind us to the important insights offered by Descartes and Hume on the nature of the passions. I 
will show that, far from thinking of the passions as mere feelings, both authors were well aware 
of their multicomponential nature.  
 
2.2.1. Descartes   
In the Passions of the Soul (1650), Descartes tried to carve out the class of passions within 
the larger class of sensations, by arguing that the passions are the only conscious experiences we 
cannot be wrong about. Descartes’ idea was that the passions, by not purporting to represent, 
cannot fail to represent. This idea finds its roots in the Cartesian distinction between three types 
of perceptions which are “found in the soul” and “caused by the body”. According to Descartes, 
body and soul are two different substances, which interact in the pineal gland through the flow of 
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animal spirits. The body is an extended and non-thinking substance, whereas the soul is a non-
extended and thinking substance.  
Some of the perceptions found in the soul and caused by the body are referred to external 
objects (“nous les rapportons …aux objets de dehors”), some are referred to the body or some of 
its parts, and some are referred to the soul itself (art. 22).4 The first are sensory perceptions (e.g. 
visual experiences, auditory experiences), the second are bodily sensations (e.g. pain, thirst, 
hunger), and the third are passions properly intended: 
The perceptions which are referred only to the soul are those 
whose effects are felt as if in the soul itself, and of which normally 
no proximate cause is known to which they can be attributed. Such 
are the sentiments of joy, anger, and others like them, which are 
sometimes excited in us by the objects which move our nerves, and 
sometimes also by other causes (art. 25) 
The passions of the soul are perceptions, sentiments, and emotions 
of the soul, which are referred particularly to the soul itself, and 
which are caused, entertained, and strengthened by some 
movement of the animal spirits (art. 27). 
Descartes calls the passions “perceptions” or “sentiments” or “emotions of the soul”, but he 
points out that the best way to designate them is the latter, in French “émotions de l’âme”. 
Emotion comes from the Latin e-movere, which means to remove or displace. The French 
émotion is probably a derivation from emouvoir, a term in Middle French (14th-16th century 
French) which means “to stir up”. Descartes’ emphasis on favoring “emotion” with respect to 
other possible designations suggests that he ascribed to them the property of being, at least when 
intense, especially “disturbing”. As Descartes put it, of all the perceptions a soul can have, “there 
are none that agitate it and disturb it so strongly as the passions” (art. 28).  
This disturbing quality is primarily due to their bodily underpinnings, an interpretation 
Descartes suggests in various places. He claims for example that “the passions are nearly all 
accompanied by some disturbance which takes place in the heart and consequently throughout 
the blood and the animal spirits” (art. 46), a passage clearly hinting at physiological 
underpinnings associated with emotions (but notice the qualifier “nearly all”).  
The main ground of difference between passions and other sensations, however, is for 
Descartes a matter of epistemic access. He seems to think that when we perceive a bear, or a pain 
                                                 
4 All Descartes’ quotes are referred to the articles in which they can be found. There are 212 articles in The Passions 
of the Soul. 
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in the toe, we are implicitly making a causal hypothesis, respectively that there is an external 
bear, and that pain is located in the toe. In both cases, our causal hypotheses may be wrong, in 
the sense that there could be no bear in the external world, and the pain may not be located in the 
toe. In the most radical of cases, we could be dreaming up the entire experience.  
But in the case of the passions, Descartes thinks, “normally no proximate cause is known to 
which they can be attributed” (art. 25), and therefore no fallible causal hypothesis is formulated. 
This passage is puzzling, because Descartes has told us that the animal spirits are the proximate 
cause of the passions. Could he be saying that what is normally not known is the distal cause of 
the passions? This would clearly be false, in the sense that on many occasions we know what the 
distal causes of our emotions are. Consider becoming afraid because you see a bear, or getting 
angry because someone stepped on your toe causing you pain. It seems natural to say in such 
cases that fear and anger are not referred “to the soul itself”, but to the external bear and to 
whatever caused the pain in the toe. 
But if that is the case, why do a visual sensation of a non-existent bear or a bodily sensation 
of a non-existent pain count as mistaken, whereas fear of a non-existent bear and anger about a 
non-existent pain do not? Descartes answer is ultimately that the passions are “so close and so 
interior to our soul that it is impossible that they should be felt without their being in reality just 
as they are felt” (art. 26). For example, “[e]ven if a man is asleep and dreaming, it is impossible 
that he should feel sad, or feel moved by any other passion, without it being strictly true that such 
passion is in the soul” (art. 26).  
By denying that a dreamed passion and an actual passion differ in the same way in which a 
dreamed vision/bodily sensation differ from an actual vision/bodily sensation, Descartes is 
implicitly suggesting that the emotions do not purport to refer to anything they could fail to refer 
to. This amounts to denying that the distinction between actually representing and only 
purporting to represent applies to the emotions. This is a grave shortcoming for a theory of the 
emotions, and it is the main ground of the cognitivist critique of the feeling theory (see Deigh 
1994).  
As I will argue in chapter 4, the emotions have intentionality or the capacity to represent, 
and a good theory of the emotions ought to be able to account for it. However, it would be 
inappropriate to summarize the Cartesian position by claiming that Descartes understood the 
emotions as mere feelings. He did in effect define the general category of passion is a way that 
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goes dangerously close to saying that a passion is a mere feeling. However, when it came to 
defining specific passions, Descartes showed to be well aware of their multidimensionality. As 
he put it, to simply say that a passion is an agitation whose proximal cause is the movement of 
animal spirits “does not enable us to distinguish between the various passions: for that, we must 
investigate their origins and examine their first causes” (art. 51).  
Descartes thinks that “objects which stimulate the senses” are the most common cause of the 
emotions, and proceeds to characterize the appraisals and behavioural dispositions of what he 
calls the six primitive passions: admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness (art. 69). 
According to Descartes, the primitive passions are the only passions which are neither subspecies 
of other passions nor obtainable from a combination of other passions. Descartes also offers 
accounts of non-primitive passions such as hope, jealousy, remorse, envy, anger, pride, disgust 
and others. Descartes attention for behavioural dispositions is related to his conviction that “the 
principal effect of all the human passions is that they move and dispose the soul to want the 
things for which they prepare the body” (40). Let us briefly consider three accounts of primitive 
passions.  
Descartes tells us that “wonder” (art. 70) is a “sudden surprise of the soul” which is 
“primarily caused by the impression we have in the brain which represents the object as rare, and 
as consequently worthy of much consideration…” (appraisal) and which leads to “consider with 
attention the objects appearing rare and extraordinary” (mental disposition). Descartes remarks 
that “wonder” is a peculiar passion, in the sense that “we do not find it accompanied by any 
change in the heart or in the blood, such as it occurs in the case of the other passions” (art. 71). 
The idea here suggested is that wonder is the only passion lacking a detectable bodily 
underpinning.  
Love and hatred (art. 79) are “emotions of the soul” – stirrings - caused by movements of 
the animal spirits brought about by evaluating an object as, respectively, agreeable and 
disagreeable. Love and hatred “incite” the emoter to, respectively, join with or separate from the 
object of the passion (behavioral disposition). Desire is “an agitation of the soul caused by the 
spirits which dispose it to wish for the future [behavioral disposition] the things which it 
represents as agreeable [appraisal]” (art. 86). 
 The structure of these definitions is similar to that of Aristotelian definitions. In both cases, 
pride of place is given to the appraisals which brings about the emotion (but Aristotle did a more 
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accurate job in describing them). Concerning differences, Aristotle in most of his definitions 
made the valence of the feeling (pleasurable or painful) explicit, whereas Descartes appeared to 
emphasize only the disturbing character of the feeling and its bodily underpinnings. Finally, 
Aristotle left implicit the behavioral tendencies associated with the passions (with the exception 
of anger), whereas Descartes gave them a central role, as he related them to the very function of 
the emotions.  
 
2.2.2. Hume   
Hume’s theory, presented in A Treatise on Human Nature (1739/1992), offers a more 
sophisticated taxonomy of the kinds of passions than any theory formulated before it. Hume 
distinguished the passions from other sensations differently from Descartes, but he also 
concluded that they have no intentionality or representational purport.  
According to Hume (1739), perceptions can be of two different kinds. On the one hand, 
there are impressions, which are those perceptions “which enter with most force and violence” 
into the mind. On the other hand, there are ideas, which are “the faint images of [impressions] in 
thinking and reasoning” (1). The passions are impressions, and so are sensory perceptions and 
bodily sensations.  
What makes the passions different from other impressions, says Hume, is that whereas 
sensory perceptions and bodily sensations arise “in the soul originally, from unknown causes”, 
the passions are “derived in a great measure from our ideas”, which is why Hume calls them 
impressions of reflection. Hume introduces a distinction between two kinds of passions, the calm 
and the violent ones. This distinction is important, because it plants the seed for a theory of the 
emotions which does not require them to be conscious experiences.  
Hume argues that “there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, though they be real 
passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the 
immediate feeling or sensation” (471). In such class, he puts the “the sense of beauty and 
deformity” (276), “benevolence and resentment”, “love of life”, “kindness to children”, or “the 
general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, considered as such” (417). Violent passions are 
instead exemplified by “the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility” (276). 
The calm passions, differently from the violent ones, produce little “emotion in the mind”, 
namely little feeling-based disturbance. We can notice here that Hume is using the expression 
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“emotions in the mind” as Descartes used the expressions “émotions de l’âme”, namely to 
designate an intense stirring. The calm passions are rather “known by their effects”, which are 
for Hume primarily effects on behavior. If this is the case, then the calm passions could in 
principle be defined in terms of what they dispose us to do, whether or not any sensory 
experience is associated to them.  
This is not the path chosen by Hume, who maintains that the calm passions are impressions, 
just impressions with a phenomenal quality which may at times be “almost imperceptible”. This 
caveat reveals how deep the identification of the passions with feelings has run in the history of 
emotion theory. Hume, who laid the groundwork for speaking of the passions in non-
phenomenological terms, never abandoned the idea that there is no passion without at least a 
modicum of sensation. To relinquish this idea demands calling into question a primitively 
compelling intuition neither Descartes nor Hume were prepared to question, namely that 
emotions are essentially kinds of percepta.  
Hume’s theory was similar to Descartes’ theory is another crucial respect, namely the 
assumption that the passions lack the (non-derivative) ability to represent. This thesis was 
formulated by Hume (1739) along the following lines: 
 
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of 
existence, and contains not any representative quality, which 
renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I 
am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that 
emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I 
am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. It is impossible, 
therefore, that this passion can be opposed by, or be contradictory 
to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the 
disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects, 
which they represent (415). 
 
This passage was offered in support of Hume’s trademark thesis that reason and passion are 
not, and should not be, in conflict, in the sense that reason is, and should be, the slave of the 
passions. The slavery of reason concerns the direction of the will to act, which is for Hume the 
exclusive domain of the passions. According to Hume, “reason alone can never be a motive to 
any action of the will…[and]…it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” (414). It 
cannot be a motive because according to Hume reason only delivers judgments that something is 
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the case (e.g. judgments that a certain effect will be caused by a certain action). These judgments 
cannot motivate unless supplemented by some passion which manages to turn, say, an expected 
effect into “the prospect of pain or pleasure”.  
Hume thinks that many have wrongly assumed that reason alone can motivate in part 
because some of the motivating passions are calm. Since such passions “cause no disorder in the 
soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason, and are supposed to proceed 
from the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and falsehood” (417). The idea is that the 
sensations produced by the calm passions are so inconspicuous that they can be confused with 
the operation of reason. This is another example of the fact that Hume thinks of the calm 
passions primarily as motivations to act, and puts their phenomenological aspect in the 
background.  
The claim that the passions cannot represent is offered in support of the conclusion that 
reason cannot even oppose the passion “in the direction of the will”, let alone direct the will 
unaided by passion. As Hume puts it, reason could only oppose a passion if a passion purported 
to represent something by being a copy of it. But the passions are impressions “derived in a great 
measure from our ideas”, without being ideas themselves. When a passion is experienced, Hume 
remarks, it has “no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more 
than five foot high” (415). We can notice two differences with the Cartesian thesis that the 
emotions fail to refer.  
The first is that Hume denies that bodily sensations such as thirst refer, whereas Descartes 
had claimed that they refer to the body. The second is that Hume is aware of the fact that the 
emotions can be warranted or unwarranted, namely that they have dimensions of normative 
assessment. In this respect, fear of a bear in a dream and fear of an actual bear would differ in the 
sense that the former would be unwarranted and the latter warranted. However, this does not 
prove that the emotions have “any representative quality”, because what does the representing is 
for Hume always a judgment. According to Hume, there are only two cases in which “any 
affection can be called unreasonable” (416).  
The first case is when “a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is 
founded on the supposition or the existence of objects, which really do not exist” (416). 
Examples of this irrationality may be being afraid of a non-existent bear as in a dream, or 
grieving about the death of a non-existent relative.  
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The second case is when “in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for 
the designed end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects” (416). Examples 
of this type of irrationality may be that of trying to hurt an enemy we hate by delivering him a 
gift he appreciates.  
Hume states that if a passion is neither “founded on false suppositions”, nor it brings about 
an action that fails to achieve the end, “the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it” 
(416). This being the case, “[i]t is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole 
world to the scratching of my finger” (416). This represents some progress with respect to the 
Cartesian account, in the sense that, although derivatively, a passion can be unwarranted by 
Hume’s own lights.  
The problem is that the passion is, to paraphrase Hume, always a slave of reason when it 
comes to its normative assessment, because a passion as such does not have any non-derivative 
representational quality. When we speak of a passion as being unreasonable, we are always 
referring to the judgment accompanying it. The passion as such is “an original existence” which 
“contains not any representative quality”. Hume is therefore as incapable as Descartes to realize 
that there may be something a passion aims to achieve constitutively, rather than by courtesy of a 
judgment that may be associated to it. This being said, it would be a mistake to accuse Hume of 
reducing passions to mere feelings. The complexity of the Humean account is best understood, 
once again, by considering the descriptions he offers of specific passions.  
Hume distinguishes between direct violent passions, which “arise immediately from good or 
evil, from pain or pleasure” (e.g. desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security) and 
indirect violent passions, which arise “from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other 
qualities (e.g. pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity) 
(399). He thinks all violent passions “both direct and indirect, are founded on pain and pleasure” 
(438), the removal of which brings about the removal of the passion. When pain and pleasure 
bring about a passion without mediation, the passion is direct. For example, “a suit of fine 
cloaths produces pleasure from their beauty; and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or 
the impressions of volition and desire” (439).  
Volition is listed by Hume among the direct violent passions, but he points out that it is not 
to be considered a proper passion, a point I will disregard henceforth. Desire and aversion are the 
direct passion caused by respectively pleasure and pain “considered simply”. I take “considered 
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simply” to mean that desire and aversion are what is elicited respectively by pleasure and pain 
when we do not take into account whether they are certain or uncertain. When pleasure and pain 
(or good and evil) are certain or very probable, the direct passions they cause are respectively joy 
and grief. When pleasure and pain (or good and evil) are instead improbable, the direct passions 
they cause are respectively fear and hope.  
But suppose now that the beautiful “cloaths are considered as belonging to ourself” (439), 
namely that an agreeable idea of self is attached to them. In such case, the indirect passion of 
pride is generated. Hume characterizes the indirect passions in terms of their sensations 
(pleasurable or painful) and in terms of the ideas which, respectively, cause the passion and are 
caused by it. Writes Hume (1739): 
We must…make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of 
[indirect] passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that 
to which they direct their view, when excited (278). 
Consider pride and humbleness, which are according to Hume “contrary” passions in that 
they allegedly cannot be experienced at the same time because one is pleasant and the other is 
unpleasant. Such passions have the same object: once they are generated, they bring about the 
idea of “self” in the emoter. From this Hume concludes that they must have different causes, 
because otherwise the same cause would generate both of them at the same time, and by 
assumption they cannot co-exist.  
It is at this juncture that the important role of appraisals appears in the Humean theory of 
the passions. What causes pride rather than humbleness is the way a certain subject – e.g. cloaths 
-  is evaluated. If the cloaths are evaluated as beautiful and belonging to oneself, pride ensues. If 
they are evaluated as ugly, and belonging to oneself, humbleness ensues. Every indirect violent 
passion is for Hume “derived from” a “double relation of ideas and impressions” (286).  
The relation of ideas is that between the idea-cause and the idea-object of a passion. In 
pride, the idea-cause is a favorable idea of the self, and the idea-object is the self. In humbleness, 
the idea-cause is an unfavorable idea of the self and the idea-object is also the self. In love, the 
idea-cause is a favorable idea of another, and the idea-object is “some sensible being external to 
us”. In hatred, the idea-cause is an unfavorable idea of another, and the idea-object is once again 
“some sensible being external to us” (329).  
The relation of impressions is that between the sensation caused by the idea-cause – Hume 
says “independently” caused - and the way the passion as a whole feels. Hume considers the 
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“peculiar emotions [that idea-causes] excite in the soul” to be the “very being and essence” of the 
passions (286). In pride and love, the sensation is pleasant, whereas in humbleness and hatred the 
sensation is unpleasant.  
The Humean account of the indirect passions, which I won’t further analyze, is a description 
of the sensations, causes and objects of a variety of indirect violent passions. For example, he 
says of pride that “[a]ny thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the 
passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object” (288). This indicates that 
Hume’s theory of the passions is also a hybrid, organized around the idea of a double relation of 
ideas and impressions.  
The essence of the passions is said to be a conscious experience of pain and pleasure, but the 
Humean passions, as in Descartes’ case, cannot be distinguished from one another merely by 
virtue of the sensations associated to them (e.g. love and pride do not differ in terms of their 
characteristic relation of impressions).  
It is at this point that the relation of ideas - the idea-cause causing the passion (appraisal) and 
the idea-object caused by it - becomes critical for distinguishing the passions from one another. 
Love and pride are both pleasant, but the causal relations in which the pleasant sensation is 
embedded – being caused by a certain idea-cause and causing a certain idea-object - are 
different.  
But what about the other marks of emotionality? Hume’s theory is at its least successful 
when it comes to characterizing the role of behavioral dispositions. He claims that some passions 
lack such dispositions. Pride and humility, for example, are “pure emotions in the soul, 
unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action”. On the other hand, other 
passions such as love and hatred are “not compleated within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, 
which they produce, but carry the mind to something farther” (367). As Hume puts it, “[l]ove is 
always followed by a desire of the happiness of the person beloved” (367) and hatred by a desire 
for his or her misery.  
The idea that pride and humility are unattended by any desire is ungrounded. For example, 
pride will bring about the desire for being given credit for what one is proud of, for receiving 
praise, for sharing pride with other people, and innumerable other desires. Hume’s aversion for 
considering behavioral dispositions and their underlying desires as part of the emotion goes 
deeper than just thinking that, as a matter of fact, some passions do not have any desires attached 
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to them. Even in the case of love and hatred, Hume is convinced that the desires by which they 
are always followed “are not the same with love and hatred, nor make any essential part of them” 
(368).  
This shows that the Humean position is importantly different from the Cartesian one, which 
took the very function of the passions to lie in the way they prepared the body for action. Hume 
has two arguments – not clearly distinguished - for the conclusion that the desires associated 
with love and hatred, and more generally the passions, “are not absolutely essential to love and 
hatred”.  
On the one hand, they are not essential because, given the nature of our minds, we may love 
or hate “without our reflecting on the happiness or misery of their objects” (368). On the other 
hand, “[i]f nature had so pleased, love might have had the same effect as hatred, and hatred as 
love. I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annexed to love, and of 
happiness to hatred” (368).  
The problem with these arguments is that they presuppose that the relation of ideas required, 
by Hume’s own lights, to identify the indirect passions is not constitutively related to the desires 
and behavioral dispositions associated with them. Hume assumes that desires and behavioral 
dispositions may be changed while maintaining unaltered the identity of the passion. If the 
identity of the passion changed as well, namely if the evaluations and sensations associated with 
it changed, then Hume would only be making the trivial claim that “love” could be the name 
given to what we currently call hatred and “hatred” could be the name given to what we 
currently call love.  
I take Hume to be making a deeper point than that, namely that nature might have 
established that love is characterized by the idea-cause of some other person as agreeable, by the 
idea-object of some other person, by a pleasant sensation, and by the desire for the misery of the 
person appraised as agreeable. Under this view, a passion could be type-identified independently 
of the desires and behavioral dispositions associated with it. The problem with severing the 
relation between appraisal, emotion and associated desires and behavioral dispositions is that 
such relation is not arbitrary. A passion combining an idea-caused of agreeableness, an idea-
object of some other person and a pleasant sensation could hardly be associated with a desire for 
the misery of the person appraised as agreeable. This sort of passion would lack psychological 
reality, and most importantly would not correspond to what we call “love”.  
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It is indeed true that, as suggested by Hume, we can fail to “reflect on the happiness” of 
those we love, and possibly neglect them, but this proves only that love comes with a tendency to 
desire the happiness of the object of one’s love, which may or may not be manifested. This is a 
much weaker claim than saying that love could be attached to no desire at all, or to any desire 
whatsoever and still be what we call “love”, if nature had so pleased. As I will argue in chapter 
10, there is no obstacle to assuming that behavioral tendencies are constitutively associated with 
emotions and at the same time that they can give rise to a wide range of behaviors or be 
inhibited.  
 
 
2.3. PHYSIOLOGICAL FEELINGS 
 
2.3.1. James and Lange  
Descartes and Hume stated that the passions are percepta, and they pointed out that they 
generally amount to intense disturbances. Descartes and Aristotle clearly suggested that they 
have a bodily underpinning. Hume and Aristotle emphasized their valence, pointing out that all 
passions are pleasant or unpleasant sensations. Descartes and Hume admitted the possibility of 
some exceptions to their general accounts, but they considered them to be exceptions of degree 
rather than of kind. For example, Descartes pointed out that “wonder” may be the one passion 
without bodily underpinning, but he stuck to his account that every passion is a form of felt 
disturbance. Hume introduced an entire class of passions, the calm ones, which had almost 
imperceptible sensations associated to them, but he maintained that every passion is ultimately a 
felt impression.  
The central question none of these authors had really addressed is: Why should a passion or 
emotion necessarily be a disturbing conscious experience? This question was explicitly answered 
for the first time by William James (1884, 1890, 1894) and Karl Lange (1885/1922), who 
independently offered the first theory of the emotions grounded in physiology. It is not an 
overstatement to say that 20th century emotion theory is a sequence of reactions to what is 
generally referred to as the James-Lange theory of the emotions, even though James and Lange 
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developed it independently. The theory has recently been revamped by a wave of influential 
Neo-Jamesians theories, defended by Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003) and Jesse Prinz 
(2004a, 2004b) among others, so it is worth paying close attention to it.  
The inspiring thought of the James-Lange theory was that a truly scientific theory of the 
emotions required understanding them as essentially physiological rather than psychic 
phenomena. James argued that emotions had been described until then as “the internal shadings 
of emotional feeling”, where feelings were understood as “psychic entities”. Lange characterized 
the approach he meant to criticize as the “hypothesis of the psychical nature of the emotions”, 
namely the view that an emotion is an event “of a purely psychical nature”, or an “event in the 
soul”, which in turn causes the bodily phenomena, which “are nevertheless in and of themselves 
wholly unessential”. Both characterizations are broadly applicable to, among others, the theories 
of the passions offered by Aristotle, Descartes and Hume.  
James (1890) believed that theorizing about the emotions in terms of internal shadings of 
emotional feeling resulted in endless classification, because “it is plain that the limit to their 
number would lie in the introspective vocabulary of the seeker, each race of men having found 
names for some shade of feeling which other races have left undiscriminated” (485). But this 
endless classifying was perceived by James as lacking in scientific rigor, because “you feel that 
[the] subdivisions [of descriptive psychology] are to a great extent either fictitious or 
unimportant, and that its pretences to accuracy are a sham” (448). What the scientific theory of 
emotion needed was for James a “central point of view, or a deductive or generative principle”, 
which would never be discovered as long as the emotions were regarded as “absolutely 
individual things” hostage to the vagaries of introspective labeling (448). Since according to 
James “the general causes of the emotions are indubitably physiological”, his conclusion was 
that by focusing on physiology he could find the “central point of view” he was looking for 
(448).  
James compared the impact such principle could have on our understanding of emotion to 
the impact the “generative principle” of heredity and variation had on the understanding of 
biological species. Lange had a different complaint against the hypothesis of the psychical nature 
of the emotions, namely that such hypothesis is explanatory moot, namely not “indispensable for 
the explanation of the group of phenomena which we call emotions”. From a scientific point of 
view, Lange argued, there is no need to think of the emotions as psychic entities. According to 
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both authors, what a scientific theory of emotions truly needed was to focus on the suite of 
physiological responses associated with the emotions, a mark of emotionality which had not until 
then to been put center stage in the definition of the emotions (although many authors had clearly 
hinted at it, e.g. Aristotle and Descartes).  
I will illustrate the James-Lange theory by focusing on the Jamesian version, presented in 
“What is an Emotion?” (1884), and updated in the chapter on emotion of The Principles of 
Psychology (1890), and in “The Physical Basis of Emotion” (1894). I will mention Lange’s 
contribution only when it integrates a point made by James, disregarding the minor differences 
between the two theories.  
James distinguished two classes of emotions, the standard or coarser emotions on the one 
hand, and the intellectual or subtler emotions on the other. The former are those “in which every 
one recognizes a strong organic reverberation” (1890, 448), namely a “wave of bodily 
disturbance of some kind [which] accompanies the perception of the interesting sights or sounds, 
or the passage of the exciting train of ideas” (1884, 189). In this class, James included “surprise, 
curiosity, rapture, fear, anger, lust, greed”, as well as “grief, .., rage, love”. The class of subtler 
emotions is the class of “those [emotions] whose organic reverberation is less obvious and 
strong”, and it includes “moral, intellectual, and aesthetic feelings”, as well as “feelings of 
pleasure and displeasure, of interest and excitement” (1890, 448).  
The distinction between standard and intellectual emotions is reminiscent of the Humean 
distinction between violent and calm passions, although Hume did not claim that the intense 
disturbance of the violent passions necessarily has a bodily underpinning. James began 
developing his “physiological theory” of the emotions on the basis of the coarser emotions, and 
then moved on to discuss the subtler ones. The natural way of thinking about the emotions, 
James pointed out, is that “the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called 
the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression” (1890, 449). 
James criticized this commonsensical approach on two main accounts.  
Firstly, he argued that in most cases of emotion there is no mental affection between the 
mental perception of some fact and the bodily expression, in the sense that “the bodily changes 
follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact” (1890, 449, emphasis in original). 
Secondly, he argued that the emotion is precisely “our feeling of the same changes as they 
occur” (1890, 449, emphasis in original). This amounts to a reversal of common sense, 
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according to which “we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and 
run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike” (1890, 449-450). According to James, 
instead, “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble” 
(James 1894, 189-190).  
James’ theory demanded supporting evidence of two kinds. On the one hand, evidence that 
bodily changes can follow the perception of the exciting fact directly. James and Lange believed 
that evidence to this effect could be interpreted as an existence proof that the emotions are not 
essentially mental affections causing bodily changes. Secondly, it required an argument to the 
effect that an emotion is nothing but the perception of bodily changes.   
Most of the critical literature on the James-Lange theory has focused on attacking the thesis 
that an emotion is nothing but the perception of a bodily change. Generally, debunking this thesis 
has been considered sufficient to debunk the thesis that “the bodily changes follow directly the 
PERCEPTION of the exciting fact”. But when we read the evidence James provided for the latter 
thesis, we realize that it does not presuppose the truth of the thesis that emotions are perceptions 
of bodily changes.  
The thesis James in effect defended ought to be reformulated as the thesis that “emotions 
follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact”. It is with respect to this thesis that James 
made what I consider some of his most important and least discussed contributions.  
In a nutshell, James offered a number of reasons why we should not assimilate emotional 
appraisal to the forms of intellectual evaluation of which a deliberate judgment that something is 
the case is a paradigmatic example. Call this the Argument from Direct Elicitation against the 
traditional way of conceiving of emotions. As I will argue in chapter 7, James foreshadowed 
some of the central criticisms launched against the cognitivist theory of emotions 70 years later. 
The Jamesian account is not systematic, but full of important leads. For example, James noticed 
that emotional evaluations are often very fast: “[i]f we abruptly see a dark moving form in the 
woods, our heart stops beating, and we catch our breath instantly and before any articulate idea 
of danger can arise” (1890, 457).  
He also noticed that they are sometimes insulated from rational considerations: “[i]f our 
friend goes near to the edge of a precipice, we get the well-known feeling of “all-overishness,” 
and we shrink back, although we positively know him to be safe” (1890, 457). In other cases, 
emotions do not even seem to result from evaluations of specific objects: “The best proof that the 
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immediate cause of emotion is a physical effect on the nerves is furnished by those pathological 
cases in which the emotion is objectless” (1890, 458).  
Lange mentioned two further cases to “prove the superfluous nature” of the hypothesis that 
emotions are psychic entities, namely that of emotions induced in infants by loud noises and 
emotions induced by chemical substances (e.g. alcohol, bromide). What the heterogeneous 
examples offered by James and Lange suggest is that the experience of emotion – i.e. the 
experience of bodily changes as far as they are concerned - is brought about at least sometimes 
directly by the “perception of the exciting fact”.  
The perception of the exciting fact amounts in effect to a process of appraisal which does 
not require time to be executed, is not penetrable by and/or available to rational cognitive 
processes, and is available to infants and, we may add, to animals.  
As James put it, certain emotions suggest that “peculiarly conformed pieces of the world’s 
furniture will fatally call forth most particular mental and bodily reactions, in advance of, and 
often in direct opposition to, the verdict of our deliberate reason concerning them” (1894, 191).  
James and Lange did not offer a theory of the intentionality of the emotions, even though - 
differently from Descartes and Hume - they neither explicitly nor implicitly denied that emotions 
have representative qualities.  
By suggesting a number of important distinctions between emotional and non-emotional 
appraisals, they pointed our attention to some of the fundamental phenomena an account of the 
intentionality of the emotions should be able to accommodate (e.g. their fastness, their 
availability to creatures without language, etc.). Jesse Prinz’s (2004a, 2004b) recent Neo-
Jamesian theory of the emotions, which I discuss in section 7.1, can be seen as an attempt to 
endow the Jamesian theory with intentionality while preserving its trademark thesis, namely that 
an emotion is a perception of bodily changes.  
Let us now turn to an analysis of how James defended such key thesis. The following 
passage, one of the most often cited in the history of emotion theory, illustrates what James took 
to be his main source of evidence. I call this the Argument from Conceivability:  
I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is 
this. If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from 
our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily 
symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no “mind-stuff” 
out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and 
neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains…What 
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kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of 
quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of 
trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of 
visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think… A 
purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity…[F]or us, 
emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable (1884, 
194, emphasis in original) 
This is an very influential argument, so let us focus on it in some detail. A virtue of James’ 
argument is that it sheds light on what James takes a bodily change to be for the purposes of the 
thesis that an emotion is nothing but the perception of a bodily change. It is obvious that the truth 
of the thesis depends on what one means by a “bodily change”. In his first formulation of the 
thesis, James stated that “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because 
we tremble”, and called all such things “bodily manifestations”.  
Under this view, an expression such as crying, an instrumental behavior such as running, 
and a physiological response such as trembling would all count as bodily manifestations the 
perception of which is the emotion. Before discussing whether or not this is a good interpretation 
of what James meant by bodily manifestation, let us notice that James, often presented as holding 
the view that emotions are just perceptions of bodily changes, was well aware of some of their 
other marks of emotionality, e.g. expressions (e.g. crying) and behavioral dispositions (e.g. 
running). James was also aware of the presence of emotional appraisals, which he described as 
direct (Argument from Direct Elicitation).  
I am convinced that the best interpretation of what James meant by “bodily changes” is not 
the all-encompassing one I have just sketched. An overly liberal notion of bodily changes seems 
to me in conflict with the starting point of the James-Lange theory, which was to focus on 
emotions as physiological phenomena. James explicitly described the theory he and Lange 
endorsed as a “physiological theory” (1890, 449), a qualifier suggesting that the bodily changes 
whose perception is the emotion are to be interpreted as physiological bodily changes. James did 
not ask: What would be left of fear if we didn’t run, or if we didn’t display the facial expression 
of fear. Rather, he asked what would be left of fear without “quickened heart-beats”, “shallow 
breathing”, “trembling lips”, “weakened limbs”, “goose-flesh”, “visceral stirrings”, and so on. 
These are all physiological responses of the autonomic variety, namely changes governed by the 
autonomic nervous system. This suggests that “the vital point of my whole theory” is for James 
 34
that an emotion is a perception of autonomic changes, rather than a perception of expressions or 
instrumental behaviors.  
In conclusion, I want to argue that the common turn of phrase with which the James-Lange 
theory is generally summarized, namely “we are sad because we cry”, must be considered 
ambiguous between two interpretations. On the one hand, the thesis that “we are sad because we 
cry” states is that we are sad insofar as we cry, in the sense that “we” cannot conceive of sadness 
without a perception of sadness-typical bodily changes (Argument from Conceivability). On the 
other hand, the thesis that “we are sad because we cry” states that - at least sometimes - we are 
sad without there being a specific thought causing our sadness (Argument from Direct 
Elicitation). Such thought may be absent when the emotion is objectless, or too quick to allow 
the formation of a thought.5 On occasion, sadness may even occur in opposition to a thought, as 
when we get sad about things we believe should make us happy. 
 
 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I discussed Aristotle’s pioneering account of the passions and what I 
consider to be the three most important emotion theorists respectively of the 17th (Descartes), 
18th (Hume), and 19th century (James). I have undertaken an analysis of prominent feeling 
theorists for two reasons. On the one hand, I wanted to react to what I consider to be widespread 
misunderstandings concerning their theories. My main point was that it is patently false that 
feeling theorists thought of the passions as mere feelings. Surprisingly, this is the common way 
in which their position is portrayed in contemporary emotion theory (see chapter 7). All the 
feeling theorists I discussed understood that emotions are commonly caused by appraisals and 
comprise behaviors and behavioral dispositions. On the other hand, as I will argue in chapter 4, 
traditional feeling theorists lacked insight into the idea that there is a form of aboutness 
constitutively associated with emotions. In a sense we will have to understand, emotions are 
endowed with representational qualities, precisely the sorts of qualities Descartes and Hume 
denied them.  
                                                 
5 This may not work too well for sadness, but it certainly does for fear 
 35
The other reason why I focused on the feeling theory is that it is the vantage point from 
which the history of 20th century emotion theory needs to be understood. The main traditions of 
research of the last 100 years have all defined themselves in contrast to the feeling theory. The 
feeling theory has been criticized for its reliance on the method of introspection hailed by 
Descartes as infallible (behaviorism, chapter 3), for its neglect of the cognitive dimension of 
emotion (cognitivism, chapter 4), for its incapacity to account for the commonality of emotions 
across species (evolutionary tradition, chapter 5), and for its blindness to the social and 
communicative dimensions of emotional phenomena (social constructionism, chapter 6). My task 
in the next four chapters will be to reconstruct how these competing traditions came to light, 
what intuitions and what arguments propelled their emergence, and what substantive problems 
ultimately emerged to limit their influence. 
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3. EMOTIONS AS BEHAVIORS  
 
 
Behaviorism brought about a radical change in the method of psychology, and produced an 
approach to the emotions which lasted roughly from the beginning of the 20th century to the late 
1950s. In this chapter, I do not mean to provide a general characterization of behaviorism, nor of 
its profound impact on a variety of scientific disciplines, nor of the reasons underlying its 
ultimate demise (see Boakes 1984 for a history of behaviorism). I only aim to highlight the 
general structure of the approach championed by behaviorists with respect to the emotions. 
Because of their intuitive connection with feelings, the emotions constituted one of the main 
challenges behaviorists had to face. When Watson (1925) began addressing the topic, James was 
singled out as the main representative of what a theory of the emotions should never be. The 
designation of James as the root of all evils in emotion theory, as we shall see, is a common 
rhetorical tool in the 20th century, and it testifies both to the profound impact of his theory, and to 
the unscrupulousness of some of his enemies. My attempt to clarify what James really said was 
meant precisely to expose his many caricatures, some of which feature in the behaviorist 
literature as well.  
I follow the customary distinction between two different strands of behaviorism, 
psychological behaviorism and philosophical behaviorism. Psychological behaviorism, 
championed most prominently by Watson (1925) and Skinner (1953), had a fundamentally 
scientific motivation. It was argued by that, for the purposes of science, what counts as an 
emotion can only be an externally observable manifestation, whereas internal states of 
consciousness – e.g. feelings – ought to be expunged from the subject matter of the psychology 
of emotions. 
Philosophical behaviorism, championed most prominently by Gilbert Ryle (1949), had 
instead an eminently philosophical motivation, namely the analysis of the way we talk about the 
emotions. The importance of Ryle’s behaviorism is that it pointed us to a feature which had 
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previously not been fully understood, namely that there are very many different uses of the term 
“emotion” in ordinary language. Ryle argued that most of them refer to dispositions rather than 
occurrent feelings. This claim became the centerpiece of a general attack against a Cartesian 
view of the mind as the “ghost in the machine” of the body.  
The historical investigation of behaviorism is particularly interesting for my project, because 
the theory of emotions I propose in chapter 10 considers the impact emotions have on behavior 
to be their essential feature. Understanding the behaviorist articulation of this idea will allow me 
to become aware of some of its possible uses, as well as some of the mistakes to be avoided. 
Also, I consider the Rylean exploration of the heterogeneity of the ways in which we talk about 
emotions to have important methodological consequences, namely that it is very hard to offer a 
single theory of emotions that fits them all. To make this point persuasively, however, we need 
to expand on Ryle’s introspective study of emotion talk with empirical evidence on the way in 
which people use emotion categories, a task I leave for chapter 8. 
 
 
 
3.1. PSYCHOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM   
 
3.1.1. Watson and Skinner  
There is a remarkable similarity between the concerns voiced by James and Lange against 
their predecessors and those voiced by the psychological behaviorists against James and 
Lange. As the reader will recall, James and Lange had rejected as unscientific the identification 
of emotions with psychic states. According to James (1890, 449), “the trouble with the 
emotions in psychology is that they are regarded too much as absolutely individual things”, 
endlessly classifiable in terms of introspectable shades of feeling “without ever getting on to 
another logical level…[w]hereas the beauty of all truly scientific work is to get to ever deeper 
levels” (1890, 449).  
The way out from the “level of individual description” was to think of them in terms of 
perceptions of bodily changes, and focus on bodily changes as the “central point” of view need 
for a scientific psychology of emotions. Lange added that, for the purposes of a scientific 
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psychology, there was no need to think of the emotions other than in terms of their 
physiological underpinnings. Watson and Skinner submitted the notion of perception of bodily 
change to the same criticism to which James and Lange had submitted the notion of psychic 
state. They said that it was not scientific, and that it was not needed for the purposes of a truly 
scientific psychology. The contentious notion was not that of a bodily change as such, but that 
of its conscious perception. Watson echoed James’s own concerns about the unprincipled 
multiplication of individual analyses of inward feelings of emotion with respect to the notion 
of consciousness itself. He wrote in “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it” (1913), a.k.a. the 
behaviorist manifesto: 
As a result of this major assumption that there is such a thing as 
consciousness and that we can analyze it by introspection, we find 
as many analyses as there are individual psychologists. There is no 
way of attacking and solving psychological problems and 
standardizing methods (5). 
Watson’s conclusion was that a truly scientific psychology should get rid of the notion of 
consciousness entirely. This demanded a revolutionary change in the nature of psychology, 
understood by James as the science which aims for “the description and explanation of states 
of consciousness as such” (6). According to Watson, this kind of psychology “has failed to 
make good its claim as a natural science” (1913, 9), and ought to be reformed with respect to it 
subject matter, goal, and methodology. The subject matter of psychology ought to be “facts of 
behavior” (9), and its “theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior” (1). This 
being the case, its method cannot be introspection of conscious states. Rather, “psychology…is 
a purely objective, experimental branch of natural science which needs introspection as little as 
do the sciences of chemistry and physics” (9).  
In 1913, he presented his distrust of consciousness as grounded in the impossibility of its 
scientific study. When he came back to the topic of consciousness in Behaviorism (1925), 
however, Watson had significantly radicalized his position. Consciousness had moved from the 
status of entity to be ignored for the purposes of science to the status of non-entity, as he wrote 
that “belief in the existence of consciousness goes back to the ancient days of superstition and 
magic” (1925, 2). The focus on consciousness had, according to Watson, made the James-
Lange theory of the emotions unscientific.  
With characteristic curtness, Watson wrote that “nearly 40 years ago James gave the 
psychology of the emotions a setback from which it has only recently begun to recover” (1925, 
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140). The problem is that “each man has to make his own introspections. No experimental 
method of approach is possible. No verification of observation is possible. In other words, no 
scientific objective study of emotion is possible” (1925, 142). Skinner (1953) echoed such 
concerns, and pointed to another problem for states of consciousness, namely their causal 
mootness. As he put it, introspective psychology “defines its ‘subjective’ events in ways which 
strip them of any usefulness in a causal analysis. The events appealed to in early mentalistic 
explanations of behavior have remained beyond the reach of observation…” (1953, 30-31).  
“The emotions”, Skinner (1953, 160) argued, “are excellent examples of the fictional 
causes to which we commonly attribute behavior”. Focusing on internal variables unavailable 
to scientific investigation has led psychologists to neglect “[t]he external variables of which 
behavior is a function”. The solution was for both Watson and Skinner to focus on the causal 
relationship between the dependent variable of behavior, that which psychology has the 
theoretical goal of controlling and predicting, and the independent variables constituted by 
external conditions.  
In effect, psychological behaviorists recommended the external stimulus-behavioral 
response pattern as a general blueprint for the study of what had previously been thought to be 
facts of consciousness as such. With respect to the emotions, this led to trying to understand 
them in terms of stimulus-response sequences. This strategy, however, presented an immediate 
difficulty, namely that the same emotion at different times and in different people can result 
from many different stimuli and it can be manifested by many different behaviors. How can we 
capture this multiplicity within the stimulus-response schema?  
Watson’s response came in two stages. Firstly, he assumed that in infants, the multiplicity 
of emotion-eliciting stimuli is dramatically reduced, and so is the multiplicity of unconditioned 
emotional responses to such stimuli. Secondly, he assumed that the variety of emotions present 
in adults resulted from a process of conditioning on the basis of the unconditioned emotional 
responses present at birth. Since he took the goal of psychology to be the control and 
prediction of behavior, he assumed that the task of a psychologist of the emotions was to 
master the control of emotional responses, and shape them in socially advantageous ways.  
This meant revealing what are the emotional stimuli which generate unconditional 
emotional responses, how they lead through process of conditioning to the complexity of adult 
emotional life, and how the process of conditioning can be interfered with at will. Watson 
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distinguished three unconditioned stimulus-emotional response sequences present at birth, 
which he called fear, rage and love. The following chart shows which unlearned responses 
were called by Watson (1925) fear, rage and love, and which stimuli were supposed to produce 
them (he added that there might be other producing stimuli, but that in any case they were “few 
in number”): 
 
Emotions Emotional 
stimuli 
Unconditioned emotional responses 
Fear Loud 
sounds, loss of 
support 
“Checking of breathing, jump or start of the whole 
body, crying, defecation and urination (and many other 
not worked out experimentally. Probably the largest 
group of part reactions are visceral)” (1925, 156) 
Rage Restraint of 
body 
“Stiffening of the whole body, screaming, 
temporary cessation of breathing, redding of face 
changing to blueness of face, etc. it is obvious that 
while there are general  overt responses, the greatest 
concentration of movement is in the visceral field” 
(1925, 156) 
Love Striking 
skin and sex 
organs, 
rocking, riding 
on foot 
“Cessation of crying, gurgling, cooing and many 
others not determined. That visceral factors predominate 
is shown by changes in circulation and in respiration, 
erection of penis, etc.” (1925, 157) 
Figure 2: Watson’s theory of fear, rage and love 
 
Under this view, infant fear/rage/love are instantiated by responding to the observable 
stimuli in the second column with the observable “behaviors” in the third column. Allegedly, 
every adult emotion results from infant fear, rage and love through a process of conditioning. 
Under this view, fear, rage and love are primitive emotions in the following sense: every other 
emotion is obtained from them by conditioning. An adult emotion, say adult guilt, is a 
conditioned response obtained by successive conditioning of fear, rage and love responses to 
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novel stimuli. This is a very unconvincing theory, both because some adult instances of love, 
fear and shame do not seem to fit the conditioning paradigm (e.g. falling in love may take 
years) and because it is entirely mysterious how emotions such as, say, shame, guilt and awe 
could result from either fear, rage or love or any combination of them by classical 
conditioning. I will disregard these problems, focusing only on the idea that an emotion can be 
defined by stimulus-response sequence.  
We should notice that Watson’s list of emotional responses in infants does not comprise 
conscious experiences (e.g. pain, bodily sensations), including instead physiological responses 
(e.g. visceral responses, defecation and urination, stiffening) and expressive/instrumental 
behaviors (e.g. crying, screaming). If we subtract the perception part, and substitute the 
appraisal of the stimulus with the stimulus itself, we are not too far from James’s own theory 
(under a broad interpretation of bodily change). Watson’s theory of emotions is ultimately that 
an emotion is a particular kind of bodily manifestation (understood broadly enough to 
comprise physiological and behavioral responses) to particular stimuli.  
There are two main reasons why behaviorists ended up focusing on behaviors rather than 
physiological responses. The first is that, at least with the instruments of the time, 
physiological events were not as accurately observable as were instrumental behaviors and 
expressions. In this respect, physiological events failed to meet the bar of scientific 
observability, not in principle as it was the case for conscious experiences, but in practice. The 
second reason is that it was widely believed that physiological changes were not sufficiently 
different from one another to distinguish the emotions from one another.  
Skinner (1953) made the point explicitly, when he said that “[i]n spite of extensive 
research it has not been possible to show that each emotion is distinguished by a particular 
pattern of responses of glands and smooth muscles. Although there are a few characteristic 
patterns of such responses, the differences between emotions are often not great and do not 
follow the usual distinctions” (160-1).  
This passage refers to evidence presented in 1929 by Walter Cannon in Bodily Changes in 
Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage, a widely influential textbook in physiology. Cannon argued that 
the physiological differences between different emotions, at least those that could be measured 
at the time, were not sufficient to distinguish them from one another. I will come back to this 
influential thesis later on. Skinner (1953) had the same worry about facial and postural 
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expressions of emotions, as he said that “it has not been possible to specify given sets of 
expressive responses as characteristic of particular emotion” (161). His recommended solution 
was to focus on instrumental behaviors, which he assumed to be both observable without 
difficulties and such as to differentiate the emotions from one another.  
Skinner’s theory is that emotions are dispositions to respond to certain stimuli with certain 
behaviors. For example, he wrote that “When the man in the street says that someone is afraid 
or angry or in love, he is generally talking about predispositions to act in certain ways. The 
angry man shows an increased probability of striking insulting, or otherwise influencing injury 
and a lover probability of aiding favoring comforting or making love…so defined, an 
emotion…is not to be identified with physiological or psychic conditions” (1953, 163).  
This remark is insightful, and it was fully developed by Ryle (1949), who argued 
convincingly that in many cases in which we ordinarily speak about the emotions, what we 
refer to are dispositions. However, it is certainly incorrect that “[t]he names of the so-called 
emotions serve to classify behaviors with respect to various circumstances which affect its 
probability” (1953, 162). The names of the emotions are often used to refer to occurrent events 
(e.g. behavioral events), rather than a disposition to engage in them with a certain probability. 
The problem with the behaviorist theory of the emotions, however, is more general, and it 
is the problem that led behaviorism to its demise in the 1950s. Already in the 1920s and 1930s 
psychologists such as Edward C. Tolman and Wolfgang Köhler had argued against the 
stimulus-response paradigm for its dismissal of intervening variables, pointing out that the 
mentalistic notion of purpose was constitutive of the notion of behavior. In an influential 
review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, Chomsky (1959) argued that the behaviorist definition of 
“verbal behavior” cannot be clearly characterized without reference to mental mechanisms 
generating it, more specifically mental grammars consisting of rules. Chomsky’s critique can 
be generalized, in the sense that it seems very hard to characterize behaviors as being of the 
same kind without making implicit presuppositions about the mental processes that cause them 
and are caused by them.  
This problem is present in the case of emotions. The distinction between, say, guilt and 
shame cannot be drawn exclusively in terms of stimulus-response sequences, in the sense that 
the very same sequences – e.g. greeting a friend with an apology - may in principle belong to 
both guilt and shame.  One may argue that it is because they are species of the same kind, but 
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the similarities can take place even with respect to emotions as diverse as love and hatred. For 
example, one may run away from someone because of both unrequited love and hatred.  
In this sense, Skinner was wrong in thinking that instrumental behaviors do not incur into 
the same problem in which physiological responses and expressions can incur, namely that 
they do not seem sufficient in themselves to type-identify the emotions. If we want to use 
behaviors to do so, as I will argue in chapter 10, we need to describe them in terms of their 
constitutive purposes, a notion which has no role in a strictly behaviorist account of the 
emotions.  
Moreover, a given stimulus-response sequence does not even reveal whether or not an 
emotion is instantiated, let alone which emotion is instantiated. Most stimulus-response 
sequences which can feature in emotional episodes can feature in non-emotional ones as well. 
Finally, what appears to be missing from the behaviorist theory is an account of the fact that 
emotional behaviors often have an urgency lacked by non-emotional ones. In Skinner’s theory, 
this feature is completely absent, as emotional behaviors are described as dispositions, without 
any consideration for the urgency by which emotional dispositions claim, at least sometimes, 
to be manifested. These mistakes will be avoided in the theory of emotions I will formulate in 
chapter 10. 
  
 
3.2. PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIORISM 
 
3.2.1. Ryle 
Emotion terms are often deployed to designate dispositions. This is the central point about 
the emotions made by Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind (1949), a book in which he 
attacked Cartesian dualism by arguing that the language of mental states, far from referring to 
a mysterious realm of private mental episodes, referred to facts of behavior. The Rylean 
project amounted to tackling various categories of mental states - the will, emotion, self-
knowledge, sensation, and imagination, etc. – and show that they correspond to facts about 
how people do behave or would behave in certain circumstances.  
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The reason why I distinguish Ryle’s philosophical behaviorism about the emotions from 
Watson and Skinner’s psychological behaviorism (despite the obvious similarities especially 
with Skinner) is that the two projects had very different motivations.  
For the psychological behaviorists, the central problem was that, since feelings are not 
intersubjectively observable, we should not offer a definition of emotions in terms of feelings. 
For Ryle (1949), the central problem was that, since feelings are not what ordinary speakers 
commonly refer to when they use emotion terms, we should not offer a definition of emotions 
in terms them. Writes Ryle (1949): 
There are two quite different senses of ‘emotion’, in which we 
explain people’s behaviour by reference to emotions. In the first 
sense we are referring to the motives or inclinations from which 
more or less intelligent actions are done. In the second sense we 
are referring to moods, including the agitations or perturbations of 
which some aimless movements are signs. In neither of these 
senses are we asserting or implying that the overt behaviour is the 
effect of a felt turbulence in the agent’s stream of consciousness. In 
a third sense of “emotion”, pangs and twinges are feelings or 
emotions, but they are not, save per accidens, things by reference 
to which we explain behaviour (110).  
All in all, Ryle distinguishes between four different entities the term emotion refers to in 
the ordinary language: (a) feelings, (b) inclinations (or motives), (c) moods (or frames of mind) 
and (d) agitations (or commotions). Feelings, he says, are “the sorts of things which people 
often describe as thrills, twinges, pangs, throbs, wrenches, itches, prickings, chills, glows, 
loads, qualms, hankerings, curdlings, sinkings, tensions, gnawings and shocks” (82). Ryle 
further characterizes feelings as “things that come and go or wax and wane in a few seconds; 
they stab or they grumble; we feel them all over us or else in a particular part” (97). 
Inclinations are “motives by which people’s higher-level behaviour is explained”, for 
example the motives of “vanity, kindliness, avarice, patriotism and laziness” (82).  
Moods are things such as being “depressed, happy, uncommunicative or restless” (95), 
which can last minutes, days or even a life-time (in the latter case, we will generally speak of 
character traits).  
Agitations, finally, are things such as being “anxious, startled, shocked, excited, 
convulsed, flabbergasted, in suspense, flurried, and irritated” (90), which interfere with our 
thinking or acting, and which have feelings as their “sign”.  
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Now, in his chapter on the emotions, Ryle argued for two theses: (a) Emotion terms often 
do not refer to feelings, i.e. turbulences in the stream of consciousness, (b) When emotion 
terms refer to feelings, such mental occurrences should not be construed as introspectable 
causes of purposive action. I will disregard the second thesis, which is not relevant for my 
purposes, and focus instead on the first.  
Thesis (a) is the thesis that emotion terms are often best understood as referring to 
inclinations, agitations and moods, which are for Ryle (1949, 81) “not occurrences and do not 
therefore take place either publicly or privately. They are propensities, not acts or states”. 
Ryle’s strategy is to take as self-evident that inclinations, agitations, and moods are very often 
what we refer to when we speak about emotions, and argue that such things neither are nor 
presuppose “feelings”. I will only consider Ryle’s argument about inclinations.  
To say of a man that he is vain, Ryle argues, is to say that he will “behave in certain 
ways”, such as talking about himself, rejecting criticism, seek the footlights and so on. It is 
also to say that he will show certain patterns of thinking, such as indulging “in roseate 
daydreams about his own successes”, or avoiding “recalling past failures and to plan for his 
own advancement” (83).  Ryle acknowledges that, among the things a vane man is disposed to 
do, there may also be the experience of feelings. For example, “to have an acute sinking 
feeling, when an eminent person forgets his name, and to feel buoyant of heart and light of toe 
on hearing of the misfortunes of his rivals” (84).  
But he wants to resist the idea that inclinations must be understood as referring essentially 
to dispositions to feel. For example, we may explain the actions of a certain man by claiming 
that he has an inclination towards Symbolic Logic. But such motive cannot be assumed to 
involve a disposition to “experience impulses of a peculiar kind, namely feelings of interest in 
Symbolic Logic” (86). Ryle plausibly remarks that “there are no peculiar feelings of interest in 
Symbolic Logic for him to report”, namely no particular perturbation by which he is overcome 
when acting on the motive constituted by his interest for Symbolic Logic. From this Ryle 
concludes that “to do something from a motive is compatible with being free from any 
particular feelings while doing it” (85).  
Moreover, Ryle remarks that having a certain motive may sometimes be psychologically 
incompatible with having a feeling associated with it. For example, if a vain man were to really 
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feel vane (as opposed to having other vanity-induced feelings other than that of vanity), his 
vanity would be undermined as a motive.  
Ryle concludes that “there is no special thrill or pang which we call a ‘feeling of vanity’”, 
and adds that the vane man is likely to be the “last person to recognize how vain he was” (85). 
There is a problem in using examples such as these to make points about the nature of 
emotions, namely that it is unclear whether, under an ordinary understanding, either interest for 
Symbolic Logic or vanity count as emotions.  
But I take Ryle’s point to be ultimately a good one, which can be reformulated with 
respect to things that are unquestionably emotions. For example, when we explain the actions 
of a certain man by claiming that he feels guilty towards his mother, we are not implying that 
he has a disposition to experience feelings of a particular sort. Our ascription may be referring 
exclusively to a disposition to behave and think in certain ways (e.g. make amends, think of 
himself as a bad person, try to change, etc.).  
Ryle makes a further important point that is relevant to discussions about the role played 
by feeling in emotion. The point is that the term “feeling” itself does not necessarily refer to 
bodily feeling. Ryle gives the following examples: “I feel ill”, “I feel stupid”, “I feel capable of 
climbing a tree”, “I felt a lump in the mattress”, “I felt cold”, “I felt my chin with my thumb”, 
“I felt in vain for the lever”, “I felt as if something important was about to happen”, “I felt that 
there was a flaw somewhere in the argument”, “I felt that he was angry” (101-103).  
In all such cases, it seems quite clear that we are not referring to the occurrence of a bodily 
feeling. As a matter of fact, we can paraphrase such expressions with roughly equivalent ones 
that do not mention feelings at all. For example, we can say “I believe I am ill”, “I think I am 
capable of climbing a tree”, “I touched a lump in the mattress”, “I am cold”, “I became 
convinced that there was a flaw somewhere in the argument”, and so on.  
Ryle suggests that there is something in common between uses of feel talk that are and that 
are not reports of feeling. In both cases, what is felt has not been “established by careful 
witnessing…or inferred from clues”, but rather grasped without having done a specific 
investigation and accumulated evidence. As Ryle puts it, that “he felt it is enough to settled 
some debates; that he merely felt it is enough to show that [some] debates should not even 
begin” (103). Ryle concludes that the fact that we say things such as “I feel guilty” (an 
inclination) or “I feel depressed” (a mood) does not imply that what is referred to is a feeling, 
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in the same sense that when we say “I feel I can do it” does not imply that what is referred to is 
a feeling.  
To say that often our emotion and feeling language does not refer to actual bodily feelings, 
however, is not to say that it never does. Ryle himself admits that sometimes we do refer to 
feelings, and he notices that the way in which we talk about emotions as feelings is very 
similar to the way in which we talk of bodily sensations. For example, we speak of twinges of 
remorse, but also of twinges of rheumatism, we speak of qualms of apprehension, but also 
qualms of sea-sickness, we speak of glows of pride but also glows of warmth.  
Ryle suggests that both in the case of both feelings and in the case of bodily sensations, 
reporting them is making causal hypotheses. When someone speaks of experiencing a “twinge 
of toothache”, Ryle says, he is making a causal hypothesis, which may be wrong. For example, 
“[a] wounded soldier may say that he feels a twinge of rheumatism in his right leg, when he 
has no right leg, and when ‘rheumatism’ is the wrong diagnosis of the pain he feels” (101). 
Similarly, when someone reports a “twinge of remorse”, he is giving “a diagnosis of it, but a 
diagnosis which is not in terms of a physiological disturbance. In some cases his diagnosis may 
be erroneous; he may diagnose as a twinge of remorse what is really a twinge of fear”, or 
ascribe to “dyspepsia a feeling which is really a sign of anxiety” (102).  
Ryle admits that “such mis-diagnoses are more common in children than in grown-ups, 
and in persons in untried situations than in persons living their charted lives”, but maintains his 
conclusion that “whether we are attaching a sensation to a physiological condition or attaching 
a feeling to an emotional condition, we are applying a causal hypothesis” (102).  
This portion of Ryle’s argument is a direct response to the Cartesian attempt to distinguish 
the class of passions from the class of sensory and bodily sensations by claiming that we 
cannot be mistaken about the passions whereas we can about other forms of perception. This 
part of Ryle’s argument is specifically meant to attack the standard Cartesian picture of 
privileged introspective access, namely that idea that our passions “are so close and so interior 
to our soul that it is impossible that they should be felt without being in reality just as they are 
felt” (Descartes 1650, art. 17-26).  
Ryle makes an interesting further point with respect to feelings. He says that “[n]either my 
twinges nor my winces, neither my squirming feelings nor my bodily squirmings, neither my 
feelings of relief nor my sighs of relief, are things which I do for a reason; nor, in consequence, 
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are they things which I can be said to do cleverly or stupidly, successfully or unsuccessfully, 
carefully or carelessly” (102). This theme, as we shall see in the next chapter, will become one 
of the trademark arguments against the feeling theory that emotions are mere feelings. The 
worry is that feelings are not the sorts of things to which normative properties can be ascribed. 
But if this is true, then emotions cannot be (mere) feelings. 
  
3.3. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I described the radical behaviorist shift that occurred in emotion theory at the 
beginning of the 20th century. I have distinguished between a psychological and a philosophical 
wing of behaviorism about the emotions.  
The psychological wing was motivated by methodological considerations on the 
requirements a science of the emotions ought to fulfill. The philosophical wing was motivated by 
a desire to reject the Cartesian picture of emotions as feelings and the idea of infallible and 
privileged access to them. Psychological behaviorism made us acutely aware of the fact that 
introspection is an inductive practice, and that such practice can go wrong. But the specific 
behaviorist recipe of eradicating consciousness entirely from the subject matter of psychology 
was unduly restrictive. It resulted in about half a century of purgatory for the notions of 
cognition, feeling and purposive behavior, all of which are required to acquire a deep 
understanding of what the emotions are.  
Ryle’s account had the great merit of bringing to our attention the fact that there are very 
many things we mean when we speak about the emotions in ordinary language. In particular, 
Ryle made a strong case for the thesis that we often do not refer to occurrences at all, let alone 
feelings, but rather to disposition to behave. 
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4. EMOTIONS AS COGNITIONS 
 
 
The cognitivist tradition finds its roots in Aristotelian and Stoic insights about the emotions, 
but it reached a mature stage only in the latter part of the 20th century. After the demise of 
behaviorism, the cognitivist theory of emotions was proposed as a solution to problems which, 
allegedly, neither behaviorism nor the feeling theory could solve. In the past forty years, it has 
become the dominant tradition in both philosophy and psychology, even though its central 
commitments are increasingly hard to stand by.  
This chapter is devoted to reconstructing the main strands of the early cognitivist critique of 
the feeling theory, in particular the arguments offered to reject the assimilation of emotions with 
sensations that type-identify them. There is much to learn from such arguments, but I do not 
think they support cognitivism as a research program. What they do is to present us with 
desiderata that any good theory of emotions ought to fulfill. 
As I see it, the cognitivist tradition fosters at least two serious misunderstandings, namely 
that emotions are necessarily cognitively sophisticated phenomena, and that their motivational 
dimension is secondary. The limits of the cognitivist tradition are paradigmatically expressed by 
the trademark thesis that emotions are judgments, a thesis Robert Solomon (2003) and Martha 
Nussbaum (2001) have energetically defended for the past twenty years. My discussion of 
contemporary cognitivism, however, will have to wait until chapter 7, because I want to offer a 
critique of it which also applies – mutatis mutandis - to cognitivism’s main competitor, namely 
the increasingly popular Neo-Jamesian theory of emotions (Damasio 1994, 2003; Prinz 2004a, 
2004b). My focus will be instead on the emergence of cognitivism as a research program. 
Despite its shortcomings, cognitivism has left us with at least two noteworthy legacies. The 
first is the realization that emotions have constitutive conditions of appropriateness. For example, 
fear is the sort of thing which is inappropriate in the absence of danger. Naïve forms of 
behaviorism and of the feeling theory fail to explain this important fact about the emotions, and 
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they are consequently hopeless. The second legacy is the realization that it is not events in 
themselves that generate emotions, but rather the way they are appraised or evaluated or 
interpreted by emoters. This means that any theory of emotions must be able to account for the 
relation between the way events are “cognized” and the emotions that follow them. 
 In this chapter, I distinguish three classes of arguments offered against the feeling theory. 
The Argument from Absent Consciousness state that emotions cannot be feelings, because we 
often speak of emotions which lack consciousness, in various senses in which such notion can 
be understood. The Argument from Intentionality states that the emotions cannot be feelings 
because they have intentionality, a property theorists in the feeling tradition had either denied 
(e.g. Descartes, Hume) or neglected to account for (e.g. James). The Argument from 
Differentiation, finally, states that emotions cannot be distinguished from one another in terms 
of their feelings, because such feelings are not sufficiently differentiated.   
 
 
4.1. THE ARGUMENT FROM ABSENT CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
The Argument from Absent Consciousness states that emotions cannot be feelings, because 
emotions often lack concomitant conscious feelings. The argument comes in several varieties 
depending on how we understand the notion of consciousness. 
 
4.1.1. Two Notions of Consciousness 
The notion of consciousness can be understood in several different ways. A useful distinction is 
the one drawn by Block (1995) between phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness) and 
access consciousness (A-consciousness). Writes Block: 
A state is P-conscious if it has experiential properties. The totality 
of the experiential properties of a state are “what it is like” to have 
it. 
A state is access-conscious if it is poised for direct control of 
thought and action (Block 1995, 380-382) 
Whether or not a state has phenomenal consciousness depends upon whether or not there is a 
way it is like to undergo it, namely upon whether or not a subjective experience of a particular 
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kind is associated with being in that state. The paradigmatic example of a P-conscious state is 
pain, but any state whatever may in principle have a way it is like to undergo it (e.g. sensory 
perceptions, thoughts, etc.). Whether or not a state has access consciousness depends instead 
upon whether or not the state can be used by the agent for theoretical and practical inferences by 
simple redirection of attention (Block says that is must be “freely available”). Block thinks that 
the verbal reportability of a state is “often the best practical guide to A-consciousness”, but he is 
prepared to grant A-consciousness also to the states of an animal, provided they rationally 
control thoughts and actions.  
The paradigmatic example of A-conscious states in a human being are “states with 
representational content expressed by “that” clauses”, for example the thought that one does not 
like fish, which can be reported, can be used in reasoning, and can influence action through a 
practical inference. There are several issues of interpretation concerning what exactly makes a 
state P-conscious or A-conscious, but I won’t discuss them here, relying on a rough and ready 
understanding of Block’s distinction.  
Block’s key suggestion is that, although states generally are either both P-conscious and A-
conscious or neither, some states may be endowed with one type of consciousness but not the 
other. For example, consider a blindsight patient, who lacks both P-consciousness and A-
consciousness with respect of the visual states in which he is in when an object is presented in 
his blind field. If we hypothesize that the blindsight patient becomes what Block (1995) calls a 
superblindsight patient, namely one who lacks a way-it-is-like to experience objects in his blind 
field, but who is poised to form thoughts such as “there is an object X in my blindfield”, we have 
an example of a state which is A-conscious without being P-conscious. On the other hand, if we 
hypothesize that the blindsight patient is miraculously given a way-it-is-like to experience 
objects in the blind hemi-field, but not the ability to report on what he sees or otherwise use his 
visual experiences to think and act, we have a case of P-consciousness without A-consciousness.  
The emotion theorists we have studied so far did not distinguish between access P-
consciousness and A-consciousness of emotion. It is quite clear from the work of Aristotle, 
Descartes, Hume and James that they assumed the emotions to be both P-conscious and A-
conscious. The P-consciousness of emotions was accounted for primarily in two ways, namely as 
being valenced and as being bodily. In other words, the way it is like to undergo an emotion was 
assumed to be a pleasurable or painful experience amounting to the perception of bodily 
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changes. The A-consciousness of emotion was simply taken for granted, in the sense that it was 
assumed that if there is a way it is like to undergo an emotion E, then one can always freely 
report “I am undergoing emotion E”, and use this thought in reasoning and action.  
The cognitivists questioned the assumption that the emotions are always P-conscious and A-
conscious, pointing to the possibility of emotions endowed with just one kind of consciousness 
or lacking both. The natural starting point for thinking about emotions without consciousness is 
Freud, who first offered a systematic alternative to the view that consciousness is the mark of the 
mental. 
 
 
4.1.2. Emotions without access-consciousness  
4.1.2.1. The Freudian unconscious 
As Guzeldere (1997) pointed out, “until the time of Freud, there was no proper theoretical 
framework in which the reject the Cartesian idea of equating the mind with whatever lay within 
the scope of one’s consciousness” (Block et al., 1997). At its highest level of abstraction, the 
Freudian insight is that the mind is not exhausted by what mindful creatures are conscious of. As 
Freud put it, consciousness just represents the tip of an iceberg, whereas the bulk of mental 
processes occur below the surface of consciousness.  
Freud (1915) did not explicitly define the consciousness of a state, but understood it roughly 
in terms of the joint presence of phenomenological consciousness and access consciousness. His 
most distinctive contribution was the distinction between two levels below the surface of 
consciousness, that of the pre-conscious and that of the unconscious. The preconscious includes 
all those states that are “capable of entering consciousness…without any special resistance and 
given certain conditions” (1915, 106), for example those which can enter consciousness by 
simple redirection of attention.  
The unconscious includes instead all those states that have been repressed as unacceptable to 
the conscious mind. Unconscious states can become conscious by virtue of a process which 
eliminates repression, namely the psychoanalytic process. Later in his career, Freud (1923, 1940) 
added to his topographical account of the mind a division into three functional components: The 
Id, which contains all instincts present at birth (e.g. eros and thanatos), the Ego, which mediates 
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between Id and external world with the task of self-preservation, and the Superego, which limits 
the pursuit of pleasure in which the Ego is engaged in light of moral constraints apprehended 
during childhood. Even though the mapping is not perfect, the general idea is that the influence 
of Ego and Superego on behavior is both conscious and preconscious, whereas the influence of 
the Id is unconscious. The result of repressed conflicts between the three functional components 
of the mind is according to Freud the experience of anxiety.  
Freud thought that ideas were the paradigmatic example of states that can be conscious, 
preconscious or unconscious, whereas his position on the possibility of unconscious emotions 
was nuanced. Freud thought that one should not speak of unconscious emotions, in the sense that 
“there are no unconscious affects in the sense in which there are unconscious ideas” (1915, 111). 
The reason for this claim is that Freud endorsed the view that “it is surely of the essence of an 
emotion that we should feel it, i.e. that it should enter consciousness” (1915, 110). Under this 
view, which well exemplifies the grip of the feeling tradition on Freud, to speak of unconscious 
emotion is to speak inappropriately.  
But Freud acknowledged that “in psychoanalytic practice we are accustomed to speak of 
unconscious love, hate, anger, etc., and find it impossible to avoid even the strange conjunction 
‘unconscious consciousness of guilt’, or a paradoxical unconscious anxiety’” (110). What is 
meant by unconscious emotion, Freud argued, is that certain emotions are “perceived, but 
misconstrued” (100), in the sense that “[b]y the repression of its proper presentation it is forced 
to become connected with another idea, and is now interpreted by consciousness as the 
expression of this other idea” (110).  
I find it useful to employ Block’s (1995) distinction in order to capture the Freudian position 
on the emotions. What I take Freud to be saying is that an emotion is always a phenomenological 
experience of a certain kind (by Freud’s definition of emotion), but that sometimes emotions lack 
access consciousness, in the sense that while someone is experiencing, say, jealousy, he or she is 
not poised to form the thought “I am jealous”, and use such thought in his mental activity and 
action. I think this is an important insight by Freud, but we need to liberate it from the idea that 
repression is the only or even the primary mechanism preventing an emotion from being access 
conscious.  
Consider the following example by Bedford (1957), one of the first cognitivists to attack the 
view that “an emotion is a feeling, or at least an experience of a special type which involves a 
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feeling” (77). Bedford pointed out that “we can be mistaken about our own emotions, and that in 
this matter a man is not the final court of appeal in his own case; those who are jealous are often 
the last, instead of the first, to recognize that they are” (81-82).  
We can notice here that, although Bedford addressed his example against the view that 
emotions are experiences, the jealousy example is best understood as an example of lack of 
access-consciousness. It is compatible with jealousy being felt, just not as jealousy. For example, 
the jealous man may experience butterflies in the stomach and an irregular breathing pattern 
during a party in which his girlfriend talks intently to another man, but ascribe his bodily 
sensations to the high room temperature or to tiredness. In such case, there would be a way it is 
like to undergo jealousy, but the emoter would lack access to the thought “I am jealous”.  
To explain this case by invoking the mechanism of repression disregards the fact that access 
to the thought “I am jealous” may be available just a few minutes after the jealousy episode, 
without any need for psychoanalysis. On the other hand, simple redirection of attention during 
the jealousy episode would not have been enough to form the thought “I am jealous now” by 
Bedford’s assumption. Moreover, the idea that emotions which lack access consciousness always 
do so because of their conflict with instincts related to the libido and death has been widely 
criticized for being unsupported by hard evidence (e.g. Grunbaum 1984).  
 
4.1.2.2. The cognitive unconscious 
 
The abandonment of the idea that repression determines the boundary between the conscious 
and the unconscious seems to me the fundamental aspect of the shift between the Freudian 
unconscious and what Kihlstrom (1987) labeled the cognitive unconscious. When theoretical 
interest in the unconscious re-emerged in the 1950s, roughly around the time behaviorism 
collapsed, the unconscious started being broadly characterized as that portion of the mind which 
is not available for verbal report, yet exerts a demonstrable influence on some aspect of cognitive 
performance. Whereas Freud focused on unconscious thoughts, the focus of cognitive scientists 
was on unconscious processing of information in the course of a variety of cognitive 
performances (e.g. perception, memory, learning, thinking, speaking, etc.).  
More generally, the focus shifted from the state of being in a certain mental condition 
unconsciously to the process of arriving unconsciously at a certain mental condition. Since a 
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large part of unconscious processing has nothing to do with repression, but is simply an effect of 
cognitive architecture, the cognitive unconscious is a much more wide-ranging notion than the 
Freudian unconscious, and it certainly cannot all be eliminated through psychoanalysis.  
This way of thinking about the unconscious finds an early example in Hermann von 
Helmholtz’s (1860/1979) claim that “[t]he psychic activities that lead us to infer that there in 
front of us at a certain place there is a certain object of a certain character, are generally not 
conscious activities, but unconscious ones”. What is meant here is not that we cannot verbally 
report on what we perceive, but rather that we cannot verbally report on the mechanisms by 
which we perceive.  
The notions of unconscious processing and unconscious state can of course combine, but 
even when they do so the lack of consciousness of a state need not have something do with 
repression. For example, if a target stimulus and a masking stimulus are presented in rapid 
succession (less than 30ms) in a backwards masking experiment (Marcel 1983), the experimental 
subjects report that they are not aware of being exposed to the masked visual stimulus (e.g. the 
picture of a snake).  
In such case, they are not only unconscious of what Helmholtz would have called the 
inferences in which their perceptual system is engaged, but also unconscious of what they are 
perceiving, in the sense that they do not have access consciousness with respect to their percepta 
(and presumably not phenomenal consciousness either).  
Often, the notion of unconscious processing is equated by cognitive scientists with that of 
automatic processing (e.g. Posner 1978), a view which finds its root in James’ claim that a state 
can be unconscious in the sense that we do not have our attention directed on it (Freud would 
have called such state preconscious rather than unconscious).  
As James (1890) put it, “my experience is what I agree to attend to” (402), the corollary of 
which is that what do not attend to is not part of my conscious experience. Shiffrin & Schneider 
(1977) distinguished between automatic and controlled information processing, pointing to 
differences between these two forms of processing in terms of the attentional resources, 
cognitive resources, effort, intentional control, and memory structures they mobilize. Ever since 
the distinction was introduced, the presence of automatic or unconscious information processing 
has been detected in a large number of cognitive activities.  
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Starting with Zajonc (1980), the presence of unconscious processing has been investigated 
also with respect to so-called “hot cognition”, namely emotions, preferences and other affective 
states. This has ultimately led Kihlstrom and his associates to claim that “it is time for the new 
science of emotion to entertain the possibility of an emotional unconscious” (Kihlstrom, 
Mulvaney, Tobias, & Tobis, 1998).  
The notion of the emotional unconscious, however, is dangerously ambiguous between two 
main interpretations. What is meant by some who use the expression “unconscious emotion” is 
that the nature of the information processing which brings about the emotion is not conscious 
(e.g. Zajonc 2000, Öhman 1999). This is the same sense in which we could say of visual 
perception that it is unconscious because, say, it relies on 2½D sketches (Marr 1982) or that 
speech perception is unconscious because it relies on Chomskian mental grammars. What is 
meant by others who speak about “unconscious emotion” is instead that the emoter is in a certain 
emotional state – however he got there – unconsciously (e.g. Berridge et al. 2003).  
The two notions of “unconscious emotion” are orthogonal to one another. Whether or not 
the processing of information leading to an emotion is unconscious does not determine whether 
or not one will unconsciously be in a certain state of emotion (and viceversa). To eliminate 
ambiguity, I will reserve the expression unconscious emotion for emotions lacking access 
consciousness, namely emotions such that those who undergo them are not poised to formulate 
the thought that they are undergoing them by simple redirection of attention. I will instead speak 
of unconscious emotional processing when I want to refer to the special features of the etiology 
of an emotion (e.g. its automaticity).  
Once we admit the possibility that there are emotions with respect to which emoters have no 
access consciousness, it becomes clear that Freud’s hypothesis that an emotion essentially has P-
consciousness comes into question. A remark in this spirit can be found in the work of the 
cognitivist Martha Nussbaum (2001), who writes that “[i]f we are prepared to recognize 
nonconscious emotional states, such as nonconscious fear of death or nonconscious anger…then 
we cannot possibly hold to any necessary phenomenological condition for that emotion-type” 
(61).  
Unconscious fear of failing, to pick a classic example, is likely to be both A-unconscious 
and P-unconscious, in the sense that if the rationale for ascribing it is to explain a certain pattern 
of behavior inclusive of slips of the tongue, dreams, anxiety states, and so on, it becomes 
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mysterious why we should maintain the assumption that there must necessarily be a way it is like 
to undergo the consciously inaccessible process that generates such behaviors.  
A different example of emotions lacking both access-consciousness and phenomenal 
consciousness is that of emotions understood as dispositions. As I argued in chapter 3, the idea 
that emotions are not essentially feelings because emotion terms sometimes refer to dispositions 
was convincingly defended by Ryle (1949).  
Echoes of the Rylean critique can be found in the work of early philosophical cognitivists in 
the 1960s (e.g. Bedford 1957, Pitcher 1965). Pitcher (1965) pointed out for example that when 
we call someone jealous, what we are saying may be simply that he would do, think or feel in 
certain ways if the circumstances were such and such. A man at a party may be jealous in this 
dispositional sense even if his girlfriend is sitting alone in a corner, provided that he would 
respond with, say, butterflies in the stomach or an aggressive behavior or thoughts of punishment 
if another man were to talk charmingly to her. 
 
4.1.3. Emotions without bodily phenomenology  
As I pointed out, feeling theorists generally assumed that the way the emotions feel had a bodily 
nature. James defined an emotion as being the perception of a bodily change, a view hinted at by 
many in the history of emotion theory (e.g. Aristotle and Descartes). The cognitivists cast doubt 
on this idea, pointing out that sometimes either the emotions lack phenomenology all together or 
fail to have a specifically bodily phenomenology. We have already explored two examples of 
complete lack of phenomenology in the previous section, when we talked about unconscious 
emotions and emotions as dispositions, both of which lack both P-consciousness and A-
consciousness (but we have considered the possibility that an unconscious emotion may have P-
consciousness as presupposed by Freud).  
In this section, I want to discuss examples of emotions that have access-consciousness but 
lack phenomenological consciousness of a bodily type. In cases such as “hope and envy”, says 
for example Nussbaum (2001, 3), “we can’t even begin to specify such a defining feeling”. 
Pitcher (1965) tells us that bodily sensations are “characteristic features of emotion situations-
although only for some emotions, not for all”, and that in any event they are “not absolutely 
essential ones, so that there may be occasional emotion-situations which lack them” (339). 
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Solomon (2003) states that “autonomic nervous system responses are not an essential part of 
every emotion” (221).  
The general thesis here is that most if not all emotions can be had in principle without 
concomitant bodily changes (e.g. anger), and that many emotions are very rarely if ever had with 
concomitant bodily changes (e.g. shame). As noticed by many in the history of emotion theory, 
there seems to be a large class of emotions which are commonly ascribed in the absence of 
bodily changes. Hume called them calm passions, and James called them subtler emotions.  
Paradigmatic examples include moral emotions such as guilt, shame and disgust, intellectual 
emotions such as cerebral rapture in an intellectual topic, and aesthetic emotions such as delight 
at the sound of music. One of the tasks for theorists who believe we are capable of conceiving of 
emotions in the absence of bodily changes is to explain what would be left of an emotion once 
the bodily changes are subtracted.  
In other words, one must answer James’ challenge in the Argument from Conceivability, 
and explain what would be left of fear once we remove its autonomic underpinnings. The general 
answer is: every other mark of emotionality with the exclusion of the bodily one, namely an 
emotional appraisal, a conscious experience without bodily underpinnings, and a suite of 
expressions, instrumental behaviors and mental behaviors. Early cognitivists did not make much 
headway in explaining how emotions can be instantiated by virtue of these marks when the 
bodily changes are absent. They noticed what appeared to them as a self-evident fact, namely 
that we do often speak of emotions even in the absence of bodily changes. But we can find some 
interesting suggestions concerning the way in which emotions could be instantiated without 
bodily phenomenology.  
The cognitivist Bedford (1957), for example, made some insightful comments, focusing his 
attention on what we do when we ascribe emotions to ourselves and others through speech acts. 
The advantage of thinking of emotional behavior in terms of speech acts is that by applying the 
taxonomy of speech acts elaborated by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969, 1980) to this particular 
kind of emotional behavior we can have a preliminary insight into what could be the point of 
ascribing an emotion if it is not necessarily that of reporting on a bodily change. Bedford (1957) 
argued that when one says “I feel shamed now” or “I am quite disgusted with the literary men”, 
it’s not the case that “the primary function of these statements is to communicate psychological 
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facts” (93). Rather, Bedford thinks that one is, respectively, making “an admission of 
responsibility, or perhaps a plea in mitigation” and “condemning literary men”.  
Let us explore this insight focusing on the sentence “I feel ashamed now”. If we apply 
Searle’s (1969, 1980) taxonomy of speech acts to it, we realize that there may be various 
illocutionary points to such utterance, namely various things the utterer may be trying to achieve 
by saying it. The speech act is assertive, as the utterer is stating that he appraises his behavior to 
have been blameworthy in the way shameful behaviors are (Bedford speaks of an “admission of 
responsibility”). The speech act is directive as well, in the sense that, as Bedford astutely notices, 
the utterer may be making “a plea in mitigation”, trying to get the hearer to forgive him. The 
speech act, finally, is commissive, in the sense that it seems reasonable to assume that the utterer 
is expressing an intention to avoid repeating the behaviors he is ashamed of in the future. Can the 
utterer be occurrently ashamed without experiencing bodily changes? If he can sincerely and 
correctly ascribe shame to himself in ordinary English without experiencing bodily changes, the 
answer would have to be positive. And I do not see any obstacle to performing successfully any 
of the speech acts I described in the absence of bodily changes.  
As it turns out, this is not a special case due to the fact that the manifestation of the emotion 
is a speech act. I will argue in chapter 10 that understanding what the emotions are requires 
understanding that they convey information about antecedent circumstances, expectations and 
intentions. It seems to me unquestionably true that this information can on occasion be conveyed 
without bodily underpinnings. The key to the emotional, as I will argue, is urgency, which is 
often but not always associated with bodily underpinnings. 
 
 
4.2. THE ARGUMENT FROM INTENTIONALITY 
 
Philosophical cognitivists further complained that feeling theories had failed to account for 
the intentionality of emotions.  Broad (1954) is the first self-described cognitivist I am aware of 
to discuss in some detail the sense in which the emotions have intentionality (but already 
Brentano had included love and hatred in his list of paradigmatic intentional states). Broad 
distinguished between two kinds of experiences, those which do and those which do not have an 
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“epistemological object”. Experiences of the first kind are such that there is something they are 
about or of or directed towards, whereas experiences of the second kind are such that undergoing 
them is not being “aware of a certain object, real or fictitious”, but rather “feeling in a certain 
way” (Broad 1954, 283; emphasis in original).  
Perceiving or thinking are paradigmatic experiences with an epistemological object, in the 
sense that perceiving and thinking are, at first blush at least, perceiving of something or thinking 
about something. On the contrary, feeling hot or feeling tired were singled out by Broad as being 
paradigmatic experiences without an object, in the sense that one is not hot or tired about things 
(although one may be hot or tired because of things). Emotions, Broad claimed, belong to the 
class of experiences with an epistemic object, since we are afraid of things, angry at people, 
guilty about our actions.  
The argument proposed by Broad was that since feelings are experiences without epistemic 
objects, and emotions are experiences with epistemic objects, emotions cannot be feelings. This 
argument, however, is problematic. Its main limitation is that is presupposes that experiences 
either are about epistemic objects or they are feelings. A feeling theorist may quickly evade the 
argument by saying that the emotions are those feelings which do have epistemic objects. It is 
hard to imagine that Descartes, Hume or James would have denied that one can be afraid of 
things, or angry about things.  
 
4.2.1. Kenny on formal objects 
A more promising formulation of the Argument from Intentionality can be found in the 
work of Anthony Kenny (1963). His main critique to the feeling theory is summarized in the 
following passage: 
 
Descartes and Hume, with the philosophers and psychologists who 
followed them, treated the relationship between an emotion and its 
formal object, which is a logical one, as if it were a contingent 
matter of fact. If the emotions were internal impressions…there 
would be no logical restrictions on the type of object which each 
emotion could have. . It would be a mere matter of fact that people 
were not angered by being benefited, nor afraid of what they 
already know to have happened…In fact, each emotion is 
appropriate-logically, and not just morally appropriate-only to 
certain restricted objects (192). 
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 Kenny (1963) was the first emotion theorist to clearly distinguish between two aspects of the 
intentionality of the emotions. On the one hand, he argued, emotions have material objects, i.e. 
what Broad had called epistemic objects. For example, the material object of Donald Trump’s 
pride may be constituted by the Trump Tower in New York City. But Kenny (1963) also added 
that “each emotion is appropriate-logically, and not just morally appropriate-only to certain 
restricted objects” (192). In this case, we are no longer referring to material objects, since the 
relation between an emotion and its material object holds contingently, rather than with logical 
necessity. Different people may be proud with respect to different material objects, or the same 
person may be proud with respect to different material objects at different times.   
What Kenny meant is that it “is not possible…to be…proud of…something which one 
regards as an evil unmixed with good…[or] to envy something which one believes to belong to 
oneself, or to feel remorse for something in which one believes one had no part” (193). Besides 
having material objects, Kenny suggested, emotions have formal objects, where the “formal 
object of Φ-ing is the object under that description which must apply to it if it is to be possible to 
Φ it” (189). What Kenny is referring to here is clearly conceptual possibility, not physical 
possibility. Kenny is not saying that nobody will be physically capable of envying something 
which one believes belongs to oneself, but rather that the concept of envy will not be instantiated 
unless what is envied can be described as something which the emoter does not believe belongs 
to himself.  
The same entity, say the Trump Tower, may be the material object of many different 
emotions for different people. Different people can be angry about it, or envious about it, or 
afraid about it. Kenny’s key point is that, whenever one of these emotions is instantiated with 
respect to the Trump Tower, it must be possible to describe the tower in a way that is logically 
appropriate to the emotion at hand. For example, if only what has property P is such that it can 
be envied, then the Trump Toward must be describable as P, which would specify the formal 
object of envy. The same principle can be applied to every emotion E, in the sense that if only 
what is PE can be E-ed, then the description “thing which is PE” will give us the formal object of 
E-ing.  
By assuming that emotions are essentially feelings, Kenny complained, emotion theorists of 
the past have failed to account for the logical relation between emotions and their formal objects. 
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On the one hand, Kenny doubted that feelings can have material objects in the first place. On the 
other hand, even if they did, “there would be no logical restrictions on the type of [formal] object 
which each emotion could have”, contrary to the assumption that “each emotion is appropriate-
logically, and not just morally appropriate-only to certain restricted objects” (192). At best, 
feeling theorists such as Descartes and Hume understood that an emotion could be about 
something contingently. What they did not realize, according to Kenny, is that there is something 
an emotion must be about necessarily. This, in a nutshell, is the Argument from Intentionality 
against the feeling theory.  
We can find versions of this argument in basically all early and contemporary cognitivist 
texts, for example in Broad (1954), Pitcher (1956), Solomon (1976), Nussbaum (2001), Gordon 
(1987), Greenspan (1988) and many others. The question is: Is it a good argument? I see two 
main problems with it. The first problem is that sometimes emotions appear not to have 
epistemological or material objects at all. Often people are not envious or angry about material 
objects such as a tower or a bear. For example, one may be afraid that the world will come to an 
end, or ashamed that income is unfairly distributed. What would the material objects be in such 
cases? We may deal with this sort of difficulty by substituting talk of material objects with talk 
of particular objects, where the particular object of E comprises whatever it is that E is 
contingently about. The particular object could be a physical object, an event, a state of affairs, 
and the like.  
A more resilient difficulty is that even an expanded notion of particular object seems not to 
accommodate all cases of emotion. On some occasions, it seems that there is really nothing an 
emotion is contingently about. Sometimes one is anxious, or afraid, or depressed, or angry, but 
not about anything in particular. These are instances of what we commonly refer to as objectless 
emotions. Their existence creates a problem for Kenny’s argument, which relies on the 
presupposition that “[i]t is possible to be hungry, without being hungry for anything in particular, 
as it is not possible to be ashamed without being shamed of anything in particular” (Kenny 1963, 
60).  
The problem is that if the strategy is arguing that emotions cannot be essentially feelings 
because they are logically appropriate only to certain restricted formal objects, and the formal 
object of Φ-ing is the material object of Φ-ing “under that description which must apply to 
[them] if it is to be possible to Φ it” (189), the existence of objectless emotions threatens the 
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Argument from Intentionality at its core. Various strategies have been employed to reconcile 
objectless emotions with the claim that all emotions have intentionality. One is to say that 
objectless emotions, contrary to appearances, do have particular objects, just extremely peculiar 
ones. When we are depressed or angry without an object, what we are depressed or angry about 
are in effect “things in general”, “the blackness of things”, “one’s present total environment”. 
Another strategy could be to say that objectless emotions are not really emotions, but, say, 
moods.  
A further option, the one favoured by Kenny, is to say that objectless emotions are 
derivative, and not sufficiently common to worry about them too much. All these strategies seem 
to me ad hoc, in a way that reveals a philosophically anaemic understanding of the intentionality 
of the emotions. There are other ways in which we can try to get a grip on intentionality other 
than in terms of the possession of objects.  
The most promising one appears to me that in terms of norm-answerability: an X is 
intentional insofar as it is answerable to norms establishing how X ought to be. Another way to 
put the same point is to say that X is intentional insofar as it can be both constitutively successful 
and constitutively unsuccessful, namely in agreement or in contrast with its intentionality-
constitutive goal. This is the approach to intentionality championed for example by John Searle 
(1983), who understood intentional states as states having conditions of satisfaction, which are 
the conditions which must obtain in order for the state to be the way it is supposed to be.  
This approach to intentionality has originated some of the most influential attempts to 
naturalize intentionality, such as those proposed by Ruth Millikan (1984, 2004) and Fred Dretske 
(1986, 1988) in the context of the research program that goes under the banner of teleosemantics. 
If we think of the intentionality of the emotions in terms of their having particular objects, we 
run into the obstacle of objectless emotions. Removing that obstacle within the object-based 
approach to intentionality leads to concocting outlandish objects for objectless emotions, or to 
dismissing them in some way or other. But nothing is in my view achieved by saying that 
objectless anxiety is anxiety about the blackness of things, or that anxiety is just a mood, or that 
we should not worry about it because we are generally anxious about specific things. If we think 
of the intentionality of the emotions in terms of their conditions of satisfaction, on the other 
hand, we are led to ask potentially fruitful questions. Is objectless anxiety a case of emotion 
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which fails to fulfill its intentionality-constitutive purpose? Or is there an intentionality-
constitutive purpose which objectless anxiety serves precisely by being objectless?  
To answer questions of this sort, we would have to know something about the purposes of 
emotions, a topic I will address in a systematic form only in chapter 10. For now, let us limit 
ourselves to transforming the notion of formal object from an object-based to a norm-based 
understanding of intentionality. According to Kenny, the formal object of Φ-ing is the particular 
object of Φ-ing under that description which must apply to it if it is to be possible to Φ it.  
Under the version I propose, the formal object of Φ-ing is a description of its condition of 
satisfaction, namely a description of the condition which must obtain in order for Φ-ing to be the 
way it is supposed to be. The relation between Φ-ing and its formal object is still logical, but the 
normative dimension has now been brought center stage. We can now say that, in order for 
something to be a correct Φ-ing, the formal object of Φ-ing must be instantiated. We have in 
effect characterized Φ-ing as the sort of thing which must have a certain constitutive purpose to 
be what it is. Under this view, whether or not an emotion has a particular object is no longer the 
key issue. The key issue is whether or not an emotion fulfils its constitutive purpose.  
I will assume that the Argument from Intentionality has thereby been defended from the 
objection that some emotions do not have particular objects. But we now have a new problem in 
our hands. Kenny and the cognitivists have used the Argument from Intentionality as a weapon 
against feeling theorists, arguing that “if the emotions were internal impressions…there would be 
no logical restrictions on the type of object which each emotion could have”. When formal 
objects are understood in terms of conditions of satisfaction, the argument takes the following 
form: emotions could not be essentially feelings because feelings lack conditions of satisfaction. 
Kenny’s (1963, 14) Argument from Intentionality rested on the assumption that “emotions, 
unlike pain, have objects: we are afraid of things, angry with people, ashamed that we have done 
such-and-such”.  
But once we make room for the possibility that emotions have formal objects despite lacking 
particular objects, this possibility extends to feelings. Insofar as pain has a formal object in the 
modified sense I described, namely conditions of satisfaction, then pain can definitely have 
“logical restrictions” on what the object of its correct instantiation is. Once we think of pain this 
way, it appears not too hard to imagine what the constitutive goal of pain could be. As argued by 
Tye (1996), pain may have the constitutive goal of detecting tissue damage. It’s not important to 
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evaluate whether or not this is a good account of pain. The point is that the question of whether 
or not feelings can have intentionality becomes an open one, once we abandon a restrictive 
understanding of intentionality in terms of the possession of particular objects.  
 
 
4.3. THE ARGUMENT FROM DIFFERENTIATION 
 
Another central cognitivist argument against the feeling theory is that differences between 
feelings, whether we understand them as sensations of pain and pleasure as recommended by 
Hume or as perceptions of bodily changes as recommended by James, do not map the differences 
between emotions. For example, two different emotions may have the same feeling attached to 
them, and the same emotion may have different feelings at different times. This sort of critique, 
as I anticipated in the section on Skinner (1953), had become very influential after Cannon 
(1929)’s sweeping attack to the James -Lange theory. Writes Cannon: 
[T]he sympathetic system goes into action as a unit-there may be 
minor variations as, for example, the presence or absence of 
sweating, but in the main features integration is characteristic. [The 
same visceral changes] occur in such readily distinguishable 
emotional states as fear and rage…[as well as in] such relatively 
mild affective states as those attending chilliness, hypoglycemia 
and difficult respirations, and such a markedly different experience 
as that attending the onset of fever. The responses in the viscera 
seem too uniform to offer a satisfactory means of distinguishing 
emotions which are very different in subjective quality (Cannon 
1929, 351-352) 
The idea here is that even in those cases in which an emotion does involve a bodily change, 
such bodily change will be undifferentiated between different emotion types. In other words, it 
will not be the case that each emotion has its own specific bodily signature. The Cannonian 
critique was echoed in practically all early cognitive critiques of the feeling theory, and it is to 
this day one of the main reasons why cognitivists urge the abandonment of the feeling theory as 
they understand it (e.g. Solomon 2003, Nussbaum 2001). Kenny (1963) stated for example that 
“[I]t soon became clear that many of the somatic phenomena characteristic of particular 
emotions occurred also in connection with quite different emotions” (38-39). Bedford (1957) 
presented the following example: “Indignation and annoyance are two different emotions; but, to 
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judge from my own case, the feelings that accompany indignation appear to differ little, if at all, 
from those that accompany annoyance. I certainly find no feeling, or class of feelings, that marks 
off indignation from annoyance, and enables me to distinguish them from one another. The 
distinction is of a different sort from this” (79). The cognitivist’s suggestion was that what 
differentiates one emotion from the other is the appraisal associated with it. This line of thought 
was bolstered by two influential experiments published in the 1960s.   
The first was performed by Speisman, Lazarus et al. (1964), who demonstrated that subjects 
exposed to a film depicting what looked like a painful ritual operation on the genitalia of the 
young members of an African tribe found the movie stressful to different degrees depending on 
its commentary. A trauma commentary, which emphasized the pain of the subjects involved, was 
associated with more stress than a denial commentary, which suggested that no pain was 
involved, which it turn was associated with more stress than an intellectualization commentary, 
which encouraged subjects to take a detached attitude on the events portrayed. Lazarus took this 
experiment to show that between a stressor event and the experience of stress there must be an 
intervening process, which in this case was assumed to be that which the commentary allowed to 
manipulate experimentally.  
Lazarus provided a general description of this intervening process in a number of 1950s 
papers, speaking about stress depending on “differences in the meaning of the situation” 
(Lazarus, Deese and Osler 1952, 294), or in the “degree of relevance of the situation to the 
emotive state” (Lazarus and Baker 1956a, 23) or to the “subject’s definition of the situation” 
(Lazarus and Baker 1956b, 267).  
In 1960, Magda Arnold (1960) introduced the term “appraisal” to designate the evaluation 
that brings about the emotion: 
To arouse an emotion, the object must be appraised as affecting me 
in some way, affecting me personally as an individual with my 
particular experience and my particular aims (171) 
Previous theories of the emotions, Arnold claimed, had mainly focuses on clarifying the 
causal relation between bodily changes and the experience of emotion, especially in the 
aftermath of James’ controversial claim that the bodily change is, contrary to common sense, 
what causes the emotional experience. What only a few theories had dealt with, she argued, was 
“the problem of how cold perception can cause either the felt emotion or the bodily upset” (93). 
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Further evidence on the crucial role played by appraisal in the elicitation of emotion was 
offered by Stanley Schachter and Jerome E. Singer (1962). The experimenters’ starting point was 
precisely the Argument from Differentiation against James’ feeling theory. They argued that “the 
variety of emotion, mood, and feeling states are by no means matched by an equal variety of 
visceral patterns” (379). The absence of physiological differentiation raised the question of what 
distinguished from one another emotions which were associated with undistinguishable 
physiological changes. Schachter and Singer reported that dissatisfaction with the Jamesian 
approach to emotional differentiation led a number of researchers “to suggest that cognitive 
factors may be major determinants of emotional states” (379). The theory Schachter and Singer 
wanted to put to the test was what has come to be known as the two-factor theory of emotions 
(a.k.a. cognition-arousal theory of emotions). The theory is summarized in the following 
passage: 
[A]n emotional state may be considered a function of a state of 
physiological arousal and of a cognition appropriate to this state of 
arousal…It is the cognition which determines whether the state of 
physiological arousal will be labeled as “anger”, “joy”, “fear”, of 
whatever” (380) 
Schachter and Singer set out to demonstrate two main theses. On the one hand, that neither 
physiological arousal nor cognition (or appraisal) alone can bring about an emotion. On the other 
hand, that when cognition and physiological arousal occur jointly, cognition is what determines 
the identity of the emotion, whereas physiological arousal is what gives emotionality to the 
experience.  
The basic experimental setting consisted of injecting epinephrine in groups of emotional 
subjects, so as to artificially produce autonomic arousal, and then leave them in a room for 20 
minutes together with a stooge playing the role of another experimental subject participating to 
the test, officially described as a vision test. During these 20 minutes, subjects were submitted to 
either of two sets of experimental conditions, meant to elicit respectively euphoria and anger. 
Shachter and Singer claimed to have observed that subjects indeed got euphoric in the euphoria 
condition and angry in the anger condition, more so if they did not know that they had been 
injected epinephrine, indicating that the presence of arousal generates a need to cognitively label 
it. They also claimed that the subjects who had not received an injection did not get angry and 
euphoric as much as the subjects injected, concluding both that physiological arousal is 
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necessary for the instantiation of emotion and that the way it is cognized determines which 
emotion is instantiated.  
The experiment, however, is fraught by methodological flaws, concerning for example the 
unreliability of the measures used to detect the presence and intensity of anger and euphoria and 
the fact that subjects were asked to self-rate their emotions after the effects of epinephrine had 
dissipated. Moreover, the data fail to fully support the experiments’ conclusion, in the sense that 
the alleged differences between emotional indexes in different conditions are often statistically 
insignificant, and subjects who are not administered epinephrine do experience anger and 
euphoria in the two experimental settings. Moreover, the experiment has turned out to be 
difficult to replicate. Despite these shortcomings, the main message of Schachter and Singer’s 
experiment, namely that cognitions or appraisals are necessary to establish the identity of the 
emotions, has been taken to heart by psychologists ever since. It is no exaggeration to say that 
the experiment represented the main propellant of cognitivism in psychology in the 1960s and 
1970s.  
The main problem with the Argument from Differentiation is that, as I see it, it is perfectly 
compatible with the feeling theory as understood by its proponents. Descartes and Hume would 
have readily agreed with the point that the quality of emotional experiences is not sufficient to 
differentiate them. I reported Descartes’ (1650) remark that to simply assume that a passion is an 
agitation whose proximal cause is the movement of animal spirits “does not enable us to 
distinguish between the various passions: for that, we must investigate their origins and examine 
their first causes” (art. 51). I also mentioned that Hume described the indirect passions as 
deriving from a double relation of impressions of pain and pleasure, which will be common 
between different emotions, and ideas, which will serve to distinguish between emotions 
characterized by the same impressions. James (1884, 1990), the main target of the Argument 
from Differentiation, did suggest that emotions may differ in terms of their physiological 
underpinnings. What is rarely noticed is that he did not commit to this hypothesis, only 
presenting it as “abstractly possible”. James (1884) wrote: 
The various permutations and combinations of which … organic 
activities are susceptible make it abstractly possible that no shade 
of emotion, however slight, should be without a bodily 
reverberation as unique, when taken in its totality, as is the mental 
mood itself (192)  
 69
James did not develop this point, and did not rely on it in his Argument from Conceivability 
(see subsection 2.3.1). It is compatible with the Jamesian proposal to say that emotions do not 
differ from one another physiologically, yet amount to perceptions of bodily changes. This is 
because it is open to a Jamesian to say that emotions are identified not only in terms of their 
bodily changes but also of the appraisals associated with them. This turns out to be the strategy 
adopted by Prinz (2004a) in his recent defense of a James-inspired theory of emotions, which I 
discuss in chapter 7. It must also be said that since Cannon wrote on the topic, it has become less 
clear whether or not different emotions differ in terms of bodily changes, if and when they 
involve them. I will further discuss this topic in chapter 10. 
 
 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I described the main arguments which led to the demise of the feeling theory 
in the early 1960s and 1970s. What came after was the cognitivist theory of emotions.  
The Argument from Absent Consciousness made a valuable point, namely that we should 
not think of the emotions exclusively in terms of the special states of consciousness associated to 
them. Some emotions lack A-consciousness, in the sense that they occur but emoters cannot 
access the thought that they do. Some other emotions lack the specific type of bodily P-
consciousness commonly associated to them. 
The Argument from Intentionality under the interpretation I have offered made an important 
point, namely that the emotions have constitutive conditions of appropriateness. However, I have 
argued that this argument alone would not prevent them from being essentially feelings.  
The Argument from Differentiation, finally, held that since feelings do not differ from one 
another enough, something else is needed to differentiate emotions from one another. The 
cognitivist proposal is that appraisal is what does the differentiating. 
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5. EMOTIONS AS ADAPTATIONS 
 
 
The approaches I have explored so far tried to explain what the emotions are without 
focusing primarily on their origin and function. The traditions I explore in this chapter and the 
next started instead from the presupposition that understanding emotions is understanding what 
sorts of problems they are meant to solve.  
According to the evolutionary tradition, an emotion is an adaptive solution to a fundamental 
life task. The basic tenet of the evolutionary tradition can also be understood as a generalization 
assumed to be true of all emotions, namely that they were selected for in the ancestral past by 
virtue of their beneficial impact on reproductive fitness. One of the notable features of the 
evolutionary approach is that it calls our attention on the communicative function of the 
emotions, all but neglected by the traditions I have surveyed so far.  
Charles Darwin (1872) was the first to study emotional expressions within an evolutionary 
framework. Notably, Darwin did not argue that the emotions evolved because of their 
communicative function. However, he laid the groundwork for a defense of this claim, and more 
importantly, for an understanding of the emotions as a whole as adaptive traits. The evolutionary 
approach was revived by Silvan Tomkins (1962, 1995) and Robert Plutchick (1962, 1970, 1980), 
and it came to maturity with Paul Ekman (1969, 1971, 1987, 1992, 1999a, 1999b) and Carrol 
Izard’s (1969, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1992, 1993). 
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5.1. EMOTIONS AS SOLUTIONS TO FUNDAMENTAL LIFE TASKS 
 
5.1.1. Darwin   
In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), Darwin did not offer a 
theory of the emotions, but rather a theory of emotional expressions, aiming to shed light on their 
origin and nature. By emotional expression, Darwin meant “movements or changes in any part of 
the body”, for example “the wagging of a dog's tail, the drawing back of a horse's ears, the 
shrugging of a man's shoulders, or the dilatation of the capillary vessels of the skin” (28).6 The 
main Darwinian novelty was to argue that the understanding of human expressions demanded an 
evolutionary framework and an appreciation of their continuity with animal expressions.  As he 
put it, “[w]ith mankind some expressions, such as the bristling of the hair under the influence of 
extreme terror, or the uncovering of the teeth under that of furious rage, can hardly be 
understood, except on the belief that man once existed in a much lower and animal-like 
condition” (12).  
The Darwinian account, however, did not fully exploit the potential of the evolutionary 
approach with respect to the emotions. On the one hand, it only focused on emotional 
expressions, rather than on emotions as a whole. On the other hand, and more surprisingly, 
Darwin did not argue for the evolutionary function played by expressions, explicitly denying that 
the communication of information contributed to explaining their origin. Despite these 
limitations, Darwin was the first to offer an evolutionary framework for the understanding of the 
emotions, a framework whose potential was explored by others in the second half of the 20th 
century. To understand the Darwinian account of emotional expressions, it is important to 
understand how it fit into Darwin’s general research agenda. The book, initially intended as a 
section of The Descent of Man (1871), had the objective of showing that the comparison between 
human and animal expressions offers further support to the hypothesis of evolution by natural 
selection, the revolutionary idea Darwin had proposed in his masterwork, On the Origin of 
Species (1859). This is the conclusion Darwin explicitly drew at the end of his book on 
expressions, when he wrote that “the study of the theory of expression confirms to a certain 
limited extent the conclusion that man is derived from some lower animal form”. 
                                                 
6 All page numbers in this section are referred to an electronic copy of Darwin’s book edited by van Wyhe and 
accessible at http://pages.britishlibrary.net/charles.darwin/. 
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To achieve the objective of using emotional expressions to support evolution, Darwin had to 
deal with a tradition of research which understood them under the assumption that “species, man 
of course included, came into existence in their present condition” (10). Authors working on 
expression in this tradition included most prominently Bell (1844), the researcher who according 
to Darwin “laid the foundations of the subject [of expression] as a branch of science” (2), as well 
as Duchenne, Gratiolet, and Piderit. The only researcher on expressions to apply the evolutionary 
approach was Herbert Spencer, whose account Darwin developed. Bell, Darwin’s chief target, 
had stated that “many of our facial muscles are "purely instrumental in expression;" or are "a 
special provision" for this sole object.””. (Bell, as quoted in Darwin (1872, 10)). Bell’s (1844) 
view was that God had given facial muscles to human beings so as to allow them to 
communicate their inner feelings.  
Ekman (1997, xxxiv), in his preface to Darwin (1872/1997), suggested that Bell’s emphasis 
on communication may explain why Darwin did not put the evolutionary value of 
communication center stage in his account of emotional expressions. This strikes me as a 
sensible suggestion, even though Ekman does not explain what he took Darwin’s implicit 
reasoning to be. A reasonable interpretation seems to me the following. Darwin was primarily 
interested in arguing that expressions had not been given to men by God, but had rather resulted 
from evolution. To make this point, Darwin denied that expressions have primarily purposes of 
communication, as this was Bell’s rationale for assuming that God had given them to men. 
Supporting the evolutionary alternative on the basis of this denial demanded explaining how 
evolution had given expressions to men without invoking their communicative function. Darwin 
could have of course chosen another path, namely conceding to Bell that human emotions were 
there because of their communicative function, but denying the other half of his thesis, and show 
that evolution, rather than God, had been the granting authority.  
In the following passage, we can appreciate the Darwinian strategy at work. Commenting on 
Bell’s claim that God had given facial muscles to men in order to allow them to communicate 
their emotions, Darwin commented that “the simple fact that the anthropoid apes possess the 
same facial muscles as we do, renders it very improbable that these muscles in our case serve 
exclusively for expression” (10). Darwin’s strategy was to capitalize on the fact that “no one, I 
presume, would be inclined to admit that monkeys have been endowed with special muscles 
solely for exhibiting their hideous grimaces” (10) and argue that if our expressions derive from 
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those of monkeys, then we should conclude that we have not been endowed with them by God 
solely for exhibiting our own grimaces. Darwin’s central explanatory principle was a 
development of a view first expounded by an author whose identity, Darwin says, “I have not 
been able to ascertain” and opposed by Bell, namely that “what are called the external signs of 
passion, are only the concomitants of those voluntary movements which the structure renders 
necessary" (Bell, as quoted by Darwin (1872, 9)).  
This view, further articulated by Spencer against Bell, became Darwin’s trademark principle 
of “serviceable associated habits”. According to such principle, some emotional expressions are 
involuntary vestiges of voluntary actions that used to be serviceable in the ancestral past and kept 
being associated by force of habit or by reflex to the states of mind that brought them about. For 
example, the snarling expression exhibited by a human being in wrath, which consists of 
“[u]ncovering the canine tooth on one side”, “is the same as that of a snarling dog” and “[i]t 
reveals his animal descent; for no one, even if rolling on the ground in a deadly grapple with an 
enemy, and attempting to bite him, would try to use his canine teeth more than his other teeth” 
(253). The snarling expression is for Darwin inherited from “our semi-human progenitors”, who 
“uncovered their canine teeth when prepared for battle, as we still do when feeling 
ferocious…without any intention of making a real attack with our teeth” (253). Once such 
expressive habit has been established, other expressions are generated on its basis through the 
subsidiary principle of “antithesis”.  
According to such principle, states of mind opposed to those eliciting expressions according 
to the principle of serviceable associated habits will recruit expressions directly in antithesis to 
them. As Darwin remarks, if a dog in a ferocious state of mind displays a fixed stare, walks tall 
and holds his tail stiff and upright, a dog in a placid state of mind will not look intently, will 
almost crouch, and will lower and wag the tail. These two principles, however, cannot explain all 
expressions, in the sense that some of them do not appear to be associated with, or opposed to, 
any action that used to be serviceable. Darwin’s principle of the “direct action of the nervous 
system” was introduced to take care of such cases.  
According to such principle, some emotional expressions are the direct result of the 
excitation of the nervous system. “When the sensorium is strongly excited”, Darwin wrote, 
“nerve-force is generated in excess” (29), and expressions result directly. Darwin cited the 
examples of “trembling of the muscles, the sweating of the skin, the modified secretions of the 
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alimentary canal and glands” (68). The three principles operated in concert, and Darwin 
acknowledged that it is often hard to apportion their individual influences. A question we must 
get clear about is: Did Darwin deny that emotional expressions communicate and play a useful 
role for human beings?  
The answer is no, since Darwin explicitly acknowledged the communicative usefulness of 
expressions. For example, he stated that “[t]he movements of expression in the face and body, 
whatever their origin may have been, are in themselves of much importance for our welfare” 
(365). A mother and an infant, Darwin remarked, usefully communicate through facial 
expressions. We perceive other people’s sympathy towards us “by their expression; our 
sufferings are thus mitigated and our pleasures increased” (365). Generally speaking, expressions 
“reveal the thoughts and intentions of others more truly than do words, which may be falsified” 
(365). Darwin’s point is rather that the origin of expressions is not due to their usefulness for us, 
in the sense that “every true or inherited movement of expression seems to have had some 
natural and independent origin” (356).  
To put is in modern terms, Darwin’s view was that emotional expressions are at best 
exaptations, namely traits which currently play a role other than the one they were selected for. 
Darwin’s point was that although expressions “often reveal the state of the mind, this result was 
not at first either intended or expected”, as they have “been at first either of some direct use [as a 
serviceable action], or the indirect effect of the excited state of the sensorium” (357). Darwin 
offered further evidence to the effect that expressions are inherited in humans. “That these and 
some other gestures are inherited”, he stated, “we may infer from their being performed by very 
young children, by those born blind, and by the most widely distinct races of man” (353). If 
emotional expressions are the same prior to learning (in children), in the absence of learning (in 
the blind) and despite differences in learning (in different races), then Darwin thought the case 
for their inherited status would be strengthened.  
The study of emotional expressions, however, did not have for Darwin exclusively the 
purpose of bolstering the hypothesis of evolution. It also had the purpose of clarifying “how far 
particular movements of the features and gestures are really expressive of certain states of the 
mind” (13), an issue of independent interest to him. To clarify what expressions stand for what 
states of mind, Darwin combined the study of animals with that of infants and the insane, both 
assumed to be very expressive, and that of works of art, which disappointed him because he 
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believed the pursuit of beauty had prevented artists from portraying intense emotional 
expressions.  
His most interesting contributions on the study of the “state of mind-expression” relation 
were the picture and questionnaire techniques he pioneered. The former consisted of showing 
people pictures of emotional expressions, and ask them what emotions they expressed. Darwin 
only applied it to English people, but his technique has become the most used one for the study 
of the universality of emotional expressions in different cultures. Darwin’s own cross cultural 
technique consisted of sending questionnaires to English observers familiar with people from 
Africa, America, Australia, Borneo, China, India, Malaysia and New Zealand, and ask them 
about the expressions of the natives. Darwin’s questions were poorly formulated, because they 
conveyed Darwin’s expected answer (e.g. “Is astonishment expressed by the eyes and mouth 
being opened wide, and by the eyebrows being raised?”). Moreover, Darwin did not collect a 
sufficiently large sample of answers (only 36 questionnaires were returned to him). The data he 
collected, however, convinced him that “the same state of mind is expressed throughout the 
world with remarkable uniformity”.  
I take this to be a formulation of what I will call the universality of emotional expression 
thesis. According to such thesis, the emotions are expressed in the same way in all cultures in 
which they exist, and at least some emotions exist in all cultures. If the thesis is true, then we 
should be able to find some emotions expressed in the same way in all cultures. The thesis can be 
strengthened by adding to it that all emotions exist in all cultures (universality of emotion thesis) 
and that all emotions have their own distinctive expression in all cultures in which they exist 
(distinctiveness of emotional expression thesis). If the three theses are fulfilled, then all emotions 
are present in all cultures and they are expressed in the same, distinctive way. The evolutionary 
lesson Darwin drew from the cross-cultural evidence he collected was that all races of men must 
have come from a common ancestry, because they share some emotions and express them in the 
same way. 
Among the emotions present and expressed in the same way everywhere, Darwin listed 
anger, indignation, contempt, disgust, scorn, disdain, shame, and “good spirit”. Darwin was 
doubtful instead that emotions such as “Jealousy, Envy, Avarice, Revenge, Suspicion, Deceit, 
Slyness, Guilt, Vanity, Conceit, Ambition, Pride, Humility” (262) have distinctive expressions 
reliably associated to them, and did not offer data in support of the view that they existed in all 
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cultures. As argued by Ekman in his introduction to Darwin (1872/1997), after an initially 
successful run, Darwin’s book on expression “became virtually forgotten for 90 years”. 
According to Ekman, one of the chief reasons for this neglect was that Darwin proposed an 
understanding of the emotions as unlearned and biologically determined, a view which 
contrasted with the research programs that dominated the first half of the 20th century. 
The behaviorists (see chapter 3) resented the unlearned nature of Darwinian emotions, as 
they took learning through conditioning to be the tool by means of which every behavior, 
including emotional ones, could be shaped. We can add to this the fact that Darwin endorsed, 
following Spencer, a theory of emotions as feelings, which the behaviorists strongly opposed. 
The cultural relativists resented Darwin’s emphasis on biological nature, arguing that the 
emotions were more a matter of nurture than a matter of nature. In particular, as we shall see in 
subsection 5.2.4, starting in the 1920s Darwin’s evidence on the universality of emotional 
expressions was questioned by anthropologists and social scientists.  
By the early 1960s, the cultural relativists seemed to have won the day. The renewal of the 
evolutionary tradition occurred mainly through Silvan Tomkins’ Affect, Imagery and 
Consciousness (1962) and Robert Plutchick’s The Emotions: Facts, Theories and a New Model 
(1962). The insights of these two books were developed in Ekman and Izard’s theory of basic 
emotions. It should also be pointed out that in the 1960s Konrad Lorenz singled out Darwin’s 
work on expressions as sharing the founding insight of ethology, which he ascribed to Charles 
Otis Whitman and Oskar Heinroth. As Lorenz (1965) wrote in his preface to Darwin’s The 
Expression of Emotion in Animals and Humans, “reading between the lines” it becomes clear 
that Darwin was aware that “behavior patterns are just as conservatively and reliably characters 
of species as are the forms of bones, teeth, or any other bodily structure” (xii).  
Once the motor pattern of biting has been selected for, Lorenz (1965) remarked, it remains 
on board even when biting is no longer of use, just as bodily structures do when they have been 
selected for. And as bodily structures such as gill slits can take on a new function for which they 
were not selected – e.g. the function of ears -, so the motor behavior of biting, abridged into a 
“snarling” movement, can take on the new function of communicating. 
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5.1.2. Tomkins  
Silvan Tomkins’ (1962, 1995) theory of emotions, which he relabeled affects, must be 
understood as resulting from two main theoretical objectives. The first objective was to argue 
that affects, rather than drives, constituted the “primary innate biological motivating 
mechanism”. This objective demanded describing how affects differ from drives, and why they 
are primary. The second objective was to argue that affects are discrete entities, rather than 
points along a continuum of variation as recommended by dimensional theories of emotion. 
Tomkin’s solution was to describe affects as differing from drives because of their being 
abstract, general and urgent, and as differing from one another because there are perceptions of 
distinct facial changes governed by an evolved affect program. Let us briefly characterize the 
drive theory of motivation and the dimensional theory of emotions from the perceived 
shortcomings of which Tomkins developed his own theory of affects.  
 The concept of drive was coined in 1918 by Robert S. Woodworth, as a substitute for the 
older instinct. Although the notion of drive comes in different flavors, the basic idea is that 
drives motivate behaviors by virtue of internal self-regulation of physiological imbalances which 
generate a need to be satisfied. Cannon (1929) described as homeostasis the self-regulating 
biological mechanism allowing the detection and stabilization of physiological imbalances. As 
Tomkins (1995) put it, “for some few thousand years, up to and including Hull and Freud”, the 
answer to the question of what motivates organisms was that “the human animal, is driven the 
breath, to eat, to drink, and to engage in sex” (101). In Freud’s case, drives reside in the Id and 
are unconscious and irrational, a feature absent from the behaviorist theory of drives developed 
by Clark Hull in the 1940s.  
 The dimensional theory of emotion stems from an old idea, namely that feelings differ 
from one another in terms of their pleasure and pain and in terms of their intensity. In 1896, 
Wundt distinguished three dimensions of variations for feelings - pleasure-displeasure, 
excitement-calm and strain-relaxation – and argued that every distinction between feelings could 
be captured along these three dimensions. Dimensional theories of the emotions attempt to shed 
light on emotion categories by associating them to points in multidimensional spaces 
individuated by a few dimensions of quantifiable variation. Several lists of such dimensions have 
been offered since Wundt (1896), but the most popular three have been the dimensions of 
pleasure (or evaluation, valence, positivity), activation (or arousal or activity) and potency (or 
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power, control, dominance). For example, anger could be represented on a continuum of 
variation by high displeasure, high arousal, and high dominance.  
 The combined effect of the drive theory of motivation and of the dimensional theory of 
emotion was that specific affects - fear, anger, sadness, happiness, disgust -  were not the primary 
object of study, whereas drives, pleasure, activation, and potency received all the theoretical 
attention. Tomkin’s aimed to change what he judged to be a centuries-long neglect of affects. 
Tomkins’ (1995) first move was to argue that drives are powerless as motivators in the absence 
of affects, and differ from them in a number of ways: 
[T]the drive must be assisted by affect as an amplifier if it is to 
work at all …. The affect is, therefore, the primary motivational 
system because without its amplification, nothing else matters, and 
with its amplification, anything else can matter. It thus combines 
urgency and generality. It lends power to memory, to perception, 
to thought, and to action no less than to the drives (355–356) 
Consider gasping for breath in a case of anoxia, or getting excited at the sight of an 
attractive woman or man. Traditionally, these would have been considered paradigmatic 
examples of how the drive to breath or the drive to engage in sex are powerful motivators. 
Tomkins’ point is that the drive signals – lack of oxygen, presence of sexual object – would not 
motivate unless they recruited the affects of, respectively, fear and excitement. Conversely, once 
such affects are recruited by things other than drives, motivation ensues. In other words, drives 
are, differently from affects, neither sufficient nor necessary for motivation, and consequently 
not primary. For example, we can be afraid or excited because of an act of cognition, a notion 
Tomkins associated to propositional thought. One can get excited at the thought that a certain 
mathematical solution is very elegant, or afraid at the thought that nuclear war may one day wipe 
out civilization. As Tomkins (1995) puts it with respect to excitement, “[a]lthough mathematics 
and sexuality are different, the excitement that amplifies either cognitive activity or drive is 
identical” (53).  
They way in which affects amplify, Tomkins remarks in the passage above, is by combining 
urgency and generality. Affects make one care about the drive signal or the perception or the 
thought amplified by it in a very powerful and insistent way, in the sense that they make coping 
with the arousing source a priority. The idea that emotions can be characterized by their urgency 
is be the central idea around which my own theory of emotions is constructed. I will come back 
to what emotional urgency is, and why it is important in chapter 10.  
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Besides being urgent, Tomkins (1995) takes affects to be general. Most importantly, 
differently from drives affects have generality of time and generality of object. They have 
generality of time in the sense that they neither occur in cycles, nor at a pre-determined time nor 
for a fixed duration. One is not afraid in rhythmic cycles, at particular times and for a pre-
established amount of time. The hunger or thirst drives, on the other hand, occur in cycles, at 
times in which resources are depleted and for the time needed to achieve satiation. Affects have 
generality of object in the sense that what one can love or be afraid of anything, and 
consequently be motivated to all kinds of responses. On the other hand, the hunger or pain drives 
motivate a more narrow range of responses, namely eating responses or responses addressed to 
taking care of the wound. After having established that affects are the primary motivators, that 
they are urgent and that they are general, Tomkins’ proceeded to explain how many affects there 
are.  
Tomkins’ (1995) view was that “affects are primarily facial behaviors and secondarily outer 
skeletal and inner visceral behavior” (217), in the sense that visceral changes slowly follow 
facial ones and that “[w]hen we become aware of these facial responses (with or without 
concurrent visceral responses), we are aware of our affects” (217). Under this view, the reason 
why an affect motivates is that there is motivating feedback from facial and visceral responses. 
Such responses are organized by a subcortical program – an affect program -  which Tomkins 
assumed to have evolved. Since affect programs control facial and visceral changes, affects are 
type-identified by unique sets of such changes. Writes Tomkins (1995): 
If each innate affect is controlled by inherited programs that in turn 
control facial muscle responses, autonomic blood flow, respiratory, 
and vocal responses, then these correlated sets of responses will 
define the number and specific types of primary affects (58). 
Tomkins (1995) argued that there are nine “discriminable distinct sets of facial, vocal, 
respiratory, skin and muscle responses”, namely “interest, enjoyment, surprise, fear, anger, 
distress, shame, contempt and disgust” (58). For example, Tomkins described “fear-terror” as 
“eyes frozen open, pale, cold, sweaty, facial trembling, with hair erect”, “shame-humiliation” as 
“eyes down, head down”, “anger-rage” as “frown, clenched jaw, eyes narrowed, red face”. What 
is absent from these definitions of emotions are all marks of emotionality other than expressive 
and physiological ones. In effect, Tomkins understood the feeling of affect roughly as James did, 
with the substitution of visceral changes with facial changes as what type-identifies affects.  
 80
I argue that the reason why Tomkins argued that cognitions and behaviors are not 
characteristics of affects as such is that he wanted to characterize affects as an independent 
motivational mechanism. He was struck by the generality of affect, namely by the variety of 
cognitions (or drives) that can cause them and the variety of behaviors (or mental acts) they can 
cause. What Tomkins did not consider is that there is a level of description that may allow us to 
characterize affects in terms of their appraisals and behaviors despite their generality. For 
example, one can be afraid of many things, but, at first blush at least, they all appear to qualify as 
appraisals of danger. Similarly, one can do many things when in fear, but, at first blush at least, 
they all qualify as avoidance behaviors. The differentiation of the emotions from one another, as 
well as the account of their intentionality, demands that we go beyond the feelings of emotions, 
whether they are understood as feeling of visceral changes or feelings of facial changes. 
Tomkins’ (1962) central assumption was that each of the nine primary affects had distinct 
facial expressions associated to them. However, he did not have experimental data to back this 
up. The question has since become very controversial. 
What appears to be clear is that at least some of the things we ordinarily call emotions do 
not have a distinctive facial signature. This possibility was known to Tomkins, who did not 
include for example guilt and shyness in his list of primary affects. He argued that “[o]ne should 
not distinguish shame from guilt and shyness as affects, but rather as affect complexes of shame 
plus varying perceived and conceived causes and consequences” (1995, 61). Affect complexes are 
understood by Tomkins as “complex assemblies of affects and perceived causes and 
consequences” (59). The problem is that neither guilt nor shyness are kinds of shame with 
particular causes, differently from shame caused by being naked in public and shame caused by 
being caught in a strip club by one’s girlfriend.  
The category of affect complexes is not clearly defined by Tomkins, and no explicit 
rationale is given for drawing the boundary between affects and affect complexes in terms of 
possession of distinctive facial expressions. Despite these limitations, I want to argue that 
Tomkins’ affect theory was a significant step forward in the history of emotion theory, because it 
offered a framework for the evolutionary understanding of emotions. Tomkins chose the face as 
the primary site of affect in part because he believed the communicative function of emotions 
contributed to their evolution. He wrote that the human face “seems to have evolved in part as an 
organ for the maximal transmission of information, to the self and to others, and the information 
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it transmits is largely concerned with affects” (1995, 218). In this respect, his theory differs from 
Darwin’s (1872) theory, who assumed that human facial expressions are mostly vestiges of 
serviceable behaviors, currently useful but not evolved for their communicative function.  
At the same time, Tomkins believed that the primary biological function of affects was not 
that they sent signals, but that they were “sources of motivating feed-back” (90). But how to 
affects motivate? How do they communicate? What is the evidence that they evolved? 
Answering these questions is a task Tomkins (1962) left to a number of young psychologists 
who became interested in facial expressions in the early 1960s, most prominently Paul Ekman 
and Carroll Izard. 
 
5.1.3. Ekman  
The inspiring thought at the foundation of Ekman’s (1984, 15) version of affect theory is 
that “emotions evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life tasks”, a feature 
which allegedly distinguishes them from all other affective phenomena. Generally speaking, a 
trait is an adaptation in case its existence results from a process of natural selection, and it is 
adaptive at a particular time t just in case it generates differential fitness (see below). The two 
properties are orthogonal to one another at any time t, in the sense that a trait that is adaptive at 
time t may or may not be an adaptation, and a trait that is an adaptation may or may not be 
adaptive at time t.  
Ekman’s claim is that emotions are adaptations, without necessarily being currently 
adaptive. The first emotion theorist to explicitly articulate the idea that emotions evolved not 
merely because they motivate with urgency (Tomkins’ view), but because they motivate to deal 
with fundamental biological challenges was Plutchick (1962, 1970). Plutchick characterized the 
primary emotions as those fulfilling “the basic adaptive or prototype functions”. Under this view, 
he claimed that there are 8 primary emotions: 
 
Primary Emotion Biological Function 
Fear Protection 
Anger Destruction 
Joy Reproduction 
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Sadness Deprivation 
Acceptance Incorporation 
Disgust Rejection 
Anticipation Exploration 
Surprise Orientation 
Figure 3: Plutchick’s list of primary emotions 
 
“In order to provide a general definition of emotion” Plutchick (1970) argued, “we need to 
use the functional or adaptational language”. The main virtue of such language is that, differently 
from the language of, say, feelings, it “is the most general and applies to humans as well as other 
animals” (12). Under this view, “[a]n emotion is a patterned bodily reaction of either protection, 
destruction, reproduction, deprivation, incorporation, rejection, exploration or orientation, or 
some combination of these, which is brought about by a stimulus” (1970, 12). According to 
Plutchik, emotions are primary or derived from a blend of primary emotions, in the same way in 
which “all colors can be considered to result from a mixture of just a few primary colors”.  
Ekman (1999b) developed the idea that emotions must be defined in adaptational language, 
and referred to the emotions as basic emotions, to emphasize that they are understood from an 
evolutionary viewpoint. But he also added “I do not allow for “non-basic” emotions” (57), a 
position which implies that nothing can be an emotion unless it emerged from the ancestral past 
as a solution to a fundamental life task. To illustrate his understanding of life tasks, Ekman cited 
Tooby and Cosmides’s (1990) description, which includes “event times that recurred 
innumerable times in hominid evolutionary history” such as “[f]ighting, falling in love, escaping 
predators, confronting sexual infidelity, experiencing a failure-driven loss in status, responding 
to the death of a family member” (1990, 92). Ekman has changed his views on the characteristics 
and number of basic emotions through time, and I will only refer to his latest position on the 
matter.  
In Ekman (1999b), he provides a list of eleven characteristics of basic emotions: 
 
1. Distinctive universal signals 
2. Distinctive physiology 
3. Automatic appraisal, tuned to: 
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4. Distinctive universals in antecedent events 
5. Distinctive appearance developmentally 
6. Presence in other primates 
7. Quick onset 
8. Brief duration 
9. Unbidden occurrence 
10. Distinctive thoughts, memories images 
11. Distinctive subjective experience 
 
He does not “think any of the characteristics should be regarded as the sine qua non for 
emotions, the hallmark which distinguishes emotions from other affective phenomena” (1999b, 
47). Although Ekman does not fully clarify the issue, my impression is that he is convinced that, 
at least at this stage of research, something should count as a basic emotion when “enough” of 
the characteristics are fulfilled. This will create some differences between basic emotions, but 
maintain the unifying property that they all evolved. Ekman’s choice of characteristics is 
motivated by central assumptions about the nature of the adaptive value of the emotions. Writes 
Ekman (1999b): 
 
Quick onset is central to the adaptive value of emotions, 
mobilizing us quickly to respond to important events. It is also 
adaptive for the response changes which can occur so quickly not 
to last very long unless the emotion is evoked again (54). 
I believe it was central to the evolution of emotions that they 
inform conspecifics, without choice or consideration, about what is 
occurring (47). 
 
Affective phenomena which are emotions, therefore, are understood by Ekman as having 
been selected for because of their quick and short-term resource mobilization and communicative 
effect. This is the main intuition that guides Ekman’s research program. If the emotions have 
been selected for, then they should be present in other primates and have a distinctive appearance 
developmentally. If the emotions have been selected for in part because of their speed and 
efficiency, then (a) their appraisal mechanism should be automatic, namely “capable of operating 
with great speed [and] without awareness” (Ekman 1984, 15) (quick onset), (b) “there will be 
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some common elements in the contexts in which emotions are found to occur” (distinctive 
universals in antecedent events), (c) their duration is “certainly…not hours or days, but more in 
the realm of minutes or seconds” (brief duration) (16) and (d) “there should also be physiological 
changes preparing the organism to respond differently in different emotional states” (distinctive 
physiology). If emotions have been selected for in part because of their communicative function, 
then we should expect them to be endowed with distinctive facial expressions invariant in all 
cultures (distinctive universal signals).  
The unbidden occurrence of basic emotions is a consequence of the automaticity of 
appraisals, changes in expression and changes in physiology, where the automaticity explains 
why “we often experience emotions as happening to us”. Ekman also mentions that he expects 
the emotions to “regulate the way in which we think” (distinctive thoughts, memories, images), 
and that they comprise a distinctive subjective experience, although he distrusts the evidence 
about such experience because “most of what we know about subjective experience comes from 
questionnaires, filled out by people who are not having an emotion, trying to remember what it 
feels like” (Ekman 1999b, 55).  
What is notably absent from the list of characteristics is the presence of distinctive 
behavioral responses, which are obviously characteristic of emotions if they have evolved to deal 
with specific life tasks (e.g. attack behaviors are characteristic of anger). I suspect the reason 
why Ekman did not include them in the list is that they appeared to him to be too open-ended for 
being recruited by an affect program, the “mechanism that stores the patterns for [the] complex 
organized responses” (1980, 82) characteristic of the basic emotions. I already discussed this 
point with respect to Tomkins, so I won’t speculate on this matter further. I will take affect 
programs to govern behavioral responses as well, a view that is broadly compatible with 
Ekman’s statements on the matter.   
How many basic emotions are there? Ekman’s (1999b, 55) answer is that “[a]lthough the 
evidence is certainly not available now”, there are fifteen emotions which “will be found to share 
the characteristics listed” above: amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, 
embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness/distress, satisfaction, 
sensory pleasure, and shame . Each of these emotions represents a theme or a family, which 
admits of variations. For example, the anger family will include rage, irritation, frustration, fury, 
the sadness family will include sorrow, melancholy, disappointment, and so on. Ekman (1999b, 
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55) points out that “[e]ach member of an emotion family shares the characteristics” that 
distinguish the family from all other families. This implies that however rage and frustration may 
differ, Ekman assumes them to have the distinctive universal signals of anger, the distinctive 
physiology of anger, the distinctive quick onset of anger, and so on.  
Ekman is aware that there are things we ordinarily call emotions which are not likely to 
fulfill enough or even any of the characteristics of basic emotions. He considers the examples of 
interest, romantic love, parental love, hatred, grief, and jealousy, and remarks that he does not 
expect we will find evidence to the effect that they are basic emotions. The examples could be 
multiplied, in the sense that many of what James called the “subtler emotions” (e.g. intellectual, 
aesthetic and moral emotions) do not appear likely to have enough of the characteristics of basic 
emotions. A further difficulty is that there are tokens of the basic emotion types which appear to 
lack the characteristics of basic emotion types. For example, there are tokens of anger, fear, 
disgust, sadness, surprise and joy - the six basic emotions for which Ekman thinks we have the 
strongest evidence - which lack automatic appraisal, last for a long time, have no distinctive 
facial signals, have no distinctive physiology, and have no distinctive subjective experience. An 
unconscious token of fear of failing, for example, lacks all such characteristics.  
Ekman’s strategy is simply to insist that there are no emotions other than the basic ones. But 
this clearly calls for a rationale, in the sense that it is not enough to say that jealousy is not an 
emotion because it lacks the characteristics of basic emotions. The question is: Why should the 
eleven characteristics of basic emotions matter?  
To answer this question demands getting clear on the appropriate methodology for the study 
of emotions, a task I tackle in chapter 9. 
 
 
5.2. THE ARGUMENT FROM EVOLUTION 
 
5.2.1. The pitfalls of adaptationist thinking 
Generally speaking, what counts as evidence that a trait T was selected for is that several 
empirical facts about it are best explained by the hypothesis that there has been an “adaptive 
environment” E and an “adaptive time” t in which: 
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 (1) Organisms Os varied as to whether they had trait T (principle of variation)  
(2) The offspring of organisms with T had T (principle of heredity)  
(3) Having T was beneficial in E in comparison with not having T, in the sense that it gave 
individuals with T “differential fitness” (ceteris paribus, organisms with T left more 
offspring than organisms without T) (principle of differential fitness) 
 
Common examples of empirical facts that offer support for an evolutionary explanation of T 
are the presence of T in similar form in related species, the presence of T in newborn organisms 
and, in the case of human traits, the presence of T in similar form in different cultures. As 
Griffiths (1997) has argued, we must be very careful about the way in which we interpret these 
facts, which are neither necessary nor sufficient for T to be an adaptation. For example, T may be 
an adaptation but appear in very different form in different species, since “homologies”, which 
are “traits possessed by all and only the descendants of the ancestral species in which these traits 
originate” comprise “examples which have been radically transformed in form and function”, 
such as “human arms”, the “wings of birds” and the “flippers of dolphins”.  
 On the other hand, T may not be an adaptation, but appear in similar form in different 
cultures, because of species-constant learning. Before describing the evidence for the evolution 
of the emotions, it is important to point out that evolutionary explanations are often offered in 
emotion theory without much supporting evidence. A case in point is represented by the account 
of the emotions proposed by a number of evolutionary psychologists. Evolutionary psychologists 
view the mind as “a crowded zoo of evolved, domain-specific programs” (Tooby and Cosmides 
1990, 91), and aim to apply evolutionary explanations to a much larger set of emotions that those 
admitted as basic by affect program theorists such as Ekman and Izard. As argued by Griffiths 
(1997), this is a result of “adaptive thinking”, which he takes to characterize the evolutionary 
psychology program as a whole. The issues surrounding the notion of adaptive thinking are 
complex, and they cannot be discussed in any detail here.  
 For the purposes of this dissertation, adaptive thinking is to be understood as the arbitrary 
formulation of adaptationist hypotheses and their acceptance on the basis of scant evidence, 
roughly along the lines first denounced by Gould and Lewontin (1978). Let us briefly consider 
Tooby and Cosmides (1990) account of the emotions. Their view is that “[t]o the extent that 
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situations are structured and recurred through evolutionary time, their statistical properties can be 
used as the basis for a special kind of psychological adaptation: an emotion” (410). More 
precisely, Tooby and Cosmides argue that “conditions or situations relevant to emotions”, 
namely situations that call for emotion-programs as adaptive solutions, are distinguished by five 
characteristics: they recurred ancestrally, they could not be successfully negotiated in the 
absence of a superordinate level of program coordination, they had a rich and reliably repeated 
structure, they had reliable cues signaling their presence, and they were on a type in which an 
error would have resulted in large fitness costs.  
 The problem is that it is easy to come up with plausible accounts of recurrent situations of 
this kind in correspondence with most if not all emotions, and describe these “situations” at an 
arbitrary level of specificity. Tooby and Cosmides argue for example that they consider “fear of 
predators”, “guilt”, and “sexual jealousy” to be adaptations. According to their account, 
however, we may just as well consider fear of lions, or guilt about incest, or sexual jealousy 
towards a daughter to be distinct emotion-programs. For example, we may say that the 
opportunity to have sex with a relative recurred ancestrally, that it could not be successfully 
negotiated in the absence of a guilt program specifically taking care of it, that the situation had a 
rich and reliably repeated structure, that it had reliable cues signaling its presence, and that it was 
of a type which would have resulted in a large fitness cost (e.g. children who are unhealthy). But 
the availability of a plausible story about the evolution of incest-caused guilt is clearly not hard 
evidence for its truth. 
 As Griffiths (1997) pointed out, adaptationist thinking of this kind can have a 
“substantive negative heuristic effect”, because it not only prevents us from considering 
alternative non evolutionary explanations, but it also leads us to the wrong expectations 
concerning the operations of evolution. As he puts it, “[c]ontrary to the predictions of the 
evolutionary psychologists, affect programs are designed to cope with quite general evolutionary 
problems, and the affect program system is designed to redefine those problems as the 
environment changes”. These features are apparent in Ekman’s research program. He described 
affect programs as being open programs in Ernest Mayr’s sense, emphasizing that they evolved 
“so that we can learn what will work in the particular environment in which we are living” 
(Ekman 2003, 66). This would be incompatible with having a fear program very specialized in 
terms of its elicitors, say a lion-caused or even a predator-caused fear program.  
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 Rather, the fear affect program evolved to deal with danger, a category at a higher level 
of abstraction than either predators or lions. This suggests that, even though Ekman regularly 
quotes Tooby and Cosmides (1990) to illustrate what he means by fundamental life task, his 
understanding of this notion is more general. The expectation that affect programs will deal with 
general rather than specific evolutionary problems – danger rather than lions – finds further 
support in the presence of developmental constraints on evolution, which limit the degree to 
which evolutionary problems can be dealt with independently of one another (Gould and 
Lewontin 1978).  
 Most importantly, Ekman and other members of the affect program tradition do not 
accept as evidence for the basic status of an emotion its mere compatibility with an adaptationist 
story. Empirical support is required that a significant number of the 11 characteristics of basic 
emotions are indeed fulfilled. As a testimony of the stricter criteria of admission to the category 
of basic emotions, even by the lights of his most liberal list Ekman (1999b) does not think that 
guilt, love and jealousy, let alone their more specific sub-species, are basic emotions. In other 
words, he does not think that we have sufficient empirical evidence about their facial signals, 
physiological changes, presence in other primates, and so on to conclude that the hypothesis of 
adaptation is well-supported. The evolutionary psychology literature is instead replete with 
poorly supported accounts of the evolution of guilt, love, jealousy and many other emotions (e.g. 
Buss 2002; see Buller 2005 for a thorough critical analysis of the evidential support of 
evolutionary psychology).  
What is the evidence offered by affect program theorists, as well as by researchers in other 
fields, about the evolution of basic emotions? Roughly speaking, there seem to be two main 
domains of facts supporting the hypothesis that at least some instances of some basic emotions 
can be given an evolutionary explanation: (a) the nature of emotional appraisal, and (b) the 
nature of emotional expressions. Let us consider them in turn. 
 
5.2.2. The neurobiology of emotional appraisal 
Starting with Zajonc (1980), a flurry of research has investigated the automatic appraisal 
system associated with emotions, and described its main functional and neurobiological 
characteristics. It is uncontroversial by now that the appraisal processes characteristic of some 
tokens of some basic emotion types manifests several of the properties of the input systems 
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Fodor (1983) called modules (see chapter 10 for discussion). For example, there is strong 
evidence that the dedicated neural architecture of some forms of emotional appraisal is 
phylogenetically old, and shared in homologous form across species.  
 
 
 
The idea that emotions may not rely on cortical neural pathways finds its first precursors in 
Cannon (1929) and Bard (1929). The Jamesian account of emotions, the first to address the issue 
of emotional neurobiology, indicated in the areas of the neocortex that mediate visual, auditory, 
and somatosensory sensation the brain areas involved in the elicitation of emotions. By means of 
lesion studies, Cannon (1929) and Bard (1929) brought a first blow to this idea. For example, 
Bard (1929) showed that the removal of the entire neocortex did not prevent the occurrence of 
rage responses in animals, whereas the integrity of the hypothalamus, a subcortical region, was 
required for such responses to be displayed. Cannon and Bard maintained that the feeling of 
emotion depended upon the activation of the neocortex, activated through nerve fibers ascending 
from the hypothalamus.  
 Cannon and Bard’s intuitions were further elaborated by Papez (1937), who provided the 
first fairly detailed account of the areas of the brain involved in the elicitation of emotions. What 
later came to be known as the Papez circuit comprises the hypothalamus, the anterior thalamus, 
the cingulated gyrus and the hippocampus. A further important paper was published in the same 
year by Kluver and Bucy (1937), who described a suite of behavioral changes in monkeys 
brought about by damage to the temporal lobe – a portion of the cerebral cortex. It was reported 
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that the removal of the temporal lobe in a monkey resulted in the fact that “the animal does not 
exhibit the reactions generally associated with anger and fear”.  
 For example, they would no longer respond with fear to the presence of snakes, which 
previously generated strong emotional reactions. Moreover, the animal lost the ability to 
recognize what objects are eatable, despite maintaining the ability to visualize them and navigate 
through them appropriately. Similarly, the animal lost the ability to orient its sexual behaviors to 
monkeys of the opposite sex, attempting copulation with members of its own sex as well as 
animals of other species. They described this condition as “psychic blindness” - a syndrome now 
known as Kluver and Bucy syndrome -, namely the inability to understand the significance of 
objects in the environment while maintaining the ability to see, smell, touch, taste, and hear 
them. Weiskrantz (1956) showed that the syndrome could be produced by lesions limited to 
only one area of the temporal lobe, namely the amygdala.  
 The turning point in the study of the emotional brain came with MacLean’s (1949, 1952, 
1960, 1969) masterful synthesis of several disparate sources of evidence on the role played by 
the brain in the elicitation of emotions. MacLean (1952) was interested in investigating the 
neural correlates of emotion, and claimed that we can only understand them if we realize the 
“hierarchical organization of the brain”. He argued that “man’s brain…has inherited the structure 
and pattern of organization of three basic types, which, for simplifying reasons, I refer to as 
reptilian, paleomammalian, and neomammalian [which] must intermesh and function together as 
a triune brain” (338). The reptilian brain “comprises much of the reticular system, midbrain, and 
basal ganglia” (338), the paleomammalian brain “is distinguished by a marked outgrowth of 
primitive cortex, which…is synonymous with the limbic cortex” (338), and the mammalian brain 
which is distinguished by a neocortex highly differentiated from the primitive cortex, and which 
is “the hallmark of the brains of higher mammals and which culminates in man to become the 
brain of reading, writing and arithmetic” (339).  
 MacLean called limbic system - limbic means “forming a border around” the brainstem - 
the conjunction of the “limbic cortex and structures in the brainstem with which it has primary 
connections” (339), substituting limbic system for what he had earlier called visceral brain 
(MacLean, 1949). MacLean included in the limbic system amygdala, septum, hippocampal 
formation, orbitofrontal cortex and cingulated gyrus. In his impressive synthesis, MacLean 
marshaled several sources of evidence for the hypothesis that the limbic system is crucially 
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involved in emotional phenomena. Besides the works by Cannon, Bard, Papez and Kluver and 
Bucy discussed so far, MacLean reported and discussed a number of further neurobiological 
studies. For example, MacLean (1970, 341) claimed that “the most convinging evidence that the 
limbic system is involved in emotional functions” was constituted by the study of human patients 
with temporal lobe epilepsy.  
 This kind of epilepsy, as shown by Malamud (1966, 194), is caused by damages of the 
hippocampal component of the limbic system. MacLean reported that in the proximity of 
seizures such patients manifested what he labeled basic affects (e.g. hunger, thirst, nausea, 
warmth and the need to defecate or urinate) and general affects (e.g. fear, sadness, anger and 
paranoid feelings). MacLean reported that Penfield et al. (1954) proved that electrical stimulation 
of the limbic system could produce results analogous to those occurring in cases of naturally 
occurring seizure. MacLean was also impressed by Hess’s (1956) and Hunsperger (1956) studies 
on the results of the electrical stimulation of cats’ brains. Such studies had shown, MacLean 
(1960) claimed, that angry defensive behaviors in cats – inclusive of facial expressions, postures, 
specific cardiac activity and action tendencies- , could be produced by direct stimulation of the 
hypothalamus.  
 On the basis of these and other sources of evidence, MacLean concluded that the limbic 
system “is essentially similar throughout the mammalian scale” (1969, 673) and that “in addition 
to olfactory functions, the limbic cortex is involved in emotional behavior and associated 
endocrine and viscerosomatic activities” (339). Notably, MacLean also suggested that some of 
the phenomena Freud tried to capture by positing the existence of the unconscious Id could be 
explained in terms of the tension between areas of the brain emerged at different points in 
phylogenetic history.  
 Since the appearance of MacLean’s influential account, there has been much debate 
concerning the exact role of the limbic system in the generation of emotional phenomena. It has 
become rather clear that, contrary to MacLean’s theory, there isn’t a localized system in the brain 
devoted to the production of emotions. As Le Doux (1996, 99) put it, “MacLean and later 
enthusiasts of the limbic system have not managed to give us a good way of identifying what 
parts of the brain actually make up the limbic system”. It was shown for example that the 
distinction between an old and a new cortex was questionable on anatomical grounds (Le Doux 
1996, 100). Also, the idea that higher cognitive functions are served by the neocortex exclusively 
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was put into question by studies that show that declarative memory can be impaired by damaging 
the hippocampus in a way that preserves instead the ability to produce emotional responses. 
There are two possible responses to the mounting evidence that the limbic system as understood 
by Maclean  has at best unclear identity conditions.  
One is championed by Le Doux (1996) and Brothers (1997), who argued that “the limbic 
system term…is imprecise and…should be discarded” (Le Doux 1996, 101). The other is 
championed by Panskepp (2000), who suggests that we should keep using the term as long as we 
understand it as “higher-order conceptual entity that helps us designate  and discuss the general 
locations of the families of functional neural systems commonly placed under the conceptual 
umbrella “emotion”” (139). Panksepp’s (2000) idea is to employ the idea of limbic system to 
designate and study “the general brain areas that are especially influential in elaborating 
emotions” (140), thereby defining the limbic system not in terms of its anatomy and 
phylogenetic history but, rather, in terms of its function.  Panskepp (2000) ultimately thinks that 
“credible answers to out affective questions will gradually come as we unravel the integrated 
brain structures that mediate the best external signs of emotionality we can agree upon” (139).  
 I will not take position on this controversy here. What I take to be important about the 
neurobiological evidence I described are two things in particular. Firstly, that it offers strong 
evidence for the evolutionary continuity of human and animal basic emotions. Secondly, that it 
provides a neurobiological mechanism for making sense of an idea we have seen hinted at over 
and over again in the history of emotion theory, namely that emotional appraisal is in many cases 
primitive and does not recruit complex cognitive abilities. Even if we discard the idea of an all-
purpose system for the emotions, the fact that phylogenetically old circuits of the brain may 
mediate some forms of emotionality maintains its import. Le Doux (1996) is both a critic of the 
limbic system hypothesis, and the main contributor to the elucidation of the neural underpinnings 
of fear, the best understood emotion from the neurobiological point of view.  
 LeDoux (1996) demonstrated by means of ingenious lesion studies that there is a kind of 
fear elicited in a reflex-like fashion through a neural low road that bypasses the neocortex, and 
projects along a subcortical pathway directly to the amygdala. This form of fear is supplemented 
by high road fear, which projects instead to the amygdala indirectly through the sensory cortex. 
The picture below summarizes the two neural pathways to fear as described by LeDoux (1996): 
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Figure 4: Le Doux’s high and low pathways to fear 
 
LeDoux (1996) persuasively argued that the neurobiological discovery of a low road to fear 
indicates that “emotional responses can occur without the involvement of the higher processing 
systems of the brain, systems believed to be involved in thinking, reasoning, and consciousness” 
(1996, 161). The fact that fear conditioning demonstrably occurs along subcortical neural 
pathways provides evidence to the conclusion that there is a kind of fear which can be found in 
homologous form in distinct species.  
 A further strand of research on fear appraisal offers evidence that fear was selected for by 
natural selection. Seligman (1971) reasoned that, if fear is an adaptation, then appraisal should be 
especially sensitive to things which have been dangerous in ancestral time, such as spiders or 
snakes or threatening expressions. Recently, Öhman (1999, 2002) has applied the backward 
masking technique  developed by Marcel (1983) to argue that we are in fact prepared to fear 
spiders, snakes and threatening expressions more than other things. Backward masking consists 
of the presentation of two stimuli in rapid succession, a target stimulus and a masking stimulus. 
When the interval between the two presentations – the time of stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) 
- is sufficiently short (30 ms or less), the masking stimulus effectively masks the target stimulus.  
 In response to questions, subjects report that they are not aware of being exposed to the 
masked visual stimulus, in the sense that they are unable to verbally report on it. Moreover, when 
forced to guess on the characteristics of the masked stimulus, they perform at chance level. 
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Ohman demonstrated that fear conditioning to a non-masked stimulus is quicker when the 
stimulus is a snake or a spider or a threatening face than when it is a currently dangerous object 
(e.g. a gun) or a neutral one (e.g. a flower). Also, he demonstrated that whereas the fear response 
disappears with masked guns and flowers, it is maintained towards masked images of spiders, 
snakes and threatening faces, suggesting that awareness is not a requirement for the elicitation of 
fear responses to ancestral challenges. This suggests that fear of spiders is an adaptation, selected 
for in the ancestral past when it served some useful purpose.   
 
5.2.3. Facial expressions and evolution 
Ekman’s main scientific contribution consists of having collected a large amount of 
evidence in support of the thesis that basic emotions have distinctive universal signals. To this 
achievement, Ekman and his collaborators have added some preliminary evidence that at least 
some of the basic emotions have different patterns of autonomic nervous system activity. I begin 
from the latter contribution, which can be dealt with more quickly. Ekman predicted that 
physiological responses should be distinctive for each basic emotions, and invariant across 
cultures. This goes against Cannon’s (1929) critique to the feeling theory, which I reported in 
chapter 3. But although Ekman, Levenson & Friesen (1983) and Levenson, Ekman & Friesen, 
(1990) have presented some evidence that anger, fear, disgust and sadness have different 
autonomic signatures, many other studies have offered contrary evidence (e.g. Ax 1953, Malmo 
1950). At this stage of research, Ekman (1999b, 49) himself acknowledges that “the matter is far 
from being completely settled”.  
 I want to argue that we should not expect that if emotions are adaptations then they 
should have a different autonomic signature. Ekman posited this hypothesis because he thought 
that, if emotions evolved to deal with fundamental life tasks, then the physiology of the body 
should reflect optimal preparation to adaptive action when faced with them. From this it does not 
follow, however, that physiological changes must be differentiated (see my discussion in chapter 
10). As Ekman (1999b, 50) himself remarks, if “no specific pattern of motor activity had survival 
value for an emotion, then there would be no reason to expect a specific pattern of ANS activity 
to have been established for that emotion”. I want to add to this point that there may in principle 
be life tasks such that dealing with them adaptively does not even require autonomic activation, 
let alone a distinctive one.  
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What I find quite intriguing is a preliminary finding that the same autonomic activity is 
found in different cultures, because in this case the hypothesis that physiological responses 
results from species-constant learning is not very persuasive. Levenson et al. (1992) offered 
some evidence that the physiological profile of some tokens of some basic emotions is invariant 
in Western and Non-Western cultures. They showed that the Minangkabau of Western Sumatra 
have the same emotion-specific physiology detected by Ekman, Levenson & Friesen’s (1983) 
with respect to anger, fear, disgust and sadness 
Jointly with the neurobiological evidence I discussed in the previous section, the main 
source of evidence for the thesis that emotions are adaptations comes from the study of 
emotional expressions. In particular, there is evidence that (a) some emotional expressions are 
present at birth or emerge in the first few months of life, and they express the same emotions in 
infants as they do in human adults (b) some emotional expressions are present in homologous 
form in species related to man, and they express the same emotions in animals as they do in 
human adults (c) some emotional expressions are present in all cultures, and they express the 
same emotions in each of them. In 1978, Ekman and Friesen developed the Facial Action Coding 
System (FACS), a system to measure the pattern and timing of facial movement in an objective 
and precise manner (updated in Ekman et al. 2002). The system was extended in 1992 to infants, 
with the creation of the Baby FACS by Oster and Rosenstein (1992).  
Let us consider a few highlights from the literature on emotional expressions in infants and 
animals. When they are as young as 3 weeks old, infants produce the facial expression of joy 
when exposed to a friendly human face, and at 8 weeks they produce the facial response of anger 
when in pain (Izard 1994). As summarized by Izard, “[b]y 2.5 months, infants encoded full-face 
and partial expressions of interest, joy, sadness, and anger with sufficient frequency of statistical 
analysis” as well as “surprise, disgust, and fear”, although the latter three not often enough for a 
statistical analysis. Moreover, Izard demonstrated that these emotional expressions in infants 
recruited the same muscles they recruit in adults.  
 Using a version of the Baby FACS, Camras (1992) proved that arm restraint generates 
the same facial expressions of anger in 5 months old American and Japanese infants, and that 
these expressions are morphologically identical. Studies of children born blind also confirm that 
they manifest the same facial expressions of emotion as non-blind children (Goodenough, 1931, 
Thompson, 1941, Eibl-Eibesfeld 1973). Concerning facial expressions in related species, the 
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primatologists Van Hooff (1967), Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1973) and Redican (1982) reviewed the 
literature on facial expressions in New and Old World monkeys, and agreed that humans and 
monkeys show a number of the same expressions. For example, Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1973) 
argued that there is homology between the expressions of human and simian anger, sadness, and 
affection, as well as in the crying and laughter expressions. As I reported, Darwin considered the 
similarities in facial expression between humans and related species to be an important source of 
evidence for the theory of evolution.  
Most of the evidence for the evolution of facial expressions comes from cross-cultural 
studies, which have tried to establish that some emotions are expressed in the same way in all 
cultures. I now turn to the debate generated by such studies, which will lead us to the emergence 
of the social constructionist paradigm.  
 
5.2.4. Critiques of Darwin’s universality thesis  
For 90 years, The Expression of Emotions in Humans and Animals went mostly 
unrecognized. Part of the explanation for this neglect is that the universality thesis about 
emotional expressions, namely the thesis that some emotions exist and are expressed in the same 
way in all cultures, was considered to be flawed. Three influential sources of evidence were 
presented in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s in favor of the view that emotional expressions are not 
universal and more generally not inherited.7 Firstly, Floyd Allport (1924) introduced a theory of 
species-constant learning, according to which certain traits which appear invariantly in different 
cultures are learned in all cultures because of their usefulness, rather than inherited from a 
common ancestor. This means that, even if the same expressions can be proven to appear in 
every culture, the hypothesis that they are inherited is questionable. 
Secondly, Landis (1924) denied both that emotions have specific emotional expressions 
associated to them, and that such expressions could be recognized by observers. He took pictures 
of 25 subjects in 17 emotion-inducing contexts, and failed to detect a consistent emotion-
expression relationship. In 1929, Landis selected some of the most expressive pictures from his 
first study, and showed them to observers, who allegedly failed to recognize them.  
Thirdly, Klineberg (1940) questioned the assumption that similar emotions could be found 
in species related to men. He based this conclusion on the evidence that human beings could not 
                                                 
7 This reconstruction is heavily drawn from Russell (1994) 
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recognize the facial expressions of chimpanzees, as reported by Foley (1935). His view was that 
“the great difficulty experienced by untrained human observers in recognizing the emotions of 
chimpanzees from their facial expressions strengthens the hypothesis of cultural or social 
determination of the expressions of emotions in man”. Klineberg’s (1940) conviction was that 
“[e]motional expression is analogous to language in that it functions as a means of 
communication, and that it must be learned, at least in part” (179, 200).  
Klineberg detailed various examples of cross-cultural differences in the expression of 
emotion, for example the protrusion of the tongue in surprise reported in a Chinese novel. 
However, he also pointed out that “undoubtedly certain types of expressive behavior … are 
common to all human societies” (Klineberg, 1940, 176). Among the examples, he listed 
laughing, crying and trembling. Even with respect to such expressions, however, Klineberg 
suggested the presence of cultural rules. For example, even if crying is universally present in all 
cultures, there are cross-cultural differences concerning how and when one should cry. He gave 
the example of the intensity of weeping in grief, which manifests cross-cultural variation.  
Bateson and Mead (1942, 39) reported on cross-cultural differences in emotional 
instrumental behaviors. It was argued that the Balinese express fear by falling asleep. As they 
stated, “[t]he child who is frightened by the tantrum of his child nurse falls asleep as she shrieks 
out her unrestrained rage right beside his closed ear. The older child who has lost or broken some 
valuable thing will be found when his parents return…in a deep sleep…Children learn to be 
afraid of birth, and if they find themselves in the house … with a birth, they fall into a deep 
sleep…. The thief whose case is being tried falls asleep”. By the 1950s and 1960s, the idea that 
emotional expressions are universal had largely been put to rest. In her 1955 introduction to 
Darwin’s book on emotional expressions, Margaret Mead stated that the publisher had had the 
felicitous idea of “adding at the end of the book some examples of recent work which carry on 
the inquiry which Charles Darwin initiated” (Darwin 1955, vi). The list of such works clearly 
indicates that by then some of the most influential writers on expression had become supporters 
of the anti-universality thesis.  
She did mention among the additions “Konrad Lorenz’s drawings on expressive behaviors 
in animals”, but also “selections from Gregory Bateson’s photographic studies on the Balinese”, 
and photos of members of “the group taking part in the new science of kinesics”. The last remark 
is especially telling, because in the 1960s and 1970s Ray Birdwhistell’s science of kinesics – the 
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science of movements and facial expressions - , had become the most influential source of 
skepticism about the universality thesis. Birdwhistell (1970) wrote: 
 
When I first became interested in studying body motion I was 
confident that it would be possible to isolate a series of 
expressions, postures and movements that ‘very denotative of 
primary emotional states... As research proceeded, and even before 
the development of kinesics, it became clear that this search for 
universals was culture-bound... There are probably no universal 
symbols of emotional state. ... We can expect them [emotional 
expressions] to be learned and patterned according to the particular 
structures of particular societies (126). 
 
As evidence for this thesis, Birdwhistell reported that fact that in his studies of the human 
smile he had found over and over again that subjects smile in both favorable and aversive 
conditions. What can we make of the critiques we have so far collected? Let us consider them 
one by one, starting from Allport’s (1924) hypothesis that emotional expressions could result 
from species-constant learning. What goes against it, as argued by Griffiths (1997), is the fact 
that the emotional expressions we find cross-culturally are arbitrarily associated to the emotions 
they express. There does not appear to be a specific usefulness in expressing, say, anger with 
narrowed rather than open eyes, or fear with hair erect rather than not erect. This being the case, 
if usefulness were indeed the only reason why emotions are constantly learned in different 
cultures, we should find a proliferation of different expressions for the same emotions in 
different cultures. The fact that we do not find it suggests that the universality of expressions 
must have an explanation other than the fact that every culture finds it useful to express emotions 
and learns how to do that from scratch.  
 Concerning Landis’ (1924) thesis that observers disagree on what emotion is expressed 
by a certain picture, a great amount of evidence has been offered since then to prove it false. 
Ekman (1972) criticized the specific set-up of Landis’ (1924) study, and, jointly with Izard and 
other researchers, he offered a wealth of evidence to the effect that at least some emotions are 
recognized cross-culturally. The most common cross-cultural technique used by Ekman and his 
associates is a version of Darwin’s own picture technique. It consists of showing pictures of 
emotional expressions and asking observers what emotions they express from a list of six to ten 
emotion terms in the observer’s language. The following are examples of the expressions used: 
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Figure 5: Facial expressions of happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust, sadness 
 
As reported by Ekman (1999a), these experiments have so far been performed with 
observers from 21 literate countries: Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, England, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kirghizistan, Malaysia, Scotland, Sweden, 
Indonesia (Sumatra), Switzerland, Turkey and the USA (Ekman, Sorenson & Friesen 1969b, 
Izard, 1971; Niit & Valsiner, 1991; Boucher & Carlson, 1980; Ducci, Arcuri, Georgis, & 
Sineshaw, 1982; McAndrew, 1986, Ekman et al., 1987). In all these experiments, pictures of 
happiness, anger, fear, sadness, disgust and surprise were used, plus other expressions specific to 
the particular study. Here is Ekman’s (1999a) summary of the evidence:  
 
There was an extraordinary amount of agreement about which 
emotion was shown in which photographs across the 21 countries. 
In every case, the majority in each of the 21 countries agreed about 
the pictures that showed happiness, those that showed sadness and 
those that showed disgust. For surprise expressions there was 
agreement by the majority in 20 out of the 21 countries, for fear on 
19 out of 21, and for anger in 18 out of 21. In those 6 cases in 
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which the majority did not choose the same emotion as was chosen 
in every other country, the most frequent response (although it was 
not the majority), was the same as was given by the majority in the 
other countries. In my own studies, the only studies in which the 
expressions were selected on the basis of measuring the muscle 
movements shown in the photographs, all the expressions were 
judged as showing the same emotion by the majority in every 
country we studied (305, 306). 
 
These results, criticized by Russell (1994) because of the forced-choice schema, have been 
to some extent replicated when subjects were asked to associated an emotion term to the 
expression freely rather than from a list of pre-established choices (e.g. Izard 1971, Boucher & 
Carlson 1980, Rosenberg & Ekman 1993). A problem with the studies cited so far is that they 
only deal with literate cultures. In principle, such cultures may not really be isolated from one 
another, in the sense that by accessing the same visual representations of emotions (e.g. in 
movies) people may simply learn what some expressions stand for, and either import them in 
their own culture or simply become able to recognize them. Under this view, the presence of an 
arbitrary universal expression across cultures would still be compatible with the hypothesis of 
species constant-learning. 
In 1967, Ekman went to study the South Fore culture in Papua New Guinea, a culture that 
has no access to photographs, movies, or magazines of any kind and no written language. Ekman 
and Friesen (1971) demonstrated that the natives were able to associate a story designed to elicit 
a particular emotion, say sadness, with the facial expression of sadness. This turned out to be the 
case with respect to the six emotions of happiness, anger, fear, sadness, disgust and surprise, 
although the natives were not able to distinguish the expression of surprise from that of fear. 
Russell (1994) criticized such results on the basis of a report by Sorenson (1976), who traveled 
with Ekman and Friesen and argued that “it was likely that at least some responses were 
influenced by feedback between translator and subject”, concluding that the possible “leaking” 
of cues concerning the desired answer “undoubtedly skewed our results” (Sorenson, 1976, 139–
140).  
Ekman (1994) responded to have taken all possible precautions to avoid leaking, and 
dismissed the criticism, although admitting that some form of influence might have been possible 
in principle. Ekman (1972) also asked South Fore people to generate the emotional expressions 
associated with each story, obtaining expressions such as the following: 
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Figure 6: Facial expressions from Papua New Guinea 
 
When he presented these expressions to American students, he found out that they were able 
to associate to the New Guinean expressions the emotion the story was meant to elicit, once 
again with the exception of surprise and fear, which were not distinguished from one another.  
The third strand of criticism of the universality thesis was that there are emotional 
expressions typical of some cultures but not of others. I discussed Klineberg’s report on the 
differences in intensity of weeping across cultures, Bateson and Mead’s (1942) report that fear is 
associated to sleeping among the Balinese, and Birdwhistell’s claim that smiles are expressed in 
both favorable and aversive conditions. What could one say of such cases? Since the beginning, 
Ekman’s position was not to deny the possibility of emotional expressions (and other 
characteristics of emotions) unique to some cultures, but rather to affirm the presence of 
emotional expressions common to all cultures. The fact that the Balinese have a culturally-
specific behavior associated with fear does not prove that there is no universal fear expression. 
Birdwhistell’s concern can be answered in light of Ekman’s (1980, 79) remark that expressions 
such as “frown, smile, play-face and even brow-raise are much too gross” to do science with.  
Once expressions are carefully distinguished through the FACS system, it becomes clear 
that there are at least two kinds of smiles, namely the smile that expresses enjoyment (with lip 
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corners pulled up and contracted muscles around the eyes) and smiles which express things other 
than enjoyment (without lip corners pulled up and without contracted muscles around the eyes). 
Since Duchenne was the first to notice this difference, Ekman (1992) called the smile associated 
with enjoyment Duchenne smile, and distinguished between several varieties of non Duchenne 
smiles.  
In light of these distinctions, Birdwhistell’s report that people smile in unfavorable 
circumstances is no longer problematic, as long as the smile is not a Duchenne smile. Ekman’s 
claim is only that the Duchenne smile is a universal expression of enjoyment. Klineberg’s point 
that even universal expressions such as weeping are different in different cultures was developed 
by Ekman into the notion of a display rule, which makes the universality thesis compatible with 
cultural variation. Ekman wrote: “While the facial muscles which move when a particular affect 
is aroused are the same across cultures, the evoking stimuli, the linked affects, the display rules 
and the behavioral consequences all can vary from one culture to another” (Ekman and Friesen, 
1969, 73).  
Since the beginning, he called his approach to facial expressions “neurocultural”, in order to 
emphasize “two very different sets of determinants of facial expressions, one which is 
responsible for universals and the other for cultural differences” (Ekman 1972, 212). In 1973, 
Ekman offered a general account of display rules, distinguishing between emphasizing, de-
emphasizing, dissimulating and simulating rules. Evidence for the presence of such rules was 
offered when Ekman (1972) studied the expressions of American and Japanese students exposed 
to stressful movies while their faces were secretly video-recorded. The morphology of facial 
movements turned out to be very similar when the students watched the movie alone, compatibly 
with the universality thesis. However, when a white-coated research assistant entered the video 
room while the students were watching the video, the Japanese students, differently from their 
American counterparts, started dissimulating their negative emotions through smiling.  
Ekman argued that the culturally specific display rule did not prevent the automatic negative 
expression from being present in a subdued form, as a micromovement analysis of the video 
recording reveals. The experiment was criticized by Fridlund and Duchaine (1996), who argued 
that Japanese and American students may have shown different facial expressions in the 
presence of an authority figure because they experienced different emotions, not because they 
followed different display rules for the expression of the same emotion.  
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Despite the limitations of the specific experiments I discussed, if we consider the literature 
on facial expressions in infants, animals and different human cultures as a whole, it seems clear 
that they support the hypothesis that some emotions are adaptations. This is especially true with 
respect to the emotions of happiness, anger, disgust, sadness and fear/surprise. Some preliminary 
evidence has also been marshaled in favor of the hypothesis that contempt is universally 
expressed (Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Ekman & Heider 1988; Matsumoto, 1992). Keltner (1995) 
has offered some evidence for the universal facial expression of embarrassment. On the other 
hand, so far no significant evidence has been offered for the universality of the expressions of 
excitement, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sensory pleasure, and shame, as well as for the 
universality of the expression of the emotions which do not meet Ekman’s requirements for 
being basic (e.g. hatred, romantic love, grief, jealousy, interest).  
 
 
5.3. CONCLUSION 
 
I have explored the evidence for the thesis that basic emotions are adaptations. The most 
compelling sources of evidence have to do with the neurobiology of emotional appraisal and 
with the nature of emotional expressions. So it looks like there are at least some basic emotions, 
as affect program theorists understand them. Even though affect program theorists claim that 
there are no emotions other than basic ones, it is not clear what the rationale for this claim would 
be. As I shall argue in chapter 9, the problem is once again that emotion theorists lack a clear 
understanding of the kind of activity in which they are engaged when they try to offer an account 
of what the emotions are.  
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6. EMOTIONS AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
As the evolutionary tradition, the social constructionist tradition is interested in figuring out 
what emotions are from studying what sorts of problems they solve. Social constructionists, 
however, focus mostly on the social functions played by the emotions. They are convinced that, 
if there is anything biological about the emotions, it is not central. I think the emphasis social 
constructionists have put on the social dimension of emotions is a welcome one. Whatever we 
think about the specific proposals emerging from this tradition, one thing is certain, namely that 
they have raised our consciousness about what has been neglected for a long time, namely the 
impact emotions have on interpersonal relations. 
The social constructionist approach found its first proponents in the 1920s, when a number 
of anthropologists and social scientists, as I described in the previous chapter, started questioning 
Darwin’s (1872) evidence for the universal nature of emotional expressions. Sartre can be 
considered one of the first to offer a general, although idiosyncratic, theory of emotions as social 
roles, a view developed in the early 1980s by philosophers (e.g. Harre 1986, Armon-Jones 1985, 
1986a, 1986b), psychologists (e.g. Averill 1980), and anthropologists (e.g. Lutz 1988).  
In recent times, Parkinson (1995, 1999, 2004) and especially Griffiths (2003, 2004a) have 
tried to reconcile the evolutionary and the social constructionist traditions, taking their cue from 
some important work on emotional expressions by Fridlund (1989, 1997), Russell (1997) and 
Fernandez-Dols (1997a, 1997b) among others (see Russell et al. 2003 for a review). The basic 
insight of what we may call the strategic socio-evolutionary strand of the social constructionist 
tradition is that the communicative side of the emotions has fundamentally strategic dimensions, 
which contribute to explain both why the emotion evolved and why they must be understood in 
the context of a social transaction.  
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 6.1. WHAT IS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM? 
 
 
In the early 1980s, a wave of theorizing about the emotions appeared under the general label 
of social constructionism. Contributions commonly gathered under this label span a number of 
disciplines, including philosophy (Coulter 1986, Harre 1986, Armon-Jones 1986), social theory 
(Sabini and Silver 1982), psychology (Averill 1980), and anthropology (Lutz 1982). One of the 
great problems of social constructionist theses in general is that it is not clear what is ascribed to 
an entity when it is argued that it is socially constructed. Our first order of business is therefore 
to get clear on the very idea of a social construction. My account of this issue relies on 
Hacking’s (1999) discussion, which offers a general framework I will then apply to the emotions.  
Hacking (1999) noticed that social constructionist claims are currently quite fashionable in a 
number of contemporary disciplines, and that they are made, rather nonchalantly, with respect to 
a large variety of entities (e.g. authorship in Woodmansee and Jaszi 1994, the child viewer of 
television in Luke 1990, danger in McCormick 1995, facts in Latour and Woolgar 1979, gender 
in Dewar 1986, quarks in Pickering 1984, women refugees in Moussa 1992, etc.). Generally 
speaking, the point of social constructionist claims about some X is for Hacking “to raise 
consciousness” (6) about the following thesis: 
 
(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as 
it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not 
inevitable (Hacking 1999, 6) 
 
Call this the social contingency thesis. To say that X need not have existed as it is, or that it 
is not inevitable, is to say, as suggested by Kukla (2000, 2), “that not-X is possible”. But there 
are various notions of possibility, and not all of them capture what social constructionists want to 
raise consciousness about. The key claim is that X in its present form is not “determined by the 
nature of things”, in the sense that X might have been or be different if society/social 
arrangements/social circumstances/social interaction/social selves/social values/social 
forces/social events/social facts/social history/social needs/social interests had been or were 
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different in a way that is still compatible with the nature of things. This is the subjunctive 
conditional on the alleged truth of which social constructionists want to call our attention.  
For example, one may say that X=marriage would not be the way it is in the US had the US 
embraced the values of an Islamic society. Or one may say that if blacks were the majority in the 
US, X=black race would not be the way it is. These claims appear to be platitudinous, which 
brings us to a requirement that social contructionist theses must fulfill in order to avoid triviality. 
Hacking refers to the following as a “precondition” for social constructionist ascriptions: 
 
In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to 
be inevitable (Hacking 1999, 12) 
 
The reason why we “do not find books on the social construction of banks, the fiscal system, 
checks, money, dollar bills, bills of landing, contracts, tort, the Federal Reserve, or the British 
Monarchy” (12), tells us Hacking, is precisely that (0) is not fulfilled, namely that the truth of the 
social contingency thesis about X is obvious to everyone. The necessity of precondition (0) can 
be used as a heuristic to find out what social constructionists mean by their claims. If X under 
some interpretation is obviously dependent on contingent social factors, then maybe it is not 
under that interpretation of X that the claim is made.  
Suppose a social constructionist were to say that “women refugees are socially constructed”. 
Interpreted as a claim about members of the extension of the kind woman refugee, the assertion 
is trivially true, as women become refugees by virtue of contingent social circumstances. 
Hacking sensibly suggests that the right way to interpret the assertion is in terms of a claim about 
the idea of woman refugee. As Hacking (1999, 11) puts it, “when we read of the social 
construction of X, it is very commonly the idea of X . . . that is meant”.  If pre-condition (0) has 
been fulfilled, calling attention on the truth of the social contingency thesis about X does not 
amount to stating the obvious. However, there still is the need of a motivation for raising 
consciousness about the truth of a non-trivial thesis.  
Hacking suggests that social constructivists “very often … go further [than thesis (1)], and 
urge that” (6): 
 
(2) X is quite bad as it is 
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(3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at 
least radically transformed (Hacking 1999, 6) 
 
Hacking qualifies his position by adding that “[m]any social construction theses at once 
advance to (2) and (3), but they need not do so” (7). They need not do so because it may very 
well be the case that a socially contingent X is not bad, or that changing X would not be worth 
the cost involved in doing so, and so on. But if theses (2) and (3) are not advanced, the question 
is still open of why anyone would want to raise consciousness about the truth of (1). Hacking 
makes a number of distinctions between varieties of social constructionism in terms of their basic 
motivation, but such distinctions are not relevant for my purposes.  
I distill from Hacking’s account two general and not mutually exclusive motivations that 
may ground the issuing of a social constructionist ascription. One is the intellectual motivation of 
furthering our understanding of X. The idea here is that if we really want to understand X and the 
phenomena in which X is involved, we must understand how X is crucially dependent on 
contingent social aspects. The other is the political motivation of mobilizing resources to change 
X. The idea here is that we ought to change X and the phenomena in which X is involved, and 
once we understand that there is nothing inevitable about it we will be in a better position to get 
rid of it or modify it to some extent. To conclude, social constructionists aim to raise 
consciousness, for intellectual and/or political reasons, about the fact that it is not the nature of 
things, but rather our contingent social arrangements, that make X what it is. On the basis of this 
preliminary account of social constructionism, we can turn to an understanding of social 
constructionism about the emotions. 
 
6.1.1. Two strands of social constructionism about emotions  
Social constructionism about the emotions can be understood as a set of interpretations of 
the social contingency thesis that “Emotion/anger need not have existed, or need not be at all as 
it is. Emotion/anger, or emotion/anger as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of 
things; it is not inevitable”. The motivation for raising consciousness about the social 
contingency of emotions is primarily intellectual. What social constructionists want to tell us is 
that if we want to understand emotions and the phenomena in which they are involved, we need 
to pay attention to the fact that, in various senses we need to understand, emotions are not 
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“determined by the nature of things”. As Averill (1980) puts it, “[t]he emotions can only be fully 
understood as part of the culture as a whole” (315).  
We find occasional hints of a more political nature, for example when Armond-Jones 
(1986a) tells us that since “emotions are functionally constituted for the maintenance of 
particular value systems, then a moral issue arises in that such organizations of human 
experience not only are socially based, but also can be evaluated as desirable and just” (35). By 
and large, however, social constructionism about the emotions is presented with the intent of 
raising consciousness for the sake of understanding, rather than for the sake of mobilizing 
resources for political change.  
Social constructionists aim to raise the emotion theorist’s consciousness about the fact that 
emotions are what they are because of society/social arrangements/social circumstances/social 
interaction/social selves/social values/social forces/social events/social facts/social history/social 
needs/social interests, rather than because of nature. The way in which this position must be 
interpreted, I suggest, is in terms of emphasis on the social rather than on the natural. It seems to 
me that social constructionists are not saying that nothing about the emotions is natural, a 
position that would clearly be absurd. Rather, what they are saying is that theorists of the 
emotions have so far put too much emphasis on the natural, disregarding social aspects of the 
emotions which are essential to understanding what they are. The reversal of emphasis they urge 
is well-portrayed in the following passages from the social constructionist literature: 
 
Historically, there has been a tendency to treat emotions as 
biologically primitive, instinctive response patterns. It is against 
this backdrop that the concept of emotions as social constructions 
must be viewed. It has, of course, long been recognized that 
emotional expression and eliciting conditions are subject to 
cultural influence. Nevertheless, theorists have tended to treat 
cultural differences in emotion as superficial variations imposed on 
basic biological substrata…That is, there is some “core” aspect of 
emotional behavior, identifiable in terms of neurobiological 
circuits and/or subjective experience, which is biologically given 
and hence pan-cultural. By contrast, a basic assumption of the 
present chapter is that there are no core aspects of emotion which 
are not intrinsically and essentially influenced by sociocultural 
factors (Averill 1980, 58). 
[My aim is] to deconstruct an overly naturalized and rigidly 
bounded concept of emotion, to treat emotion as an ideological 
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practice rather than a thing to be discovered or an essence to be 
distilled (Lutz 1988, 4)  
Emotions are not just remnants of our phylogenetic past, nor can 
they be explained in strictly physiological terms. Rather, they are 
social constructions, and they can be fully understood only on a 
social level of analysis (Parkinson 1995, 309) 
 
In these statements, we see the natural/social dichotomy embodied by contrasts such as the 
one between the social and the naturalized, the social and the strictly physiological, the social 
and the biologically primitive. The dichotomy takes a number of other shapes in the social 
constructionist literature on the emotions. For example, the social is sometimes contrasted with 
the innate, the genetically programmed, the not-learned, the inherited, the evolutionarily 
adaptive, and the bodily.  
I am very suspicious of these dichotomies, because I endorse an interactionist view of 
phenotypic traits such as the one proposed by Kitcher (2001) or Schaffner (1998). Under this 
view, all phenotypic traits result from an interaction between nature and nurture, and the 
distinction between the contribution of biology and the contribution of culture is in most cases 
moot (although not in all cases). But I do not think social constructionism should be judged in 
terms of how well founded the dichotomy between the natural and the social is. Rather, it should 
be judged in terms of whether or not the features of the emotions social constructionists consider 
to have been neglected in emotion theory can really contribute to our understanding of what the 
emotions are.  
The fact that social constructionists consistently call such features social, and contrast them 
with natural ones, is to be considered as nothing more than a rethorical consciousness-raising 
tool. I consider social constructionism about the emotions to have been motivated by two main 
theses: 
 
(a) Emotions are different in several essential respects in different cultures  
(b) Emotions fulfill ends by virtue of which they should be considered actions or roles or 
moves rather than passions  
  
Call the first the thesis of emotions as culturally specific syndromes, and the second the 
thesis of emotions as roles/transactions. Let us consider them in turn. 
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6.2. EMOTIONS AS CULTURALLY SPECIFIC SYNDROMES 
 
The evidence on cultural variation in the emotions’ domain can be organized under two 
headings: (a) variation in the marks of emotionality, (b) variation in the structure of lexical 
emotion categories 
  
6.2.1. Do emotions differ in different cultures?8 
I argued that prototypical instances of prototypical emotions tend to have a variety of marks, 
including appraisal, physiological responses, expressions, instrumental behaviors and mental 
actions. I pointed out that starting in the 1920s the hypothesis that emotional expressions are 
universal had been questioned on the basis of evidence that there are culturally-specific 
expressions. The same cultural specificity has been demonstrated with respect to all other marks 
of emotionality. It has been shown for example that the same emotions are elicited by different 
antecedents in different cultures, which means that the way people appraise emotion-causing 
events is to some extent culturally specific. Among other things, this will have an impact on the 
frequency of occurrence of a certain emotion in a certain culture.  
Differences in what elicits what emotion may simply be due to different material conditions 
in the cultures compared (e.g. wealth, climate, population density, risk factors, etc.). For 
example, in a culture in which restaurants are blown up often, eating in a restaurant will be 
appraised as dangerous and elicit fear, whereas in a peaceful culture eating in a restaurant will 
not be appraised as dangerous. Also, every culture will have many elicitors of emotions not 
present in other cultures (e.g. specific animals for fear, specific forms of entertainment for joy, 
etc.).  
More interestingly, differences in appraisal may result from differences in the views of the 
self, in the “focal concerns” (Frijda and Mesquita 1992), and in the norms that govern a given 
culture. Markus and Kitayama (1991) have argued for example that Westeners tend to focus on 
their individual achievements and autonomy, whereas in several non-Western cultures people are 
more focused on relationships and interdependence. This is likely to have an impact on what 
elicits certain emotions, and on how frequently they occur. Markus and Kitayama (1991) have 
                                                 
8 This section is a close summary of Mesquita and Frijda (1992), one of the best available reviews of cultural 
variation in the emotions. Most of the references I cite are lifted directly from the bibliography of their article.  
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proposed that this difference explains why events affecting relationships are frequent elicitors of 
emotions in Japan, a highly interdependent culture. This results in the fact that, as they argue, 
emotions such as shame and respect are more prominent in Japan than in the US, whereas 
emotions such as anger and pride are more prominent in the US than in Japan.  
A given culture may have a specific value system which affects what kinds of things elicit 
what emotions. For example, among the Awlad'Ali, a Beduin tribe living in Egypt, one the most 
prominent shared concerns – a focal concern - is that of honor. This turns into elicitors of shame 
many events we would not consider to be shameful, such as the simple interaction with members 
of a more powerful tribe (Abu-Lughod 1986). Notably, the Awlad'Ali sometimes appraise the 
death of a loved one as an anger elicitor, because they consider public sadness to be a threat to 
their personal honor (Abu-Lughod, 1986). In cultures in which the focal concern is that of 
societal communion, just being alone can become en elicitor of sadness (Briggs 1970).  
Japanese people have been reported to appraise injustice as an anger elicitor much more 
rarely than Europeans and Americans (Scherer et al. 1988). On the other hand, Japanese people 
blame themselves more easily for negative events, even when they are not directly responsible 
for them. For example, the event of being cheated on by one’s husband often becomes a guilt 
elicitor among Japanese women (Lebra 1983), whereas it would most likely elicit anger among 
Americans and Europeans. Sometimes the nature of appraisal is affected by norms about the 
value of the emotion itself. For example, Briggs (1970) argues that anger is widely disapproved 
among the Utku Eskimos, who consider it highly disruptive of the social order. As a 
consequence, very few events are appraised as worthy of anger, which is mainly directed towards 
dogs (Briggs 1970). On the other hand, in the Kaluli tribe anger is often considered to entitle one 
to compensation, and many events are appraised as anger elicitors (Schieffelin 1983, 186).  
Physiological reactions across cultures have not been studied much (but I reported on 
Levenson et al. 1992’s preliminary evidence in support of universality). Cross-cultural studies 
have instead been made concerning self-reports of the physiological underpinnings of emotions. 
Scherer et al. (1986, 1988) asked students from different European countries, Israel, United 
States and Japan to describe the bodily reactions correspondent to anger, happiness, sadness, joy, 
and fear, and they obtained very similar results for the first three groups (e.g. unpleasant arousal, 
lowering of temperature, blood pressure increase, gastric sensations, sweating, and muscular 
tension for fear). Japanese subjects, on the other hand, reported less physiological sensations that 
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European, Israeli and American subjects. Low focus on bodily symptoms was also reported in 
spontaneous description of emotions among the Samoans (Gerber 1985) and the Ifaluk (Llutz 
1987). Using a forced choice questionnaire which included lists of physical symptoms (e.g. 
muscles tensed, heartbeat, etc.), however, Wallbott and Scherer (1988) were able to report strong 
similarities between physiological self-ascriptions in 27 countries. These data do not answer one 
way or the other whether or not there are actual physiological differences in the experience of 
emotions, as they only address what bodily symptoms people typically associate with the 
emotion categories they use.  
Concerning emotional expressions, I have already discussed the topic in the previous 
chapter. I pointed out that even affect program theorists acknowledge the presence of display 
rules which shape emotional expressions (e.g. the rule of suppression of negative emotions when 
in the presence of authority manifested by the Japanese students in Ekman 1972), as well as 
expressions specific to a culture. An example of the latter is given by Shweder (1991, 246), who 
reports an expression common among the Oryia women in a region of India “in which the tongue 
extends out and downward and is bitten between the teeth, the eyebrows rise, and the eyes 
widen, bulge, and cross”, associated to a sort of surprise/embarrassment/fear. Cultural 
differences have also been reported with respect to the instrumental behaviors characteristic of 
emotions. We have already discussed the case of the Balinese, who reportedly fall asleep when 
afraid (Bateson and Mead 1942).  
Different views of the self, different focal concerns, and different norms are likely to 
influence what behaviors are associated to what emotions. For example, in a culture such as the 
Kaluli one, which approves of anger and even compensates for it, “[w]hen a man has suffered 
wrong or loss…, he may stamp furiously up and down the outside yard or inside hall of the 
longhouse yelling the particulars of his injury for everyone to hear” (Schieffelin, 1983, 186). In 
cultures which disapprove of anger, instead, the behaviors associated with it are likely to be 
much more subdued (e.g. the case of anger for the Utku, see Briggs (1970).  
In some cases, culturally-specific emotional behaviors take the form of rituals, namely 
elaborate ceremonial acts. For example, one of the behaviors associated with anger among the 
Ilongot men is the ritual of communal headhunting, in which the angry individual looks for 
someone to behead jointly with his fellow tribesmen so as to vent his anger in ways that are not 
detrimental to the group (Rosaldo 1980). When the headhunting expedition is successfully 
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completed, the men return to the village and their return is celebrated by public songs. Among 
the Awlad'Ali, emotions such as sadness are expressed by the formulation of little poems read 
among intimates (Abu-Lughod 1986). 
One of the most famous cases of culturally-specific emotional behaviors was first described 
by Newman (1964). Members of the Gururumba tribe, a community living in New Guinea, 
sometimes engage in the “wild pig” syndrome. The syndrome is a sort of ritualized anger, which 
the locals interpret as being caused by having been bitten by the spirit of a deceased person. The 
“wild pig” engages in a sequence of behaviors that are culturally specific in terms of their nature 
and duration. Such behaviors include looting objects of small value and shooting arrows, which 
rarely result in injury to anyone. These behaviors last for a few days, at the end of which the 
“wild pig” goes into the forest, where he spends a few more days before returning to the village 
in a calm state in which he claims not to remember anything about the episode. 
 The conscious experience of emotions is also likely to manifest cultural differences, as an 
effect of cultural differences in the other marks of emotionality. For example, in a culture with a 
display rule against crying (e.g. the Utku culture, Briggs 1970), sadness is likely to have a 
different feel, because it won’t be accompanied by the physiological discharges that accompany 
crying. In a culture in which manifestations of happiness are disapproved of (e.g. the Ifaluk 
culture, Lutz 1987), happiness will also probably have a different feel. This is especially true 
because the bodily manifestations of emotions have been proven to affect their intensity. Studies 
have shown that sensory feed-back from facial and postural movements can intensify or reduce 
emotions, and in some cases even appear to cause them (see Izard, 1993).  
The nature of the mental actions associated with emotions, finally, is also likely to manifest 
cultural variations. The acts of reasoning, memory and imagination generated in a certain 
emotional state will reflect the same cultural elements that shape the other marks of emotionality. 
For example, in a culture which disapproves of sadness (e.g. the Awlad'Ali, see Abu-Lughod, 
1986), it is likely that sadness will be accompanied by thoughts of worthlessness, and mental 
plans for redressing one’s wounded honor.  
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6.2.2. Do lexical emotion categories differ in different cultures?9 
 
What kind of emotion taxonomies exist in the approximately 6,000 spoken languages other 
than English? The first important fact is that some languages do not collect subordinate emotion 
kinds such as fear, anger, disgust, shame, guilt and so on into a superordinate category such as 
our “emotion”. For example, Tahitians (Levy, 1973, 271), Bimin Kuskusmin of Papua New 
Guinea (Poole, 1985), Gidjingali aborigines of Australia (Hiatt, 1978), Ifalukians of Micronesia 
(Lutz, 1980, 1983), Chewong of Malaysia (Howell, 1981), and Samoans (Gerber, 1975) appear 
to lack a term intertranslatable with “emotion”. On the other hand, Samoans use the term lagona, 
which groups together emotions and sensations (Gerber, 1975). The Ifaluk speak of emotions as 
instances of niferash, i.e. “our insides”.  
Generally speaking, languages vary widely concerning their total number of emotion 
categories. Whereas estimates of emotion categories in the English language range from 500 
(Averill 1975) to 2,000 (Wallace & Carson 1973), some languages are much less rich in this 
respect. For example, Lutz (1980) claimed to have found only 58 emotion categories in the 
Ifalukian language, and Howell (1981) detected only 7 emotion categories in Chewong. Levy 
(1983, 1984) argued that some cultures hypercognize certain emotions by generating large 
quantities of lexical categories for them. Conversely, other emotions are hypocognized, and very 
few lexical categories – sometimes none – are produced for them. For example, Levy (1983) 
argued that anger and sadness are respectively hypercognized and hypocognized by the 
Tahitians, who distinguish between 46 kinds of anger but lack the lexical category of sadness 
entirely. This does not mean that they do not experience sadness, but merely that that sadness is 
not categorized by a lexical item that designates it uniquely. Levy reports the Tahitian term pe'a 
pe'a, which does not distinguish between sadness, illness and fatigue, but is applied for example 
to situations of separation from loved ones.  
It seems that every language L has at least some L-specific emotion category E, meaning 
that no language other than L has a word which designates the same combinations of evaluations, 
physiological reactions, expressions, instrumental and mental behaviors as E does. Since emotion 
categories are formed to serve purposes of communication on the background of a given social 
                                                 
9 This section is a close summary of Russell (1991), where I found most of the references I cite.  
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context, this linguistic phenomenon is not surprising. Here are a few examples of language-
specific emotion categories. Some can be understood as resulting from the precisification of 
antecedent circumstances of existing English emotion categories. The Czech language 
contemplates an emotion named Litost, which is “a state of torment caused by a sudden insight 
into one's own miserable self” (Kundera 1980, 121–122). The Japanese contemplate the category 
of ijirashii, which is a kind of joy caused by seeing that a commendable person overcomes an 
obstacle (Russell 1991). Ifalukians distinguish disgust caused by moral indignation, song, and 
disgust caused by detection of decaying matter, niyabut (Lutz, 1980, 183–184).  They also 
distinguish fear of future events, metagu, from fear of present ones, rus (Lutz, 1980, 188).  
Briggs (1970) reported that the Utku distinguish love towards vulnerable creatures, naklik, 
from love towards admirable people, niviuq. Morice (1978) detected fifteen kinds of fears in 
Pintupi, including ngulu (fear of another seeking revenge) and wurrkulinu (fear about land or 
relatives). The Japanese category of amae, first described by Doi (1973), designates a kind of 
joyful dependence towards someone, similar to what a child may experience towards a mother. 
In other cases, the L-specific emotion category is meant to introduce a new superordinate of 
existing English emotion categories.  
For example, as described by Fajans (1983), Baining people of Papua New Guinea have the 
category of awumbuk, supposedly a combination of “sadness, lassitude, tiredness, and boredom 
caused by the departure of visitors, friends, or relatives” (Russell 1991). Shostak (1983) speaks 
of the !Kung having the category of kua, a combination of awe, respect, and fear caused by 
having one’s life achievements publicly celebrated. Sometimes the L-specific category is meant 
to introduce a subordinate category of emotion which does not exist in English. For example, 
Lutz (1985) argues that the Ifaluk have the category of nguch, a kind of emotion roughly 
corresponding to our feeling sick and tired of something. Fago, discussed by Lutz (1980), is 
experienced when somebody dies or is in need, as well as when a gift is received or when one is 
in the presence of someone admirable, and it can be understood as a sort of combination of love, 
empathy, pity, sadness, and compassion.  
In some cases, languages other than English lack English-specific emotion categories. For 
example, some African languages do not have a distinct category for anger and sadness (Leff 
1973, 301). The distinction between shame and fear is not available to the Gidjingali aborigines 
of Australia (Hiatt, 1978), who use the category of gurakadj to cover both. Shame and 
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embarassement are blurred into one category by the Japanese (Lebra, 1983, 194), the Tahitians 
(Levy, 1973), the Ifalukians (Lutz, 1980, 209), the Indonesians (Keeler, 1983, 153), and the 
Newars of Nepal (Levy, 1983).  The Ilongot do not have the categories of shame, timidity, 
embarrassment, awe, obedience, and respect, and use betang to cover them all (Rosaldo 1983, 
141). The Javanese call isin the disjunction of shame, guilt, shyness, and embarrassment (Geertz, 
1959, 233). Samoans use the category of alofa for love, sympathy, pity, and liking (Gerber, 
1975, 3). The Utku do not distinguish kindness and gratitude lexically, calling both hatuq 
(Briggs 1970, 326). 
In some cases, languages lack English emotion categories and do not even subsume them 
under more abstract categories. For example, Marsella (1981) argued that the category of 
depression is absent from many non-Western cultures. Eskimos and Yorubas lack the category of 
anxiety (Leff, 1973, 304). Johnson, Johnson, and Baksh (1986) did not encounter any category 
corresponding to our worry among the Machiguenga of Peru. Levy (1973, 342) argued that the 
Tahitians have “no word which signifies anything like a sense of guilt”. Apparently, the category 
of guilt is also missing from the Sinhala language of Sri Lanka (Obeyesekere, 1981, 79), from 
the Ilongot language of the Philippines (Rosaldo 1983, 139–140), from the Pintupi language of 
aboriginal Australians (Morice 1978, 93), and from the Samoan language (Gerber, 1975). Gerber 
(1975, 3) stated that there is a “notorious absence of a term equivalent to guilt in many Asian and 
Pacific languages.” The Quichua of Ecuador lack the category of remorse (Tousignant 1984), 
and apparently the Ifaluk lack the category of surprise. The Nyinba of Nepal do not have the 
category of love (Levine 1988), and refer to what we call love either in terms of compassion (for 
children) or in terms of desire (for sexual partners).  
 
6.2.3. Does cultural variation support social constructionism? 
The question to ask is: Are the cultural differences I described so far a good reason to say 
that the emotions are socially constructed? According to some social constructionists such as 
Armon-Jones (1986a, 33), the very fact that emotions are “elicited as a result of the agent having 
acquired a culturally appropriate construal of the situation” is sufficient ground to conclude that 
emotions are socially construed. Since appraisals are shaped by culturally specific material 
conditions, forms of self-understanding, shared concerns, values, and norms, we could say that 
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the emotions in a given culture “need not exist in their present form”, and are not determined by 
the “nature of things”.  
This kind of argument can be reinforced by considering the influence of cultural factors on 
marks of emotionality other than appraisal. This is the line suggested by Averill, who argues that 
there are, besides social rules of appraisal which “pertain to the way a situation is perceived and 
evaluated”, also social rules of behavior, which “refer to the way an emotion is organized and 
expressed”, social rules of prognosis, which “concern the time course and progression of an 
emotional episodes”, and social rules of attribution, which “pertain to the way an emotion is 
explained or legitimized” (107-108). Averill’s convinction is that, even though “some of these 
component responses may be biologically based” – for example physiological and expressive 
responses – “the way the components are organized into coherent syndromes is determined 
primarily by social and not biological evolution” (1986, 100).  
The evidence on cultural variations I have described is certainly fascinating. But is it enough 
as such to ground an interesting form of social constructionism? Affect program theorists are 
well aware of the fact that several features of the emotions are culturally specific. For example, 
Ekman and Friesen (1969, 73) have written that “[w]hile the facial muscles which move when a 
particular affect is aroused are the same across cultures, the evoking stimuli, the linked affects, 
the display rules and the behavioral consequences all can vary from one culture to another”. 
Even though Ekman discussed mostly culturally-specific display rules for expressions, the 
same rationale that led him to posit such rules should motivate positing culturally-specific 
appraisal rules, behavioral rules, assessment rules and so on, as suggested by Averill. But the 
presence of such rules is no threat to the affect program position. The affect program thesis is not 
that all marks of emotionality in all emotions are universal across cultures, but rather that there 
exist some marks of some emotions that are universal, and thereby support the hypothesis of 
evolutionary origin. Holding that some parts of emotions are universal is perfectly compatible 
with holding that some others are culturally-specific.  
The ethnographic evidence does not offer us any reason to think that there are no universal 
elicitors, expressions and behavioral tendencies for emotions such as anger, fear, surprise, joy, 
sadness, disgust. For example, a car accident will surely elicit the same fear response in all 
cultures, namely the same automatic elicitation of an affect program with several of the features 
described by Ekman. On the other hand, the evidence I have described points us to a limitation of 
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affect program theory I have already remarked upon, namely that it fails to comprise within its 
purview a large bulk of affective phenomena that in ordinary language we call emotions. Several 
emotion episodes do not have distinctive universal signals, their appraisal is not automatic nor 
likely to be mediated by subcortical pathways, their antecendents are not universals, they do not 
occur in other primates, their onset is slow, they last for longer than a few seconds, and so on. In 
other words, affect program theory is incomplete as a theory of emotions as ordinarily 
understood. But this is not something affect program theorists are likely to deny. Their rationale 
for focusing on basic emotions, as I have argued, is that they assume them to share deep 
similarities stemming from their evolutionary origin. Moreover, the basic emotions approach, 
with its emphasis on observable characteristics, makes the scientific study of the emotions 
possible. 
 In conclusion, the version of social constructionism embodied by the emotions as 
culturally-specific syndromes thesis seems to me to violate Hacking’s (1999) pre-condition (0). 
Since emotion theorists of all stripes accept the presence of cultural variation, there is no room 
for consciousness-raising with respect to this issue. The task for social constructionists is a 
different one, namely to explain in what respects the social dimension of emotions is crucial to 
understanding them. For example, what is the importance of the social dimension of emotional 
phenomena to understand their evolution? Are there aspects of the emotions other than those 
stemming from their evolutionary origin that make them proper objects of scientific 
investigation? Can the study of the social dimension of emotions move from mere speculation to 
scientific test? The core of an interesting social constructionism, and the springboard for 
answering these sorts of questions, lies in my view in the emotions as roles/transactions thesis, 
to which I now turn.  
 
 
6.3. EMOTIONS AS SOCIAL ROLES AND INTERPERSONAL MOVES 
 
This strand of social constructionism questions the view of the emotions as passions, 
pointing to the existence of ends served by the emotions in light of which they should rather be 
understood as actions or roles or moves. The assumption that the emotions are passive is as old 
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as the study of emotion itself, and it is embodied by the very name under which the emotions 
have been known for most of their intellectual history, starting with the Aristotelian theory of 
pathe (see subsection 2.1.1) In this sense, this version of social constructionism unquestionably 
fulfills Hacking’s (1999) precondition (0), as the large majority of emotion theorists have 
historically taken and currently take the passivity of the emotions for granted. Ekman (1999b, 
54), for example, argues that “[b]ecause emotions can occur with a very rapid onset, through 
automatic appraisal, with little awareness, and with involuntary changes in expression and 
physiology, we often experience emotions as happening to us. Emotions are unbidden, not 
chosen by us”.  
This strand of social constructionism puts pressure on the very idea that emotions are not 
chosen by emoters. Notice that this version of social constructionism is conceptually distinct 
from the previous one, even though it is generally conjoined with it. Even if the emotions did not 
change across cultures, they may still have to be understood in each culture as roles/transactions 
rather than passions insofar as they fulfill ends (the ends may be the same in every culture).  
We can distinguish two versions of the emotions as roles/transactions thesis. According to 
the first, proposed most prominently by Averill (1980), the emotions fulfill ends at the societal 
level, solving conflicts between norms that regulate behavior in society. Call this the emotions as 
social roles thesis. According to the second version, proposed most prominently by Parkinson 
(1995) and Griffiths (2003, 2004a), the emotions fulfill personal ends emerging in the course of a 
social transaction. Call this the emotions as social transactions thesis. This second approach 
comes with a strong emphasis on the strategic nature of the emotions, so I will deal with it only 
after having discussed the emergence of the idea of a strategic dimension in emotional 
phenomena.  
 
6.3.1. Sartre 
The importance of Jean-Paul Sartre for the social constructionist approach to the study of 
emotions is that he is the first to offer a theory of emotions as strategic moves in the negotiation 
of a social transaction. Jointly with evidence on cultural differences, this is the main idea that 
motivates social constructionism about the emotions. Sartre’s version of ante litteram social 
constructionism is very radical, and often expressed in a characteristically obscure language. 
Nevertheless, once we clarify what Sartre meant and purge his theory of some of its flamboyant 
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non-sequiturs, a number of useful insights, later independently developed by others, can be 
gleaned.  
Sartre (1948) offered his theory as a reaction to the perceived shortcomings of James-
inspired theories of the emotions. His main complaint was that such theories focused on “the 
processes of the emotion itself”, rather than on the “general and essential structures of human 
reality” that make emotion possible (9). This approach is problematic because emotion as studied 
by psychologists “will never be anything but a fact among others”, and will not permit “grasping 
by means of it the essential reality of man” (9). According to Sartre, what we need to do is to 
“study emotion as pure transcendental phenomenon, trying to “elucidate the transcendental 
essence of emotion as an organized type of consciousness” (12). Sartre states that “every 
consciousness exists to the exact extent to which it is conscious of existing” (11). What follows 
from this is the “absolute proximity of the investigator and the thing investigated”. 
Phenomenology, states Sartre, “is the study of phenomena, not facts”, where a phenomenon 
is “that which manifests itself”, or “that whose reality is precisely appearance” (14). For 
consciousness, “to exist is to appear” (14). Sartre cites Heidegger and Husserl as early 
proponents of the right approach to the study of emotions. Heidegger thinks that “emotion is the 
human reality which…directs itself towards the world”, and Husserl adds that “a 
phenomenological description of emotion will bring to light the essential structure of 
consciousness, since an emotion is precisely a consciousness” (15). The fundamental ground of 
difference between thinking of emotions as facts and thinking of them as phenomena is for Sartre 
that, whereas psychologists conceive of emotion as a fact from which signification has been 
removed, for the phenomenologist “every human fact is, in essence, significative” (16).  
Consequently, in order to study emotion as a “true phenomenon of consciousness”, we have 
to understand emotion as something “significative”, where to “signify is to indicate another 
thing” (16). What Sartre invites us to consider is that “emotion signifies, in its own way, the 
whole of consciousness and…human reality” (17), since “emotion is an organized form of 
human existence” (18). The methodological consequence of these remarks is that, in order to 
study the emotions, we must interrogate “phenomena, that is, to put it exactly, psychic events, 
insofar as they are significations and not insofar as they are pure facts” (19). It is at this very 
juncture that the contrast between Sartre’s theory and the feeling theory of emotions emerges 
most compellingly. 
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Sartre is convinced that thinking of emotions as significant phenomena of consciousness, as 
recommended by phenomenology, is incompatible with thinking of emotions as physiological 
facts, as recommended by feeling theories of Jamesian ancestry. As he puts it, “physiological 
facts…taken by themselves and in isolation…signify almost nothing” (17), and therefore “it is 
impossible to consider emotion as a psychological disorder” (17). As Sartre puts it, in the case of 
emotions we have “signification by nature of a functional order” (41). The functional order of the 
emotions consists of their being “an organized system of means aiming at an end” (32). What is 
special about the emotions is that they aim at their ends in a masked or covert fashion. Writes 
Sartre: 
[Emotion] is called upon to mask, substitute for, and reject 
behavior that one cannot or does not want to maintain. By the same 
token, the explanation of the diversity of emotions becomes easy; 
they represent a particular subterfuge, a special trick, each one of 
them being a different means of eluding a difficulty (32) 
Sartre’s central idea is that we emote when the opportunity to pursue our ends in non-
emotional ways turns out to be unavailable or unappealing. Under this view, we emote by 
substituting a behavior that is openly instrumental with one that is covertly instrumental. Sartre 
labels the non-emotional instrumental behavior as the superior one, and the emotional 
instrumental behavior as the inferior one. We can better understand what Sartre had in mind by 
focusing on a few of his examples. Sartre describes the case of “a young girl whose father has 
just told her that he has pains in his arms and that he is a little afraid of paralysis”. At this point, 
the girl undergoes a sequence of violent emotions, which finally lead her to see a doctor. In the 
course of treatment, “she confesses that the idea of taking care of her father and leading the 
austere life of a sick nurse had suddenly seemed unbearable” (26). In such case, the superior 
behavior would have been to openly reject the role of nurse, and accept the social disapproval 
that would ensue.  
 By having an emotional break-down, the girl covertly rejected that nursing role, resorting 
to an inferior behavior to achieve that objective. Sartre’s insight is that we should not merely say 
that the inferior behavior substitutes the superior one, but rather that it occurs in order to 
substitute the superior one. This is what gives emotions their covert finality. Sartre offers a 
variety of suggestive examples of this sort of finality in the emotional domain. He reports the 
case of a woman who had begun an embarrassing confession to Pierre Janet, one of the first 
doctors to recognize and treat psychosomatic illnesses in 19th century France. All of a sudden, 
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the girl interrupted her confession, and started to sob copiously. In such case, emoting was a 
means to cope with “a narrow and threatening world which expected her to perform a precise 
act”, and it resulted in achieving the end of dissolving the “intolerable tension” generated by the 
confession, thereby “transforming Janet… from a judge to a comforter”, and “canceling the 
precise necessity to give such and such information” (38).  
 Sartre also reports his own experience of getting angry when “I could not longer reply to 
someone with whom I had been bantering” (38). In such case, the superior behavior would have 
been to reply with another witticism, but lacking such option for the inability to come up with a 
witticism, Sartre resorted to getting angry as a means “to conquer my opponent”. Sartre takes the 
covert finality of emotions to be the essence of emotion, an essence which becomes apparent to 
anyone willing to make an “objective examination of emotional behavior” (41).  
 We should not construe Sartre’s notion of a subterfuge, I suggest, in terms of a deliberate 
pretense. Sartre remarks that there is no “reasoned calculation” (36) in the covert finality of 
emotion. As he puts it, “emotion is a certain way of apprehending the world”. Superior 
behaviors, what we would call standard actions, are for Sartre the result of an “apprehension of 
the means as the only possible way to reach the end”. When “the paths traced out become too 
difficult, or when we see no path”, standard actions must be substituted with something else. It is 
at this point that “we try to change the world, that is, to live as if the connection between things 
and their potentialities were not ruled by deterministic processes, but by magic” (59).  
 An emotion can therefore be understood as “a transformation of the world” (59) 
according to the laws of magic. “There is emotion”, Sartre tells us, “when the world of 
instruments abruptly vanishes and the magical world appears in its place” (90). Importantly, the 
emoter’s “attempt [to transform the world] is not conscious of being such, for it would then be 
the object of a reflection” (59). I do not interpret Sartre as saying that emotions are not access-
conscious in Block’s (1995) sense (see 4.1.1). What I take him to be saying, rather, is that people 
do not accompany their access consciousness with respect to being, say, angry or sad with the 
intention of achieving the ends that their being angry or sad does achieve.  
 Sartre gives several further examples of the ways in which emotions serve masked ends. 
For example, “sadness aims at avoiding the obligation to seek new ways”, and it does so by 
magically turning the universe into a gloomy place in which one must no longer cope with the 
difficult situation at hand (65). Joy is “a magical behavior which tends by incantation to realize 
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the possession of the desired object as instantaneous totality” (69). Fear “is a consciousness 
which, through magical behavior, aims at denying an object of the external world” (64). For 
example, one may encounter a dangerous animal, experience fear and faint, thereby finding 
refuge in the denial of danger, rather than in the adoption of a behavior of escape that is no 
longer available. The language of magic and incantations, as the language of subterfuges and 
tricks before, is an example of Sartre’s penchant for flamboyance over clarity.  
 What Sartre aims to say is that the special consciousness needed for the instantiation of 
the masked finality of the emotions has an important physiological underpinning. Sartre thinks 
that the emotions generate their magical world “by using the body as a means of incantation” 
(70). An “emotion [is] an abrupt drop of consciousness into the magical” (90), caused by the 
special role played by the body in emotional episodes. Sartre compares the magical 
consciousness into which we drop by emoting to “the consciousness of sleep, dream, and 
hysteria” (77). He writes that “[i]t is necessary to speak of a world of emotion as one speaks of a 
world of dreams or of worlds of madness” (80). The analogy, as I understand it, is due to the fact 
that in such states one is inclined to take the world to be as it appears, as we are inclined to do 
when the world appears to us as scary, infuriating, or sad.  
 Sartre does not say much about magical consciousness, but he is clear that the magic of 
emotions comes from their physiological underpinnings. In emotion, he tells us, consciousness 
“is caught in its own trap [as] it lives the new aspect of the world by believing in it” (78). The 
trap is the one predisposed by the emoter’s own physiology. “In order for us truly to grasp the 
horrible”, says Sartre, “we must be spell-bound, flooded by our own emotion” (74), a state we 
reach by virtue of “purely physiological phenomena [which] represent the seriousness of the 
emotion” (74). He remarks that “in order to believe in magical behavior it is necessary to be 
highly disturbed” (75). This clarifies that Sartre’s primary complaint with respect to James’ 
theory of the emotions is not that it reduces consciousness to its physiological underpinnings, but 
rather that it considers such physiological underpinnings in isolation.  
 Sartre wants us to understand the physiological in emotional phenomena in relation to 
their masked finality. The emotion is “the demeanor of a body which is in a certain 
[physiological] state; the state alone would not provoke the demeanor; the demeanor without the 
state is comedy…without [the] disturbance, the behavior would be pure signification, an 
affective scheme” (75). The body resonates in emotional phenomena in such a way that the 
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emoter is truly struck by the horrible, the joyful or the disgusting, and interacts with the world in 
light of the acceptance of its emotionally apprehended qualities. Such acceptance need not be 
reflectively underwritten, a point suggests when he compares emoting to hallucinating or 
dreaming.  
 At the end of his book, Sartre (1948) himself seemed to realize that there was at least one 
case in which his account of masked finality did not work well. He pointed out that “this theory 
of emotion does not explain certain abrupt reactions of horror and admiration which appear 
suddenly”, as when we unexpectedly see a “grinning face…flattened against the window pane” 
(82). In such cases, Sartre states that “it seems that the emotion has no finality at all” (83). But he 
thinks that the general spirit of his theory can be maintained, if we understand the case of sudden 
horror as one in which “the world itself…reveals itself to consciousness as magical” (83). The 
idea here is that in the case of horror directed towards the grinning face, we do not project the 
horrible into the world as if by magic, but rather the horrible manifests itself as an “existential 
structure of the world which is magical”.  
 The distinction between a projected and an independently existing magic is not well 
worked out, and Sartre does not do much to shed light on it. His suggestion is that “there are two 
forms of emotion, according to whether it is us who constitute the magic of the world to replace 
a deterministic activity which cannot be realized, or whether it is the world itself which abruptly 
reveals itself as being magical” (85). He concludes by saying that “there are often mixtures of the 
two types and most emotions are not pure” (86). With this final caveat, Sartre takes himself to 
have provided a fully general theory of the emotions that achieves what it aimed for, namely 
restoring a central role for the psychic, and opposing an understanding of the emotions as mere 
physiological disturbances.  
 The psychic had been restored because emotion had been shown to be a phenomenon of 
magical consciousness, and the physiological component had been accounted for as an essential 
part of the “total modification of “being-in-the-world” according to the very particular laws of 
magic” (93). Sartre’s assimilation of reflex emotions to the pattern of finality typically 
instantiated by crying in order to be comforted is unprincipled, and ought to be rejected. More 
generally, we should reject the presupposition that a single account of the finality of emotions 
will explain all forms of finality instantiated by emotional processes. Sartre is refreshingly 
sensitive to the ends our emotions allow us to achieve by virtue of what they communicate in the 
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course of an ongoing social transaction. For example, being sad communicates the need for 
comfort, and Sartre reveals remarkable insight when he suggests that understanding sadness 
demands, among other things, understanding how the evaluation of the payoff to be gained by 
getting sad causally impacts on the appraisal by virtue of which we get sad. But he is wrong if he 
assumes that every case of finality is somehow derivative from the general model he has 
provided.  
 The case of reflex emotions, to elaborate on Sartre’s own example, seems particularly 
problematic for an account that assumes the emotions to occur when, after having considered the 
situation at hand, we realize that “the paths traced out become too difficult, or…we see no path”, 
and thereby substitute a standard action with an inferior emotional behavior. Reflex emotions are 
elicited before the presence or absence of paths can even be considered, and they do not seem to 
involve any sort of strategic evaluation. As I see it, the value of Sartre’s account of finality does 
not lie in its generality, but in the fact that it points our attention to the strategic dimension of 
communication in emotional phenomena. 
Sartre’s own way to reconcile strategic and non-deliberate dimensions of emotionality was 
not entirely satisfactory, but he must be commended for having questioned with unprecedented 
force the commonsensical view that emoting is a way of being acted upon, pointing out various 
ways in which emoting is in fact more like acting. This insight, as well shall see, has been 
developed into the important idea that emotions have a Machiavellian dimension which is crucial 
to understand their origin and current function (Griffiths 2003, 2004a). 
   
6.3.2. Averill 
Let us now consider Averill’s emotions as social roles thesis. Its inspiring thought is that 
“emotions are responses that have been institutionalized by society as a means of resolving 
conflicts which exist within the social system” (1980, 37). The evidence I discussed in the 
section on cultural differences offered us examples of the institutionalization of emotional 
responses, namely of the fact that each of the marks of emotionality is affected by culturally-
specific rules of appraisal, of display, of behavior, and so on. The key addition here is that such 
institutionalization is aimed at solving societal conflicts, under the presupposition that “[f]or a 
response to become institutionalized, it must serve some social function” (1980, 47). In this 
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sense, the emotions are social roles, where a social role is “socially prescribed set of responses to 
be followed by a person in a given situation” (Averill 1980, 308).  
But clearly not all social roles generated to solve social conflicts count as emotions. For 
example, the social role of a policeman, which comprises a socially prescribed set of responses 
aimed at resolving societal conflicts, is something other than an emotion. The final piece of 
Averill’s account is that the social roles that are emotions are on the one hand temporary and on 
the other hand construed as passions. As Averill (1980) puts it, “[a]n emotion is a transitory 
social role (a socially constituted syndrome) that includes an individual’s appraisal of the 
situation, and is interpreted as a passion rather than as an action” (139). The rules of attribution 
by virtue of which emotions are interpreted as passions are key to distinguishing social roles 
such as policeman from social roles such as anger.  
Averill argues that the assumption of passivity results from a limited understanding of the 
social role played by emoting. As he puts it, “the experience of passivity during standard 
emotional reactions presume[s] a limited self-awareness, a restricted insight into the sources of 
one’s actions” (1980, 65). Under this view, the emoter does not feign anger, love, grief, sadness 
and so on, but rather goes through such emotions without fully understanding that he or she is 
engaging in them in order to resolve existing conflicts. Averill believes the “wild pig” syndrome 
I described in the previous section (Newman 1964) offers a general blueprint for what the 
emotions (as social constructions) are. Notice that this represents a diametrically opposed choice 
of paradigm case with respect to affect program theorists, who take the brief episode of fear 
caused by loss of support to be a general model for what the emotions (as affect programs) are.  
As I reported, people in the Gururumba society sometimes become “wild pigs”, and engage 
in a ritualized series of aggressive acts which last a few days, after which they hide in the forest 
to come back a few days later allegedly without recollection of what they have done. Averill 
suggests that the social function of the syndrome is to give people “an acceptable means of 
communicating the difficulty” (1980, 47) encountered in dealing with social responsibilities. The 
syndrome only occurs in people between the ages of 25 and 35, a critical age in the life of a 
Gururumba male. This is in fact the time in which males get married and begin sharing a 
significant portion of communal responsibilities. When the wild pig man returns from the forest 
in a state of calm, nobody reproaches him for his rampage and the members of the tribe 
 127
“reevaluate the individual’s ability to meet his obligations, and expectations are adjusted 
accordingly” (1980, 45).  
Importantly, neither the “wild pig” nor the community around him have a full understanding 
of the wider social context in which the emotional episode is embedded. As I pointed out before, 
within the Gururumba society it is assumed that what causes the syndrome is “being bitten by the 
ghost of a person who has recently died” (1980, 44). This is a vivid example of what it means to 
interpret an emotion as a passion, namely as something that occurs unbidden, without insight into 
the larger social dynamics that bring it about.  
But can this account be generalized to all emotions? Averill (1980) is convinced that “most 
standard emotional reactions…are behaviors which frequently are condemned by society and yet 
which are maintained because they serve useful (but disguised functions) within the sociocultural 
system” (66). We have a further thesis here, namely that emotions are not only means of 
resolving a societal conflict, but also that the societal conflict concerns the very kinds of 
behaviors comprised in the syndrome. Under this view, emotions emerge when there are “norms 
which simultaneously encourage and discourage a particular kind of behavior”, which becomes 
an emotional behavior to be justified in the name of passivity.  
For example, anger is the kind of behavior discouraged by norms against violence and 
encouraged by norms in favor of protecting one’s own rights from infringers. By being 
“overcome” by anger, individuals manage to protect their rights by inflicting violence, and are 
justified in so doing so because anger allegedly overcame them (Averill 1980, 66). An obvious 
problem with this account is that a large number of emotions consist of behaviors that either are 
neither encouraged nor discouraged or are either encouraged or discouraged, but not both.  
Love behaviors seem to be a good example of behaviors that are generally encouraged but 
nor discouraged, whereas there do not seem to be specific social norms about, say, surprise 
behaviors. Moreover, in the case of many emotions there are no responses that are prescribed, 
namely such that one has an obligation to perform them. For example, there are very many 
loving behaviors one may choose when in love, but the presence of a unique ritualized sequence 
as in the wild pig case appears absent. We may substitute prescribed with “prescribed or 
permitted”, so as to enlarge the domain of emotions understood as institutionalized responses in 
a broader sense.  
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The real problem, however, concerns the assumption of conflict resolution. Averill is forced 
to make up sui generis conflicts to bestow generality upon his account. He proposes for example 
that romantic love is discouraged by norms which require the anonymity of individual subjects, 
and encouraged by norms demanding the promotion of self-worth. This is clearly a stretch, 
which shows that there is something wrong with the idea that emotions always come about to 
solve societal conflicts, more precisely conflicts regarding emotional behaviors themselves.  
I think Averill has missed the main insight offered by rejecting the idea of emotions as 
unbidden occurrences. His account presupposes that what one does by emoting is essentially 
performing an act that is societally prohibited in a way that becomes justifiable because of the 
assumption of passivity. This view suggests that the point of emoting is getting away with a 
norm violation. On the contrary, it seems to me that if there is a point to emoting by virtue of 
which we can assimilate emoting to an activity, it is that of bringing about certain effects in the 
context of a social transaction. This is the thesis of emotions as social transactions. Bringing 
about such effects may not involve behaviors discouraged by social norms, and even when it 
does, the point of emoting is bringing about the effects, not getting away with the norm violation.  
Consider anger once again. According to Averill, anger serves the purpose of making 
aggressive behavior justified. The interpretation of passivity here results from the emoter lacking 
insight into the fact that he is emoting so as to avoid the social disapproval that would be 
associated with his behavior had he not been overcome by it. The problem is that people don’t 
get angry in order to be justified in behaving aggressively, but in order to obtain something by 
behaving aggressively. As first suggested by Sartre, sometimes people get angry in order to 
“conquer an opponent”, namely in order to bring about a submissive response. The interpretation 
of passivity here results from the emoter lacking insight into the fact that he is emoting so as to 
bring about a certain response in the opponent.  
What is masked is not the resolution of a social conflict between norms, but the pursuit of a 
personal end. The same disregard for the personal ends emoting may fulfill in the context of a 
personal transaction appears in all accounts of emotions as social roles mentioned by Averill. For 
example, falling in love while already married is much more likely to serve the purpose of 
changing sexual partner while reducing the blame connected to violating a bond of trust (“I could 
not help it, I’m a sorry”), than the purpose of getting away with violating the (alleged) social 
norm discouraging anonymity. 
 129
Similarly, the wild pig in the Gururumba society is not likely to engage in the syndrome in 
order to be justified in shooting arrows and looting other people’s properties, but in order to have 
his social obligations reassessed. This leads me to conclude that the most promising version of 
the emotions as roles/transactions thesis takes the emotions to be social transactions in the sense 
of interpersonal moves.  
But what is the evidence that emotions are social transactions? Aren’t emotions the arena of 
the automatically elicited and unbidden? Don’t emotions occur so quickly that there simply is no 
time for strategic considerations? Aren’t facial expressions involuntary and impossible to 
reproduce at will? 
 
6.3.3. Hinde and Fridlund   
The picture of emotions emerging from the Darwin-Tomkins-Ekman tradition has the 
following distinguish properties. An automatic appraisal is assumed to occur in correspondence 
to universal antecendents. The appraisal is followed by a cascade of responses, including 
physiological, expressive and behavioral ones, which follow quickly and mandatorily from the 
appraisal. A specific expression is universally associated with each basic emotion, and 
consequently it carries veridical and highly reliable information about what emotion is unfolding. 
Under this view, expressions are recipient-independent, and informative of the occurrence of a 
specific affect program. The expressions produced by the affect program, on the other hand, can 
be partially inhibited or modified - display rules are at work – and they can be faked. Ekman 
(1972) argued that in the first case, the universal expression is likely to transpire, whereas in the 
second case it is not likely to be accurately reproduced.  
 A rather different picture of emotional expressions has emerged in the last fifteen years, 
commonly associated with the names of Fridlund (1997) and Russell (1997), but importantly 
anticipated by Hinde (1985a, 1985b). As I understand it, their work suggest that at least some 
emotional expressions are recipient-dependent and strategic, in the sense that they are 
specifically directed towards a recipient, and they do not necessarily inform him of the 
occurrence of an affect program. Rather, they aim to generate an effect in the recipient that is 
advantageous to the sender. Whereas the Darwin-Tomkins-Ekman tradition thinks of expressions 
primarily as external read-outs of an occurring emotion (call this the traditional view), the 
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Hinde-Fridlund-Russell tradition thinks of expressions primarily as moves in the course of an 
ongoing negotiation (call this the behavioral ecology view). 
 The ethologist Robert Hinde (1985a, 1985b) was the first to make an articulate case for 
the negotiating role of expressions. He began by noticing that several kinds of expressions, in 
both humans and animals, are issued only when a recipient is there to be influenced by them, and 
that the responses of the recipient to the expression determine what behaviors follow it.  For 
example, Hinde pointed out that in several cases birds flee after having issued a threat expression 
(Stokes 1962). His interpretation was that threat displays “were given when the bird was 
uncertain what to do” and that “which of the several possible responses it showed next depended 
on the behavior of the rival” (Hinde 1985a, 109). Under this view, threat expressions should be 
understood as “signals in a process of negotiation between individuals”. 
 These ideas were applied by Hinde (1985a) to cast doubt on the assumption that 
“emotional behavior is the outward expression of an emotional state, and that there is a one-to-
one correspondence between them”, an assumption Hinde associated with Darwin. By emotional 
behavior, Hinde understood mostly facial and postural expressions. Hinde thought that the 
assumption of a one-to-one correspondence does not make evolutionary sense, as it may be 
adaptive for an organism to mislead the recipient of the expression about the nature of the 
internal state to which it is associated (Dawkins and Krebs 1978). In many cases, natural 
selection will favor sending non-veridical or ambiguous messages, and take a course of action 
contigently upon the response received.  
 Hinde, however, acknowledged that signals do not always serve negotiating purposes. 
For example, in the case of the “begging calls of a young bird” the signal is indeed the read-out 
of an internal state. Hinde’s (1985b) conclusion was that we should expect expressions to lie on a 
continuum between expressing and negotiating. He wrote:  
 
Such considerations suggest the view that emotional behavior may 
lie along a continuum from behaviours that is more or less purely 
expressive to behavious concerned primarily with a process of 
negotiation between individuals…In animals, bird songs lies nearer 
the expressive end, threat postures nearer the negotiation end. In 
man, spontaneous and solitary laughter are primarily expressive, 
the ingratiating smile primarily negotiating. However most 
emotional expressions involve both (Hinde 1985b, 989) 
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I consider this to be an important insight. What I take Hinde to be suggesting is that most 
emotional signals have a non-arbitrary relation to the states to which they are associated but at 
the same time are aimed at making a move in a negotiation whose outcome is open-ended and 
crucially dependent upon the recipient’s responses. In chapter 10, this idea will be put at the 
center of the theory of emotions I propose. 
Ever since Hinde wrote on this issue, much research has been offered in support of the view 
that emotional expressions have a strategic dimension. The debate has become quite radicalized, 
and the idea of a continuum has gone lost in favor of views that take expressions to be either 
pure read-outs or pure negotiating moves.  
 Fridlund (1989, 1997) is the best known contemporary researcher on the strategic 
dimensions of emotional expression. The basic tenet of his view is that facial displays are not 
“‘expressions’ of discrete, internal emotional states, or the outputs of modular affect programs” 
and that “displays have their impact upon others’ behavior because vigilance for and 
comprehension of signals coevolved with the signals themselves” (Fridlund and Duchaine 1996, 
278). This view is accompanied by skepticism on the universality of facial expressions, 
articulated most prominently by Russell (1994) (see Ekman 1994 for a response). Some of the 
points of contention have been surveyed in my review of Ekman’s experiments in subsection 
5.2.4, so I won’t discuss them again here. 
 Fridlund and Duchaine’s (1996) view is that “there may be no prototypes [sic] faces for 
each category. Rather, displays exert their influence in the particular context of their issuance” 
(278). Under this view, there is no expression universally associated with each of the basic 
emotions. Anger expressions, for example, will comprise all the expressions which can be used 
in different circumstances to convey something like the message “I am likely to attack you”.  
This is not simply to say that the universal expression of a basic emotion can be inhibited or 
transformed, as Ekman would have it with his proposal of display rules. Rather, the idea is that 
no universal expression is automatically associated with basic emotions at all.  
 For example, according to the traditional view, Duchenne smiles are always generated as 
part of the affect program of happiness. Fernández-Dols & Ruiz-Belda (1997b) demonstrated 
that Olympic gold medal winners, allegedly a paragon of happiness, generate the Duchenne 
smile only when interacting with other people. We can interpret this fact as indicating that smiles 
are not broadcast in a recipient-independent way as part of an automatic cascade of responses, 
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but are issued instead in order to negotiate a social transaction. The same is true of the smiles of 
soccer fans on the occasion of a goal of their favorite team. As shown by Fernández-Dols & 
Ruiz-Belda (1997b), Duchenne smiles are only issued when fans face one another.  
 Manifestations of the influence of recipients on expressions - the so-called audience 
effects - have also been shown with respect to the expressions generated by tasting and smelling 
and by pain (see Russell et al. 2003 for a recent review of the literature on audience effects). The 
behavioral ecology view, it seems, faces a difficulty in light on the fact that expressions are 
sometimes issued when the emoter is alone. Many take this to be a clear sign that the behavioral 
ecology view cannot be a general theory of expressions, as it covers at best a subset of the 
domain of expressions. For example, Ekman (1990, 263) wrote that “[f]acial expressions do 
occur when people are alone…and contradict the theoretical proposals of those who view 
expressions solely as social signals”. Hinde himself considered solitary laughter to be an 
example of the purely expressive nature of some emotional expressions.  
 Fridlund (1990) has argued instead that we should not infer that audience effects are 
absent just because an audience is physically absent. Audience effects may be generated by 
imagining an audience. This is an old idea in the literature on emotional expressions, initially 
formulated by Piderit and Gratiolet. Piderit wrote in 1858 that “the muscular movements of 
expression are in part related to imaginary objects, and in part to imaginary sensory impressions” 
(Piderit as quoted by Fridlund and Duchaine 1996, 265). The problem is that just positing the 
presence of imaginary audiences when expressions appear not to be social signals risks turning 
the hypothesis into an unfalsifiable one.  
 Fridlund (1990) realized this risk, and tried to test the imaginary audience hypothesis 
experimentally. He first proved that experimental subjects smile much more often when viewing 
a humorous videotape in the company of a friend than when alone. To test the hypothesis that 
audience effects can be implicit, he measured the amount of smiling in experimental subjects 
who watched the videotape alone but under the experimentally induced assumption that their 
friend was watching the same videotape at the same time in another room. If audience effects 
depended exclusively on the physical presence of an audience, there should be no difference in 
smiling between this situation and the alone viewing condition. But Fridlund (1990) documented 
that people smile almost as much when their friend is actually present as they do when they just 
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imagine him to be engaged in the same activity. The experiment does seem to show that we 
cannot reliably infer the absence of audience effects from the mere absence of an audience.  
 Although the literature on the social dimensions of expressions has been dismissed by 
some (e.g. Ekman 1994), I am convinced it offers an important insight on the nature of the 
emotions. But I think it should be integrated with, rather than opposed to, the literature on 
universal emotional signals. What the data offered by Fridlund and others make a case for is that 
in many cases emotional expressions work as negotiating signals. The evidence, however, does 
not prove that emotions never have automatic expressions associated to them, nor that such 
expressions are not universal. The facial expression of someone about to have a car accident, or 
of someone suddenly losing support, is going to be automatic and universal, and it does appear to 
be purely expressive.  
 Incidentally, Fridlund’s (1990) own experiment shows that the idea that emotions are 
never purely expressive is problematic, as subjects in the alone condition do smile in the absence 
of an imagined audience. If smiling in the alone condition while imagining an audience suggests 
that the physical absence of an audience is no proof that audience effects are absent, smiling in 
the alone condition while not imagining an audience suggests that audience effects do not offer a 
complete explanation of facial expressions. 
  Some of the examples of emotions used by Fridlund and his associates, moreover, do not 
appear to qualify as affect programs. For example, the happiness of an Olympic champion, 
which behavioral ecologists assume not to be automatically associated with Duchenne smiles, is 
an extended episode which certainly lasts for more than a few seconds, and does not appear to be 
governed by an automatic appraisal mechanism. The data on the negotiating aspects of the 
happiness of Olympic champions should probably be constructed as evidence that many ordinary 
episodes of happiness are not affect programs, rather than as evidence that affect programs lack 
universal expressions.  
 There is another, more important reason why it is better to avoid the dichotomy between 
purely expressing and purely negotiating when it comes to signals. If there were no reliable 
connection between displays and internal states, understood as causes of ensuing behaviors, 
displays could hardly function as signals at all. For example, if threat displays were associated 
with equal probability with aggressive and peaceful behaviors, their negotiating potential would 
vanish. To say that signals are at the same time expressive and negotiating, as suggested by 
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Hinde, hints at the necessity for signals to be connected with internal states by a reliable, if not 
one-to-one, correspondence.  
 I propose we concede to Ekman that a handful of emotional episodes are automatically 
associated with recipient-independent and universal expressions, but point out that this is an 
incomplete theory of facial expressions. Many emotional expressions of many emotions have 
negotiating dimensions we cannot neglect if we want to understand their evolutionary origin and 
current function. 
  
6.3.4. Parkinson and Griffiths  
If emotional expressions are at least in part negotiating signals, couldn’t emotions as a 
whole be at least in part negotiating moves in an ongoing social transaction? This is precisely 
what the emotions as social transactions thesis assumes to be the case. I will call transactionalist 
any emotion theorist who endorses this thesis. Brian Parkinson (1995, 2004, 2005) is the most 
prominent transactionalist in psychology, and Paul Griffiths (2003, 2004a) has began to show 
what philosophical dividends can be paid by this emerging research program. One difference 
between them is that, whereas Parkinson tends to contrast affect program theory with the thesis 
that emotions are interpersonal moves, Griffiths takes this thesis to complement the existing 
literature on basic emotions.  
I pointed out in the last subsection that signals in many cases are not likely to be recipient-
independent effects of internal states, but rather signals meant to influence a signal recipient in 
an advantageous way. What transactionalists want to make a case for is that emotions themselves 
in many cases are not interactant-independent effects of appraisals, but rather moves meant to 
influence an emotion interactant in an advantageous way.  The hypothesis is that emotions may 
be produced, rather than merely expressed, in a strategic way.  
Parkinson’s (1995) starting point is the view that “[a]lthough certain aspects of emotional 
response derive fairly directly from our biological heritage,…I do not believe that it is possible to 
give a full account of all human emotional states by exclusive reference to evolutionary 
explanations” (163). Parkinson’s view is that emotions “are social constructions, and they can be 
fully understood only on a social level of analysis” (1995, 309). Griffiths (2003) considers 
instead the social level of analysis to complement the evolutionary one. As he puts it, “a socially-
oriented (‘Machiavellian’) perspective on the basic emotions can be incorporated into a theory of 
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extended emotion episodes…in such a way as to provide biological underpinnings for ideas that 
have traditionally been associated with social constructionist…accounts of emotion” (2003, 49).  
I side with Griffiths in thinking that an evolutionary account is entirely compatible with one 
that emphasizes the strategic and social dimension of emotional phenomena. Hinde (1985a, 
1985b) and Fridlund (1990, 1997) offer an example of this integration, as they diagnosed the 
emergence of strategic aspects as resulting from evolutionary pressures. Also, I argued that the 
very distinction between the social and the biological is problematic under an interactionist 
approach to the emotional phenotype such as the one I endorse. What Parkinson and Griffiths 
have in common is that they point us to aspects of the emotions that have been long neglected in 
emotion theory.  
The key difference between the emotions as social roles thesis endorsed by Averill and the 
emotions as social transactions thesis endorsed by Parkinson and Griffiths is that according to 
the latter thesis what makes emotions goal-directed is not that they aim to solve societal conflicts 
but rather that they aim to promote the emoter’s interests. The promotion of social ends, if there 
is one, is a secondary phenomenon under the transactionalist view. The primary phenomenon is 
that emoters emote in order to influence those they interact with in an advantageous way. This 
contrast is remarked upon by Parkinson (1995): 
 
[M]any of the occasions for emotion arise from local negotiations 
in the course of everyday personal interaction and do not directly 
reflect societally prescribed norms. The conflicts, disagreements, 
and commitments that lead to emotion may be based on mutually 
established rights and obligations in relationships which have only 
a remote connection with culturally imposed rules and roles (162).  
 
What is added to this distinction is a dynamic dimension neglected by the emotions as social 
roles thesis. Averill characterized emotions as “responses that have been institutionalized by 
society”, describing the production of such responses as akin to the performance of a script 
(although without insight, on the emoter’s part, that it is a script). The model is that of a 
behavioral ritual, as the one manifested by the wild pig in the Gururumba society (see 
subsections 6.2.1 and 6.3.2) or by someone who expresses grief at the funeral by going through a 
fixed sequence of responses (e.g. crying at a particular time, fainting at another, etc.). 
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This view misses the point that emotional episodes often result from a dynamic give-and- 
take, in which responses are not pre-ordained at the beginning of the sequence, but rather shaped 
by the interactant’s responses. This is where the metaphor of negotiation comes to full fruition, 
as the emotional episode is not exhausted by the interactant’s reception of a one-shot message, 
but is rather dynamically shaped by how the interactant responds to the initial message, by how 
the emoter responds to the interactant’s response, and so on. As Parkinson puts it, “[t]he acting 
out of emotion episodes is guided on-line by the affordances offered or denied by other people’s 
ongoing actions, which in turn are mutually coordinated with the actor’s own self-presentation” 
(163). This is a central idea in the theory of emotions as “urgency management systems” I 
develop in chapter 10.  
Griffiths (2003) emphasizes that what is required to make sense of the idea that emotions are 
produced strategically is that appraisals take into account the likely impact on the interactant of 
engaging in an emotional episode. This is what Griffiths calls the Machiavellian Emotion 
Hypothesis: 
 
Emotional appraisal is sensitive to cues that predict the value to the 
emotional agent of responding to the situation with a particular 
emotion, as well as cues that indicate the significance of the 
stimulus situation to the agent independently of the agent’s 
response (2003, 54). 
 
Notice the two components of this hypothesis. On the one hand, appraisal is sensitive to the 
advantage of engaging in a certain emotion in certain circumstances. Under this view, the 
production of emotions is interactant-dependent, and contingent upon the effect expected from 
the emotional episode. On the other hand, appraisal is sensitive to cues that indicate the 
significance of the stimulus situation as such. Griffiths argues that the significance is 
independent of the agents’ response, but I propose that we should understand it as independent 
of the interactant’s response. In other words, emotional appraisal is sensitive to the significance 
of the antecedent circumstances for the emoter both independently of the interactant’s response 
and in light of it.  
I think the most fruitful way to interpret the Machiavellian Emotion Hypothesis is along the 
lines suggested by Hinde with respect to emotional expressions. I will reformulate it as follows: 
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Emotional appraisal lies along a continuum from appraisal of 
interactant-independent personal meaning of antecedent 
circumstances to appraisal of interactant-dependent advantage of 
engaging in a certain emotion. Emotional appraisals sometimes lie 
close to the pure registration of personal significance end, and 
sometimes they lie close to the pure negotiation of interpersonal 
advantage end of the continuum. Most emotional appraisals, 
however, involve both aspects. 
 
Consider an episode of anger. The appraisal that brings it about is sometimes close to the 
pure registration end of the continuum, for example when anger results from being suddenly 
poked in the back. In such case, the likely effect of getting angry on the interactant is not 
considered by the emoter, and anger unfolds automatically. One other occasions, the appraisal 
that brings anger about is close to the pure negotiation end of the continuum. For example, one 
may get angry with a store clerk just to get a refund on a purchased item, despite having lost the 
receipt and despite not blaiming the store clerk for it. In most cases, emotional appraisals involve 
both aspects, namely a registration of personal significance and a negotiation of interpersonal 
advantage.  
The question we must ask is: What is the evidence that emotions are interpersonal moves, 
namely that they have a Machiavellian dimension? So far we have only relied on the intuitive 
appeal of this idea. Griffiths (2003) suggests that the evidence for the strategic effects of 
emotional displays in animals ought to be construed already as evidence that the production of 
emotion has strategic dimensions in animals. This is because the “distinction between having an 
emotion and expressing it may be distinctly problematic in nonhuman subjects” (2003, 56). 
Under this view, the strategic threat displays of a bird such as those discussed by Hinde must 
already be understood as evidence for the truth of the Machiavellian Emotion Hypothesis with 
respect to animals.  
Griffiths also offers some tentative evidence about strategic dimensions of emotions in 
humans, which he argues ought to be expected on theoretical grounds given the homology 
between emotional appraisal systems in humans and animals. For example, Stein et al. (1993) 
reported that people list the prospect of obtaining compensation among the factors which 
determine whether they will appraise a loss as an anger elicitator or a sadness elicitor. Griffiths 
also mentions the evolutionary hypothesis that romantic love may have been selected for because 
of the differential fitness advantage afforded by mating outside one’s long term bond (Konner 
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1982, 315). Although he acknowledges that there are competing explanations for the emergence 
of romantic love, Griffiths (2003) points out that Konner’s provisional hypothesis is interestingly 
similar to the social constructionist interpretation of love as an excuse for adultery.  
Parkinson et al. (2005) offer further evidence in support of the emotions as interpersonal 
moves thesis in humans. Consider embarrassment, an emotion elicited 98% of the time only in 
the presence of an interactant (Tangney 1996), and consequently a good candidate for the study 
of the transactional aspects of emotion. Parkinson reports that Leary, Landel, and Patton (1996) 
have shown that people continue to rate themselves as embarrassed about the way they sung a 
song (“Feelings”) they just recorded until the experimenter somehow acknowledges that they are 
embarrassed. The consequence of the detection of embarrassment, as shown by Semin and 
Manstead (1982), is that interactants have a more lenient view of the embarrassing behavior.  
Parkinson also reports that O’Malley and Greenberg (1983) showed that female 
experimental subjects reduced the fines they gave to motorists that expressed remorse in 
hypothetical accidents. This appears to offer us an insight into the effect of remorse on the 
interactor, which is likely to become a part of the appraisal that elicits it. There is also some 
preliminary evidence on the strategic elicitation of guilt (Miceli, 1992; Vangelisti, Daly, & 
Rudnick, 1991).  
If we consider the evidence on the strategic dimensions of emotional expressions, and this 
preliminary evidence on Machiavellian effects in human emotions, the emotions as social 
transactions thesis appears worth taking seriously.  I will try to develop its insights in the contaxt 
of a new theory of emotions as urgency management systems I will develop in chapter 10. 
 
 
6.4. CONCLUSION 
 
I have tried to disentangle various ways in which the thesis that emotions are social 
constructions has been understood. The most interesting strand of the social constructionist 
tradition has turned out to be the one which assimilates emotions with social transactions. As 
demonstrated by Griffiths’ work in particular, this idea is compatible with affect program theory. 
As affect program theory, however, it appears to fall short as a general theory of emotions. There 
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clearly are instances of emotions which lack a strategic dimension. Reflex emotions such as fear 
generated by a suddenly looming object are an obvious example. But should a theory of 
emotions accommodate all instances of emotions as ordinarily understood? Isn’t the point of a 
theory to help us formulate new explanations and predictions? In the next chapter, I begin 
tackling such methodological questions by illustrating and discussing the two most popular 
theories in contemporary philosophy of emotions, namely cognitivism and Neo-Jamesianism.   
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7. A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 
OF EMOTIONS 
 
In contemporary philosophy of emotions, the two most popular theories are currently offered 
by cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians. Martha Nussbaum (2001) and Robert Solomon (2003), two 
prominent champions of contemporary cognitivism, have argued that emotions are particular 
kinds of judgments. Their theory is the most recent and sophisticated embodiment of the 
cognitivist tradition I characterized in chapter 4. Jesse Prinz (2004a, 2004b) has instead defended 
the view that emotions are particular kinds of perceptions of bodily changes. As I argued in 
subsection 2.3.1, this was the idea at the heart of James’ (1884, 1990) theory of emotions. It has 
enjoyed a revival in recent times mostly through the work of the neurobiologist Antonio 
Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003). What Prinz adds to the Damasian version of James’ theory is an 
account of the emotions’ intentionality. 
Cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians explicitly characterize their respective accounts of emotions 
as definitions, and claim that the sets of necessary and sufficient conditions they comprise 
capture anything which deserves to be called an emotion. When we probe the nature of this 
deservingness, we realize that their proposed definitions aim to capture anything that can 
rightfully be called an emotion in ordinary language. The implicit assumption is that the shared 
ground captured by the definition individuates a domain of theoretically interesting similarity 
among emotions as ordinarily understood. Although naturalistic philosophers of emotions such 
as Griffiths (1997) have voiced skepticism about the legitimacy of this project, I think it is an 
intellectually coherent project, which complements the project of developing explications of 
emotions. 
My concern is of a different sort, namely that cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians presuppose 
that a satisfactory account of what makes something an emotion in the ordinary sense can take 
the form of a definition. There are good Wittgensteinian reasons to be skeptical about this 
assumption, and skepticism turns out to be well-grounded with respect to the work of 
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philosophers of emotions. When we consider their argumentative strategies in some detail, we 
realize that both cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians insulate their alleged definitions of emotions 
from ordinary language counterexamples by means of two equally problematic strategies. One is 
that of trivializing the notions used to define the emotions, and the other is that of legislating on 
proper use of ordinary language on the basis of introspective intuitions which are nothing more 
than expressions of prior theoretical commitments. 
Neither of these strategies accomplishes either the goal of capturing the condition of 
application of folk emotion categories or the goal of developing a fruitful explication of them, 
which I take to be the two central purposes for a theory of emotions. If emotion theorists aim to 
accurately capture what makes something an emotion in the ordinary sense, then they should 
supplement their introspective intuitions with the empirical evidence collected by experimental 
psychologists in the last twenty years concerning the way in which ordinary language users sort 
emotions from non-emotions. This is what I will do in chapter 8, where I collect the empirical 
evidence on folk emotion categories and try to draw methodological conclusions from it. 
On the other hand, if emotion theorists aim to develop fruitful explications of emotion 
categories, they should focus on demonstrating what theoretical purposes are served by the 
explications proposed, without striving for anything more than “similarity in use” with folk 
emotion categories. I discuss the properties a good explication of emotions should have in 
chapter 9. 
 
 
7.1. WHAT ARE COGNITIVISTS AND NEO-JAMESIANS TRYING TO ACHIEVE? 
 
Nussbaum and Solomon believe that “[e]motions are appraisals or value judgments” 
(Nussbaum 2001, 4) or that “to have an emotion is to hold a normative judgment about one’s 
situation” (Solomon 2003, 8). Prinz (2004a, 55), on the other hand, is convinced that “emotions 
are perceptions of bodily states”. These ostensibly very different accounts are understood as 
having the logical form of definitions. Consider the following passages:  
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[W]e are in a position to conclude not only that judgments of the 
sort we have described are necessary constituent elements in the 
emotion, but also that they are sufficient (Nussbaum 2001, 43-44) 
Showing that [perceptions of] bodily changes are sufficient does 
not establish that the somatic theory is true. For that, one would 
also need to show that [perceptions of] bodily changes are 
necessary for emotions…I think the somatic approach can subsume 
anything that deserves to be called an emotion (Prinz 2004a, 46, 
49) 
Nussbaum (2001, 196) argues that emotions can “be defined in terms of judgment alone,” 
and Prinz (2004b, 190) refers to “[m]y definition of emotions.” But what makes a definition of 
emotions a good one? More generally, how do we establish whether or not a certain account of 
emotions, whatever its logical form, captures “anything that deserves to be called an emotion”? 
There are at least two paths a theorist of emotions may follow to articulate an answer.  
One would be to say that a certain account captures anything that deserves to be called an 
emotion insofar as it captures what is worth calling an emotion relative to the purposes of a given 
theory. The key epistemic virtue that grounds deservingness is in such case fruitfulness. Under 
this view, good accounts of emotions would capture what deserves to be called an emotion for 
the purposes of a theory T (e.g. neuroscience, biology, experimental psychology, clinical 
psychology, social theory, etc.).  
Another possibility would be to say that a certain account captures anything that deserves to 
be called an emotion insofar as it captures all and only what competent speakers can rightfully 
call an emotion in ordinary language. The key epistemic virtue that grounds deservingness would 
be in such case ordinary language compatibility.  
If we consider the argumentative strategies of philosophers of emotions such as Solomon, 
Nussbaum and Prinz, it is apparent that the accounts they put forth aim for ordinary language 
compatibility (see below). At the same time, cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians assume that what 
deserves to be called an emotion in ordinary language corresponds to what is fruitful to call 
emotion for theoretical purposes, even though the specific nature of this fruitfulness is generally 
left implicit. The identification between what emotion terms allegedly mean in ordinary language 
and what is a “good thing to mean” by them for the purposes of a theory is one of the most 
common features of emotion theory writ large.10 I am convinced that this is one of the central 
                                                 
10 I borrowed the expression “good thing to mean” from Nuel Belnap. 
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methodological obstacles to progress in emotion theory. Accurately capturing the condition of 
application of folk emotion categories and offering fruitful explications for them are distinct 
intellectual projects, both interesting and legitimate, but to be evaluated in light of desiderata 
which are different and may not be fulfilled jointly. 
I discussed James’ theory of emotions in subsection 2.3.1 in terms of its content, but I now 
want to use it as an example of the way in which the epistemic virtues of theoretical fruitfulness 
and ordinary language compatibility have systematically been blurred in the history of emotion 
theory. It is useful to begin from James’ theory also because cognitivism and the Neo-Jamesian 
theory of emotions are attempts to solve the substantive problems encountered by the Jamesian 
theory in the version I discussed in 2.3.1. Moreover, I want to argue that James would probably 
not have been a Neo-Jamesian, so it is good to refresh our memory about what James (1884, 
1990) really said. 
The inspiring thought of James’ (1884, 1890, 1894) theory was that the psychology of 
emotions had yet to grow from a descriptive to a scientific phase. As I argued in chapter 2, 
psychologists had generally identified the emotions in terms of feelings, and treated such feelings 
as “eternal and sacred psychic entities, like the old immutable species in natural history.” The 
“merely descriptive literature” resulting from the attempt to describe “the internal shadings of 
emotional feeling” was such that James declared he would rather “read verbal descriptions of the 
shapes of the rocks on a New Hampshire farm” than have to toil through it again (James 1890, 
448).  
What the psychology of emotions needed, James argued, was a “central point of view, or a 
deductive or generative principle,” which could do for the understanding of emotions what the 
principle of heredity and variation had done for the understanding of species, namely allow it to 
get “on to another logical level” (James 1890, 448). Since James believed that feelings ultimately 
resulted from physiological causes, he proposed a physiological account of emotions.  
When it came to spell out the central reason why his theory of emotions had to be 
embraced, however, James presented what I called the Argument from Conceivability (see 2.3.1 
for discussion): 
 
I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is 
this: If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract 
from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic 
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bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no “mind-
stuff” out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold 
and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains… A 
purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity…[F]or us, 
emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable (James 
1884, 193) 
 
Notice the shift of emphasis here. The “vital point” urged by James is not, as we may expect 
from the previous discussion, that there is significant heuristic value in thinking of emotions as 
perceptions of bodily changes, and that a large number of emotions, especially the strong ones, 
involve such perceptions. Rather, the vital point is that an emotion dissociated from all bodily 
feeling is “for us…inconceivable,” in the sense that “whatever moods, affections, and passions” 
we can conceive of, they “are in very truth constituted by, and made up of, those bodily changes 
we ordinarily call their expression” (James 1890, 452).  
James’ argument presupposes the fruitfulness of thinking of emotions in terms of 
perceptions of bodily changes, but looks for legitimacy in the way in which competent language 
users – a.k.a. “we” – conceive of emotions. The result of this shift of emphasis has been that 
much of 20th century emotion theory has been focused on trying to show in how many ways not 
contemplated by James “we” can conceive of an emotion. This is not to say that conflicts 
between different schools have always been framed in terms of whether or not a certain account 
is compatible with ordinary language. For example, I argued in section 3.1 that psychological 
behaviorists questioned the Jamesian theory of emotions on the ground that it made use of a 
scientifically problematic notion, namely that of a conscious perception of bodily changes. The 
issue is rather that considerations of fruitfulness have been confusingly mixed with 
considerations of ordinary language compatibility.  
Skinner (1953) had methodological misgivings about the notion of consciousness (see 
section 3.1.1), but he supported his theory of emotions in part by saying that “[w]hen the man in 
the street says that someone is afraid or angry or in love, he is generally talking about 
predispositions to act in certain ways” (1953, 162). The task of characterizing what 
predispositions the average person on the street is talking about when he or she talks about the 
emotions was of course perfected by Ryle (1949). I reported in section 3.2.1 on his distinction 
between the emotional predispositions he called inclinations (e.g. interest for symbolic logic), 
agitations (e.g. excitement) and moods (e.g. depression).  
 145
A formidable adversary for the Jamesian theory emerged when behaviorism collapsed 
around the mid-1950s, and a number of philosophers of emotions began working within the 
emerging cognitivist tradition along the lines I sketched in chapter 4. Solomon (2003) and 
Nussbaum (2001) are the contemporary champions of the cognitivist tradition, and they make 
abundant use of “conceivability” arguments. Consider the following quote from Nussbaum:  
 
The reason it makes sense to imagine a bodyless substance having 
genuine emotions is that it makes sense to imagine that a thinking 
being, whether realized in matter or not, could care deeply about 
something in the world, and have the thoughts and intentions 
associated with such attachments. And that’s all we really require 
for emotion (Nussbaum 2001, 60) 
 
What is important about this passage is that it clearly brings to the fore the nature of many 
conflicts between emotion theorists, which are conflicts about what “we really require for 
emotion.” James’ belief that a disembodied emotion is “for us” unconceivable is met by 
Nussbaum’s assurance that “we” are perfectly able to conceive of a bodyless creature having an 
emotion. If we consider the sorts of ordinary language counterexamples discussed in debates 
between cognitivists and feeling theorists, and more generally in contemporary emotion theory, 
we realize that they belong to two families: 
 
Type 1 Counterexamples: Instances x of emotion (E) as ordinarily understood which do 
not satisfy the account A proposed 
Type 2 Counterexamples: Instances x which satisfy the account A proposed but are not 
instances of emotion (E) as ordinarily understood 
 
In the passage above, Nussbaum offers a Type 1 counterexample to the thesis that an 
emotion is a perception of bodily changes. On the other hand, the Jamesian excerpt can be 
construed as a Type 2 counterexample to Nussbaum’s thesis that an emotion is a judgment by 
which we “ascribe to things and persons outside the person’s own control great importance for 
that person’s own flourishing” (Nussbaum 2001, 4). As far as James is concerned, “we” would 
qualify such judgment as a “cold and neutral state of intellectual perception” insofar as it lacked 
bodily symptoms.  
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The prominence of Type 1 and Type 2 counterexamples in debates among emotion theorists 
reveals that the epistemic virtue of ordinary language compatibility is interpreted in terms of 
insulation from Type 1 and Type 2 counterexamples. Nussbaum explicitly declares that “[m]y 
procedure is Socratic,” and she reminds us that candidate definitions are rejected in the Socratic 
dialogues by discovering either “what both Socrates and the interlocutor consider to be a genuine 
case…not covered by the definition” or by discovering that “the definition covers phenomena 
that neither Socrates nor the interlocutor is prepared to count as a genuine case” (2001, 10).   
 
7.1.1. Counterexamples to cognitivism and Neo-Jamesianism  
The attempt to formulate definitions of emotions capable of capturing what counts as an 
emotion in the folk sense ought to be met by Wittgenstein-style skepticism: Why are cognitivists 
and Neo-Jamesians convinced that “emotion” (or “anger,” or “fear” etc.) are any different from 
“game” and innumerable other linguistic categories which cannot be defined? Didn’t Socrates 
systematically fail at the task Nussbaum explicitly commits herself to? Prinz (2004a, 49) 
acknowledges that one “could concede that emotions form a mongrel category,” and Nussbaum 
(2001, 8) points out that “some would claim that there is no interesting common ground” among 
the items that qualify as emotions in the ordinary sense. However, Prinz (2004a, 49) thinks that 
conceding that the emotions form a mongrel category “would leave us with a puzzle…Why does 
a single word, emotion, lord over such a motley?.”  
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1953, § 66) well-known answer would be: “Don’t say: ‘There must 
be something common, or they would not be called [emotions]’- but look and see whether there 
is anything common to all.” Cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians implicitly claim to have “looked 
and seen,” and concluded that “the common ground within the class of emotions is actually 
greater than we might suppose” (Nussbaum 2001, 8) and that there is “far greater unity in the 
emotion category than often appreciated” (Prinz 2004a, 49).  
I want to show that this claimed unity is achieved by means of two illegitimate 
argumentative strategies, namely the trivialization of the notions used to define the emotions, and 
the arbitrary stipulation that what fails to meet the proposed definition is not really an emotion. 
In this section, I clarify the nature of Neo-Jamesian and cognitivists definitions of emotions, and 
collect some of the most obvious Type 1 and Type 2 counterexamples they encounter. In the next 
section, I discuss the argumentative strategies employed by philosophers of emotions to insulate 
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their alleged definitions from such counterexamples, and argue that they fail. As it turns out, 
cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians have not followed Wittgenstein’s advice, which is to “look and 
see” what emotions have in common. This task, which must be carried out empirically in order to 
be carried out reliably, is going to be tackled in the next chapter. 
Let us begin from a quick summary of the main difficulties faced by the theory of emotions 
offered by James. As I mentioned, cognitivism and the Neo-Jamesian theory are alternative 
attempts to develop a theory of emotions capable of avoiding these difficulties. In his Argument 
from Conceivability, James had argued that “we” could not conceive of an emotion other than in 
terms of perception of bodily changes. He wrote about fear: “What kind of an emotion of fear 
would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of 
trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were 
present, it is quite impossible to think” (James 1884, 183). Under this view, fear is the perception 
of a suite of bodily changes. This account appears to encounter Type 2 counterexamples, since 
something could be a perception of bodily changes of the kind described without being an 
emotion.  
The first problem emphasized by early cognitivists in the 1950s and 1960s is that bodily 
changes are undifferentiated between distinct emotions. Bedford (1957) claimed, for example, 
that there is no difference between the bodily changes of indignation and annoyance, and he 
criticized James on this basis (see 4.1.3). Notably, this line of criticism has been a thorn in the 
side of the Jamesian theory since the physiologist Walter Cannon (1929, 352) argued that “[t]he 
responses in the viscera seem too uniform to offer a satisfactory means of distinguishing 
emotions which are very different in subjective quality.”  
The second and most serious problem is that the emotions appear to have intentionality. As I 
argued in chapter 4, we can distinguish two aspects to the intentionality of emotions. On the one 
hand, emotions are contingently about particular objects, at least most of the time. Emoters are 
generally afraid, angry or sad about particular individuals, events or states of affairs, rather than 
in an objectless fashion. On the other hand, emotions appear to be non-contingently about what 
Kenny first dubbed their formal objects (see discussion in 4.2.1). Subtleties apart, anger appears 
to be non-contingently about slights, fear about dangers, sadness about losses, and so on. This 
generates a dimension of normative assessment for emotions which has been called “logical”, 
“conceptual” or “internal”. The basic idea is that if the formal object of fear is the dangerous, 
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then fear is the sort of thing which is inappropriate when danger is not present. But “[i]f the 
emotions were internal impressions,” Kenny (1963, 192) concluded, “there would be no logical 
restrictions on the type of object which each emotion could have.”  
If we interpret this argument as relying on the interpretation of formal objects as 
conceptually required descriptions of particular objects, then we run into trouble, because not all 
emotions are about particular objects. For example, anxiety and depression are often objectless. I 
argued in 4.2.1 that we should understand the formal object of an emotion as a description of its 
conditions of satisfaction. This is an alternative way to spell out the notion of intentionality for 
mental states, according to which a state X is intentional insofar as there is a way X is supposed 
to be (Searle 1983). Under this view, objectless anxiety is still intentional because it has 
conditions of satisfaction, namely the presence of danger.11 Customary descriptions of formal 
objects for prototypical emotions are danger for fear, slight for anger, loss for sadness, 
transgression of a moral imperative for guilt, failure to live up to an ego ideal for shame, and 
others (see chapter 10 for an extended discussion).  
Prinz’s Neo-Jamesian theory contains interesting answers to the two criticisms I have 
reported. Firstly, Prinz has pointed out that the recent experimental literature on emotional 
physiology casts at least a reasonable doubt on the thesis that bodily changes are undifferentiated 
between different emotions (e.g. Levenson et al. 1990). Although this is true, I do not think that 
the evidence will ultimately born out a differentiation of emotions in terms of bodily signatures. 
This is because there is no theoretical reason why such differentiation should be expected. 
Emotions have several functions, and one of them is to prepare the body for action.  
But insofar as different emotions are similar in terms of the actions to which they prepare, 
we should also expect that the bodily preparations they involve are similar. For example, there 
are similarities between what emoters do when they are ashamed and what they do when they are 
embarrassed (e.g. trying to avoid contact, trying to not to call further attention on themselves, 
etc.). Why should the bodily profiles of embarrassment and shame necessarily differ? What we 
ought to expect is only a difference between bodily profiles of emotions which predispose to 
very different actions. This may be the case for, say, fear and happiness. Experimental results 
                                                 
11 I leave the discussion of whether all instances of objectless anxiety are inappropriate with respect to their formal 
object for another day. 
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appear to support the prediction that bodily differences exist at the level of families rather than at 
the level of individual emotions, with a few exceptions. 
Cacioppo et al. (2000) published a meta-analysis of the available literature on physiological 
differentiation, which has so far focused mainly on anger, fear, happiness, disgust, and surprise. 
They reported than no study shows disgust to differ from control conditions on any measure of 
autonomic arousal. On the other hand, they reported several studies showing that heart rate 
increase is higher in fear than in anger, higher in anger than in happiness, higher in both fear and 
anger than in sadness, and higher in anger, fear, happiness, and sadness than in control 
conditions.  
Also, diastolic blood pressure appears higher in anger than in fear, or sadness or happiness, 
and higher in sadness than in happiness. Anger also appears to differ from fear because it is 
associated with larger increases of nonspecific skin conductance responses, facial temperature, 
finger pulse volume, and smaller increases in stroke volume and cardiac output. Cacioppo et al. 
(2000) also suggested that there is a difference between the autonomic arousal of positive and 
negative emotions.  
The distinction between positive and negative emotions is unclear, but for our purposes we 
can take positive emotions to be those manifested by appetitive approach and negative emotions 
to be those manifested by aversive avoidance. They argued that during negative emotions all 
autonomic indexes measured in the studies they surveyed (e.g. heart rate, diastolic pressure, 
blood volume etc.) were more active than during positive emotions. These results suggest that 
Cannon (1929) was both right and wrong (see 4.1.3 for background).  
Cannon (1929) was right in thinking that emotions cannot be differentiated from one another 
(with possibly a handful of exceptions) in terms of the patterns of autonomic arousal eventually 
associated to them, because such patterns do not differ from one another to a sufficient degree. 
He was instead wrong in thinking that autonomic arousal is undifferentiated among different 
emotions. For example, very high increase in heart rate and diastolic blood pressure appears 
much more likely to be associated with anger or fear than with sadness. 
But where does this leave the Neo-Jamesian theory? If Prinz’s (2004a, 2004b) theory were 
that emotions differ from one another merely by virtue of bodily signatures, just saying that the 
evidence against their presence is inconclusive would not be much of a progress. But Prinz is not 
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committed to the thesis that the emotions must be differentiated from one another exclusively in 
terms of bodily changes.  
Prinz’s most intriguing innovation is having shown how perceptions of bodily changes could 
appraise in a way that at the same time is compatible with the Jamesian theory, contributes to 
type-identifying emotions potentially undifferentiated at the bodily level, and accounts for their 
intentionality. The key insight of Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is that emotions involve 
appraisals by virtue of what they represent, and that they represent what they have the function 
of being reliably caused by. This approach relies on Dretske’s (1981, 1986, 1988) teleosemantic 
theory of representation, according to which, roughly speaking, mental states acquire conditions 
of satisfaction by virtue of being set up – by natural selection or by learning – to be set off by 
certain circumstances (Prinz 2004b, 54). Such circumstances consequently become those under 
which the state is the way it is supposed to be, namely those under which the state represents 
correctly. 
Prinz’s (2004a, 55) hypothesis is that “emotions are perceptions of bodily states…caused by 
changes in the body” and that such “changes in the body are reliably caused by the instantiation 
of core relational themes,” from which it follows that the core relational themes are what the 
perceptions of bodily changes represent. In a nutshell, “[e]motions are states that appraise by 
registering bodily changes” (Prinz 2004b, 78), where bodily changes are assumed to have been 
set up to be set off by the emotion’s core relational themes or formal objects. Fear is then not, as 
James would have it under a standard reading, merely the perception of a particular suite of 
bodily changes, but rather the perception of a suite of bodily changes set up to be set off by 
danger. Similarly, sadness is the perception of bodily changes set up to be set off by loss, shame 
is the perception of bodily changes set up to be set off by failure to live up to an ego idea, and so 
on. To generalize, the Neo-Jamesian definition of emotion E is that an emotion E is the 
perception of bodily changes set up to be set off by E’s formal object.  
Although this is certainly progress with respect to James’ original account, the Neo-
Jamesian theory still appears to encounter a large number of Type 1 counterexamples. Not only 
can we conceive of emotions as dispositions (e.g. love), but we can also conceive of emotions as 
not involving perceptions (e.g. unconscious anger) and of emotions as lacking bodily changes 
(e.g. guilt, shame). At first blush, what is true of emotion as a superordinate category is also true 
of particular emotions. We can conceive of fear as a disposition (e.g. fear of snakes), we can 
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conceive of fear as not involving bodily changes (e.g. fear that a certain politician will win the 
elections), and we can even conceive of forms of fear which do not involve a conscious 
experience of any kind (e.g. unconscious fear of failing).  
Difficulties of this sort, and the conviction that feeling theories could neither handle the 
intentionality of emotions nor account for their type-identity, propelled the emergence of 
cognitivism in the 1960s and 1970s. In its most recent formulation, the cognitivist proposal is 
that “[e]motions are appraisals or value judgments” (Nussbaum 2001, 4). For example, Solomon 
(2003, 7, 8) argues that ““I am angry at John for taking…my car” entails that I believe that John 
has somehow wronged me… My anger is that judgment.” Similarly, fear is the judgment that 
something dangerous is at hand, sadness is the judgment that a loss has been suffered, shame is 
the judgment that one has not lived up to an ego ideal, and so on. To generalize, the cognitivist 
definition of emotion E is that an emotion E is the judgment that E’s formal object is instantiated.  
The trouble with the cognitivist theory is that it also seems to encounter plenty of Type 1 
counterexamples. For example, “we” conceive of instances of fear in the absence of the capacity 
for judgment (e.g. fear of cliffs in infants and animals), prior to judgment (e.g. reflex fears with a 
quick and automatic onset), and in opposition to judgment (e.g. fears elicited through a primitive 
appraisal mechanism in contrast with one’s considered judgments as in spider phobias). 
Moreover, cognitivism appears to encounter Type 2 counterexamples, in the sense that even 
when emotions involve judgments, they do not seem to be mere judgments. Someone could 
judge that danger is at hand without being afraid, someone could judge that a loss has been 
suffered without being sad, someone could judge to have failed to live up to an ego ideal without 
experiencing shame, and so on.  
Should we then conclude in the manner of Wittgenstein (1953, § 66) that “if you look at [the 
emotions] you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a 
whole series of them at that”?  
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7.2. THE TROUBLE WITH COGNITIVIST AND NEO-JAMESIAN REBUTTALS 
 
Cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians alike argue that we should not adopt a family resemblance 
account of emotions. As Prinz puts it, emotions “share a common essence. It is rare for nature 
(and folk psychology) to offer such a neat category.” (Prinz 2004b, 102). Their argumentative 
strategy is to counter (a) Type 1 counterexamples by either claiming that their favorite definition 
is satisfied once we understand it properly, or that x is not really an instance of E in the ordinary 
sense, and (b) Type 2 counterexamples by either claiming that their favorite definition is not 
satisfied once we understand it properly, or that x is on reflection an instance of E in the ordinary 
sense. The way such strategy is carried out, however, comprises two problematic moves. One is 
to liberalize what is meant by respectively judgment and by perception of bodily changes by 
turning such notions into placeholders. The other is to let prior theoretical commitments color 
introspective intuitions about what counts as an emotion in the ordinary sense.  
The Type 1 and Type 2 counterexamples I presented in the previous section have implicitly 
presupposed what we may call a conservative understanding of both judgment and perception of 
bodily changes. I have understood judgments along the lines of a philosophical tradition whose 
origin can be traced back to the Aristotelian and Stoic distinctions between an impression 
(phantasia) and a judgment (krisis). Under this view, judging is engaging in a mental operation of 
assent or endorsement with respect to some propositional object p.  
In more recent times, Sellars (1966, 150) has offered a broadly Kantian theory of judgment 
according to which judging that p is engaging in a discursive inner episode, which has as its 
model the overt verbal reporting that p (see Brandom (1994, 2000) for a sophisticated 
development of this idea). According to this understanding of judgment, the activity of judging 
that p is the paradigmatic expression of linguistic abilities, it is reflective, it is sensitive to the 
evidence that p, it requires possession of the concepts deployed in p, it requires the ability to 
recombine such concepts in the context of other propositional contents, and so on. Similarly, I 
have understood the notion of perception of bodily changes in terms of the notion of conscious 
perceptual experience of autonomic changes. It is under this conservative understanding of 
judgments and perception of bodily changes that the counterexamples I presented in the previous 
section have sounded persuasive.  
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7.2.1. The Placeholder Strategy 
Cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians have responded to their critics by arguing that this is not 
what they meant by, respectively, judgments and perceptions of bodily changes. Let us consider 
the cognitivist rebuttals first. Since we can conceive of infants and animals having emotions, but 
judgments understood conservatively are not available to them, the cognitivists have simply 
stated that infants and animals are capable of assenting to propositional objects. As Solomon 
(2003, 187) puts it with possibly ironic disregard for well-known philosophical controversies, “I 
take it as uncontroversial that animals make all sorts of judgments.” Since emotions can be 
unconscious and can be elicited through primitive appraisals, whereas judgments understood 
conservatively are deliberate and involve higher cognitive abilities, cognitivists have allowed 
judgments to be instantiated at low levels of cognitive complexity. For example, Solomon 
describes judgments as not being necessarily “conscious or deliberative or even articulate,” and 
says that sometimes “we judge unconsciously, without thinking or reflection” (Solomon 2003, 
210-211).  
Since emotions sometimes involve physiological changes, whereas judgments understood 
conservatively simply amount to ways to make up one’s mind, the cognitivists have assumed that 
judgments comprise changes in the body. Nussbaum (2001, 45) argues that “I am conceiving of 
judging as dynamic, not static…So why would such a dynamic faculty be unable to house, as 
well, the disorderly motions of grief?.” Solomon makes the point even more explicitly, as he says 
that “[o]ne can, and sometimes must, speak of bodily judgments” (Solomon 2003, 213). Since 
emotions involve behaviors and behavioral tendencies, whereas judgments understood 
conservatively are not causally efficacious in the absence of a conative attitude, Solomon argues 
that “judgments in emotions are judgments which have a quasi conceptual connection with 
desires,” in the sense that “one might analyze the various emotions as judgmental structures 
enclosing a core desire which is both their motivation and their “conatus”” (Solomon 2003, 105-
106). Since emotions involve mental behaviors such as the recruiting of memories, Nussbaum 
(2001, 65) states that “[g]rief is not just an abstract judgment [in the sense that] the experience 
itself involves a storm of memories.” 
There are several other examples of this liberalizing strategy at work, but I take it that its 
general thrust is already clear. Judgment is slowly turned into a placeholder, which on the one 
hand comprises the actual set of properties something must fulfill in order to be an emotion in 
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the ordinary sense (e.g. the property of including a behavioral tendency), and on the other hand 
allows for something to qualify as an emotion in a variety of different ways (e.g. with and 
without physiological changes, consciously or unconsciously, etc.).  
The same unbridled liberalizing strategy characterizes Prinz’s Neo-Jamesian rebuttals. Since 
some emotions are unconscious, and this appears to be in contrast with James’ thesis that all 
emotions amount to perceptions, Prinz has argued that perceptions of bodily changes need not be 
conscious. In this respect, he is following the neurobiologist Damasio, who has argued that “a 
signal body state or its surrogate may have been activated but not been made the focus of 
attention. Without attention, neither will be part of consciousness, although either can, be part of 
a covert action on the mechanisms that govern, without willful control, our appetitive (approach) 
or aversive (withdrawal) attitudes toward the world” (Damasio 1994, 190). Since some emotions 
appear to lack bodily changes of the autonomic variety, whereas James had claimed that all 
emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, Prinz expands the notion of bodily change to 
comprise neural counterparts of autonomic changes.  
This is another suggestion borrowed from Damasio, who argued that there are two types of 
neural bodily changes, those generated by the “body loop” and those generated by the “as if body 
loop” (Damasio 1999, 281). Both are representations of the “body landscape” in “somatosensory 
structures of the central nervous system,” but whereas “body loop” changes correspond to actual 
changes in the body, “as if body loop” changes do not correspond to any changes in the body 
other than neural ones. In the “as if” case, “the representation of body-related changes is created 
directly in sensory body maps, under the control of other neural sites, for instance, in the 
prefrontal cortices” (Damasio 1999, 281).  
In some passages, Prinz appears to liberalize the notion of bodily changes even further, to 
encompass also the instrumental and expressive behaviors involved in the emotions. For 
example, he argues that “a somatic change can be a change of facial expression, an increase in 
heart rate, a secretion of hormones,” and reports approvingly that James considered “bodily 
changes” to comprise “everything from tremors and tears to striking out in rage” (Prinz 2004b, 
5). It seems to me that a notion of perception of bodily changes as liberal as the one 
recommended by Prinz is in conflict with the basic tenets of the Jamesian theory. James 
described his theory as a “physiological theory” of emotions, and justified this label by arguing 
that “the general causes of the emotions are indubitably physiological” (James 1890, 449), a 
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qualification which suggests that the bodily changes whose perception is the emotion are to be 
understood as autonomic bodily changes.  
The spirit of the Jamesian approach is arguably still maintained when autonomic changes are 
turned into their neural counterparts. But it is certainly lost when instrumental behaviors and 
expressions can count as bodily changes, and when perceptions of them can become 
unconscious. Unconscious aggressive behavior towards one’s mother, deprived of either 
autonomic changes or of their neural counterparts, may qualify as a perception of bodily changes 
if we understand such notions as liberally as Prinz appears willing to, but it is certainly not the 
sort of thing James meant when he said that “every one of the bodily changes, whatsoever it be, 
is FELT, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs” (James 1884, 192).  
Notice that in the crucial passage in which James tries to “to urge the vital point of my 
whole theory,” the bodily manifestations mentioned are not behaviors (expressions or 
instrumental behaviors), but rather autonomic responses. James (1884, 193) did not ask: What 
would be left of fear if we didn’t run, or if we didn’t display the facial expression of fear, but, 
rather, what would be left of fear without having a feeling, i.e. a conscious perception, of 
“quickened heart-beats,” “shallow breathing,” “trembling lips,” “weakened limbs,” “goose-
flesh,” and “visceral stirrings.” This suggests that, even though James in some passages did refer 
to instrumental behaviors as “bodily manifestations,” this is not what he meant by bodily 
changes in the context of his trademark thesis that “our feeling of [bodily] changes as they occur 
IS the emotion” (James 1884, 189-190).  
 My remarks are meant to question the fittingness of the Neo-Jamesian label when it comes 
to designating Prinz’s and Damasio’s theories, because the notion of bodily changes they endorse 
strikes me as unfaithful to the spirit of James’ original enterprise. When a Freudian unconscious 
anger towards one’s mother or a Rylean interest in symbolic logic can both count as special cases 
of the Neo-Jamesian theory, it is legitimate to ask what the label Neo-Jamesian is supposed to 
designate. 
The real issue, however, is not exegetical. The real issue is that Prinz is in effect doing to the 
notion of perception of bodily changes what cognitivists have done to the notion of judgment, 
namely turn it into a placeholder. To say that striking out is the bodily change whose perception 
is rage is the strategic equivalent of saying, as proposed by Solomon, that striking out is the 
result of the desire for revenge included quasi-conceptually in the judgment that one has been 
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slighted which is rage. Both are highly misleading ways to say that rage involves not only an 
appraisal of slight and a perception of physiological changes (which may not be necessary), but 
also a behavioral tendency of attack expressed by striking out.  
The main problem with turning an alleged definiens of emotions into a placeholder is that 
this procedure hides from view precisely what needs to be clarified. When we try to find out 
what makes something an emotion/rage in the ordinary sense, we are not looking for a generic 
label to designate the condition whose fulfillment makes something an emotion/rage. We are 
looking for that very condition, in all of its complexity.  
The strategy of liberalizing what is meant by judgment and by perception of bodily changes 
to the limit of their meaning in English allows maintaining the impression that one has defined 
the emotions, but it is in effect a way to avoid asking what the members of folk emotion 
categories share by virtue of which they are members. 
The alternative, of course, is to explicate emotions, without trying to capture conditions of 
application for folk emotion categories. This is ultimately the strategy I will recommend, but it is 
not the strategy philosophers of emotions are following. The nature of the debate in which they 
are engaged clearly reveals that they are interested, among other things, in achieving ordinary 
language compatibility.  
 
7.2.2. Legislating on ordinary language 
There is a second, and equally problematic, strategy adopted by cognitivists and Neo-
Jamesians to defend their alleged definitions of emotions, namely to legislate on proper use of 
ordinary language. In this case, instead of liberalizing what is meant by either judgment or 
perception of bodily changes, it is stipulated that what fails to satisfy the definition proposed is 
not a real emotion. For example, Solomon asks: “Do we make any judgment at all when we are 
simply startled? I suspect the answer is no” (Solomon 2003, 214). Solomon does not explain why 
we do not, and I will not try either, although I do not see any reason why we should make a 
solitary exception for startle given that judgment plays in effect a placeholder function within the 
cognitivist theory.  
The interesting part is that Solomon (2003, 214) argues that “there is considerable dispute 
whether the startle reaction is an emotion at all, and that question is firmly focused on the 
question of whether it involves a judgment.” This provision guarantees that the cognitivist 
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account will accommodate startle, because the only way for startle to really be an emotion is 
being a judgment. But this is nothing other than the expression of a theoretical commitment. No 
evidence is provided that startle is or is not an emotion as ordinarily understood, and this 
certainly cannot be established by asking whether or not startle is a judgment. In the case of 
startle, Solomon is guaranteeing the appropriateness of cognitivism by mere stipulation. 
Prinz (2004a, 50) argues with respect to the aesthetic emotion of delight experienced by an 
art critic contemplating a piece of artwork that “[i]f the critic claimed to find delight in an 
artwork but showed absolutely no somatic response, we might justifiably question her sincerity.” 
In this case as well, it is quite surprising that Prinz even contemplates this possibility, since the 
notion of somatic response has been expanded so as to include instrumental behaviors which are 
clearly involved in the critic’s delight (e.g. approaching, looking at the artwork intently). In the 
passage cited, Prinz seems to be resorting to a conservative understanding of somatic responses 
as autonomic responses, along the lines I have claimed James presupposes all along.  
The interesting point is that Prinz argues that in order to really be an emotion, delight needs 
to involve a somatic response. No evidence is offered that delight ordinarily counts as an 
emotion just in case it involves autonomic changes. It is simply stipulated that “we might 
justifiably question” the critic’s sincerity if it did not. Prinz inherits this argumentative strategy 
directly from James (1884), who also discussed the case of what he called subtler emotions such 
as aesthetic, moral and intellectual ones. James argued that in the case of subtler emotions “[t]he 
bodily sounding-board is at work, as careful introspection will show, far more than we usually 
suppose,” but he concluded that in all cases in which it is not, “a cold and neutral state of 
intellectual perception [would be] all that remains” (James 1884, 201).  
What is problematic with this second strategy is that the theorist is trying to have it both 
ways, namely capturing what counts as an emotion in the ordinary sense and stipulating without 
supporting evidence that what does not satisfy the proposed definition is not an emotion in the 
ordinary sense. The normative commitments of the theorist in effect determine what things count 
as emotions as ordinarily understood. This shortcoming is grounded in the exclusive reliance of 
cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians on their own introspective intuitions when it comes to 
establishing what things counts as emotions as ordinarily understood. I do not mean to be saying 
that philosophers of emotions make no use of data other than own introspective intuitions. Prinz 
(2004b, 30) explicitly argues that “philosophical methods are most powerful when used in 
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conjunction with empirical data,” and Nussbaum (2001, 9) asserts that in her account “intuitive 
judgments about…cases are consulted throughout, along with the results of…scientific 
investigations.” Both Neo-Jamesian and cognitivist philosophers of emotions are surely up to 
date on the latest scientific discoveries about the emotions.  
What I am saying is that no empirical data are considered concerning the way in which 
ordinary language users classify instances of emotion, or of particular emotions. The 
introspective intuitions of the theorist about what items count as emotions are acknowledged to 
be fallible, and provisions are made for the possibility that scientific discoveries down the line 
will show “our” ordinary conceptions of emotions to be at least in part mistaken (Prinz 2004b, 
29; Nussbaum 2001, 9-10). The point is that the theorist’s intuitions are the only evidence 
considered by Neo-Jamesians and cognitivists concerning what “we” currently conceive an 
emotion to be.  
This strikes me as a major source of unproductive disputes in emotion theory, in which two 
authors respectively affirm and deny on the basis of their clashing introspective intuitions that 
“the man in the street” means X when he or she conceives of emotions. My view is that “relying 
on people’s ability to classify instances of emotion,” as Nussbaum (2001, 9) suggests we should, 
requires studying empirically how such ability gets to be manifested across the language 
community. 
Nussbaum formulates an analogy which strikes me as a helpful way to describe what many 
philosophers of emotions are in effect trying to achieve. Nussbaum (2001, 9-10) compares the 
job of an emotion theorist to that of a field linguist who is trying to uncover rules of grammar by 
relying on judgments of grammaticality. Such judgments are not accompanied by the ordinary 
speakers’ ability to tell what makes a sentence grammatically correct, but what the grammarian 
is trying to describe are the rules of correctness tacitly embedded in ordinary judgments of 
grammaticality.  
Clearly, some language users will make mistakes about what they take to be grammatical. 
But the job of the theorist is to extract from the total set of ordinary judgments of grammaticality, 
the correct and the incorrect ones alike, the rules such as they may exist concerning what makes 
a sentence grammatical. Cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians are trying to do the same thing with 
respect to emotion categories. They aim to extract from ordinary classifications of items as 
emotions, correct and incorrect ones alike, what the condition of application for emotion kind 
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terms are in ordinary language. The point is that if this is what they are trying to achieve, they 
need to ground their theories in careful field work. As the history of emotion theory vividly 
shows, the intuitions of theorists clash, and they do so partly because they often do not express 
anything other than prior theoretical commitments. Fortunately, a significant amount of field 
work has already been done by experimental psychologists in the last twenty years. In the next 
chapter, I will summarize what they have discovered. 
 
 
7.3. CONCLUSION 
 
The history of emotion theory is a long sequence of attempts to individuate a subset of 
marks of emotionality such that anything that deserves to be called an emotion fulfills them. I 
pointed out that this notion of deservingness has generally been ambiguous between two 
interpretations, namely that of theoretical fruitfulness and that of ordinary language 
compatibility. Emotion theorists have been unclear about what sort of deservingness they were 
pursuing, in part because of the widespread assumption that what emotion terms “mean” 
coincides with what is a “good thing to mean” by them relative to the purposes of a theory.  
Cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians are the latest representatives of the long lineage of theorists 
working under this assumption. As revealed by their argumentative strategies, they strive to 
come up with definitions of emotions which are ordinary language compatible, and assume that 
such definitions capture a theoretically interesting common ground between emotions. 
Cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians are aware of the fact that most lexical categories cannot be 
defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.  
However, they seem to be convinced that, although “it is rare for nature (and folk 
psychology) to offer…a neat category” (Prinz 2004b, 102), emotion categories just happen to be 
such rare categories. I have tried to show that that the alleged “neatness” of emotion categories is 
entirely illusory, because it results from the equally problematic strategies of (a) trivializing the 
ingredients used in the definition to the limit of their meaning in English and (b) stipulating that 
the only way for something to really be an emotion is to fulfill the proposed definition.  
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My worries about cognitivism and Neo-Jamesianism, I emphasize it, go deeper than this. As 
I will argue in chapter 10, these theories fail to offer a viable account of the intentionality of 
emotions, and disregard the fundamental motivational dimension they have. What I focused on 
in this chapter are the sorts of problems cognitivism and neo-Jamesianism encountered achieving 
what they set out to achieve, namely offering a definition of emotions which does not encounter 
ordinary language counterexamples.  
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8. INTERPRETING THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON 
EMOTION CONCEPTS 
 
In the first seven chapters of this dissertation, I explored some of the most influential 
theories of the emotions ever proposed, studying a number of influential figures from Ancient 
Greece to our time. At first blush at least, every account I considered seems to encounter a 
domain of emotional phenomena to which it fails to apply, unless ad hoc moves are put into 
place. I have just explored in some detail the shape this problem takes with respect to 
cognitivism and Neo-Jamesianism, but I emphasize that it is a general problem. 
 An affect program theorist such as Ekman, for example, claims that all emotions are basic 
emotions, which, among other properties, are assumed to be short-lived episodes associated with 
typical facial expressions (see subsection 5.1.3). But very many emotions appear to be long-lived 
episodes, and lack such expressions. For example, guilt is generally not associated with a guilt-
typical facial expression, and it generally lasts for significant periods of time. Ekman’s response 
to these sorts of counterexamples is in effect to legislate on ordinary language. His point is 
simple: “I do not allow for “non-basic” emotions”. Under this view, guilt is not an emotion. But 
this position raises the need for a rationale, which can’t be found in Ekman’s own theory. Are we 
free to legislate however we want when it comes to giving a theory of emotions? 
Social constructionist theories of emotion also encounter domains of emotional phenomena 
they are unable to account for. As I argued in subsection 6.3.2, Averill proposes that emotions 
are transitory social roles interpreted as passions. But some emotions do not fit this model, as 
there doesn’t seem to be anything social about them. For example, it is hard to understand how 
the sort of fear one experiences when suddenly losing support may amount to a social role. One 
could of course start twiddling with the notion of a social role so as to make it fit every case, but 
ad hoc moves such as these are not to be recommended, because their explanatory payoff is nil 
It is time to understand why emotion theorists have had so much trouble capturing the 
emotional domain with definitions which apply to them all, and with generalizations that admit 
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of no exceptions. The way to do it is in my view to heed the advice Wittgenstein gave about 
games, namely to “look and see” what sorts of things emotions have in common by virtue of 
which they are called emotions. 
 In the past twenty years, psychologists have empirically studied emotion concepts, by which 
they refer to the kinds of mental representations that govern people’s categorizations and 
inferences with respect to emotion categories. Categories named by emotion terms such as 
“emotion”, “fear”, “anger” etc. are in turn assumed to be sets of items which fulfill a condition of 
category membership, which describes the condition of application for the emotion term which 
designates the category.12  
What this (generally neglected) empirical literature reveals is that, as we may expect, 
emotion categories manifest prototypicality phenomena, since some emotions are judged to be 
better examples of “emotion” than others. But the literature also suggests that emotion categories 
manifest a great deal of heterogeneity and vagueness. Heterogeneity and vagueness present 
emotion theorists with a puzzle, which is how one should go about studying items of a category 
that contains instances which are widely different from one another as well as borderline 
instances. 
This is the puzzle I try to solve in chapter 8, where I explain what I take to be the desiderata 
for a good theory of emotions. In this chapter, I illustrate a number of key empirical facts about 
emotion concepts, and offer an interpretation of what they tell us about folk emotion categories.  
 
 
8.1. EMOTIONS AND PROTOTYPICALITY 
 
The first systematic empirical study of the nature of emotion concepts is due to Fehr and 
Russell (1984). They began their study by asking 200 experimental subjects – undergraduates 
from the University of British Columbia - to freely list examples of members of the category of 
emotion (generation of categories subordinate to emotion), and to freely list the general category 
of which categories such as anger, love, fear, sadness were instances (generation of categories 
                                                 
12 I will use the terms “category” and “kind” interchangeably, under the interpretation I just mentioned. 
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superordinate to anger, love, fear etc.). This experiment was meant to study the hierarchical 
structure of emotion categories. In the first experiment, 196 examples of emotion were listed by 
at least two subjects.  
The following are the ten items freely listed by most subjects as instances of the category 
“emotion”: Happiness (152/200), Anger (149/200), Sadness (136/200), Love (124/200), Fear 
(96/200), Hate (89/200), Joy (82/200), Excitement (53/200), Anxiety (50/200), Depression 
(42/200). The items at the bottom of the ranking are things like Tranquility, Ambivalence, 
Withdrawn, Weak, Wanting, Uptight, Unstable, Understanding (each freely listed by no more 
than 4 people). More than half the subjects freely listed happiness, anger, sadness and love as 
instances of “emotion”.  
In a second study, Fehr and Russell (1984) chose ten items other than the first ten from the 
list obtained in the first study, looking for instances of emotion cited at different levels of 
frequency. The ten items selected were the following: Disgust, Guilt, Embarrassment, Worry, 
Awe, Pride, Envy, Calmness, Boredom, and Respect. A list was then formed by combining such 
selected items with the 10 most frequently listed categories of emotion.  
Fehr and Russell (1984) called the set of 20 items so obtained “target emotions”. The target 
emotions were then distributed in four 20-item lists, together with filler items such as tingle, 
stubbornness, and alertness. The experimental subjects were asked to provide a superordinate 
category for each of the items in the four lists. “Emotion” was free listed as a superordinate 
category for most of the target emotions, but with widely different frequencies. For example, 
whereas 64.3% of the subjects indicated emotion as a superordinate for “love”, only 3.3% 
indicated emotion as a superordinate for “boredom”, and 0% indicated emotion as a 
superordinate for “respect”.  
These results suggest that “emotion” represents the head of a hierarchy of categories, and 
that the subordinate-superordinate relation between “emotion” and specific emotions comes 
more quickly to mind for some emotions rather than for others. The results also suggest that 
there may be some disagreement in the population of speakers concerning whether or not 
something counts as an emotion, an issue we will explore in the next section.  
One of the key results presented by Fehr and Russell (1984) is that “emotion” instantiates 
protypicality effects, namely that some of its members are judged to be better examples and 
some of its members are judged to be worse examples of emotion. The phenomenon of 
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prototypicality is very widespread, so it would be highly surprising if it did not apply to emotions 
as well. Evidence of prototypicality effects has been shown with respect to biological categories 
(Rips, Shoben and Smith 1973), trait and person categories (Cantor & Mischel, 1977), social 
psychological categories (Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982), clinical categories (Cantor, 
Smith, French, & Mezzich, 1980), categories of painting style (Hartley &  Homa, 1981), 
categories of musical themes (Welker, 1982), and even categories such as “even number” or 
“female” (Armstrong et al. 1983).  
The importance of the phenomenon is that “the prototypicality of items within a category 
can be shown to affect virtually all of the major independent variables used as measure in 
psychological research” (Rosch 1978, 198). For example, judgments of prototypicality have been 
proven to predict reaction times in sentence verification tasks (Hampton, 1979; Rosch and 
Mervis, 1975), order of output when asked to provide an instance of the kind (Barsalou & 
Sewell, 1985), efficacy in priming tasks (Rosch 1975; Rosch, Simpson, & Miller, 1976), order in 
which they are learned by infants (Rosch 1973), and drawing of inferences from being a category 
member to having a certain property characteristic of the category (Smith 1989).  
A variety of explanations have been proposed for judgments of prototypicality with respect 
to a member x of a category, most importantly (a) how similar x is to a mentally stored exemplar 
of the category or to an abstraction of central tendency of the category, (b) how close x is to an 
ideal of the category, (c) how frequent is the instantiation of x within the category (see Barsalou 
and Sewell 1985).  
Rosch and Mervis (1975) offered empirical evidence that “members of a category come to 
be viewed as prototypical of the category as a whole in proportion to the extent to which they 
bear a family resemblance to (have attributes which overlap those of) other members of the 
category. Conversely, items viewed as most prototypical of one category will be those with least 
family resemblance to or membership in other categories” (Rosch and Mervis 1975, 575).  
Notice that there may be family resemblance in this sense whatever the condition of 
membership for the category is. For example, if most members of the kind grandmother share, 
besides the condition of membership of being the mother of someone’s mother or father, the 
properties of having white hair, moving with some difficulty, and making presents at Christmas, 
then grandmothers with these further properties will be judged more typical of the category than 
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grandmothers without such properties, as they “have attributes which overlap those of other 
members of the category”.   
At the same time, if the very condition of membership to the category were family 
resemblance, prototypicality phenomena would ensue whether or not there are differences with 
respect to the overlap of attributes besides those that make them kind members. Kind members 
may already be viewed as prototypical to the extent to which they have cluster properties in 
common with other members of the category.  
A category such as “tall” may show prototypicality effects for a different reason, namely 
that the best example of a tall man is that of a man as tall as possible, namely as close to an ideal 
of tallness as possible.  
Finally, a category such as “even number” may show prototypicality effects because the 
number 4 is more frequently instantiated in the life of cognizers than the number 106. These 
elements can of course combine to determine judgments of prototypicality (see Murphy 2003 for 
review). The fact that also categories such as “even number” show prototypicality effects, 
incidentally, indicates that prototypicality effects as such do not count as evidence that the 
condition of membership of a category has any particular logical form rather than another. 
We can now ask: What are the best examples of “emotion” according to competent English 
speakers? In a third study, Fehr and Russell (1984) asked subjects to evaluate how good an 
example of emotion each of their 20 “target emotions” was. They graded the judgment of 
prototypicality by asking subjects to assign to each emotion a number of points ranging from 1 
(for an “extremely poor example”) to 6 (for an “extremely good example”). The following is the 
ranking of prototypicality they obtained for the twenty target emotions: 
 
Average prototypicality 
ratings for 20 “target emotions” 
1. Love (5.46/6.00) 
2. Hate (5.26/6.00) 
3. Anger (5.15/6.00) 
4. Sadness (5.04/6.00) 
5. Happiness (5.00/6.00) 
6. Joy (4.89/6.00) 
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7. Fear (4.78/6.00) 
8. Depression (4.73/6.00) 
9. Excitement (4.58/6.00) 
10. Guilt (4.55/6.00) 
11. Embarrassment (4.36/6.00) 
12. Anxiety (4.29/6.00) 
13. Envy (4.13/6.00) 
14. Worry (3.84/6.00) 
15. Disgust (3.71/6.00) 
16. Awe (3.46/6.00) 
17. Pride (3.33/6.00) 
18. Calmness (2.75/6.00) 
19. Boredom (2.71/6.00) 
20. Respect (2.49/6.00) 
Figure 7: Which emotions are prototypical? From Fehr and Russell (1984) 
 
The data indicate that, among the 20 “target emotions”, “love”, “hate”, “anger”, “sadness” 
and “happiness” are the best examples of emotion, and “calmness”, “boredom” and “respect” are 
the worst examples. There are two limitations to this experiment. The first is that it does not give 
us a complete overview of prototypicality phenomena for the category of “emotion”, because it 
is limited to 20 target emotions, 10 of which were chosen among items freely listed by just a 
handful of people in the first study (e.g. awe was free listed by 4 people only). The second is that 
Fehr and Russell’s (1984) choice scheme did not allow subjects to distinguish between the 
judgment that a target emotion is an extremely poor example of emotion and the judgment that it 
is not an emotion at all. This means that judgments at the bottom of the scale are ambiguous 
between judgments of low prototypicality and judgments of non-membership.  
Be that as it may, Fehr and Russell (1984) demonstrated that the prototypicality of the 
twenty target emotions was correlated with a number of indexes of cognitive performance, 
including frequency in a free-listing task, probability that “emotion” was mentioned as a 
superordinate category when prompted and substitutability for the term “emotion” in natural 
sounding sentences while maintaining their “naturalness.” For example, Fehr and Russell (1984, 
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472-474) demonstrated that sentences which “sound natural” about emotion – presumably 
because they express received ideas about the category - start sounding unnatural once 
“emotion” is substituted by non-prototypical emotions. On the other hand, the sentences maintain 
their natural sounding quality if the substitution is made with prototypical emotions. Just to give 
a couple of examples, “emotion enables the individual to exert great energy for a brief period” 
and “emotion means an aroused or “stirred up” frame of mind” sound natural when “anger” or 
“fear” are substituted to “emotion,” but not when “remorse” and “melancholy” are (Fehr and 
Russell 1984, 472-474).  
This suggests that the received ideas people have about emotions, as about any members of 
a category with prototypicality effects, tend to be formed around prototypical instances, namely 
those which are considered to be good examples of the category, come to mind first, are learned 
earlier, and so on. 
 
 
8.2. EMOTIONS AND VAGUENESS  
 
I suggested before that Fehr and Russell’s (1984) data on prototypicality ratings fail to 
distinguish between poor examples of emotion and non-instances of emotion. Fortunately, their 
article contains studies which allow us to investigate this distinction. Fehr and Russell (1984) 
asked 37 subjects whether each of the 20 “target emotions” they had selected was indeed an 
emotion. Their sample was not very large, but I will assume for the sake of argument that the 
result is representative of the linguistic community as a whole. This assumption is supported by 
the fact that introspection leads to data compatible with those offered in this experiment. Here is 
a summary of their main result: 
 
“Target emotion” Percentage of 
subjects who said it 
is an emotion 
Percentage of 
subjects who said it is 
not an emotion 
Love (5.46/6.00) 94% 6% 
Hate (5.26/6.00) 100% 0% 
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Anger (5.15/6.00) 100% 0% 
Sadness (5.04/6.00) 100% 0% 
Happiness (5.00/6.00) 100% 0% 
Joy (4.89/6.00) 96% 4% 
Fear (4.78/6.00) 97% 3% 
Depression (4.73/6.00) 89% 11% 
Excitement (4.58/6.00) 92% 8% 
Guilt (4.55/6.00) 89% 11% 
Embarrassment (4.36/6.00) 78% 22% 
Anxiety (4.29/6.00) 82% 8% 
Envy (4.13/6.00) 84% 16% 
Worry (3.84/6.00) 89% 11% 
Disgust (3.71/6.00) 94% 6% 
Awe (3.46/6.00) 74% 26% 
Pride (3.33/6.00) 74% 26% 
Calmness (2.75/6.00) 52% 48% 
Boredom (2.71/6.00) 61% 39% 
Respect (2.49/6.00) 26% 74% 
Figure 8: Which emotions are borderline? From Fehr and Russell (1984) 
 
Although in some cases the presence of a small percentage of subjects who disagree from 
the majority is to be understood as the equivalent of mistaken judgments of grammaticality, this 
interpretation becomes less convincing the closer the population of experimental subjects 
becomes to being equally divided. For example, whereas we can think of the 3% and 4% of 
experimental subjects who believe that, respectively, fear and joy are not emotions as being 
incompetent language users, this interpretation is distinctively less appealing when roughly 75% 
of the people have a certain view about membership and one quarter disagree (e.g. with respect 
to pride, respect, awe, embarrassment). In cases such as calmness (52% vs. 48%) and boredom 
(61% vs. 39%), the experimental subjects are fairly equally divided on the emotion status of the 
category.  
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I call these examples of “epistemic indeterminacy” with respect to category membership, 
namely cases in which a significant amount of language users are in disagreement as to whether 
or not some x definitely belongs to some category C. There are other possible manifestations of 
“epistemic indeterminacy”, although Fehr and Russell (1984) did not study them with respect to 
emotion. For example, sometimes a significant amount of language users are uncertain, rather 
than disagree, about whether or not some x definitely belongs to the category, or think that x 
belongs to the category only to a certain degree. This appears to be the case for example for 
categories such as “bald” or “tall”. Language users appear to be systematically uncertain as to 
whether or not certain people are tall or bald, and/or state that they are tall or bald only to some 
degree.  
But what is the explanation of “epistemic indeterminacy”? The answer, it seems to me, is to 
be given on a case by case basis. On some occasions, the best explanation of it will be ignorance 
of the condition of membership on the part of language users, or inability to verify whether or 
not a known condition is fulfilled because of a cognitive failure of some kind. For example, a 
significant amount of language users are likely to be in disagreement or uncertain as to whether 
or not the square root of 16 is even. Some may not know the condition of membership for 
“even”, i.e. being a natural number exactly divisible by two, and some may be unable to 
calculate the square root of 16.   
In some cases, however, there seem to be no evidential reasons to conclude that epistemic 
indeterminacy results from ignorance or cognitive deficit on the part of language users. An 
alternative explanation for epistemic indeterminacy is vagueness, which I understand in the 
manner of non-epistemicist theories of vagueness as lack of sharp boundaries for the category. 
As Sorensen (2003) puts it, under this view of vagueness “[b]orderline cases are inquiry 
resistant”, in the sense that there simply is no fact of the matter as to whether they fall under 
the category. Our habits of language have left it indeterminate whether or not borderline cases 
belong to the category. The alternative epistemic interpretation of vagueness, championed most 
prominently by Williamson (1994), takes ignorance to be the appropriate explanation for 
borderline cases. Categories are assumed to be always such that their condition of membership 
settles whether or not an item belongs to them, although often language users ignore what such 
condition is. 
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To defend the view of vagueness as lack of sharp boundaried from objections, and to show 
it to be superior to non-epistemic theories of vagueness, is a complex job I cannot undertake in 
this dissertation. I refer the reader to existing defenses of non-epistemic theories of vagueness 
(e.g. Wright (2001), see Sorensen (2003) for further references), and assume henceforth that a 
vague category is one whose condition of membership does not settle for all x whether or not 
they definitely belong or fail to belong to the category. 
The category “emotion” is in my view very much like categories such “religion”, “game”, 
“democrat”, which are what Alston (1967) called “combinatory vague” categories. They are 
vague because, as Wittgenstein (1953) put it with respect to games, “[w]e do not know the 
boundaries because none have been drawn…One might say that the concept ‘game’ is a concept 
with blurred edges” (68-71). They are combinatory vague because it appears to be indeterminate 
what combinations of properties are such that, were they to be fulfilled to a sufficient degree, 
would qualify some x for membership to an emotion kind. Degree vagueness emerges instead 
whenever it is indeterminate whether or not a property featured in the condition of membership 
of a kind has been fulfilled to a sufficient degree, as in the paradigmatic cases of “tall” and 
“bald”. 
Under this view, the reason why there is epistemic uncertainty in the language community as 
to whether, say, calmness and boredom are emotions is that “emotion” has combinatory 
vagueness, instantiated when we are “not able to make any sharp discriminations between those 
combinations of conditions which are, and those which are not, sufficient and/or necessary for 
application” of the category (Alston 1967, 220). 
Fehr and Russell (1984) only tested the presence of disagreements among language users, 
and focused on only 20 target emotions 10 of which are prototypical. My view is that if we allow 
people to manifest their judgments of uncertainty and graded membership, “emotion” reveals 
itself to be a category with many borderline cases. If I take myself to be representative of the 
linguistic community, for example, I would have to conclude that respect, startle, interest, pain, 
and lust are examples of borderline emotions, namely emotions whose membership to the 
category emotion is indeterminate given our habit of language. I would be uncertain about 
several of them, and assign graded membership.  
I am also convinced that the emotion categories subordinate to “emotion” are vague in the 
same sense in which “emotion” is (combinatory vague). With respect to this issue, there is some 
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preliminary evidence to consider. For example, Russell and Fehr (1994) considered 20 candidate 
subordinate categories of “anger” such as “fury”, “aggravation”, “exasperation”, etc.. They 
showed that only 2 out of 28 categories subordinate to anger were judged to be instances of 
“anger” by 100% of the people polled, whereas there was some amount of disagreement with 
respect to the other 26. In the case of “torment”, for example, 57% of the people polled 
considered it to be an instance of anger, and 43% considered it not to be an instance of anger.  
Even emotions that I would personally never consider instances of anger (e.g. disgust, envy) 
were judged by about 70% of English speakers to be categories subordinate to anger! The picture 
that emerges from these data is that there is massive epistemic indeterminacy among language 
users concerning what things count as emotion, or as particular emotions. The data and the 
considerations I offered give good reasons to conclude that emotion, and its subordinates, are 
vague.  
What I propose to retain of the epistemic approach to vagueness is a live sense of possibility 
that vagueness is an explanation of epistemic indeterminacy which could be wrong even when it 
is strongly supported. Maintaining this sense of possibility, however, is compatible with thinking 
that there are more evidential reasons to believe that a condition of membership that settles all 
cases does not exist for folk emotion categories, than to believe that it exists and we do not know 
it.  
 
8.3. EMOTIONS AND HETEROGENITY 
  
Shaver et al. (1987) presented a further study on the prototypicality of “emotion”, which 
allows us to form a more detailed picture of the emotion hierarchy, and discuss the central topic 
of heterogeneity. They asked 100 experimental subjects to rate 213 categories that “could 
reasonably be considered emotion names” (1065) in terms of how good or bad an example of 
emotion they were. In this case, the rating system allowed for a study of prototypicality and 
epistemic indeterminacy at the same time. Subjects were asked to rate each category on a 4 
points scale, from “I would definitely not call this an emotion” (1 point) to “I would definitely 
not call this an emotion” (4 points). At first blush at least, closeness to 4 indicates 
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prototypicality, whereas closeness to 1 indicates lack of membership. The first 98 items on 
Shaver et al.’s (1987) list are the following:  
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 Average Prototypicality Ratings for “Emotion” 
1. Love (3.94.00/4.00) 34. Lust (3.43/4.00) 67. Gladness (3.17/4.00) 
2. Anger  (3.90/4.00) 35. Disgust (3.42/4.00) 68. Regret (3.16/4.00) 
3. Hate (3.84/4.00) 36. Hostility (3.41/4.00) 69. Rejection (3.16/4.00) 
4. Depression (3.83/4.00) 37. Jubilation (3.41/4.00) 70. Pride (3.14/4.00) 
5. Fear (3.83/4.00) 38. Loneliness (3.41/4.00) 71. Gaiety (3.13/4.00) 
6. Jealousy (3.81/4.00) 39. Delight (3.40/4.00) 72. Homesickness (3.13/4.00) 
7. Happiness (3.77/4.00) 40. Pleasure (3.40/4.00) 73. Jolliness (3.12/4.00) 
8. Passion (3.75/4.00) 41. Tenderness (3.40/4.00) 74. Nervousness (3.12/4.00) 
9. Affection (3.72/4.00) 42. Pity (3.39/4.00) 75. Woe (3.12/4.00) 
10. Sadness (3.68/4.00) 43. Bitterness (3.38/4.00) 76. Longing (3.11/4.00) 
11. Grief (3.65/4.00) 44. Disappointment (3.38/4.00) 77. Loathing (3.10/4.00) 
12. Rage (3.64.00/4.00) 45. Humiliation (3.38/4.00) 78. Satisfaction (3.10/4.00) 
13. Aggravation 
(3.63/4.00) 
46. Despair (3.37/8) 79. Hope (3.08/4.00) 
14. Ecstasy (3.63/4.00) 47. Frustration (3.37/4.00) 80. Abhorrence (3.06/4.00) 
15. Sorrow (3.62/4.00) 48. Hurt (3.37/4.00) 81. Insecurity (3.06/4.00) 
16. Compassion 
(3.61/4.00) 
49. Adoration (3.36/4.00) 82. Defeat (3.05/4.00) 
17. Joy (3.62/4.00) 50. Agony (3.35/4.00) 83. Dread (3.05/4.00) 
18. Envy (3.58/4.00) 51. Thrill (3.34.00/4.00) 84. Fondness (3.05/4.00) 
19. Fright (3.58/4.00) 52. Fury (3.33/4.00) 85. Enthusiasm (3.05/4.00) 
20. Terror  (3.57/4.00) 53. Remorse (3.30/4.00) 86. Sentimentality (3.05/4.00) 
21. Elation (3.55/4.00) 54. Agitation (3.29/4.00) 87. Hopelessness (3.04.00/4.00) 
22. Guilt (3.53/4.00) 55. Outrage (3.28/4.00) 88. Annoyance (3.03/4.00) 
23. Excitement (3.51/4.00) 56. Resentment (3.28/4.00) 89. Cheerfulness (3.03/4.00) 
24. Anguish (3.49/4.00) 57. Dislike (3.27/4.00) 90. Displeasure (3.03/4.00) 
25. Embarrassment 
(3.49/4.00) 
58. Glee (3.24.00/4.00) 91. Melancholy (3.02/4.00) 
26. Worry (3.49/4.00) 59. Alienation (3.23/4.00) 92. Glumness (3.01/4.00) 
27. Panic (3.48/4.00) 60. Distress (3.23/4.00) 93. Shock (3.01/4.00) 
28. Unhappiness 
(3.48/4.00) 
61. Enjoyment (3.23/4.00) 94. Spite (3.01/4.00) 
29. Anxiety (3.46/4.00) 62. Relief (3.23/4.00) 95. Suffering (3.01/4.00) 
30. Desire   (3.45/4.00) 63. Gloom (3.21/4.00) 96. Dismay (3.00/4.00) 
31. Horror (3.45/4.00) 64. Misery (3.20/4.00) 97. Exasperation (3.00/4.00) 
32. Sympathy (3.44/4.00) 65. Euphoria (3.19/4.00) 98. Infatuation (3.00/4.00) 
33. Shame (3.4.003/4.00) 66. Bliss (3.18/4.00)  
Figure 9: The top 100 folk emotions. From Shaver et al. 1987 
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These are, at first blush at least, the categories that count as kinds of emotions in ordinary 
English. When asked “Would you call this an emotion?,” a significant majority of the 
experimental subjects answer that they definitely would with respect to the 98 items reported in 
the table. As the decreasing numbers in parenthesis show, ordinary language users tend to 
consider some items (e.g. love, anger, 3.94 and 3.90 points average respectively ) to be better 
examples of emotion than others (e.g. exasperation, infatuation, 3 points average each). 
Among the items after the 98th, but still with a rating between 2.99 and 2.50, we find ire, 
wrath, insult, liking, neglect, astonishment, gratitude, boredom, calmness, respect, sulkiness, and 
indignation. Among the items in the 2.49-2.00 range we find nostalgia, modesty, vanity, 
exhaustion, startle. Among the items in the 1.99-1.57 range (1.57 being the lowest), we find 
interest, self-control, alertness, and intelligence.  
What can be concluded from such data? First of all, they confirm Fehr and Russell’s (1984) 
prototypicality results, offering a fairly similar account of the best examples of emotion. 
Secondly, the data suggest that there is a certain degree of consensus that the items at the top of 
the list are instances of emotion (e.g. love, anger, hate, depression) and the item at the bottom are 
not instances of emotion, or at least not definitely instances of emotion (e.g. alertness and 
intelligence).  
But it remains unclear where the cutoff point between items that are non-prototypical 
emotions and items that are not emotions, or not definitely emotions, is located. For example, 
what does a 2.73/4.00 average rating for “awe” indicate exactly? To interpret the number, it 
would be useful to know the variance, namely how spread the numerical results were around 
2.73. This would indicate whether 2.73 results from a significant disagreement about 
membership or from consensus that “awe” is a poor example of emotion. The data I discussed in 
section 8.2 concerning epistemic indeterminacy suggest that many of the low averages are 
probably to be interpreted as manifestations of epistemic indeterminacy, which I have interpreted 
as evidence of vagueness. 
What interests me in particular about Shaver et al. (1987)’s list of emotions, however, are 
not the data concerning prototypicality and epistemic indeterminacy. What the list offers is an 
overview of the items judged by the population of speakers at large to be emotions. Figure 10 
reports only emotion categories with at least a 3.00/4.00 average rating. This provision is meant 
to eliminate items whose status as emotions may be in question in the linguistic community. My 
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assumption is that, if 4 means to be definitely an emotion and 1 means to be definitely not an 
emotion, an average rating of at least 3 indicates the presence of a significant consensus in the 
population that something counts as an emotion.  Not necessarily a prototypical emotion, but an 
emotion nevertheless. What I want to point the reader’s attention to is that the list of items 
judged to be emotions by the linguistic community is exceptionally heterogeneous. I offer the 
following list of 17 dimensions of heterogeneity, which is not meant to be complete, but only to 
offer a preliminary overview of the heterogeneity of the domain of phenomena people ordinarily 
call “emotion”. All the examples I use below are taken from the list of items within the 3.00-4.00 
range in Shaver et al. (1987) I reported above. 
 
Ontological status 
Items in the list vary with respect to their ontological status: some items appear to designate 
exclusively dispositions, others both occurrences and dispositions, and others only occurrences 
For example, hostility seems to be a disposition to respond aggressively in certain 
circumstances, rather than an occurrence. Anger seems to comprise both dispositions and 
occurrences. Fright appears to designate only occurrences  
 
Mode of onset 
Items in the list vary in terms of their mode of onset: some items appear to be designate 
occurrence elicited quickly and automatically, and others appear to designate occurrences with a 
slower and less automatic onset.  
For example, love and hopelessness appear to be generally elicited slowly and not 
automatically, whereas horror and embarrassment appear to be elicited quickly and automatically 
 
Duration 
Items in the list vary in terms of their duration: some items appear to designate short-lived 
occurrences, others appear to designate long-lived ones 
For example, panic and disgust seems to be short-lived occurrences, whereas grief and 
bitterness seem to be long-lived ones 
 
Conscious Experience 
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Items in the list vary in terms of whether or not they can be had without a conscious 
experience: some items appear to designate occurrences that can be had both consciously and 
unconsciously, whereas appears not liable to occur unconsciously 
For example, fear and envy appear liable to being had both consciously and unconsciously, 
whereas shock and bliss seem to demand a conscious experience 
 
Particular intentional objects 
Items in the list vary in terms of whether or not they have particular intentional objects: 
some items appear to have them, and others appear not to have them.13  
For example, depression and anxiety often do not have objects, whereas horror and jealousy 
generally have them 
 
Bodily changes 
Items in the list vary in terms of whether or not they tend to have a bodily underpinning of 
the autonomic sort: some appear to have it, and some appear to lack it 
For example, anger and fear often have bodily underpinnings, whereas loneliness and regret 
rarely if ever appear to have them 
 
Occurrence in infants and animals 
Items in the list vary in terms of whether or not they can be had by infants and animals: 
some appear to be shared across species and available to infants, and others do not 
For example, excitement and fright appear to be available to infants and animals, whereas 
guilt and envy do not 
 
Biological primitivity 
Items in the list vary in terms of whether or not they are primitive biological motivators: 
some appear to be, and others appear not to be  
For example, lust and pleasure appear to be primitive biological motivators, whereas dread 
and awe do not 
                                                 
13 On the other hand, I assume that emotions always have formal intentional objects, under the interpretation of 
formal objects I proposed in subsection 4.2.1. 
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 Valence 
Items in the list vary in terms of their valence: some appear to have positive valence, others 
appear to have negative valence, others appear to have mixed valence. 
For example, love seems to have a positive valence, terror seems to have a negative one, 
melancholy seems to have a mixed valence.  
 
Facial expressions 
Items in the list vary in terms of whether or not they have facial expressions commonly 
associated to them 
For example, panic and disgust seem to have facial expressions commonly associated to 
them, whereas hope and resentment do not seem to. 
 
Prompting or inhibiting action 
Items in the list vary in terms of whether they prompt or inhibit action: some appear to 
energize towards doing things, others appear to reduce the inclination to act 
For example, disgust and jealousy seem to prompt towards action, whereas depression and 
gloom seem to prevent action 
 
Priority and urgency of coping 
Items in the list vary in terms of whether or not they demand urgent and prioritized coping: 
some appear to interrupt any other activity, others do not seem to   
For example, horror and rage appear to involve immediate action which takes precedence 
over any pre-existing plan, whereas resentment and longing do not appear to demand immediate 
action 
 
Presence of feedback in the course of execution 
Items in the list vary in terms of whether or not the urgent and prioritized coping they 
demand can eventuate in a reflex action, or in an action which receives feedback in the course of 
execution: some appear to work reflex-like, and others do not 
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For example, fear often occurs in a reflex-like fashion, whereas frustration and alienation do 
not. 
 
Attention 
Items in the list vary in terms of whether or not they demand focused attention: some appear 
to involve redirection of selective attention on their objects, whereas others do not 
For example, fury and ecstasy appear to demand attention to be focused on their objects for 
the entire duration of the episode, whereas melancholy and remorse do not 
 
Integration with long term planning 
Items in the list vary in terms of whether or not they are integrated with long term planning: 
some appear to commonly bring about impulsive actions, whereas others appear to be more 
integrated with long term planning 
For example, panic appears to bring about impulsive actions, whereas resentment seems to 
be integrated with long term planning. 
 
Complexity of appraisal 
Items in the list vary in terms of the cognitive complexity of the appraisal which brings them 
about: some are elicited by an appraisal process which presupposes and involves higher 
cognitive capacities, others appear to be elicited by a low-level appraisal process  
For example, guilt, remorse, and seem to require the ability to engage in complex cognitive 
processing, whereas panic, lust, olfactory disgust do not 
 
Machiavellian elicitation  
Items in the list vary in terms of whether or not their elicitation mechanism has a prominent 
Machiavellian dimension: some are elicited by an appraisal which manifests sensitivity to the 
payoff expected from engaging in them, whereas others do not 
For example, anger and jealousy are often elicited in order to affect the behavior of an 
interactant, whereas insecurity and shock appear less geared towards influencing interactants 
advantageously 
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These are 17 dimensions of heterogeneity affecting the category “emotion”. I collected them 
to show how multi-dimensional the conceptual hyperspace occupied by the category “emotion” 
actually is. The reader has certainly noticed that the seventeen dimensions of heterogeneity are 
dimensions around which some of the main attempts to characterize emotions in the last 2,500 
years have been centered. I have discussed most of them in the previous seven chapters of this 
dissertation. In other words, the seventeen dimensions are the output of many centuries of 
“looking and seeing”, as Wittgenstein (1953) would put it, what emotions as ordinarily 
understood have in common. None of the dimensions I considered, as it turns out, individuates a 
feature that is necessary for being an emotion as ordinarily understood. 
At this point, we have two options. One is to keep trying, and the other is to give up on the 
idea that the category of “emotion” is individuated by a set of individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions. Given how long the history of unsuccessful attempts to find them, the 
appropriate inductive inference seems to me that individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for something to count as a folk emotion have not been recovered because there are 
no such conditions. Famously, this is what Wittgenstein concluded with respect to games, even 
though his inductive basis was much more limited than the one I rely on, as it only comprised his 
own attempt to find out what all games have in common.  
Wittgenstein’s well-known conclusion was the following: 
 
Consider for example the proceedings we call “games”. I mean 
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. 
What is common to them all?-Don’t say: “The must be something 
common, or they would not be called games”- but look and see 
whether there is anything common to all.-For if you look at them 
you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that…we see a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I 
can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities 
than “family resemblances”…[a]nd I shall say: ‘games’ form a 
family (Wittgenstein 1953, § 65-67)  
 
Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, I will say that also “emotions” form a family. Notice that this is 
an aspect of the analogy between emotions and games different from the one I discussed in 
section 8.2. There, I reported that Wittgenstein was convinced that there are borderline cases of 
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game, namely cases such that it is indeterminate whether or not they definitely are or are not 
games. I concluded that the same holds for the category emotion” (as well as for categories 
subordinate to it such as “anger” and “fear”), and presented some preliminary empirical evidence 
on epistemic indeterminacy to back that up (Wittgenstein relied on introspection to make the 
vagueness point about games). What I am saying now is something different, namely that the 
items which are definitely emotions form of family, characterized by a “complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing”. 
I am convinced that the same is true of categories subordinate to “emotion”. For example, 
there seem to be instances of fear which are occurrences, and instances which are dispositions, 
instances which are elicited quickly, and instances which are elicited slowly, instances which 
involve conscious experiences, and instances which are unconscious, instances which involve 
bodily changes, and instances which lack them, instances which are short-lived and accompanied 
by facial expressions, and instances which are long-lived and not accompanied by facial 
expressions, instances which have great urgency, and instances which do not, instances which 
work as reflexes, and instances which comprise feedback mechanisms in the course of execution, 
instances which are elicited by simply appraisal mechanisms, and instances which are elicited by 
complex ones, and so on. As I will put it, also “fear”, “anger”, “guilt”, “shame’, “disgust” each 
form a “family”, whose members, once again, share a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing. 
Under the view I am proposing, folk emotion categories designate families of items which 
share a family resemblance, and have borderline members. However, a student of emotions 
cannot afford stopping here, and say about emotions only that they share a complicated network 
of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing. The question is: What options are available for 
theorizing about emotions? 
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8.4. CONCLUSION 
 
I surveyed the available empirical literature on emotion concepts, to try and understand what 
sorts of items are ordinarily considered to be emotions, or particular emotions. I reported that 
competent English speakers deem some items to be better and some items to be worse examples 
of emotions, which should not surprise us given how widespread prototypicality phenomena are 
with respect to all kinds of lexical categories. What is more interesting is that there is evidence of 
widespread epistemic indeterminacy when it comes to folk emotion categories. Competent 
English speakers appear to be uncertain or disagree about whether or not some items count as 
instances of emotion, or of a particular emotion. 
I also surveyed the domain of items English speakers consider to be definite examples of 
emotion, and detected the presence of a massive heterogeneity within such domain. I reported 
seventeen dimension of heterogeneity, gleaned from the long history of failed attempts to define 
the emotions. The best interpretation of the empirical data I presented, I concluded, is that folk 
emotion categories lack a condition of membership comprising individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions of membership, and have blurred edges.  
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9. WHAT ARE THE DESIDERATA FOR A THEORY 
OF EMOTIONS? 
 
The emotion theorists we have surveyed up to now tend to ask "What is an emotion?" or 
“What is anger?” without a clear understanding of what counts as getting the answer right. An 
account of what counts as getting the answer right must begin from the conclusion I reached at 
the end of the last chapter, namely that folk emotion categories are vague and characterized by 
family resemblance. I want to argue that there are two different projects in which an emotion 
theorist may be engaged with respect to such categories. The first is what we may call the Folk 
Emotion Project, which aims to offer a descriptive account of the conditions of membership of 
folk emotion categories such as “emotion” and “anger”. The second option is to engage in what I 
call the Explicating Emotion Project. This project aims to offer explicative accounts (or 
explications) of folk emotion categories which aim to transform them into explicative categories 
endowed with fruitfulness relative to a certain set of theoretical objectives. Uncertainty about the 
desiderata of these two projects, and ambiguity about which one is being pursued, strike me as 
the two biggest methodological obstacles to progress in the history of emotion theory. The aim of 
this chapter is to remove such obstacles, and get clear on the ground rules of the activity of 
answering questions of the form “What is an emotion/anger?”. 
 
 
9.1. THE FOLK EMOTION PROJECT 
 
9.1.1. Folk emotion categories as cluster categories in a fuzzy hierarchy 
One of the projects in which a theorist answering questions such as “What is an emotion?” 
or “What is anger?” may be engaged is the Folk Emotion Project (FEP). Its chief purpose is to 
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offer what I call a descriptive account of folk emotion categories, namely an account of their 
condition of membership which is compatible with the empirical facts I have illustrated in 
sections 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. In a nutshell, the folk emotion theorist must shed light on the family 
resemblance condition of membership of a vague category. Such condition must explain why 
there is more than one way to qualify as an emotion/anger - another way to say that emotions 
form a family - and why there are borderline cases of emotion/anger. 
Notice that this is a substantive intellectual task, which is certainly not fulfilled by dictionary 
definitions. The Webster Dictionary, just to pick an example, tells us that an emotion “is a state 
of feeling” or that anger is “a strong feeling of displeasure and usually of antagonism”. But these 
descriptive accounts are definitions, namely sets of individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions, and we have already concluded that no account with such logical form can capture 
the condition of membership for folk emotion categories. The two specific definitions offered by 
the Webster dictionary comprise conditions which are neither individually necessary nor jointly 
sufficient. They are not jointly sufficient because many things other than emotions are states of 
feeling (e.g. pain, nausea) and many things other than anger are strong feelings of displeasure 
and usually of antagonism (e.g. jealousy). They are not individually necessary because many 
things which are instances of emotion do not meet the proposed definition (e.g. unconscious 
emotions) and many things which are instances of anger do not meet the proposed definition 
(e.g. self-righteous anger can be mild and somewhat pleasant).  
The question is: How should folk emotion categories descriptively accounted for? What 
counts as a good descriptive account for a vague category whose instances only share a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing? My view is that the 
appropriate logical form for it is that of a cluster account. I propose the following as a general 
description of what I shall call a cluster condition of membership: 
 
A category has a cluster condition of membership when membership to the category is a 
matter of fulfilling enough properties from a cluster set {P1,..,Pn, Pj?} 
 
I call cluster account a sentential account of a condition of this sort, and cluster category a 
category with a cluster condition of membership. A cluster condition of membership states that 
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being a category member is fulfilling enough of the properties from the cluster set {P1,..,Pn, Pj?}.  
The fundamental features of the cluster condition I described are two. 
Firstly, there is more than one way of fulfilling it, which is what accounts for Wittgenstein’s 
“family” idea. Often many different combinations of properties from the cluster set will be 
jointly sufficient for membership, namely such as to meet the threshold for “enough”. This will 
create a “complex network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” among category 
members.  
Secondly, indeterminacy is built into the very condition of membership for the category, 
which is what accounts for Wittgenstein’s “blurred edges” idea. There are two sides to this 
indeterminacy. On the one hand, the key term “enough” admits of borderline cases. Secondly, 
the identity of the cluster set {P1,..,Pn, Pj?} is not fully determinate, in the sense that there may be 
some property Pj such that it is not determinate whether or not it belongs to the cluster set. 
Belonging to the cluster set is in effect being a component of at least one combination of 
properties which are “enough” for membership (without any proper subset of such set being 
enough for it), and there will be indeterminacy as to whether or not some properties ever achieve 
that distinction. For the sake of simplicity, I will disregard this aspect of indeterminacy in what 
follows, and work under the assumption that there is no indeterminacy at least as to the identity 
of {P1,..,Pn}, which may be the case for some emotion categories. 
Notice that what a cluster condition of membership states is not that with respect to 
borderline cases we are ignorant about whether or not enough properties have been fulfilled, but 
rather that there is no fact of the matter concerning whether or not enough properties have been 
fulfilled. No amount of investigation will settle the issue, because – under the understanding of 
vagueness I am presupposing - our habits of language have left it an open question how the issue 
ought to be settled.  
The admissibility of borderline cases, however, should not be construed as global 
indeterminacy. There will be cases such that the cluster condition of membership has definitely 
been fulfilled and cases in which it has definitely been violated. For example, fulfilling all 
properties in the cluster set of any cluster category is definitely having fulfilled enough 
properties, and fulfilling none of them is definitely not having fulfilled enough properties. This 
means, incidentally, that the cluster properties must be jointly sufficient for membership, and that 
fulfilling none of them must be sufficient for non-membership.  
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The domain of indeterminacy of cluster category, on the other hand, will differ from 
category to category. Some categories will be such that any proper subset of the cluster set is a 
borderline case: whenever not all properties from the cluster set have been fulfilled, it is neither 
definitely the case that the condition of membership has been fulfilled nor definitely the case that 
it has been violated. In such case, the cluster set will be the only sufficient condition of 
membership for the kind. Other categories will be such that there will be several proper subsets 
of the cluster set that are jointly sufficient for membership, so that the domain of indeterminacy 
will be more restricted. These differences may be hinted at by choosing other terms in lieu of 
“enough”, such as “most”, “many”, “some”, “sufficiently many”, and so on.   
Cluster categories differ also in another important respect, namely whether or not the cluster 
set contains individually necessary properties. For example, it may well be the case that being 
voluntary is a necessary condition for being a game, but that being a game is being voluntary and 
fulfilling enough properties from the cluster set (which includes the necessary property). In this 
respect, Wittgenstein (1953) was wrong in thinking that what makes games a “family” is that 
there is no properties all games must share in order to be games. They could be a family even if 
such properties existed, as long as there are several ways of fulfilling the cluster condition of 
membership for the category. 
My central hypothesis is that folk emotion categories have a cluster condition of 
membership, in the sense that membership to them is a matter of fulfilling enough properties 
from a cluster set {P1,..,Pn}.14 Call this the cluster hypothesis for folk emotion categories. The 
cluster hypothesis (CH) explains very well the empirical data I collected in sections 8.1, 8.2 and 
8.3.  
It explains why definitions of emotions in terms of individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions have so far eluded emotion theorists, who have tried to define the emotions 
for centuries without success. According to CH, this is because the only thing which is necessary 
and sufficient when it comes to folk emotion categories is fulfilling enough properties from the 
cluster set. It also explains why there is a great deal of heterogeneity among instances of folk 
emotion categories, in the sense that there are many ways to fulfill enough properties from a 
                                                 
14 As I pointed out before, the cluster set itself may have borderline members, but I won’t pursue this point in what 
follows 
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cluster set. Finally, CH explains why there are borderline cases of emotions, as sometimes it is 
simply indeterminate whether or not enough properties from the cluster set have been fulfilled. 
If I am right, the primary tasks for a folk emotion theorist is to shed light on the cluster set 
associated with the folk category “emotion” (and its subordinates), find out what properties in 
the cluster set are individually necessary (if any), and find out what proper subsets of the cluster 
set are sufficient conditions of membership (if any).  
This is a substantive task, which is to be carried out by investigating empirically emotion 
concepts along the lines pioneered by the psychologists I have discussed in chapter 8. We 
certainly know what the candidates for the cluster set are, namely what in the introduction I 
called the marks of emotionality, namely the prototypical components involved in instances of 
prototypical emotions such as anger, fear, disgust and so on. Such components comprise an 
appraisal, a suite of physiological responses, a conscious experience, and a behavioral action 
tendency manifested by physical actions, mental actions and expressions. But it is unclear 
whether these really are the properties of the cluster set as I defined it, whether any of them is 
necessary for something to qualify as a folk emotion, and what subsets of them are sufficient for 
something to qualify as a folk emotion. 
What the folk emotion theorist is ultimately after is to shed light on what I call the Fuzzy 
Hierarchy of Folk Emotion Categories. It looks something like this: 
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Anger1 
IS-A IS-A
IS-A
Fear  
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Cluster Category 
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IS-A TO SOME DEGREE
Anger2 Anger3 Borderline 
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IS-A TO SOME DEGREEIS-A  
Fear1 
IS-A IS-A 
Fear2 Fear3  Borderline 
Fear 
IS-A TO SOME DEGREEIS-A  
IS-A
Figure 10: The fuzzy hierarchy of folk emotion categories 
 
In the hierarchy described above, anger, awe and fear are classically subsumed under 
emotion, because every instance of anger, fear and awe is an instance of emotion, but there are 
instances of emotion which are not instances of anger, fear, or awe. On the other hand, respect is 
fuzzily subsumed under emotion, because instances of respect are borderline instances of 
emotion, but at least one instance of emotion (e.g. an anger instance) is definitely not an instance 
of respect. We need the distinction between these two types of subsumption if we want to allow 
for cluster folk emotion categories. Such categories will enter relations of subsumption with 
other folk emotion categories, but they will not be relations of subsumption as classically 
understood, namely relations of set inclusion. 
In figure 11, I indicated classical subsumption with a full line labeled “__IS-A__”, and 
fuzzy subsumption with a dotted line labeled “__IS-A__TO SOME DEGREE”. Each of the 
emotion cluster categories will be characterized by a cluster set which the folk emotion theorist 
must discover. There will be many emotion kinds which are classically subsumed under emotion, 
namely many categories all the instances of which fulfill enough properties of the cluster set for 
“emotion”. Some of them will be prototypical emotion categories. Their instances are not only 
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definitely instances of emotion, but also very good examples of emotion. On the basis of the 
evidence described in section 8.1, I suggest that the group includes, among others, anger, fear, 
happiness, sadness, love, hate, guilt, and sadness.  
Other kinds classically subsumed under emotion will be non-prototypical emotion 
categories, namely kinds whose instances are definitely instances of emotion, but not 
prototypical ones. This group may include, among others, awe, gloom, spite, infatuation. There 
will also be emotion kinds which are fuzzily subsumed under emotion, in the sense that with 
respect to their instances it is neither definitely the case that they are emotions nor definitely the 
case that they are not. The group of borderline emotion categories includes, among others, 
respect, boredom, calmness, startle, interest and many others. The instances of such categories 
are such that it is indeterminate whether or not they fulfill enough properties from the cluster. 
Each of the prototypical, non-prototypical and borderline folk emotion categories will in 
turn subsume other categories. For example, there will be several categories of anger - anger1, 
anger2, anger3, etc. - which are classically subsumed under anger, in the sense that their instances 
fulfill enough properties from the cluster set of anger to qualify as anger.  
Species of anger are generated by the specific way in which the cluster condition of 
membership is met and by the specific way the cluster properties are fulfilled. Some of these 
kinds will be prototypical anger categories, and others will be non-prototypical anger 
categories. Prototypical anger categories tend to have most or all of the cluster properties, and 
tend to fulfill them in a prototypical way. For example, a prototypical anger category would 
includes instances of anger which involve appraisal of slight, autonomic changes such as 
increased heart beat, blood pressure and trembling, an attack tendency manifested through 
expressions such as fixed stare, eyes widened, and bared teeth, physical behaviors such as 
screaming and hitting, mental behaviors such as focusing attention on the object of anger and 
plotting further harm in the future, and a negatively valenced feeling.  
Some of the categories subsumed under anger have a name in the English language, but 
there certainly are more categories of anger that there are names for them. An example of named 
anger category could be rage, which tends to have all of the characteristics I listed above. On the 
other hand, there will be several instances which fulfill enough properties from the cluster set for 
anger to count as borderline anger, but not enough to count as anger.  
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In other words, it will be indeterminate whether or not they are anger, and no amount of 
investigation will settle the issue. I include all such borderline instances in the borderline anger 
kind, which is fuzzily subsumed under anger. The same is going to be true of fear, which will 
classically subsume prototypical and non-prototypical fear kinds, and fuzzily subsume a 
borderline fear kind. 
 
9.1.2. Are folk emotion categories natural kinds?  
I am not interested in the Folk Emotion Project, even though I acknowledge that it is an 
interesting and intellectually coherent project. This means that I will not try to offer a 
characterization of the cluster set which individuates “emotion”, or any particular emotion such 
as “anger”, nor try to reconstruct the precise shape taken by the fuzzy hierarchy of folk emotion 
categories. 
The reason is that, whatever the cluster condition of membership for folk emotion categories 
may be, we already know that the items which fulfill it display the sort of massive heterogeneity 
and vagueness I documented in sections 8.2 and 8.3. But categories of this kind are not the sorts 
of categories suitable for scientific investigation. To develop scientific theories of emotions, 
which is what I am interested in, we need some degree of precision, and most importantly we 
need to individuate a domain of phenomena which share a dimension of scientifically interesting 
similarity.  
Another way to formulate this point is to say that folk emoting categories are not natural 
kinds. This thesis has been made popular by Griffiths (1997), but has recently been attacked 
from a variety of fronts (e.g. Nussbaum 2001, Charland 2002, Prinz 2004c; see Griffiths 2004b 
for replies). Griffiths (2004b) uses the term natural kind “to denote categories that admit reliable 
extrapolation from samples of the category to the whole category”, and argues that “[i]deally, a 
natural kind should allow very reliable predictions in a large domain of properties” (235). This 
approach is broadly inspired by Boyd’s (1991) analysis of natural kinds as homeostatic property 
clusters kinds. 
Boyd was interested in natural kinds such that some natural mechanism underlies the 
satisfaction of the condition of membership on the part of kind members. The condition of 
membership presupposed by Boyd is similar to what I called a cluster condition of membership, 
namely a cluster of properties such that being a kind member amounts to fulfilling enough of 
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them. This being the case, there is no fixed set of necessary and sufficient properties that all 
natural kind members must fulfill. What characterizes Boyd’s kinds is that the satisfaction of 
enough of the cluster properties is the result of a causal process: 
 
There are a number of scientifically important kinds (properties, 
relations, etc.) whose natural definitions are very much like the 
property-cluster definitions postulated by ordinary language 
philosophers except that the unity of the properties in the defining 
cluster in manly causal rather than conceptual. The natural 
definition of one of these homeostatic property clusters kinds is 
determined by the members of a cluster of often co-occurring 
properties and by the (“homeostatic”) mechanisms that bring about 
their co-occurrence (Boyd 1991, 141, emphasis in original). 
 
What makes homeostatic property cluster kinds natural is that it is, as it were, up to nature 
what properties “cluster” in virtue of causal mechanisms. Whereas we are free to define kinds by 
the combination of any cluster of properties we wish, only some clusters will have a causal basis. 
For example, we are free to generate kinds by establishing sets of properties that, say, stars in the 
sky must fulfill. We can define a kind as being formed by stars in a region of space that, seen 
from the earth, looks like a lion. In such case, most likely no causal mechanism will underlie the 
satisfaction of the condition of membership for the kind.  
 On the other hand, when we define the kind “spiral galaxy”, whose condition of 
membership is that of “exhibiting a central nucleus or barred structure from which extend 
concentrations of matter forming curved arms” (Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary), 
being member of the kind has a causal basis, in the sense that a natural common cause must have 
brought the stars belonging to the spiral galaxy to gather in that particular configuration we call 
spiral galaxy. 
Boyd points out that the attempt to define kinds whose condition of membership is fulfilled 
in virtue of a causal mechanism is significant only when we are engaged in inductive and 
explanatory projects: 
 
In defining a kind we should be required to defer to the world just 
in case and to the extent that reference to the kind in question is to 
be part of an inductive or explanatory project. In cases in which 
our concerns are largely with the establishment of workable 
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conventions for non-inductive practice, deference to the world 
should be largely unnecessary (1991, 140) 
 
The reason is that when we want to engage the world of nature in our explanatory and 
inductive projects, we must defer to the causal structure of such world. As Boyd puts it, 
“successful induction and explanation always require that we accommodate our categories to the 
causal structure of the world” (139). Since the causal structure of the world is something we 
discover as we go along with induction and explanation, natural kinds will receive their ultimate 
definitions “a posteriori in deference to nature rather than nominally” (139). 
Under this broad characterization of natural kinds, Griffiths (2004b) argues that folk 
emotion categories are not natural kinds. His central point is that “it is unlikely that all the 
psychological states and processes that fall under the vernacular category of emotion are 
sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified scientific psychology of emotion” (2004c, 
233). Griffiths extends this thesis to specific folk emotion categories, suggesting that vernacular 
categories such as anger and love are unlikely to be natural kinds. Notice that this is not to say 
that emotions have nothing in common, or that what they have in common cannot be discovered. 
It is simply to say that instances of folk emotion categories do not share the sorts of properties 
“that are the focus of investigation in psychology and the neurosciences”.  
Griffiths (1997, 2004b) argues that the only types of emotions for which we have evidence 
of naturalness are affect programs (or basic emotions), namely biologically based and pan-
cultural suites of short-term, coordinated and automated responses which includes measurable 
physiological changes, stereotyped facial expressions and action tendencies (see chapter 5). 
Ekman’s (1999b) most recent list of such programs comprises surprise, amusement, anger, 
contempt, joy, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, 
sadness/distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame. As I pointed out in 5.1.3, however, so 
far we only have evidence for basicness with respect to anger, fear, disgust, sadness, surprise and 
joy. 
Differently from Ekman, Griffiths acknowledges that affect programs are not the only things 
that qualify as folk emotions, but he points out that they are sufficiently different from affect 
programs to require a distinct scientific psychology. Griffiths (2004b) suggests two main 
research paths along which we may develop theories suitable for other natural kinds of emotions. 
Some emotions appear to require “responding in a more cognitively complex way to more highly 
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analyzed information” (2004b, 236) than it is the case for basic emotions. This seems to be the 
case for emotions such as envy, jealousy, moral indignation, resentment and others. Griffiths 
proposes to call such emotions higher cognitive or complex emotions.  
On the other hand, on some occasions emotions appear to “involve an internalized cultural 
model of appropriate behavior”. Griffiths suggests that this appears to be the case for emotions 
such as “going postal”, which seem to follow a script “derived from real or fictional incidents 
that are culturally salient” (2004b, 236) (see my discussion of this case in subsection 6.3.2). 
Griffiths proposes to call such emotions “socially sustained pretenses”.  
Griffiths’ primary concern is not to develop detailed accounts of either higher cognitive 
emotions or socially sustained pretenses, but only to point out that these emotions cannot be 
understood as affect programs or combinations of affect programs. This being the case, we 
cannot extrapolate to the folk category of emotion the scientific discoveries made about affect 
programs. Similarly, since there are instances of folk categories such as anger and disgust which 
are not affect programs, we cannot extrapolate to the folk categories of anger or disgust the 
scientific discoveries made about affect program anger and affect program disgust. In a nutshell, 
neither the folk category of emotion nor the folk categories of specific emotions such as anger, 
disgust, shame, etc. are natural kinds.  
Griffiths considers a possible objection to his argument, namely that all instances of emotion 
which are not instances of affect programs may be reduced to blends of affect programs. 
Griffiths (1997) has a number of responses to this challenge. Firstly, he believes that the elicitors 
of some emotions such as jealousy and moral indignation cannot be reduced to combinations of 
elicitors of affect programs. Secondly, he points out that many emotions are not short-lived, 
whereas affect programs are. Thirdly, he states that many emotions “do not have immediate 
behavioral and physiological consequences” (1997, 102) as affect programs do. Fourthly, he 
argues that some emotions are “highly integrated with complex, often conscious cognitive 
processes”, whereas affect programs appear to have many of the properties of modules (e.g. 
informational encapsulation).  
Griffiths’ conclusion is that many instances of folk emotion cannot be reduced to 
combinations of affect programs. Consequently, folk emotion categories are neither natural kinds 
nor reducible to combinations of basic emotions which instead are natural kinds. 
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As I pointed out before, Griffiths’ thesis has been criticized by several emotion theorists in 
recent times. The standard criticism is that Griffiths failed to appreciate that there are things all 
emotions share by virtue of which they are natural kinds. I will consider only Prinz’s (2004c) 
version of the criticism, because it offers a vivid portrayal of a general problem. 
Prinz’s case for holding that Griffiths’ thesis is wrong is summarized in the following 
passage: 
 
Each [emotion] is structurally analogous. Each is simply a 
perception of a patterned bodily change. Even emotions that we 
acquire by blending [between basic emotions] have this simple 
structure. They are simply perceptions of blended bodily patterns. 
Some emotions are attained by adding conceptually sophisticated 
judgments to out elicitation files, but this does not alter their 
structure. Elicitation files are content-determining causes of our 
emotions, not constituent parts. And all emotions have elicitation 
files that can contain judgments, as well as perceptual 
representations. Thus, hybrid theories are wrong. All named 
emotions are very much alike. All have the same internal structure, 
and all bear the marks of both nature and nurture (Prinz 2004c, 85-
86) 
 
I already criticized Prinz’s Neo-Jamesian theory because of its unwarranted assumption that 
all emotions are perceptions of bodily changes (see section 7.2). I will further criticize it in 
chapter 10 because of the theory of intentionality it presupposes, and argue that it fails to account 
for the crucial motivational dimension of emotions. Here, I want to argue that Prinz’s (2004c)  
argument for the naturalness of the folk category “emotion” would not work even bracketing all 
such worries. Let us assume for the sake of argument that “[a]ll emotions are embodied 
appraisals under the causal control of calibration files”, where “calibration file” is another name 
for what I earlier described as appraisal. Consider fear. According to Prinz, all instances of fear 
are perceptions, conscious or unconscious, of the bodily changes of fear broadly understood (see 
subsection 7.1.1). Such perception was set up to be set off by items contained in the fear 
calibration file, such as loud noises and loss of support. 
However, fear can be calibrated through higher cognitive processes as well. For example, 
fear can be generated by the judgment that a meteorite will hit the earth in two years. The fear 
calibration file, in other words, contains items resulting from calibration of fear elicitors, which 
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reflect different levels of cognitive complexity and cultural differences. But what about higher 
cognitive emotions such as guilt or shame? Prinz’s response is that “[h]igher cognitive emotions 
are either blends of two basic emotions (just as martinis are blends of two spirits), or 
combinations of basic emotions and cognitive elaborations (just as screwdrivers combine a spirit 
and a fruit juice)”. Prinz concludes that emotions “share a common essence” by virtue of which 
they are natural kinds, namely being all embodied appraisals. 
The problem is that this argument does not address the real issue, which is that members of 
folk emotion categories are extremely heterogeneous. Let us assume for the sake of argument 
that, by sufficiently stretching the notion of perception of bodily changes, and allowing for 
calibration files to range from cognitive primitive to cognitively complex forms of information 
processing, we manage to conclude that “[a]ll emotions are embodied appraisals under the causal 
control of calibration files”, either in the form of basic emotions or in the form of combinations 
of basic emotions. It would still be the case that such embodied appraisals manifest the seventeen 
dimensions of heterogeneity I described in section 8.3.  
To summarize, some embodied appraisals would be occurrences and others would be 
dispositions, some would be elicited quickly, and some would be elicited slowly, some would 
involve conscious experiences, and some would be unconscious, some would involve autonomic 
changes, and some would not, some would be short-lived and accompanied by facial 
expressions, and some would be long-lived and not accompanied by facial expressions, some 
would have particular intentional objects, and some would lack them, some would occur in 
infants and animals, and some only in adult humans, some would prompt action, and some would 
inhibit it, some would work as reflexes, and some would involve action tendencies, and so on. 
What needs to be demonstrated is that there is a dimension of scientifically interesting similarity 
which holds across all such differences, and this is not something we can find in Prinz’s theory.  
What Prinz ultimately tells us is that all emotions have the same internal structure, namely 
being embodied appraisals, and that all embodied appraisals bear the marks of both nature and 
nurture. He adds to such qualifications that “[a]ll emotions seem to involve overlapping brain 
structures, and all can be affected by the same clinical conditions” (2004c, 77). Let us assume all 
such things are true of emotions. The fact is that being embodied appraisals, bearing the marks of 
both nature and nurture, involving overlapping brain structures and being affected by the same 
clinical conditions does not individuate a kind such that it is likely that “all the psychological 
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states and processes that fall under [it] are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified 
scientific psychology” (Griffiths 1997, 233). 
Prinz’s (2004c) argument simply does not address the problem raised by Griffiths, offering 
nothing more than a characterization – problematic in its own right – of what all instances of 
emotion have in common by virtue of which we call them emotions in the vernacular sense. But 
showing that the somatic theory “subsume[s] anything that deserves to be called an emotion 
(Prinz 2004a, 49) does not amount to showing that anything that deserves to be called an 
emotion forms of natural kind. 
I am convinced that Griffiths’ (1997, 2004b) argument is here to stay. I would not formulate 
it, however, in terms of the distinction between affect programs such as anger and fear, higher 
cognitive emotions such as guilt and envy, and socially sustained pretenses such as “going 
postal”. This formulation carries two risks. The first is to suggest that higher cognitive emotions 
and socially sustained pretenses form natural kinds of emotions, as affect programs do. The 
second is to suggest that the each folk emotion category falls neatly into one of these three kinds 
of emotion. 
Griffiths does not hold any of these two views. He mostly describes higher cognitive 
emotions and socially sustained pretenses in terms of the fact that they are not affect programs, 
without explicitly arguing that they “are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified 
scientific psychology”. Moreover, he is open to the possibility that the same kind of emotion – 
say anger - may have instances that count as affect programs, higher cognitive emotions and 
socially sustained pretenses.  
Griffith’s interpreters, however, often take answering the claim that emotions are not natural 
kinds to amount to showing that there is unity in the emotion domain despite the tripartition 
between affect programs, higher cognitive emotions and socially sustained pretenses. We have 
seen the impact of this assumption on Prinz’s (2004c) argumentative strategy.  
Holding that folk emotion categories are not natural kinds does not require holding that there 
are any specific natural kinds of emotions other than basic emotions (e.g. higher cognitive 
emotions and social pretenses). For that matter, it does not even require holding that basic 
emotions are natural kinds. All we need to say is that it is very unlikely that the “complex 
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” which characterizes folk emotion 
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categories is a network of similarities allowing for the formulation of scientific explanations and 
predictions that hold for all instances of the folk category.    
 
 
9.2. THE EXPLICATING EMOTION PROJECT 
 
The problem with folk emotion categories, I argued, is that our habits of language qualify a 
very heterogeneous set of items as definite instances of them, and do not settle with respect to 
several items whether or not they are in fact instances of the category. If the objective of a 
theorist is to individuate with precision an interesting dimension of similarity within the domain 
of emotions, it is not advisable to work with folk emotion categories. Notice that this would be 
true even if the Folk Emotion Project had already been successfully completed. Having a cluster 
account for folk emotion categories would make explicit what makes something a folk emotion 
(or a particular folk emotion), but would not eliminate the dimensions of heterogeneity which 
characterize it (I detected seventeen such dimensions), nor the vagueness of the category. In fact, 
eliminating vagueness would qualify as a shortcoming for a descriptive account, whose objective 
is to mirror, rather than reduce or eliminate, the vagueness of the folk category whose condition 
of membership is being described. 
What a theorist needs to do in these circumstances is to transform folk emotion categories so 
as to make them suitable to his or her theoretical purposes. My own objective is to transform folk 
emotion categories so as to make them suitable for the purposes of scientific psychology. But I 
want to begin by offering a general discussion of the desiderata which govern what I call the 
Explicating Emotion Project. Its chief purpose is to offer an explication of folk emotion 
categories, which is roughly speaking an account of what is a “good thing to mean” by them 
relative to certain theoretical purposes. The job of an emotion theorist engaged in explication is 
not to shed light on the family resemblance condition of membership of vague folk emotion 
categories, as is the case for the Folk Emotion Project. Rather, the purpose is to create a new 
category which is useful to certain purposes, but similar enough to the old category to count as 
explicating it. I will try to shed light on explication by introducing and developing Carnap’s 
pioneering account. 
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9.2.1. Carnap’s account of explication developed 
 
 
According to Carnap’s (1950) broad characterization, “[t]he task of explication consists in 
transforming a given more or less inexact concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the 
first by the second. We call the given concept (or the term used for it) the explicandum, and the 
exact concept proposed to take the place of the first (or the term proposed for it) the explicatum” 
(3). Let us call explicans the account of the condition of membership for the explicatum or 
explicative kind. The question we have to answer is: What desiderata should a good explication 
fulfill? The general intuition is that a good explication preserves a significant portion of the 
meaning of the explicandum, and makes up for whatever is lost by conferring upon the 
explicatum epistemic virtues lacked by the explicandum.  
Carnap’s account of the desiderata of explication reflects the theoretical purposes for which 
the notion was introduced, namely scientific purposes. We will have to transform the Carnapian 
account slightly to endow it with more generality, because scientists are not the only ones who 
engage in explication. 
Here is a summary of what Carnap takes the desiderata of explication to be (Carnap used the 
term “concept” as I am using the terms “category” or “kind”): 
  
If a concept is given as explicandum, the task consists in finding 
another concept as its explicatum which fulfils the following 
requirements to a sufficient degree.  
    1. The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a 
way that, in most cases in which the explicandum has so far been 
used, the explicatum can be used; however, close similarity is not 
required, and considerable differences are permitted.  
    2. The characterization of the explicatum, that is, the rules of its 
use (for instance, in the form of a definition), is to be given in an 
exact form, so as to introduce the explicatum into a well-connected 
system of scientific concepts.  
    3. The explicatum is to be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for 
the formulation of many universal statements (empirical laws in 
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the case of a nonlogical concept, logical theorems in the case of a 
logical concept).  
4. The explicatum should be as simple as possible; this means as 
simple as the more important requirements (1), (2), and (3) permits 
(Carnap 1950, 7) 
 
Let us label the four desiderata as similarity, exactness, fruitfulness, and simplicity. The 
desideratum of similarity states that the explicatum must be usable “in most cases” in which the 
explicandum has been used, but “considerable differences are permitted” and “close similarity is 
not required”. Expressions such as “most cases”, “considerable differences”, and “close 
similarity” are vague expressions, which admit borderline cases. In other words, there will be 
situations in which it is not determinate whether or not the differences between the way in which 
explicandum and the explicatum are used are similar enough to achieve explication. 
What Carnap (1950) leaves implicit are the uses on which the similarity between 
explicandum and explicatum is to be grounded. As I interpret him, what he is referring to is the 
way in which the terms designating explicandum and explicatum are used in (the same) 
language. Under this view, whether or not similarity is achieved is contingent upon the degree to 
which the explicatum term is interchangeable with the explicandum term in such a way that the 
sentence obtained after substitution maintains the properties it had before substitution. More 
precisely, I think Carnap is referring to the preservation of the truth value of declarative 
sentences. Under this view, explicandum term and explicatum term are similar to the extent that 
they are interchangeable salva veritate in a favored set of declarative sentential contexts. There 
must be many such contexts in which interchangeability is preserved, although “close similarity” 
is not required and “considerable differences are permitted”. 15
This is the sense in which an explicatum does not aim for alikeness in meaning with the 
explicandum, which is what a definition as generally understood aims to bring about. An 
explication is not an attempt to capture all and only the meaning of the explicandum, but only to 
capture a good portion of such meaning – the one embodied by the degree of interchangeability 
achieved – while fulfilling other desiderata at the same time. This is the sense in which we can 
                                                 
15 For simplicity of reference, I will drop the qualifier “term”, but keep assuming the interpretation of similarity 
in use I just presented. 
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speak of an explication as stating a “good thing to mean” by the explicandum, rather than what 
the explicandum means. 
Carnap (1950) argues that the explicatum must be characterized in “exact form”, so that it 
can be introduced “into a well-connected system of scientific concepts”. He also argues that the 
explicatum must be fruitful, namely “useful for the formulation of many universal statements”. 
Finally, Carnap (1950) states that the explicatum must be “as simple as possible”. I will 
disregard the desideratum of simplicity in what follows, because it may very well be that an 
explicatum “as simple as the more important requirements (1), (2), and (3) permit[]” is in fact 
extremely complex. The epistemic virtue of being as simple as it is required to fulfill 
requirements other than simplicity, namely similarity, exactness and fruitfulness, sounds fairly 
trivial and is certainly not central to determine the quality of an explication. 
Carnap’s account of the desiderata of explication points us in the right direction, but needs 
some modifications. What is good about it is that it emphasizes what I take to be the two main 
objectives of an explication, namely offering a characterization of the explicatum in terms of 
precise rules of use and offering a characterization of the explicatum which endows it with 
fruitfulness. However, I think these desiderata need not be pursued at the same time, and they do 
not have to be understood exclusively in terms of scientific exactness and scientific fruitfulness.  
On the contrary, Carnap (1950) argues that an explication is good just in case it fulfills both 
exactness and fruitfulness, along with similarity, “to a sufficient degree”. Moreover, he assumes 
that the rules of use of the explicatum must have the sort of exactness which introduces the 
“explicatum into a well-connected system of scientific concepts” and that what makes the 
explicatum fruitful is that it is useful “for the formulation of many universal statements 
(empirical laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical theorems in the case of a logical 
concept)”.  
My view is that there are perfectly good explications which only aim for and achieve 
exactness understood as precision in the rules of use, and perfectly good explanations which only 
aim for and achieve fruitfulness understood as usefulness with respect to an open range of 
purposes, not necessarily scientific ones. For example, a government may want to issue laws 
regulating the free exercise of “religion”, and may wish to exclude borderline cases of religion 
with respect to which it is indeterminate whether or not the law applies. This would be a fine 
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reason to explicate “religion”, but there would be no other aim than exactness for the purposes of 
law.  
On the other hand, a philosopher may want to achieve both exactness and fruitfulness, but 
for the purposes of philosophy. Philosophical accounts of categories such as “knowledge”, 
“perception”, and “inference” very rarely “introduce the explicatum into a well-connected 
system of scientific concepts”, or formulate “universal statements” about the explicatum. The 
point is, they do not aim to, and there is no reason why they should. Given that fruitfulness is a 
discipline-relative notion, I think we ought to assess explications relative to the theoretical 
purposes of a particular discipline, not simpliciter. 
It is even questionable that scientists themselves have as strict an understanding of exactness 
and fruitfulness as Carnap (1950) does. For example, there is debate as to whether any universal 
statements hold true the special sciences. Asking an explication to generate an explicatum 
embeddable in “many universal statements” appears to be asking too much even for scientific 
purposes. I will reformulate the idea of fruitfulness by equating it with usefulness in the 
formulation of generalizations (explanatory, predictive, etc.) which meet the standard of 
adequacy of the relevant discipline, without making any further assumptions on the nature of 
such generalizations. 
In summary, my reformulation of Carnap’s (1950) desiderata for explication takes the 
following shape: 
 
If a category C is given as explicandum relative to the purposes of 
discipline D, the task consists in finding another category C* as its 
explicatum which fulfils the following two requirements to a 
sufficient degree: 
1. The explicatum C* is to be similar to the explicandum C in such 
a way that, in most cases in which C has so far been used, C* can 
be used; however, close similarity is not required, and considerable 
differences are permitted.  
2. The characterization of the explicatum C*, that is, the rules of its 
use is to be given in an exact form  and/or the explicatum C* is to 
be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the formulation of the 
explanatory and predictive generalizations characteristic of D   
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One of the big risks when introducing explications is that of generating ambiguity, namely 
multiplicity of meaning. For example, if we were to call “knowledge” an explicatum obtained 
from the explicandum “knowledge”, the term “knowledge” would designate both the 
explicandum and explicatum. This would be a problem, because whereas the explicandum is the 
set of things which fulfill the cluster accounts individuated by folk knowledge theorists, the 
explicandum is the set of things which fulfill the proposed explicans. A superscript 
(knowledge*), a subscript (knowledge1), or a new name which wears the explicative relation on 
its sleeves (knowledge-how) would be equally good ways to avoid the problem of ambiguity. 
 
9.2.2. Explicating emotions  
One of the projects in which a theorist answering questions such as “What is an emotion?” 
or “What is anger?” may be engaged is the Explicating Emotion Project (FEP). Its chief purpose 
is to transform folk emotion categories such as “emotion” and “anger” into explicative kinds 
which are similar in use to the folk categories, and decrease their vagueness and/or increase their 
fruitfulness. The explicating emotion theorist starts from the same folk categories from which the 
folk emotion theorist starts. Differently from a descriptive account, however, an explication does 
not aim to capture all and only the meaning of folk emotion categories.  
Consider “emotion”, the folk category I propose to explicate in the next chapter by means of 
what I call the Urgency Management System (UMS) theory of emotions. To explicate it 
successfully would be to construct a notion of “emotion*” which is similar to “emotion” in such 
a way that in most cases in which “emotion” has so far been used, “emotion*” can be used. 
Given the gloss I put on the idea of use, what this means it that “emotion*” has to be 
interchangeable salva veritate with “emotion” in most linguistic contexts. But, crucially, 
“emotion*” can be a good explicatum for “emotion” even if there are many linguistic contexts in 
which “emotion*” is not interchangeable with “emotion”. This is because “considerable 
differences in use” between “emotion*” and “emotion” are permitted by the very ground rules of 
explication. Emotion theorists who were to criticize an explication of emotions because it 
encounters some ordinary language Type 1 and Type 2 counterexamples (see section 7.1) would 
simply not have understood what an explication is.  
Now, the payoff(s) which “emotion*” must bring to the table in order to be a good 
explication are an increase in precision and/or fruitfulness with respect to “emotion”. But, as I 
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argued in subsection 9.2.1, we can’t assess an explication of emotion in the abstract, but we must 
do so relative to the theoretical objectives of a specific discipline that determines a reference 
class for what is fruitful. The explicative project I am most interested in is that of characterizing 
explicative emotion kinds that are useful for the purposes of scientific psychology. 
Before getting started, I want to emphasize two important features of explication I would 
like the reader to keep in mind as she or he goes through the theory I propose in the next chapter. 
The first is a general problem in establishing whether or not an explication is a good one. 
Carnap pointed out that since the explicandum “is not given in exact terms [and] since the datum 
is inexact, the problem [of explication] itself is not stated in exact terms”. This being the case, “if 
a solution for a problem of explication is proposed, we cannot decide in an exact way whether it 
is right or wrong”. The main point I take Carnap to be making is that will often be hard to tell 
whether or not explicatum and explicandum are sufficiently similar to one another to instantiate 
the explication relation.  
Carnap (1950) criticized philosophers for trying to provide explications without having 
understood how the explicatum is used in ordinary language. Carnap scolds for example those 
philosophers who ask “'What is causality?', 'What is life?', 'What is mind?', 'What is justice?', 
[and] immediately start to look for an answer without first examining the tacit assumption that 
the terms of the question are at least practically clear enough to serve as a basis for an 
investigation, for an analysis or explication”.  
This is the spirit in which I have offered an extended discussion of the empirical literature 
about emotion concepts, and argued that it is the appropriate starting point for an explication of 
emotions. If we do not know how folk emotion categories are used in ordinary language, we 
won’t be able to aim for similarity in use with respect to them, and one of the two key 
requirements for a good explanation will go unfulfilled. 
What I will try to formulate in the next chapter is an explication of folk emotion categories 
which fulfills the requirement of similarity in a clear way, namely one which stays clear of the 
worry raised by Carnap concerning borderline cases of similarity. 
At the same time, the account I propose does not aim to avoid all ordinary language 
counterexamples, but only to avoid enough of such counterexamples for it to be clear that the 
differences in use between “emotion” and “emotion*”, although “considerable”, are of the 
permitted” kind. 
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The other important feature of explication I want to emphasize is that it is intrinsically 
pluralistic. Given any folk emotion category C, there will be innumerable explicata C*, C**, 
C*** which achieve similarity in use with C in a favored set of linguistic contexts, and fulfill 
exactness and/or fruitfulness relative to a given set of theoretical purposes. In other words, to 
understand the desiderata of explication is to understand that there are many “good things to 
mean” by the same explicandum, which are not synonymous with one another nor with the 
explicandum, but manage to decrease vagueness and/or increase fruitfulness in their own, 
distinctive ways. 
Consequently, what I propose is not the only conceivable theory of emotions, but what I take 
to be a good theory of emotions relative to the purposes of scientific psychology.  
I conclude with a figure which summarizes the two projects an emotion theorist may be 
engaged in: 
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Figure 11: Two projects for emotion theory 
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Whereas the Folk Emotion Project aims to formulate cluster accounts of folk emotion 
categories which account for all of their instances, the Explicating Emotion Project aims to 
formulate explications for such categories which do not apply to the entire vernacular domain. 
For example, a cluster account of “emotion” would have to characterize a condition of 
membership which accommodates the facts that anger, awe and fear are emotions, and respect is 
a borderline emotion. An explication of “emotion” has not such requirement. It can capture a 
dimension of similarity shared by certain kinds of angers (anger1) and certain kinds of fears 
(fear1), but not shared by some other kinds of anger (anger2) and fear (fear2), and not shared by 
any kind of awe and respect. Even under such circumstances, it may be the case that the 
explication is a good one, as long as it preserves similarity in use with the explicandum, and 
fulfills the desiderata of reducing vagueness and/or increasing fruitfulness. 
 
9.3. CONCLUSION 
 
The history of emotion theory is a long sequence of attempts to individuate a subset of 
marks of emotionality such that anything that deserves to be called an emotion fulfills them. I 
pointed out that this notion of deservingness has generally been ambiguous between two 
interpretations, namely that of theoretical fruitfulness and that of ordinary language 
compatibility. Emotion theorists have been unclear about what sort of deservingness they were 
pursuing, in part because of the widespread assumption that what emotion terms “mean” 
coincides with what is a “good thing to mean” by them relative to the purposes of a theory.  
I have argued that emotion theorists should decisively divorce the two projects which, as I 
have argued, have been run together for most of the history of emotion theory. One is the project 
of capturing what can rightfully be called an emotion in ordinary language (Folk Emotion 
Project), and the other is the project of capturing what is worth calling an emotion relative to the 
purposes of a given theory (Explicating Emotion Project).  
In the next chapter, I will offer a new theory of emotions in the context of the Explicating 
Emotion Project. 
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10. EMOTIONS AS URGENCY MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS 
 
 
In this final chapter I aim to offer a new theory of emotions. My objective is to explicate the 
ordinary notion of emotion so as to individuate a precisely characterized and potentially fruitful 
theoretical construct I call “umotion”. 16 The neologism “umotion” is meant to signal that what I 
am offering is not a descriptive account of “emotion”, but rather an account to be assessed in 
light of the desiderata for explication I discussed in section 9.2. It is also meant to remind the 
reader that the fundamental feature of umotions is Urgency. More precisely, I characterize an 
“umotion” as an “urgency management system”, and I label the theory I construct around such 
systems as the “urgency management system” (UMS) theory of emotions. 
What is the take home message of the UMS theory? In a nutshell, it is that an umotion is a 
special type of superordinate system which activates and manages an urgent action tendency by 
coordinating the operation of a cluster of cognitive, perceptual and motoric subsystems. 
Crucially, such a superordinate system has a proper function by virtue of which it acquires a 
special kind of intentionality I call pragmatic.  
The theoretical construct of umotion emerges from the integration of two core ideas. The 
first idea is that umotions are special action control structures devoted to the management of 
situations which involve the pursuit of high priority goals. I borrow this idea from Nico Frijda’s 
(1986)’s theory of emotions as action tendencies, which I develop in several directions. The 
second idea is that umotions are intentional pushmi-pullyu representations: they acquire 
normativity from having proper functions, and they combine descriptive and directive purposes 
                                                 
16 The term “Umotion” was suggested to me by Paul Griffiths 
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into an undifferentiated whole. These ideas are adapted from Ruth Millikan’s (2004) theory of 
intentionality, but applied to umotions in novel ways.  
The UMS theory of emotions, therefore, provides a new account of the vehicles of emotional 
representation, understood as urgency management systems, and a new account of the 
representation relation, understood in teleosemantic terms. I argue that the theory I provide is 
better equipped than either cognitivism or Neo-Jamesianism, currently the two most popular 
theories of emotions, to fruitfully explicate what the emotions are relative to the purposes of 
scientific psychology. The differences between the UMS theory and such theories are both 
methodological and substantive. Differently from cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians, I do not claim 
that my theory captures everything that deserves to be called an emotion in ordinary language. I 
am explicitly in the business of explicating emotion, and all I argue for is that there is “similarity 
in use” between the folk category “emotion” and the explicative kind “umotion” I introduce. 
Also, I do not claim that my theory captures the only interesting explication of emotion we can 
come up with. In fact, I am convinced that there are many interesting explicative projects in 
emotion theory other than the one articulated by the UMS theory.  
 Substantively, my theory starts from the assumption that the evaluations embodied by 
umotions and the way umotions feel are phenomena to be understood in light of the impact 
umotions have on action. Cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians consider instead evaluations and 
feelings to be what emotions are essentially, leaving the crucial relation between emotion and 
action in the background. Under the view I propose, evaluations and feelings are important but 
not essential components of the urgency management systems with which emotions are 
identified. 
The argumentative strategy I employ comprises three steps. The first is to illustrate Frijda’s 
(1986) theory of emotions as action tendencies, which is the main inspiration for my own theory. 
The second step is to offer a detailed account of the features of umotions as urgency management 
systems. The third step is to explain in what sense urgency management systems have pragmatic 
intentionality. I will conclude by explaining why I take the UMS theory to be a good theory of 
emotions. 
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10.1. DEVELOPING FRIJDA 
 
The idea I start from is a simple one, namely that when organisms emote they are inclined to 
act in ways which are related to the type of emotion they are having in a non-arbitrary, although 
non-deterministic, fashion. For example, a person who is angry with Alexandra and a person 
who is in love with her are inclined to act towards her in very different ways, although what they 
specifically end up doing may on occasion be similar (e.g. trying to find her). The idea that 
emotions involve impulses for action is of course an old one. Aristotle, for example, stated that 
anger “may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a 
conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what 
concerns one’s friends” (Rhetoric 2. 2 1378a31-1378b1).17 The question is: what sort of 
impulses do emotions generate?  
The best answer to this question I know of is offered by Frijda (1986). The central thesis of 
Frijda’s theory of emotions goes as follows: 
 
Emotions…can be defined as modes of relational action readiness, 
either in the form of tendencies to establish, maintain, or disrupt a 
relationship with the environment or in the form of mode of 
relational readiness as such (Frijda 1986, 71) 
 
The central notion here is that of a mode of relational action readiness, which can exist 
either in the form of an action tendency or in the form of readiness as such. Frijda borrowed 
the notion of a tendency from Magda Arnold’s (1960) theory of emotions (see section 4.3). 
According to Arnold (1960, 182), an emotion is the “felt tendency toward anything intuitively 
appraised as good (beneficial), or away from anything intuitively appraised as bad (harmful)”. 
To appraise something intuitively is for Arnold (1960) to appraise it in a way which is 
immediate and direct, roughly in the sense that it does not involve slow and laborious thought 
processes. As Arnold notes, an elephant appraising whether or not a certain ground will sustain 
its weight, or a ball player appraising whether or not a flying ball can be caught will make such 
                                                 
17 As I argued in chapter 2, anger is the only emotion with respect to which Aristotle makes explicit the impulse 
component 
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appraisals “intuitively”.18 But what exactly counts as a tendency? Neither Arnold nor Frijda 
offer us an explicit account of tendencies, so I will provide a working one.  
I understand tendencies as dispositions in the philosophical sense, namely properties 
associated with a typical manifestation and a typical set of triggering circumstances. Although 
the precise logical relation between dispositions and subjunctive conditionals is controversial 
(see Mumford 1998 for discussion), I will assume that dispositions are associated with a 
subjunctive conditional of the form “if triggering circumstances T were fulfilled, then the 
bearer would display manifestation M with probability p”.19 It is important for my subsequent 
analysis that it is not assumed that a disposition is necessarily manifested when the triggering 
circumstances for it are fulfilled: some dispositions are probabilistic, namely such that their 
associated manifestation follows their triggering circumstances with a probability of less than 
1. 
Ryle (1949) remarked that an expression such as “tends” suggests that “it is a good bet that 
it will be…the case” (131). This idea can be expressed in terms of subjunctive conditionals by 
saying that a tendency is a disposition such that the manifestation follows the triggering 
circumstances with a significant probability (there will clearly be borderline cases). Let us 
work with this rough and ready account, and ask whether emotions are the sort of felt 
tendencies described by Arnold (1960). It is quite clear that not all tendencies towards things 
or away from them are emotions, whether or not they are felt. For example, I may intuitively 
appraise, say, a banana as good and feel a tendency towards eating it, or intuitively appraise a 
business proposal as bad and feel a tendency towards rejecting it, without an emotion being 
instantiated in either case. If we want to identify emotions with tendencies, we need to qualify 
what kinds of tendencies we are talking about, because many tendencies are clearly not 
emotions.  
As a first approximation, Frijda’s (1986) theory is that emotions are action tendencies,20 a 
notion he characterized as follows: 
                                                 
18 I propose a caveat to the idea that emotional appraisal is always immediate and direct in sub-section 10.2.3 
19 I follow Elizabeth Prior (1985) in thinking that the ascription of dispositions generally presupposes a set of 
background circumstances C in which the disposition is assumed to hold. For example, a given object X counts as 
having the dispositions of fragility, solubility, or inflammability not simpliciter, but given a set of background 
circumstances C. The same object may be, say, fragile given a background temperature of -170°C, but not fragile 
given a background temperature of 30°C. 
20 They are action tendencies when they are not states of readiness as such, the other species of the “relational 
action readiness” genus contemplated by Frijda 
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 Action tendencies are states of readiness to execute a given kind of 
action. A “given kind of action,” and thus an action tendency, is 
defined by its end result aimed at or achieved. That end result can 
be inferred from behavior; the basis of inference is the behavior’s 
flexibility…Action tendency is readiness for different actions 
having the same intent. One action tendency is readiness for 
attacking, spitting, insulting, turning one's back, or slandering, 
whichever of these appears possible or appropriate at a given 
moment; a different action tendency is readiness to approach and 
embrace, fondle, look at avidly; or say sweet things, again 
according to what the circumstances favor (70-71) 
 
This passage states that having an action tendency amounts to being in a particular state of 
readiness, namely a readiness “to execute a given kind of action”. What kind of action it is will 
depend on what kind of “end result” is being pursued. In the passage quoted at the beginning of 
this section, Frijda spoke of action tendencies as “tendencies to establish, maintain, or disrupt a 
relationship with the environment”. I will call relational goal (or purpose) the goal associated 
with an action tendency, namely the goal towards which the tendency is assumed to be flexibly 
directed. Frijda takes flexibility to be the primary manifestation of goal-directedness, relying on 
the assumption that, as Woodfield (1976, 51) once put it, “sensitivity to changed conditions is a 
good sign of goal-seeking ability in general”. The relational goal of the action tendency, Frijda 
suggests, is to be inferred from “behavior’s flexibility”, namely from the fact that an action 
tendency can be manifested “according to what the circumstances favor” or to what “appears 
possible or appropriate at a given moment”. What makes different actions manifestations of the 
same action tendency is their “having the same intent”, namely aiming to fulfill the same 
relational goal. The relational goal is not to be understood as whatever end-state is finally 
reached once the action tendency is manifested, but in terms of an end-state which is supposed 
to be reached when a given action tendency is manifested. The way in which I will account for 
this essential normative aspect of teleological processes is in terms of Millikan’s notion of a 
proper function, which grounds the possibility of genuine goal-failure in terms of a history of 
selection (see below). 
Before discussing proper functions, there is a major problem with Frijda’s theory we need 
to address. The problem is that an emotion cannot possibly be any state of readiness to choose 
“different actions having the same intent”. For example, someone may be currently ready to 
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choose actions fulfilling a given relational goal if certain further circumstances were fulfilled, 
but not be in an emotional state. For example, I am now in a state of readiness to attack, insult, 
slander, etc. Howard Stern if I am threatened by him. This does not mean that I am currently in 
a state of anger towards Howard Stern, although I am disposed to get into one if provoked. The 
sort of readiness Frijda presupposes must be readiness in the current circumstances.  
A further problem is that there are forms of current readiness to achieve a certain relational 
goal which have nothing to do with emotions. For example, when the commuter train I have 
been waiting for finally arrives, I am ready to hop on it in the current circumstances to fulfill 
the goal of going to work, but there need not be anything emotional about my hopping. This 
problem is addressed by Frijda (1986) through the introduction of the important idea of control 
precedence:  
 
Action tendencies have the character of urges or impulses. - Action 
tendencies - and action readiness changes generally - clamor for 
attention and for execution. They lie in waiting for signs that they 
can or may be executed; they, and their execution, tend to persist in 
the face of interruptions; they tend to interrupt other ongoing 
programs and actions; and they tend to preempt the information-
processing facilities…Evidently, then, action tendencies are 
programs that have a place of precedence in the control of action 
and of information processing. We therefore say: Action 
tendencies - action readiness changes generally - have the feature 
of control precedence (78) 
 
Emotion, as action readiness state or as emotional action, has 
action control precedence in two senses. It can interrupt other 
processes and block access to action control for other stimuli and 
other goals; it invigorates action for which it reserves control and 
invests that control with the property of indistrability or persistence 
(460) 
 
These quotes reveal that Frijda is ambiguous about the nature of action tendencies. He had 
previously described them as mere states of readiness, but he now characterizes them as states of 
readiness endowed with control precedence (or urgency). Since not all action tendencies “have 
the character of urges”, I propose we distinguish between action tendencies with and without 
control precedence. The former are what Frijda ultimately takes emotions to be, and they are the 
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sorts of action tendencies I will focus on from now on when I speak of urgent action tendencies. 
Frijda’s key insight is that action tendencies with control precedence are those which “clamor for 
attention and for execution”. This “clamoring” strikes me as being both the primary, and the least 
explored, of the marks of the emotional. We must now ask: what exactly does it mean for an 
action tendency to clamor for attention and execution? In the passages I just quoted, Frijda 
introduces a number of distinct aspects to this “clamoring”.  
The first is that states of readiness with control precedence “tend to interrupt other ongoing 
programs and actions”. This is an idea Herbert Simon (1967) put at the center of his theory of 
emotions as interrupt systems. Simon’s basic point was that there is a “close connection between 
the operation of the interrupt system and much of what is usually called emotional behavior” 
(35), and that “an interruption mechanism, that is, emotion, allows the [information] processor to 
respond to urgent needs in real time” (38).21 Although interruption characterizes the operation of 
many action tendencies with control precedence, it does not characterize the operation of them 
all. On some occasions, “urgent needs” are in fact connected to the pursuit of an “old” goal. For 
example, I may be engaged in trying to get a store clerk to give me a refund for a purchase and 
get angry in the course of my interaction with her. In such case, I would still be engaged in the 
attempt to get a refund, but I would do so in an angry way, without interruption of other ongoing 
programs and actions. Wisely, Frijda only claims that urgent action tendencies “tend” to 
interrupt.  
The second element introduced by Frijda (1986) is that states of readiness with control 
precedence “lie in waiting for signs that they can or may be executed”. I interpret this passage as an 
attempt to suggest that an emoter is not only ready to fulfill a certain relational goal in the sense of 
being prepared for it, but in the stronger sense of trying to find means to it. This aspect seems to me a 
central aspect of what gives emotions their urgency, and it needs to be further developed. What is 
missing from Frijda’s formulation is a proper characterization of the fact that, far from “lying in 
                                                 
21 The main problem with Simon’s (1967) theory is that he failed to provide an account of what happens after an 
emotion “interrupts”, other than saying that “the response program may, and often will, activate the autonomic 
response system” (35) and that there may be the generation of “subjective feelings” “produced, in turn, by internal 
stimuli resulting from the arousal of the autonomic system” (35). The activation of the autonomic systems and its 
attendant feelings, however, are accessory as far as Simon’s theory is concerned. But to say that emotions are 
interrupt systems which lead to the pursuit of urgent needs in real time is just to give the headline for a theory of 
emotions. Providing the actual theory demands explaining how exactly the pursuit of urgent needs is supposed to 
take place. 
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waiting”, emotional action tendencies generate an active exploration of the environment aimed at 
finding ways to achieve or maintain a certain kind of relationship with it.  
A third component is that the search for actions that fulfill the relational goal is accompanied 
by bodily and mental preparations for such execution. As Frijda puts it, an emotional action 
tendency “invigorates action for which it reserves control” and it “tend[s] to preempt the 
information-processing facilities” and “block[s] access to action control for other stimuli and other 
goals”. The invigoration of action takes place through the priming of the body for action, 
whereas “preemption” of information processing facilities and “blocked access to action control” 
suggest that emotions involve the coordinated operation of the entire cognitive architecture, 
which becomes geared towards a given relational goal.  
A fourth element is that, once the execution process is under way, it has some degree of 
“indistrability”, in the sense that the “execution…tend[s] to persist in the face of interruptions”. I 
interpret this point as indicating that there is some degree of inertia in an urgent action tendency once 
it begins manifesting itself (but I will disregard this particular aspect of control precedence in what 
follows). 
The picture that emerges from these passages is that emotions are action control structures 
which prioritize the pursuit of certain relational goals, prepare for their fulfillment both mentally and 
physically, and protect the execution of actions aimed at fulfilling them from possible interferences. I 
take this to be a very promising vantage point for theorizing about emotions, and I will construct my 
own theory of emotions around it.  
Frijda (1986) discusses two importantly different ways in which emotions can acquire control 
precedence:  
 
The system constituting emotion is constructed, it appears, so as to 
allow for control precedence: There would seem to be two ways to 
account for this feature. The first: There exist certain action 
programs that in reflex-like fashion are linked to the mismatch 
(and potential match) signals under concern; these links might 
provide for built-in control precedence…The second: match and 
mismatch signals are responsible. The signals involved are highly 
persistent; they are loud and claim attention; and the system 
recognizes their claim upon control and their nature as calling for 
change or for continuing along present lines (92)  
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The first form of control precedence characterizes reflexes, which generate the automatic 
and immediate pursuit of a relational goal upon detection of a certain stimulus. The second form 
of control precedence characterizes instead action tendencies proper, which clamor for attention 
and execution along the lines I just described. Frijda realizes that “[t]o the extent that action 
programs are fixed and rigid, the concept of action tendency loses much of its 
meaning…action readiness only exists to the extent that inhibition can block action execution” 
(83). This passage suggests that reflexes are tendencies in an inverted commas sense at best. 
Most importantly, action tendencies have, and reflexes lack, a feed-back mechanism which can 
guide execution in real time, and eventually lead to inhibition if there are no opportunities for 
successful execution. This being said, I follow Frijda (1986) in thinking that we should 
consider reflexes to be limiting cases of action tendencies, in which the manifestation 
automatically and unfailingly follows the triggering circumstances without feedback in the 
course of execution. When I speak of an urgent action tendency, I will generally refer to an 
action tendency proper, but I allow the notion to comprise reflexes as a special case. The primary 
focus of my theory, I emphasize it, is on urgent action tendencies which are not reflexes. 
Frijda’s central thesis is that a great many emotions can be identified with action 
tendencies with control precedence, under the broad understanding of such notions I 
articulated. For example, Frijda suggests that the “action tendency of anger is interpreted as a 
tendency to regain control or freedom of action – generally to remove obstruction” (88). Fear 
is characterized as the action tendency of “avoidance”, associated with the relational goal of 
achieving one’s “own inaccessibility”. Disgust is the action tendency of “rejecting”, 
characterized by the relational goal of “removal of object”. Surprise is the action tendency of 
“interrupting”, which the relational goal of “reorientation”. All of these action tendencies can 
be flexibly manifested, depending on the circumstances. For example, the action tendency of 
anger - call it attacking - can be manifested by spitting, insulting, turning one's back, 
slandering, and so on, as the circumstances of its elicitation allow and recommend. 
Although the construct of an urgent action tendency is central to Frijda’s account, he is 
careful to add that “[n]ot all emotions are action tendencies” (71). For example, sadness does 
not appear to be an urgent tendency to act, but if anything the opposite, namely the absence of 
impulses to do much of anything. On the other hand, joy often does not appear to be an urgent 
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tendency to do anything in particular, but rather a general eagerness to engage in many 
different activities. How can we account for such cases of emotion? 
Frijda (1986) does so by introducing two further theoretical constructs, namely that of a 
“null state” and that of an “activation mode”. These are both manifestations of “modes of 
relational readiness as such”, the other species of the genus “modes of relational action 
readiness” with which Frijda identifies emotions. According to Frijda, sadness is a relational 
null state, namely a state of “explicit absence of relational activity” (22). Joy, on the other 
hand, is the “manifestation of free activation” (38, emphasis added). With these caveats, Frijda 
believes that the cases of sadness and joy fall within the purview of his theory, in the sense that 
“null states, activation modes, and action tendencies proper, all are modifications of action 
tendency in a general sense: they all represent modes of readiness, unreadiness included, for 
relational action” (71). 
There is an air of ad hocness to Frijda’s account of sadness and joy. My view is that the 
similarity between sadness and joy on the one hand, and anger, fear, disgust or surprise on the 
other does not lie merely in the fact that these are all changes in readiness to act. The main 
similarity lies in the fact that they all have control precedence, under a suitably broad 
understanding of such notion. At the heart of the notion of “control precedence”, I argue, is the 
idea that emotions exert prioritized control on what the organism will do next. Generally, this 
control is geared towards the pursuit of a specific goal to be achieved with priority. The cases 
of sadness and joy are different, in the sense that they generally occur when a certain goal is 
either no longer achievable (sadness) or has already been achieved (joy).  
But there is a sense in which sadness still exerts a strong influence on what the organism 
will do next, in the sense that it curtails the ability to pursue goals in general. Joy, on the other 
hand, has its own way of clamoring for attention and execution, often characterized by the 
absence of a specific goal pursuit but geared towards an open set of possible goals.  
I will come back to the cases of sadness and joy later on, but I want to emphasize right 
away that the theory I am proposing does not specifically aim to accommodate the cases of 
sadness and joy. It is built around different exemplars of emotions, namely emotions which 
prioritize the pursuit of specific goals when they are still achievable and prior to achieving 
them. Sadness and joy are (at best) special cases with respect to the theory I have to offer. As I 
will argue later on, failing to accommodate some of the uses of the explicandum is a common 
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feature of good explications, and it is not as such a reason to reject a theory offered in the 
context of the Explicating Emotions Project. 
Now, is Frijda’s theory convincing, once we complement it with the caveats I introduced 
so far? As I see it, the theory still has four major limitations. The first is that it fails to clarify 
in much detail the nature of the clamoring for attention and execution that characterizes urgent 
action tendencies, especially with respect to the active search for means to the relational goal. 
The second limitation is that it restricts the phenomenon of emotion to the emergence of an 
action tendency with control precedence, leaving in the background the way the action 
tendency is managed through time by means of a feedback mechanism. The third limitation is 
that although urgent action tendencies occur very often in the context of a social transaction, 
their communicative dimension is barely mentioned in Frijda’s theory. The fourth and most 
important limitation is that Frijda’s (1986) theory is silent on the issue of intentionality. When 
cognitivism emerged in the 1960s from the ashes of the behaviorist theory of emotions, early 
cognitivists argued that thinking of emotions as behavioral predispositions (or feelings) failed 
to account for their intentionality. Any theory aiming to assimilate emotions to particular kinds 
of action tendencies must be able to explain what sort of intentionality they have. My task in 
the next few sections is to get rid of these four major limitations, and in the process construct a 
satisfactory theory of emotions as urgency management systems.  
 
 
10.2. EMOTIONS AS URGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
 
10.2.1. My account in a nutshell 
Emotions are, in slogan form, “urgency management systems” (UMS), in short “umotions”. 
This identity claim is offered as an explication: I argue that “umotion” is a good explicatum with 
respect to the explicandum “emotion” relative to the purposes of scientific psychology. Four 
central ideas inspire the UMS theory of emotions. The first, borrowed from Frijda’s (1986) work, 
is that the mark of the emotional is urgency, namely priority in the control of action. I will 
understand action in a broad sense, which includes physical actions, expressions, and mental 
actions. Unlike Frijda, I claim that the management of an urgent action tendency, rather than 
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merely its activation, is part of umotion. For example, I take the physical movements of an 
organism experiencing fear not to be something other than fear, but rather one of the components 
of fear itself, in the same sense in which the physiological discharges of fear may be.  
The second idea is that the urgency characteristic of umotions is due to their being  
superordinate systems with access to practically all cognitive, perceptual and motoric subsystems 
available to the organism. The notion of a “superordinate program” plays a prominent role also in 
the theory of emotions proposed by evolutionary psychologists Tooby and Cosmides (1990, 2000). 
Their theory, however, lacks a clear account of the way in which the resources of the organism 
are organized in emotion, and it assumes that “programs” are evolved modules, a position I reject 
(see 5.2.1). 
The principle of organization I propose is that of the management of an urgent action 
tendency. As I understand it, the notion of management is broad: it includes modes of 
management focused on the urgent action tendency itself (call it tendency-focused management) 
and on the relational goal of the tendency (call it goal-focused management). For example, 
tendency-focused forms of management may comprise the attempt to re-appraise the event that 
led to the urgent action tendency, to make sure that it really has the features that make the urgent 
action tendency an appropriate response to it. It may also comprise the attempt to regulate the 
physiological discharges associated with the urgent action tendency, practicing controlled 
breathing, exercising control on muscle tension, and so on. Although tendency-focused 
management is an important phenomenon, I leave it in the background in my analysis, and 
concentrate on goal-focused management. 22
I distinguish three broad functional components in the (goal-focused) management of a state 
of urgent action readiness, which I call preparation, action, and communication. Preparation has 
                                                 
22 The distinction between tendency-focused management and goal-focused management is inspired by Lazarus’ 
(1991, 2001) distinction between emotion-focused and problem-focused coping, but it differs from it in several 
respects. Lazarus (2001, 45) characterizes coping as “the effort to manage psychological stress”, whereas I speak of 
management as the effort to manage any urgent action tendency, whether or not it involves stress.  Also, Lazarus 
claimed that whereas problem-focused coping involves “acting to change the person-environment relationship”, 
emotion-focused coping “involve[s] mainly thinking rather than acting” (112). I make no such assumption. As I 
understand it, goal-focused management often eventuates in mental actions (e.g. thinking about killing someone in 
anger rather than actually killing him), and tendency-focused management in physical actions (e.g. working on one’s 
breathing patterns to try to calm down in fear). The key issue is whether efforts are directed at regulating the process 
by which the relational goal is pursued (goal-focused management) or the tendency itself (tendency-focused 
management). The distinction is not cut-and-dry, since many efforts appear to be focused at the same time on the 
goal and on the tendency (e.g. re-appraising the eliciting event to both establish whether the tendency is appropriate 
to it and how best the relational goal can be fulfilled). 
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to do with getting ready to execute one of the actions that share the relational goal of the action 
tendency, action has to do with executing a particular action, and communication has to do with 
broadcasting emotional signals throughout preparation and action.  
The third central idea of my account is that no specific set of subsystems is activated in all 
cases of umotion, in the sense that distinct urgent action tendencies, and the same action 
tendency at different times, may recruit different groups of organismic subsystems. I allow for 
the possibility that an emotion may be instantiated with many different forms of preparation, 
action, and communication, each involving various possible combinations of subsystems. What is 
non-negotiable is only that an urgent action tendency is active and is being managed. Depending 
on the tendency at hand and its specific eliciting circumstances, this task can be carried out in a 
variety of ways.  
The fourth idea is that the intentionality of umotions cannot be understood by invoking the 
sorts of representations commonly used in the philosophy of emotions, namely merely descriptive 
representations (e.g. beliefs) and merely imperative representations (e.g. desires). This is because 
umotions do not divorce the aim of telling emoters what is the case, as descriptive representations 
do, from the aim of directing action, as imperative representations do. Rather, umotions collapse 
descriptive and directive functions into an undifferentiated whole. I will try to capture this idea by 
using Millikan’s (1996, 2004) theory of pushmi-pullyu representations. Since this will require an 
extended discussion, I first characterize urgency management systems and then offer an account of 
their intentionality. I emphasize that umotions as I understand them are urgency management 
systems endowed with intentionality. What they represent, I will argue, is an essential part of what 
they are. 
 
10.2.2. Umotion defined 
Here is the central thesis of the Urgency Management System (UMS) theory of emotions: 
 
An umotion E is a superordinate system, generally activated by an appraisal, which:  
(a) controls a cluster of organismic subsystems whose synchronized operation 
instantiates, and manages through time, an action tendency TE with control 
precedence,  
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(b) has a pragmatic object, which describes the conditions of pushmi-pullyu 
appropriateness PPE for E  
 
Under this view, what type-identifies an umotion E is a combination of an urgent action tendency 
TE and of a set of conditions of pushmi-pullyu appropriateness PPE for it. In turn, such conditions 
of appropriateness are related to the proper function of the mechanism activating the urgent 
action tendency. Roughly speaking, this proper function will be determined by the effects 
explaining why the mechanism producing the urgent action tendency was selected for in past 
circumstances of selection. According to the UMS theory of emotions, E=fear can for example 
be characterized as a superordinate system that controls a cluster of organismic subsystems 
whose synchronized operation instantiates, and manages through time, an urgent avoidance 
tendency. Such superordinate system has the pragmatic object of danger, which describes the 
conditions under which an urgent avoidance tendency is pushmi-pullyu appropriate. This is 
tantamount to assuming that that the system activating the urgent action tendency of avoidance 
characteristic of fear was selected for activating such tendency in circumstances of danger. 
Under this view, being elicited in dangerous circumstances is the proper function of fear. 
Importantly, these may or may not be the circumstances in which an emoter is disposed to 
produce fear. As I will argue, the account I propose is perfectly compatible with the possibility 
that a given emoter may be disposed to generate urgent avoidance tendencies with respect to 
entirely harmless triggering circumstances.  What type-identifies such tendencies as fear is that 
the mechanism producing them was selected for eliciting urgent avoidance tendencies when 
faced by danger, whether or not it currently fulfills such proper function. In other words, the 
history of selection of the superordinate system which activates (and manages) urgent action 
tendencies is what gives umotions their constitutive goals or purposes. Consequently, what 
matters for establishing the conditions of PP appropriateness of umotions are not the 
circumstances in which emoters are currently disposed to engage in urgent action tendencies, 
but those in which they ought to be so disposed in light of a history of selection. 
To make sense of the various ingredients of this theory, and to explain how they hang 
together, will demand some work. I begin by clarifying the structure of the superordinate system 
I take an umotion to be. To do so, I need to clarify what causes the activation of an urgent action 
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tendency, and how its management through time is articulated into the functional components of 
preparation, action and communication.  
 
10.2.3. Appraisal 
According to the UMS theory, what causes the activation of umotions is generally the 
appraisal of an event.23,24 In ordinary language, the notion of appraisal only signifies an 
unspecified evaluation, and there are many forms of evaluation which do not bring about umotions. 
What we need to understand is what sorts of appraisals are emotional in the sense of the UMS 
theory, namely such as to bring about the activation of an urgent action tendency.  
The rationale for assuming that umotions are generally caused by appraisals is that (a) events 
of the same type can generate an umotion in some organisms but not in others, (b) events of the 
same type can generate different umotions in different organisms, (c) events of the same type can 
generate different umotions in the same organism in different circumstances. For example, events 
of the type “flying on an airplane” cause elation in some people, fear in others, no emotion in yet 
others, and different umotions at different times in the same flier (e.g. before and after a course in 
panic control). This suggests that it is not events in themselves – the event of flying on an airplane 
– that cause umotions, but rather the way in which they are evaluated by emoters.  
In principle, any event can be appraised so as to cause any umotion. In practice, there is a 
correlation between certain types of events and certain types of umotions. Physical events such as 
                                                 
23 I speak of “cause” in terms of Mackie’s (1965) notion of cause. Mackie wrote that what is commonly – although 
not always - meant by saying that event A causes (caused) event B is that A is (was) “an insufficient but necessary 
part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” B (A is an INUS condition for B). To say 
that an appraisal caused an emotion is therefore to say that the appraisal was part, in combination with several other 
background conditions, of a complex condition Sufficient to bring about the emotion. The appraisal was an 
individually Necessary but Insufficient part of that sufficient condition, in the sense that, given the presence of the 
other background circumstances, the emotion would not have come about without the appraisal, and the appraisal 
alone would not have brought about the emotion unless the other background conditions had been present. The 
combination of appraisal and background conditions, finally, was Unnecessary, in the sense that the emotion could 
have been brought about in principle by other combinations of circumstances. There are several limitations for the 
INUS account as a general account of causation (see), but I will not explore them in this dissertation.  
24 The notion of an “event” is also the object of much philosophical speculation. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I endorse a rough and ready view of events which ascribes to them the following key properties: (a) 
they are unrepeatable particulars rather than repeatable universals, (b) they occur contingently, (c) they are spatio-
temporally located, (d) they have parts (see Casati and Varzi 2002). By and large, this is the view of events defended 
by Davidson (1980), and paradigmatically exemplified by ascriptions such as “the boiler exploded in the cellar”, a 
concrete unrepeatable with parts that occurred at a particular spatio-temporal location. I will also use the terms 
occurrence and episode to refer to events, disregarding the differences existing between such terms in ordinary 
language. 
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loud explosions tends to elicit fear in a large variety of organisms. Mental events such as memories 
of past slights tend to elicit anger in human beings. 
Although the UMS theory assumes that appraisals are the most common causes of umotions, 
exceptions are admitted. For example, there is some evidence that umotions can be chemically 
induced, or brought about by brain manipulations, or generated by facial feedback (Izard 1993). 
The evidence for such alternative forms of elicitation is not conclusive at present, but I do not see 
any reason to exclude that an urgency management system could be activated in ways other than 
through an appraisal. At the same time, I take this to be a residual case, which will not concern me 
from now on.25 What makes it residual is that, as I shall argue in more detail below, umotions 
fulfill their proper functions when they are elicited in some circumstances rather than in others. 
The appraisal mechanism is what allows a given umotion to be caused in the circumstances that 
explain why the mechanism producing the umotion was selected for. Mechanisms of elicitation 
such as chemical induction, direct brain stimulation or facial feedback, on the other hand, do not 
represent the outcome of an evaluation of circumstances, and consequently constitute abnormal 
conditions of elicitation (more on this below). 
Now, what are the properties of the forms of appraisal that elicit umotions? According to the 
UMS theory, umotion-causing appraisal has three basic properties. The first is that it is 
intrinsically motivational. If umoting is shifting to a state in which an urgent action tendency is 
activated and managed, umoting is being motivated to act. But since this form of appraisal 
cannot occur without an umotion following it (but notice: an umotion need not be preceded by an 
appraisal), we can speak of umotion-causing appraisal as being intrinsically motivational. This is 
not a discovery about appraisal, but an obvious consequence of the fact that we are considering a 
special class of evaluations identified as umotion-causing. Given how I characterized umotion-
causing appraisal, one cannot be engaged in it without being motivated in the particular way in 
which an umotion motivates.  
The second property is that umotion-causing appraisal is not deliberate, at least not in the 
same straightforward sense in which raising one’s hand is deliberate. At least generally, one 
cannot “deliberate” to appraise a certain event through, say, a fear-causing appraisal rather than a 
disgust-causing appraisal. This aspect of emotional appraisal is one of the main reasons why 
                                                 
25 Similarly, I will not be concerned with discussing whether or not we can reinterpret, say, chemically induced 
happiness as chemically-induced appraisal causing happiness. However we settle this issue, this is not a standard case 
of emotion elicitation. 
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emotions have been described as passive for most of their intellectual history. The UMS theory 
of emotions makes good sense of this passivity. If umotions are superordinate urgency 
management systems, it is not surprising that, at least in general, they cannot be elicited at will. 
This is because one cannot simply “will events into urgency”. What the organism appraises as 
creating a situation of urgency is influenced by factors not available to instantaneous 
deliberation. 
On the one hand, such factors comprise details of cognitive architecture that are beyond the 
reach of deliberation in principle. For example, there are forms of fear appraisal mediated by 
dedicated neural pathways which do not involve the cortical areas associated with deliberation 
(Le Doux 1996). On the other hand, what determines which situations generate urgency depends 
largely on a value system emerged throughout the entire learning history of the organism. This 
value system cannot be changed as easily as the position of one's arm.  
This being said, we must not conflate the idea that umotion-causing appraisal is not 
deliberate with the idea that umotions just “happen” to emoters. This common way of thinking 
about the emotional is misleading in a variety of different ways. It tends to obliterate at least 
three dimensions of agency which importantly shape appraisal.  
The first and most obvious one is that emoters can deliberately search for events they expect 
to appraise in a particular way. For example, one can deliberate to bungee-jump or watch a 
horror movie with the reliable expectation that the fear system will be activated.  
The second element is that emoters can influence their value system through time. As I 
discussed in subsection 2.1.1, this aspect was emphasized firstly by Aristotle, who pointed out 
that we can influence the way we feel by habituating ourselves to behave in certain ways (e.g. as 
virtuous people do).  
The third element is the one I discussed in chapter 6 under the heading of Machiavellian 
appraisal. As argued by Griffiths (2003), “[e]motional appraisal is sensitive to cues that predict 
the value to the emotional agent of responding to the situation with a particular emotion” (54). 
Under the UMS theory, this amounts to saying that emotional appraisal, although not deliberate, 
is not independent of considerations about whether or not shifting to a certain urgent action 
tendency will be conducive to the goals of the emoter. 
This feature of appraisal accounts for the Machiavellian dimension with respect to the 
activation of an urgency management system. There is a fundamental Machiavellian dimension 
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also to the management of an urgent action tendency. This is because emoters make efforts to 
manage to their advantage the urgent action tendencies they undergo throughout the emotional 
episode. This Machiavellian aspect is expressed primarily through sensitivity to “affordances” 
predicting whether or not an ongoing urgent action tendency can or cannot be advantageously 
manifested (see below).  
The third important property of umotion-causing appraisal is that it is immediately followed 
by umotion, in a way which is perceived as effortless. An emoter does not produce an appraisal 
first and then, with a significant time gap and the exercise of some laborious intellectual activity, 
an umotion follows. The fastness and effortlessness of umotion, however, must not be confused 
with the fastness and effortlessness of the formation of umotion-causing appraisal. Although 
very often appraisal is also fast and effortless upon exposure to a given stimulus pattern, on other 
occasions it is the culmination of a slow and effortful process. Sometimes it takes some time and 
effort to realize that one is in a situation requiring urgent action. Once this evaluation has been 
made, however, umotion follows suit.  
Consider for example a pilot who notices something slightly unusual in one of his cockpit 
instruments. He may begin checking on several other instruments, call control tower, make some 
calculations, and finally realize that the airplane is unlikely to make it to the ground safely. At 
this point, an umotion (most likely fear) will quickly and effortlessly follow. We could debate 
whether or not the appraisal is not really formed until this realization is made. I see reasons to 
say both that what caused the umotion is the slow and effortful appraisal process which started 
when something unusual was noticed in the cockpit and to say that what caused it is instead the 
quick appraisal process instantiated by the final realization that the airplane would likely go 
down. I remain neutral on this issue, and allow for the possibility of describing umotion-causing 
appraisal as both slow and fast in such cases, provided we are clear on what we mean by what we 
say. 
According to the UMS theory, in conclusion, umotion-causing appraisal is intrinsically 
motivational, non-deliberate and immediately and effortlessly followed by the umotion it causes. 
This being said, there are many differences between forms of umotion-causing appraisal. Firstly, 
different appraisals differ in terms of cognitive complexity. Secondly, different appraisals cause 
different umotions.  
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Emotion theorists have often noticed the recalcitrance of emotional appraisal to rational 
considerations. One may well know that airplanes are the safest means of transportation, but 
spend every flight in a state of terror. Facts such as these have led some theorists to assume that 
emotional appraisal is isolated from rational considerations, and constitutes an input system of its 
own. Zajonc (1980), for example, argued that “the form of experience that we came to call 
feeling… derives from a parallel, separate, and partly independent system for the organism” 
(154), which may be served by a dedicated “network in the central nervous system”.  
This is the idea of “affect primacy”, according to which affects constitute an evolutionarily 
older system, independent of the system of “cognition” paradigmatically involved in activities 
such as categorization or recognition. My view is that this approach looks at only one side of the 
spectrum of emotional appraisal. Even though many episodes of emotional appraisal are indeed 
recalcitrant to rational considerations, other forms are not at all, or not entirely, insulated from 
them.  
The UMS theory makes sense of this feature too. If umotion-causing appraisal registers 
situations calling for the pursuit of high priority goals, we must expect that different forms of 
appraisal will be associated with different kinds of high priority goals. In some cases, appraisal 
will be completely impenetrable to what one believes. For example, it is probably the case that 
nothing can prevent an organism from experiencing fear from sudden loss of support. At the 
same time, there certainly are forms of fear on which one can work by going to a psychotherapist 
twice a week. An example may be fear of speaking in public. In this case, the sort of emotional 
appraisal of a crowd which leads to an urgent avoidance tendency is at least to some degree 
penetrable by beliefs about one's own worth, other people’s expectations and so on.  
The hypothesis that there may be different levels of emotional appraisal is borne out by 
LeDoux’s neurobiological studies on fear. LeDoux (1996) demonstrated by means of ingenious 
lesion studies that there is a kind of fear elicited in a reflex-like fashion through a neural low 
road that bypasses the neocortex, and projects along a subcortical pathway directly to the 
amygdala (see subsection 5.2.2). LeDoux persuasively argued that this neurobiological discovery 
indicates that “emotional responses can occur without the involvement of the higher processing 
systems of the brain, systems believed to be involved in thinking, reasoning, and consciousness” 
(LeDoux 1996, 161). At the same time, there is a high road to fear, which relies on cortically 
mediated processing systems.  
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The picture is most likely more complex than that, in the sense that there is no reason to 
suppose that there are just two, firmly distinguished levels of emotional appraisal. Most likely, 
there is a continuum of levels of appraisal operating at different levels of cognitive complexity. I 
will not attempt to further distinguish between such levels, offering just a broad characterization 
of what I take to be the two ends of the continuum.26 It seems to me that such ends can be 
fruitfully characterized using Fodor’s (1983) distinction between modular and central input 
systems. I propose we think of emotional appraisal as lying on a continuum such as the 
following: 
 
 
Figure 12: From modular to central emotional appraisal  
 
As I understand them, modularUMS and centralUMS emotional appraisals are characterized by 
several of the properties of Fodorian modules/central systems, but not necessarily all or most of 
them as required by modules and central systems sensu Fodor (1983). For example, I do not 
assume that forms of appraisal lying towards the modularUMS end of the continuum are innate (a 
trademark property of Fodorian modules). Also, I do not assume that forms of emotional 
appraisal lying towards the centralUMS end of the continuum are mediated by inferences (a 
trademark property of Fodorian central systems). Most importantly, I take modularUMS forms of 
                                                 
26 Leventhal and Scherer (1987) tried to distinguish between a sensory motor level, a schematic level and a 
conceptual level of emotional appraisal. The distinctions they draw have some intuitive value, but are far from being 
precisely characterized. 
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emotional appraisal to be informationally encapsulated, with limited central access and possibly 
dedicated neural pathways, whereas I take centralUMS forms of appraisal to be informationally 
penetrable, with unlimited central access and without dedicated neural pathways.  
I emphasize that I reject the strict dichotomy between modularUMS and centralUMS input 
systems when it comes to umotion-causing appraisal. I believe that there are forms of appraisal 
which have some of the features of modules and some of the features of central systems. For 
example, some forms of appraisal are penetrable to beliefs, but only with major efforts. The fear-
causing appraisal of a friendly crowd as dangerous, for example, may take many years of 
psychoanalysis to change. The idea that there are different levels of cognitive complexity in 
appraisal allows for the possibility that certain forms of umotion-causing appraisal are available 
to pre-linguistic and non-linguistic creatures, emerge early in ontogeny and are evolutionarily 
old, whereas others require language possession, emerge late in ontogeny and are evolutionarily 
more recent.  
Since under the UMS theory appraisal is a detector of situations requiring urgent goal 
pursuit, it is to be expected that non-linguistic and pre-linguistic creatures will be able to engage 
in primitive forms of urgency detection. It is also to be expected that, as organisms mature, their 
ability to detect situations of urgency will change, and reflect the value system acquired 
throughout the learning history of the organism. Also, the cognitive complexity of the species to 
which the organism belongs will be reflected by the classes of events appraised as requiring the 
pursuit of high priority goals.  
A second important aspect of umotion-causing appraisal, besides the fact that it lies on a 
continuum of cognitive complexity, is that since appraisals cause umotions and umotions differ 
from one another, appraisals must also differ in ways that account for the different umotions they 
bring about. This raises the question of what are the dimensions of evaluation to which emotional 
appraisal is sensitive. There is an industry in contemporary psychology devoted to characterizing 
the structure of emotional appraisal so as to determine which specific emotion will follow it. For 
example, Lazarus (1991, 2001) has distinguished between primary and secondary appraisals. 
Primary appraisals focus on answering the question “In what ways, if any, is this stimulus 
relevant?”, whereas secondary appraisals focus on the question “How do I cope with the 
situation at hand?”. Lazarus distinguished between three components of primary appraisal (goal-
relevance, goal-congruence and incongruence, type of ego-involvement) and three components 
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of secondary appraisal (blame or credit, coping potential, future expectancy), and argued that 
each emotion is distinguished by a particular configuration along the six combined dimensions of 
primary and secondary appraisal. 
Other appraisal researchers have endowed the appraisal process with even more structure. 
For example, Leventhal and Scherer (1987) distinguished between sixteen dimensions of 
appraisal, which they called Stimulus Evaluation Checks (SECs). In a recent update of Leventhal 
and Scherer (1987), Scherer (2001) collected the sixteen SECs into four classes, which represent 
“the major types or classes of information with respect to an object or event that an organism 
requires in order to prepare an adequate reaction” (94). The four classes are appraisals of 
relevance, consequences, coping potential, and normative significance. The various checks are 
organized by Scherer (2001, 15) into the following four classes: 
 
1. Relevance detection checks 
Novelty check, evaluating “whether there is a change in the pattern of external or internal 
stimulation”.27
Intrinsic pleasantness check, evaluating “whether a stimulus event is pleasant, inducing 
approach tendencies, or unpleasant, inducing avoidance tendencies”. 
Goal/need significance check, evaluating “whether a stimulus event is relevant to important 
goals and needs of the organism”. 
2. Implication assessment checks 
Causal attribution check, evaluating “the causes of the event, in particular to discern the 
agent that was responsible for its occurrence”.   
Outcome probability check, evaluating “the likelihood or certainty with which certain 
consequences are to be expected”. 
Discrepancy with expectation check, evaluating whether “the outcome is consistent with or 
discrepant from the state expected for this point in the goal/plan sequence”. 
Goal/need conduciveness check, evaluating whether the outcome is “conducive or 
obstructive to reaching the respective goals or satisfying the relevant needs”. 
Urgency check, evaluating “how urgently some kind of behavioral response is required”. 
3. Coping potential determination check 
                                                 
27 There are three types of novelty checks, in terms of suddenness, familiarity and predictability. 
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Control check, evaluating the “degree of control over the event or its consequences”. 
Power check, evaluating “the resources at [one’s] disposal to change contingencies and 
outcomes according to its interests”. 
Adjustment check, evaluating “the potential for adjustment to the final outcome via internal 
restructuring”. 
4. Normative significance evaluation checks 
Internal standards check, evaluating whether the event “is consistent with internalizes norms 
or standards as part of the self concept or ideal self”. 
External standards check, evaluating “whether the event, particularly an action conforms to 
social norms, cultural conventions, or expectations of significant others”. 
 
For example, Scherer (2001) argues that anger is caused when an event is appraised as 
novel, of high significance, intentionally caused by someone else, with very high probability of 
consequences dissonant with the goals of the agent, requiring an urgent response, involving a 
high degree of coping potential, and being at odds with social norms, cultural conventions or 
expectations of significant others. Each emotion is similarly associated with its own profile of 
stimulus evaluation checks, and the holy grail of the research program is to formulate a profile 
that admits of no exceptions. 
This approach, however, strikes me as seriously ill-conceived. One problem is that appraisal 
theorists seem to ascribe to emotional appraisal a high degree of cognitive sophistication, which 
is difficult to reconcile with many forms of emotional appraisal, especially those lying towards 
the modularUMS end of the continuum I illustrated above. Being suddenly poked in the back 
reliably brings about anger, but it is hard to imagine that the emotional appraisal involved in it 
comprises sixteen evaluation checks running in parallel in a fraction of an instant. Moreover, it is 
hard to imagine how pre-linguistic and non-linguistic creatures could engage in, say, coping 
potential determination checks which distinguish between appraising ”the resources at [one’s] 
disposal to change contingencies and outcomes according to its interests” (2001, 15) and “the 
potential for adjustment to the final outcome via internal restructuring” (2001, 15). 
Discriminations at this level of cognitive complexity definitely seem to require language 
possession. 
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A second problem is that, even if we accept the level of cognitive complexity embodied by 
the various dimensions of appraisal for the sake of argument, there seem to be many instances of 
emotion caused by evaluations different from those appraisal theorists associate with them. For 
example, people often get angry about events they consider of low significance, which they have 
themselves caused, which have very low probability of interfering with their goals, with respect 
to which they have no coping potential and which are not at odds with social norms, cultural 
conventions, or expectations of significant others. For example, I sometimes get angry with 
inanimate objects into which I accidentally run, even when the physical pain I suffer is minor. 
But I certainly do not ascribe high significance to events of this type, nor do I consider the object 
I run into responsible for the accident, nor do I consider my coping potential relative to an 
accident which already occurred particularly high, and most certainly I do not consider the event 
to lack conformity to social norms, cultural conventions, or expectations of significant others. 
The basic problem with this literature, as I see it, is that there is a conceptual confusion at 
work between two notions of appraisal. One is the notion of appraisal which brings about a 
certain emotion (call it emotion causing appraisal), and the other is the notion of appraisal 
implied by having a certain emotion (call it entailed appraisal). As Kenny (1963) first argued, 
“each emotion is appropriate-logically, and not just morally appropriate-only to certain restricted 
objects” (192). As I discussed in 4.2.1, he called such objects formal, and assumed that each 
emotion is associated with a set of conditions of appropriateness that distinguish it from all other 
emotions. As I will argue in some detail section 10.3, the source of normativity underlying the 
notion of formal objects is that emotions have proper functions: they can function properly and 
improperly in light of their history of selection. 
The formal object of an emotion E, Kenny believed, is associated with E non-contingently. 
In effect, the formal object describes the property complex ascribed to the contingent object of a 
given emotion E by having E towards it. For example, by fearing a given object, emoters can be 
said to ascribe to it the property of being dangerous. We can then distinguish between fear-
causing appraisal, the evaluation which brings about fear, and the entailed appraisal of fear, the 
evaluation implied by having fear. Fear could be caused by direct brain stimulation rather than 
appraisal, but still entail a certain appraisal of the circumstances. 
By distinguishing dimensions of appraisal along the lines I described, appraisal theorists 
have in my view simply offered a highly nuanced account of the formal objects of emotions. 
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What they have described is not what properties emotion causing appraisals have, but what 
properties entailed appraisals have, confusing the conditions of elicitation of an emotion E with 
the conditions of appropriateness of an elicited E. It is not hard to find evidence for this 
misunderstanding in the literature. Consider Scherer (2001) and Lazarus (1991), the two most 
prominent contemporary appraisal theorists. The former describes as follows the principle 
governing his choice of dimensions of appraisal (a.k.a. stimulus evaluation checks or SECs): 
 
The SECs are chosen, in a principled fashion, to represent the 
minimal set of dimensions or criteria that are considered necessary 
to account for the differentiation of the major families of emotional 
state (Scherer 2001, 94).  
 
The focus here is not on what causes different emotions, but rather on what differentiates 
them from one another. What Scherer has tried to elucidate are in effect the basic dimensions of 
entailed appraisal which distinguish one emotion type from all others. As I read his theory, the 
SEC profile of an emotion describes its circumstances of appropriateness. For example, the SEC 
profile of anger states that anger is the sort of thing which is appropriate when elicited in 
circumstances of high significance, with respect to events intentionally caused by someone else, 
when there is a high degree of coping potential, and there is tension with social norms, cultural 
conventions or expectations of significant others. We may disagree with this account, but the 
point is that it is not an account of what causes anger, but at best of what ought to cause it if 
anger were elicited in circumstances in which it is appropriate.  In turn, such circumstances 
depend upon the proper function of anger, which allows us to sort the causes and effects of 
properly functioning anger tokens from the causes and effects of non-properly functioning anger 
tokens. 
The same problem applies to Lazarus’s (1991) appraisal theory, which distinguishes six 
rather than sixteen dimensions of appraisal. Here is a key passage:  
 
I believe we should combine the partial meanings, which derive 
from a causal analysis of a number of part processes-that is, the 
appraisal components, of which I have enumerated six-into a terse, 
integrated gestalt or whole, which is what characterizes the 
cognitive-motivational-relational cause of the emotion. In other 
words, the process of appraising must be examined at higher level 
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of abstraction that just a listing of separate, partial meanings. I 
refer to this higher level as the core relational theme for each 
emotion. This theme is a terse synthesis of the separate appraisal 
components into a complex, meaning-centered whole (Lazarus 
1991, 64).  
 
Lazarus (1991) suggests that the core relational theme of sadness is having experienced an 
irrevocable loss, the core relational theme of anger is having experienced a demeaning offense 
against me or mine, the core relational theme of fear is having experienced immediate, concrete 
and overwhelming physical danger, the core relational theme of guilt is having transgressed a 
moral imperative, and so on. Lazarus’ core relational themes, once again, correspond by and 
large to the formal objects of emotions. This is not surprising, because they are not descriptions 
of the “cognitive-motivational-relational cause of the emotion”, but rather of the “restricted 
object” an emotion must be associated with in order to be what it is.  
People can be angry without having experienced a demeaning offense (e.g. anger towards 
inanimate objects), afraid about things they do not appraise as representing immediate, concrete 
and overwhelming physical dangers (e.g. panic attacks), guilty about events which they do not 
believe to involve the transgression of a moral imperative on their part (e.g. victim guilt), and so 
on. If we take core relational themes to be good descriptors of conditions of appropriateness, 
these forms of anger, fear and guilt qualify as inappropriate, because they violate the constitutive 
norms of appropriateness of the emotions they are. In other words, they represent tokens of 
emotions that fail to fulfill their proper functions. 
Every core relational theme can be broken down into smaller conceptual components. A 
demeaning offense against me or mine, for example, can be individuated on a hyperspace with 
six dimensions – the one Lazarus proposes - by claiming that it amounts to the entailed 
appraisals that something relevant to my well-being happened, that it is bad, that I or somebody I 
care about is involved, and that someone is to blame for it. But it is misleading to say that these 
dimensions, which are conceptually related to being an offense against me or mine, are 
combined into “a terse, integrated gestalt or whole” which causes anger. 
The study of emotion causing appraisal, I suggest, must explore empirically what kinds of 
situations generate what kinds of emotions. Appraisal theorists, however, rely for the most part 
on self-reports, as they try to figure out what caused an emotion by asking people what goes 
through their heads when they experience it. But, as insightfully argued by Parkinson (2004, 
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117), “[w]hen people usually think about their emotions, the default option is to think of 
justifiable, reasonable examples as specified in everyday common sense”. This is another way to 
put my point, which is that the dimensions of appraisal obtained by appraisal theorists – 
generally through self-reports - are dimensions of appropriateness, which describe (at best) the 
etiology of justified emotions. Let us now turn from the activation of emotion to its management, 
and try to understand how exactly an urgency management system works.  
 
10.2.4. From appraisal to preparation, action and communication 
In this section, I aim to clarify the following portion of the central thesis of the UMS theory of 
emotions: 
 
An umotion E is a superordinate system, generally activated by an appraisal, which 
controls a cluster of organismic subsystems whose synchronized operation instantiates, 
and manages through time, an action tendency TE with control precedence.  
 
This is not a complete account of umotions, because no mention is made of their conditions of 
appropriateness, to be discussed in the next section. My task is to clarify how the managing 
operations of the superordinate system “umotion” work, illustrating the three functional 
components I called preparation, action, and communication. The following picture can help us 
organize our discussion: 
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Figure 13: A diagram of umotions as urgency management systems 
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Dotted lines represent relations instantiated in many or most instances of umotion, but not 
strictly necessary for umotion to be instantiated. Non-dotted lines represent instead relations which 
are necessary to have umotion. Here is, in broad outline, what the diagram is meant to represent: 
 
(a) Umotions are generally caused by appraisals of physical or mental events, but 
exceptions are admitted (e.g. facial feedback, direct brain stimulation) 
(b) An umotion is activated when a superordinate system for the management of an 
urgent action tendency is activated 
(c) The superordinate system that is umotion controls a variety of subordinate 
subsystems such as attention, perception, memory, the parasympathetic system, the motor 
system, and so on in the specific ways involved in the management of a specific urgent 
action tendency 
(d) The management of an urgent action tendency has two main dimensions, one 
tendency-focused and the other goal-focused 
(e) An important component of the tendency-focused management is the re-appraisal of 
the eliciting event, portrayed by the dotted line between the superordinate system and 
appraisal. For example, a snake-shaped object in the dark may automatically activate the fear 
system through a modularUMS appraisal, and then be re-appraised and judged not to be 
dangerous. This would most likely lead to the inhibition of the action tendency. As shown in 
the diagram, re-appraisal tends towards the centralUMS end of the continuum of emotional 
appraisal. The snake-shaped object will be categorized as being or not being a snake, and 
beliefs about the particular snake it is will be involved in re-appraising whether or not it is 
dangerous. 
(f) The goal-focused management of an urgent action tendency comprises three main 
functional components, namely preparation, action and communication. Without the 
instantiation of at least one of them, there is no umotion, hence the full line below the 
superordinate system box. This full line divides up into three dotted lines, which are meant to 
indicate that an umotion can be instantiated by preparation only, by action only and by 
communication only. In prototypical cases of umotion, all three functional components will be 
involved. 
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(g) The preparation component of umotion has to do with the fact that, once an urgent 
action tendency is activated, emoters search for ways to fulfill its relational goal (affordance 
search), undergo bodily changes (e.g. increased heart rate), and engage in mental actions (e.g. 
planning ways to respond to possible moves of a predator). Some umotions are so fast, 
however, that they lead to action directly, without going through any preparation. 
(h) The action component of umotion has to do with the fact that, once an action tendency 
is activated and opportunities to manifest it advantageously have been found, emoters try to 
fulfill the relational goal of the action tendency. Their actions can be physical actions, mental 
actions or expressions. Some emotions, however, do not lead to action but rather to inhibition. 
This is often because no affordances for an advantageous manifestation of the action tendency 
have been recovered. 
(l) The communication component of umotion has to do with the fact that, once an action 
tendency is activated, emoters broadcast signals non-arbitrarily associated with the urgent 
action tendency that is being managed. Some signals are directed to the self. For example, 
feeling that one’s body is trembling may work as a signal to the self that one is undergoing 
fear. Some signals are instead sent to others. For example, one can send signals of anger 
through facial expressions (e.g. a fixed stare) or through physical actions (e.g. slamming a 
door). Importantly, communication has an impact on preparation: responses to emotional 
signals are factored in the search for ways to fulfill the relational goal of the action tendency. 
For example, the responses of an interactant to an anger expression will be factored in the 
evaluation of whether or not the interactant is of a type which allows for anger to be 
manifested advantageously through angry physical actions. Some umotions are so fast, on the 
other hand, that they lead to action directly, without going through any communication of 
signals prior to taking action. 
 
These are the basics of the theory I will articulate and defend. Let us now get into the details. 
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10.2.5. Umotion as a superordinate system   
I claimed that an umotion is a superordinate system which controls a cluster of organismic 
subsystems whose synchronized operation instantiates, and manages through time, an urgent 
action tendency. The term “system” comes from the Greek “synistanai”, which means “to 
combine”. By using it, I intend to emphasize that an umotion is a complex entity comprising 
interrelated parts which form a unified whole. What makes an umotion superordinate relative to 
other subordinate systems is that it controls them in a coordinated fashion. Although such 
subordinate systems, in turn complex collections of integrated parts, exist independently of 
umotion, the synchronized way in which umotion can recruit them suggests that they can be 
conceived as parts of a higher order entity that is the umotion.  
However, they are not subordinate systems in the sense that their only purpose is being part of 
an umotion, as the purpose of a heart ventricle is being part of the heart. Rather, such systems 
fulfill other functions unrelated to umotion. For example, the motor system supports non-
emotionally navigating a cluttered environment as well as engaging in the evasive actions of fear. 
 An important feature of the theory I propose is that umotion controls a “cluster” of 
subsystems. The notion of a cluster is meant to signal that there is no specific set of subsystems 
always recruited when an umotion is instantiated. Various combinations of subsystems can 
instantiate and manage any given urgent action tendency type, and different action tendencies will 
recruit different groups of subsystems. The type of umotion at hand, and the specific circumstances 
of its elicitation, will determine which systems are recruited in a given episode of umotion.  
Now, where does the idea that emotions are superordinate systems come from? Although 
several emotion theorists have described the emotions as systems (e.g. Simon 1967), and 
suggested that they coordinate the operation of several subsystems (e.g. Scherer 2001), my main 
inspiration comes from Tooby and Cosmides (1990, 2000). An important difference between my 
theory and theirs, however, is that they take an emotion to be a superordinate program evolved 
to deal with ancestral life tasks, whereas I take an umotion to be a superordinate system which 
instantiates and manage a state of action readiness endowed with control precedence. I leave the 
question of the origin of such superordinate system open for discussion, allowing for the 
possibility that some umotions did not evolve to deal with ancestral life tasks. Consider the 
following passage from Tooby and Cosmides (2000): 
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[A]n emotion is a superordinate program whose function is to 
direct the activities and interactions of the subprograms governing 
perception; attention; inference; learning; memory; goal choice; 
motivational priorities; categorization and conceptual frameworks; 
physiological reactions…; reflexes; behavioral decision rules; 
motor systems; communication processes; energy level and effort 
allocation; affective coloration of events and stimuli; recalibration 
of probability estimates, situation assessments, values, and 
regulatory variables (e.g., self-esteem, estimations of relative 
formidability, relative value of alternative goal states, efficacy 
discount rate); and so on (93) 
 
This list comprises redundancies (e.g. goal choice and motivational priorities), it runs the risk of 
circularity (e.g. affective coloration of events), it characterizes in a coarse-grained fashion some 
of the systems involved (e.g. it treats all physiological reactions as if they were part of one 
system), and it is not exhaustive (e.g. the musculoskeletal response system is not included). 
Consequently, I do not endorse the list it in its current form, but borrow a key insight from it. 
This is that an umotion has global reach over practically all cognitive, perceptual and motoric 
resources available to the organism. There is no need to fuss over what specific subsystems are 
recruitable by emotion, once we realize that in circumstances of urgency practically all of them 
are. What is missing from Tooby and Cosmides’s account is something much more important, 
namely an explanation of the way in which the resources of the organism get to be coordinated 
by the superordinate system.  
Tooby and Cosmides (2000) have in effect offered a laundry list of subsystems without 
explaining their role in the superordinate system that is the emotion. Their account suggests that 
a superordinate system counts as an emotion just because it directs “the activities and interac-
tions” of a bunch of subsystems. As they put it, an emotion “is a superordinate program whose 
function is to direct the activities and interactions of the subprograms”.   I see two main problems 
with this account. 
The first is that emotions are not the only systems capable of directing the activities and 
interactions of several subsystems. For example, the “system” which governs navigation through 
a cluttered environment controls the activities and interactions of attention, goal choice, reflexes, 
motor systems, effort allocation and so on, but it is not an emotion. The second problem is that 
the proper function of emotions is not merely to coordinate subsystems, but to obtain something 
by means of such coordination. What is missing from Tooby and Cosmides’s account is the 
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central idea that an emotion directs the activities and interactions of subsystems in pursuit of 
high priority goals.  
Failure to bring this point to the fore may be due to the assumption that emotions evolved to 
deal with ancestral life tasks. As I discussed in 5.2.1, ancestral life tasks are characterized by 
Tooby and Cosmides (2000) as having five main characteristics: they recurred ancestrally, they 
could not be successfully negotiated in the absence of a superordinate level of program 
coordination, they had a rich and reliably repeated structure, they had reliable cues signaling 
their presence, and they were of a type in which an error would have resulted in large fitness 
costs. Tooby and Cosmides may be convinced that once the idea of evolutionary origin is added 
to the idea of a superordinate program, what we get is a good principle of individuation for 
emotions. But this is far from being the case.  
Firstly, the five characteristics fail to distinguish between emotions and other superordinate 
systems of possible evolutionary origin. For example, the superordinate systems for navigating a 
cluttered environment may arguably have evolved to deal with situations that recurred 
ancestrally, required a superordinate level of program coordination, had a rich and reliably 
repeated structure and reliable indicators, and created the risk of large fitness costs (e.g. hitting 
an obstacle at high speed). However, a navigation system is not an emotion.  
Secondly, there is no reason to assume that all emotions evolved to deal with situations with 
the features described. Evolutionary psychologists are generally convinced that the mind is “a 
crowded zoo of evolved, domain-specific programs” (Tooby and Cosmides 1990, 91), and they 
apply this assumption to emotions. As I argued in 5.2.1, the evidence on which they rely is often 
very thin, and it has led to the mistaken expectation that emotions are highly domain-specific 
programs, whereas there are good reasons to expect them to be open programs in Ernest Mayr’s 
sense (Griffiths 1997; see section 5.2). To mark the distance between my account and the one 
proposed by evolutionary psychologists, I call emotions “superordinate systems” rather than 
“superordinate programs”, even though “program” and “system” are to a large extent 
semantically equivalent.  
Progress with respect to Tooby and Cosmides’ (2000) account demands not only that we 
avoid making their mistakes, but also that we fill in their omissions. What we need to understand 
is how the superordinate system that is umotion organizes subsystems so as to instantiate and 
manage an action tendency with control precedence.  
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 10.2.6. Preparation: body and mind 
According to many emotion theorists, the most important function of emotions lies in bodily 
preparation. Descartes (1650), for example, argued that “the principal effect of all the human 
passions is that they move and dispose the soul to want the things for which they prepare the 
body” (art. 40) (see chapter 2). We can distinguish various types of bodily changes, which will 
be involved in different types of urgent action tendencies. 28
The bodily changes most often invoked in emotion theory are autonomic changes, namely 
the sorts of changes James (1884) presupposed when he claimed that an emotion is a perception 
of bodily changes. Autonomic changes comprise changes in heart rate, blood pressure and blow 
flow distribution, respiration, electrodermal activity and sweating, gastrointestinal and urinary 
activity, secretory and papillary responses, composition of blood and saliva and trembling. But 
there are also other kinds of changes which may in principle count as bodily.  
Three further examples are hormonal changes such as changes in the catecholamine 
hormones epinephrine and norepinephrine, musculoskeletal changes such as changes in muscle 
tension, and neural changes such as changes in the activation of particular brain areas (e.g. 
amygdala activation in fear).  
In the context of the UMS theory, physiological responses are understood in terms of the 
role they play in the activation and management of an urgent action tendency. Generally 
speaking, bodily preparation is preparation for the execution of the kinds of bodily movements 
that are liable to fulfill the relational goal of the action tendency. Since different action 
tendencies have different relational goals, there may be some degree of emotion specificity in 
bodily changes. In section 7.1.1, I concluded on the basis of the review of the available empirical 
evidence offered by Cacioppo et al. (2000) that there are some broad differences between 
families of emotions (e.g. positive and negative emotions) and some specificities with respect to 
some emotions (e.g. heart rate increase in intense fear is generally higher than in any other 
emotion), but nothing like a one-to-one correspondence between emotion types and bodily 
profiles.  
                                                 
28 The distinctions between kinds of bodily changes, and the lists of specific bodily changes, are borrowed from 
Frijda (1986). 
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Emotional preparation has also a mental counterpart. The subsystems governing physiology 
are not the only ones to be mobilized when emoters prepare for action. Consider a gazelle 
drinking by a pond. A predator enters her visual field, appraisal follows, and the fear system is 
activated. What does this involve? On the one hand, subordinate systems governing 
physiological reactions will be activated.  There will be an increase in cardiac output, breathing 
rate, and diastolic blood pressure, enhanced skin conductance responses and gastrointestinal 
activity, activation of the amygdala and so on.  
On the other hand, the systems governing faculties like attention, perception, memory, etc. 
will also be recruited and put at the service of the management of the urgent avoidance tendency. 
For example, the attention of the gazelle will be redirected from drinking to dealing with the 
presence of the predator. Her perceptual abilities will be sharpened, so that she can see, hear, 
smell, touch and taste with maximal acuity. As suggested by Tooby and Cosmides (2000), an 
animal in the circumstances described may also activate a “specialized inference system” 
according to which a predator’s “trajectory or eye direction may be fed into systems for inferring 
whether the [predator] saw you” (94). The memory system would also be activated. The gazelle 
may suddenly remember that she just walked by a pathway which may lead her to safety. This 
conclusion may be facilitated by “conceptual frame shifts”, as the gazelle may apply “safety 
categorization frames” (104) to what she perceives, infers or remembers. The list of mental 
activities does not have any principled limitation other than the cognitive complexity of the 
organism under consideration (e.g. a human being may engage in imaginings, intendings, and so 
on).  
The general point is that not only the body but also the mind of the emoter is readied in the 
course of the management of an urgent action tendency, and put at the service of the goal pursuit 
that characterizes it. What is rarely discussed in emotion theory is the active side of emotional 
preparation, namely the search for means to fulfill the relational goal of the action tendency. 
Given its importance and relative neglect in the contemporary literature, I will now say a little 
more about what I call the affordance search. 
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10.2.7. Searching for relational goal-affordances   
There is a picture of emotions which has loomed large in the history of the subject. 
According to such picture, emotions just happen to emoters when they are presented with the 
appropriate stimuli. This picture is not entirely off the mark. In some cases, umotions work 
indeed as reflexes. You present an organism with a sudden and unexpected loud noise, and the 
fear system will be reliably activated. In many cases of umotion, however, this picture is very 
misleading. What it hides from view is the fact that an umotion comprises several active 
components, one of which is the search for opportunities to fulfill the relational goal of the 
action tendency. I already mentioned that Machiavellian considerations enter already at the level 
of emotional appraisal, since the organism is sensitive to cues predicting whether or not a certain 
emotion could possibly be to his or her advantage (Griffiths 2003). What I have not yet discussed 
is what shape such considerations take after an urgent action tendency has been elicited. 
The way I propose to make sense of the active side of emotions is through the notion of 
affordances. The notion of affordances was introduced in psychology by James J. Gibson (1979). 
It is an important concept, which has not yet received the attention it deserves (but see Bermudez 
1998, Machamer and Osbeck 2003, and especially Millikan 2004). In part, this is because 
affordances have been associated with some of the problematic assumptions of the Gibsonian 
movement. Most importantly, they have been associated with Gibson’s rejection of the notion of 
representation as a useful explanatory construct. This position puts Gibsonians at loggerheads 
with most cognitive scientists working today.  
As I argued in Scarantino (2004), however, the concept of an affordance can be made sense 
of independently of the thesis that perception is direct. This is because whether or not X affords 
Y to O, where X is a portion of the environment, Y is an action mode and O is an organism, does 
not depend on whether or not O perceives that X affords Y. At the same time, it must be 
emphasized that the theoretical interest of the notion of affordances is tied to their being 
perceivable.29 Gibson believed that a great many affordances are specified in ambient energy and 
that as a matter of empirical fact organisms guide their behaviors by becoming attuned to them.  
Gibson introduced the notion of affordances to capture the essential complementarity 
between the organism and the environment. As he put it, the “affordances of the environment are 
                                                 
29 I thank Ruth Millikan for urging me to emphasize that the theoretical interest of affordances is fundamentally tied 
to their perceivability 
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what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson 1979, 127; 
emphasis in original). For example, Gibson described a surface such as the brink of a cliff as fall-
off-able, a substance such as an apple as eat-able, an object such as a stone as throw-able, an 
animal such as a conspecific as copulate-with-able, an event such as a fire as cook-with-able.  
The two key dimensions of affordances are relationality and potentiality. Relationality is 
due to the fact that the offerings of the environment cannot be specified independently of the 
organism (or class of organisms) relative to which they are instantiated. A lioness offers an 
opportunity to copulate to a lion, but certainly not to a mouse, to a gazelle or to an elephant.  
Potentiality is due to the fact that the offerings of the environment are contingent upon what 
may be the case, were some further circumstances to occur. The fact that a lioness affords 
copulation to a lion does not imply that copulation will occur, but only that copulation is possible 
given certain circumstances (e.g. the lion is interested in it). In Scarantino (2004), I tried to 
capture the relationality and potentiality of affordances by assimilating them to particular kinds 
of dispositional properties. The basic idea I defended is that to ascribe an affordance to some 
bearer X relative to some organism O in certain background circumstances is to say that, in such 
circumstances, if a set of triggering circumstances T were the case, then a manifestation M 
involving X and O would be the case (with significant probability).  
For example, to say that a given tree affords climbing to a squirrel in normal ecological 
circumstances (e.g. the tree is not covered by an invisible slipping substance) is to say that, in 
such circumstances, if the squirrel were to try climbing, he would be highly likely to succeed. 
Under the Gibsonian picture, the perception of a climbing affordance plays a causal role in 
allowing successful climbing to occur. The squirrel not only perceives that the tree affords 
climbing, but also perceives how to climb, namely what specific dynamic sequence of his own 
movements affords climbing.30   
In Scarantino (2004), I distinguished between two main types of manifestations of 
affordances. If we look at Gibson’s examples of affordances, we notice manifestations such as 
climbing, catching, getting under, eating, mailing a letter, but also such as bumping into, getting 
burned by, falling off, being eaten by. Whereas events in the first list constitute things organisms 
do, events in the second list constitute things that happen to them. The distinction is in my view 
                                                 
30 I owe the clarification of this point to Ruth Millikan’s comments on an earlier draft 
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important enough to distinguish between two classes of affordances, namely goal-affordances 
(their manifestation is a doing) and happening-affordances (their manifestation is a happening).  
Now, Gibson assumed that perception is always perception of affordances, namely of 
possibilities for actions (and for happenings, which in turn influence the organism’s possibilities 
for actions):  
 
[P]laces, attached objects, objects, and substances are what are 
mainly perceived, together with events, which are changes of these 
things. To [perceive] these things is to perceive what they afford. 
(Gibson 1979, 240) 
 
The crucial empirical hypothesis of ecological psychology is that affordances are 
perceivable. At the same time, “an affordance is not bestowed upon an object by a need of an 
observer and his act of perceiving it” (Gibson 1979, 139). It is bestowed instead by a set of 
physical properties of the affordance-bearer and the organism which are relevant to make a 
specific activity possible (e.g. grasping, catching, being eaten by). For example, Gibson (1979, 
133) indicated that “to be graspable, an object must have opposite surfaces separated by a 
distance less than the span of the hand.”  
But how do organisms perceive affordances? To perceive affordances, according to Gibson, 
is to become attuned to invariants and disturbances that specify them. An intuitive understanding 
of these technical notions is the following. An invariant is a property of the structure of ambient 
energy arrays31 (e.g. the optic array, the acoustic array, etc.) instantiated when, relative to some 
source of change such as a moving point of observation or a moving source of illumination, the 
structure is left unchanged in a way that is typical of the item specified (e.g. a reflectance can 
specify the substance “coal” by being unchanging in the way characteristic of coal substances). 
A disturbance is a property of the structure of ambient energy arrays instantiated when, relative 
to some source of change (e.g. the change constituted by an approaching predator), the structure 
presents a pattern of change that is typical of the item specified (e.g. the contour of an animal 
can specify the event “approaching predator” by changing in the way typical of approaching 
predators).  
                                                 
31 “To be an array means to have an arrangement, and to be ambient at a point means to surround a position in the 
environment that could be occupied by an observer” (Gibson 1979, 65).   
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In general terms, to say that affordances are perceivable is to say that there are invariants 
and disturbances in ambient energy arrays that specify the threats and promises of items in the 
environment. For example, to say that the eat-ability of a given apple is perceivable, or that the 
being-hit-by-ability of a flying ball is perceivable is to say that there is a sensory appearance - a 
way to be visible/audible/tangible/odorous/tastable - typical respectively of apples affording 
eating, and of flying balls affording being hit by. Gibson was very clear that we cannot establish 
“a priori” what affordances are specified in ambient energy.32 As he put it, “[t]he central 
question for the theory of affordances is not whether they exist and are real but whether 
information is available in ambient light for perceiving them.” (Gibson 1979, 140) Information is 
available for perceiving all and only those offerings of the environment that are associated with 
typical sensory appearances. In some cases, the organism will have to learn to perceive a 
perceivable affordance, i.e. learn to become attuned to the invariant or disturbance specifying it. 
What invariants and disturbances are in fact available for the specification of affordances will 
have to be established by empirical investigation. 
But which of the innumerable perceivable affordances will in fact be perceived by an 
organism? As Millikan (2004, 164) persuasively remarks, “[t]here seems no reason to suppose 
that affordances irrelevant to current needs are always, or even ever, perceived by most animals”. 
Generally speaking, not all affordances of the environment can be perceived at any one time.  
There are innumerable things one can do, and innumerable things that can happen: some 
principle of selection as to what affordances are in fact perceived at any one time is necessary. 
For example, my red pen affords being brought to Rue Moliere in Paris in 2007 at 3:32 pm, and 
my neighbor’s dog Terry affords being roasted together with an orange and the finger of a 
Congressman from Iowa.  To suppose that anytime I look at the pen or at Terry I perceive such 
affordances would clearly be preposterous. Which among the affordances of my red pen or Terry 
do I perceive at any one time? Millikan’s suggestion goes exactly in the right direction: “[m]ore 
likely [organisms] only perceive what they have motivation, at the moment, to exploit”` (164). 
The intuitive appeal of this idea is nowhere more evident than in the case of umotion. The 
activation of an umotion generates a principle of selection for affordances, according to which 
                                                 
32 Gibson (1979)’s main focus was on ambient light, but his account must be generalized, because an affordance 
could be specified despite lacking a typical way to look (it may have a typical way to, say, sound and/or smell). 
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organisms perceive what can help them fulfill the relational goal of the urgent action tendency 
associated with umotion. 
Consider once again our gazelle placidly drinking by a pond, a few instants before she sees a 
predator. The environment affords her all sorts of things, some good and some bad. For example, 
the pond affords drinking, but also drowning in. A tree perched on a cliff in the distance affords 
eating berries, but also presents the danger of falling off the cliff. A large passage between two 
trees affords running through, whereas a narrow passage affords bumping into the neighboring 
trees, and so on. The appearance of the predator activates a superordinate system whose 
management encompasses, among other things, a prioritized search for “escape the predator”-
affordances.  
This will entail the interruption of all prior affordance searches (what portion of the terrain 
affords drinking without falling into the pond?) and of all ongoing actions (e.g. drinking), and a 
global redirection of organismic resources towards searching for means to successfully avoid the 
predator. 
One key aspect of emotional urgency, therefore, is that the superordinate system umotion 
puts organismic subsystems at the service of a relational goal-affordance search. In the case of 
the gazelle, this will be a search for affordances that fulfill the relational goal of avoiding the 
predator. I speak of “searching” rather than “perceiving” relational goal-affordances because I do 
not assume that the only faculty mobilized to recover affordances is perception. The subsystems 
governing what Tooby and Cosmides (2000) call Memory and Inference, just to give two 
examples, may be essential to discover what affords escaping a predator.  
The idea of an affordance search allows us to bring into relief the fact that umotions, at least 
when not operating reflex-like, are peculiar action control structures combining urgency with 
flexibility. Urgency is due to the fact that all organismic subsystems are coordinated towards a 
search for relational goal affordances, and the exploitation of such affordances when available. 
Flexibility derives from the fact that an affordance search may unveil several goal affordances 
for the same relational goal, which can lead to a variety of different actions. At the same time, 
the affordance search may indicate that there simply are no available relational goal affordances 
in the circumstances.  
Importantly, what goal-affordances are available changes dynamically through time, often 
because the behaviors of other organisms change as the emotional episode unfolds. One of the 
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main channels through which the goal-affordances space is dynamically shaped is the 
communication of emotional signals to other organisms. I will come back to this point shortly, 
after having illustrated the action component of umotion, which comprises emotional 
expressions, one of the main channels of emotional communication. 
 
10.2.8. Action: physical, mental and expressive behaviors 
The notion of action is notoriously hard to pin down, as soon as one tries to go beyond the 
platitude that an organism’s actions comprise whatever the organism does. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, I take an action to be an event that is goal-directed under some description, 
namely caused by the pursuit of a goal and such that there is a description of the event under 
which the goal is achieved (in the right way). By emotional action, I mean anything the 
organism does with the aim of fulfilling the relational goal of the action tendency.  
This notion of action must not be confused with the notion of action prevalent in the 
philosophy of action. According to the widely influential Causal Theory of Action, for example, 
acting is doing something with an intention, and “[i]f someone acts with an intention then he 
must have attitudes and beliefs, from which had he been aware of them and had he had the time, 
he could have reasoned that his act was desirable” (Davidson 1980). More precisely, an action is 
understood as an event that is intentional under some description, namely triggered by an 
intention and such as to fulfill it under some description (in the right way) (Davidson 1980, 61). 
By speaking of emotional action as being goal-directed under some description I mean to resist 
two equally detrimental tendencies in the study of emotion.  
The first is that of assuming that emoting is shifting from a domain in which goals are 
pursued to a domain in which things just happen to emoters. This is a view that first emerged 
with the Stoic account of the passions as "excessive impulses which are disobedient to reason" 
(Arius Didymus, 65 BC, as quoted in Baltzly 2004), and it has loomed large in theories of the 
emotions ever since (see my discussion of appraisal in 10.2.3). According to the UMS theory, 
instead, emotions have a crucial goal-directed aspect, in the strong sense that they are special 
systems for the pursuit of goals, paradigmatically characterized by a combination of urgency and 
flexibility.  
The second bad habit in emotion theory has been to assume that emotional action can be 
assimilated to the standard model of action presupposes by the Causal Theory of Action I 
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sketched above. Under this view, an action is always understood as the culmination of an actual 
or “as if” process of practical reasoning. As a first approximation, practical reasoning consists of 
constructing a space of alternatives, predicting the consequences of each and their probability of 
occurrence, weighing pros and cons associated with each alternative in light of one’s beliefs and 
desires, and finally forming an all-things-considered intention to select one of the alternatives, 
and executing such intention when the time to do so has come.  
The problem with this approach is that emotional action is not brought about by an actual 
process of practical reasoning, but by a superordinate system for the management of an urgent 
action tendency. As I argued above, such system is generally activated by an appraisal which is 
intrinsically motivational, non-deliberate and immediately and effortlessly followed by the 
activation of the superordinate system umotion. It is highly misleading to assimilate the 
operations of appraisal and of umotion, which jointly lead to emotional action, to practical 
reasoning. This view misses entirely what is special about umotion as an action control structure.  
One may try to solve this difficulty by assimilating appraisal to “as if” practical reasoning, 
as philosophers have done to explain automatic actions such as standing up from a couch to get a 
beer while thinking about something else. The problem with this move is that it fosters the 
mistaken expectation that the etiology of emotions is grounded upon one’s beliefs and desires, in 
the same way in which automatically standing up to get a beer may be. Although the analogy 
may work with some cases of appraisal, it is patently false when appraisal lies towards the 
modularUMS end of the continuum I described in section 10.2.3.  
Forms of modularUMS appraisal tend to be shared across species, appear early in ontogeny, 
and are endowed with properties such as informational encapsulation, limited central access, 
dedicated neural pathways, and so on. These properties are not compatible with the view that 
emotional appraisal is the culmination of an “as if” practical inference, unless we posit special 
classes of emotional beliefs and desires which have exactly the characteristics we need to make 
sense of the features of modularUMS emotional appraisal.  
But this would be an ad hoc move, without any foreseeable explanatory purchase. If all we 
mean by saying that modularUMS appraisal is an “as if” practical inference is that it causes action 
in the specific way in which appraisal does it when it causes umotion, then we are not making 
any progress in our understanding of the phenomena, but just redescribing them in a potentially 
misleading way. What makes it misleading is that many philosophers make assumptions about 
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beliefs and desires - e.g. that they require language possession, that they can be recombined with 
maximal inferential promiscuity (Hurley 2003), that they comprise smaller units such as 
concepts, etc. - which are squarely at odds with the properties that would have to be posited for 
them to make sense of modularUMS forms of appraisal. The likely result would be that holders of 
different views of beliefs and desires would begin talking at cross purposes, which is exactly 
what has happened with respect to the idiosyncratic cognitivist understanding of the notion of 
“judgment” (see my analysis in chapter 7).  
A characteristic feature of the UMS theory of emotions I propose is that emotional actions 
are considered to be a part of umotion. In emotion theory, instead, actions are generally 
considered to be caused by emotions, but not part of them. Notably, this is true even of Frijda’s 
(1986) theory, where emotions are described as action tendencies with control precedence. As far 
as Frijda’s theory is concerned, an emotion ends with the emergence of an urgent action 
tendency. Under the view I propose, instead, the management of an urgent action tendency is 
what the umotion system is all about, and a key aspect of such management is the transformation 
of the action tendency into an actual action.  
I find it paradoxical that so many emotion theorists have considered bodily changes, which 
amount to preparation for action, as being essential to emotion, but not the action to which they 
prepare, as if the point of emoting were simply to prepare for doing things without actually doing 
them.  
One reason why action has been kept distinct from emotion may be that not all emotions 
appear to lead to actions. According to the UMS theory, the superordinate system that is 
umotion leads to action whenever it leads to facial, vocal and postural expressions, whenever it 
leads to physical actions involving motor control (e.g. moving, maintaining posture), and 
whenever it leads to mental actions such as thinking, reasoning, planning, reminiscing, etc. This 
is because these are all events which are goal-directed under some description. The distinction 
between expressions, physical actions and mental actions is hard to draw precisely, and I will 
only be able to rely on an intuitive understanding of it, which admits of borderline cases. For 
example, weeping appears to be in some sense an expression and in some sense a physical 
action, and talking appears to be in some sense a physical action and in some sense a mental 
action.  
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Even with this broad understanding of action, I agree that not all emotions lead to action. An 
alternative is that the superordinate system managing the urgent action tendency leads to 
inhibition. The inhibition of an urgent action tendency amounts to its active suppression, which 
is something one does in an inverted commas sense at best. Inhibition can be brought about in a 
variety of different ways. One may be through the operation of tendency-focused management, 
as when emoters re-appraise the event that activated umotion and realize that the circumstances 
do not justify the elicited urgent action tendency (e.g. the snake-shaped object is a toy). 
Another may be through change of the eliciting circumstances, as when the event that caused 
and justified the urgent action tendency goes out of existence (e.g. a real snake is shot by 
someone else). On other occasions, inhibition comes about when the search for affordances 
leads to the conclusion that there are no opportunities to fulfill the relational goal of the action 
tendency.  
The possibility of inhibition points us to two distinct aspects of the potentiality of urgent 
action tendencies. On the one hand, they can be actively suppressed. On the other hand, there 
is a variety of ways in which they can be behaviorally manifested. This leads us to another 
possible worry, which may also explain why emotion theorists have generally taken emotional 
action to be distinct from emotion. Given any umotion, there appear to be innumerable forms 
of action to which it can lead, especially if we allow action to range over physical action, 
mental actions and expressions. This is true, but it is also true that the set of actions one can 
perform when in a state of urgent action tendency is not arbitrary.  
To “umote”, under the view I propose, is to have an urgent tendency to do any of the 
innumerable actions which fulfill a given relational goal. The avoidance of a danger can occur 
in a fearful person by running away, by staying put, by taking cover, by calling for help, by 
brandishing a weapon, and so on. These are all means to the same higher order goal, namely 
that of avoiding the danger. Trying to describe the relational goal of a given urgent action 
tendency is in effect trying to describe what all actions which would satisfy the tendency have 
in common.  
The fact that actions are non-arbitrarily associated with urgent action tendencies is what 
allows us to maintain that an umotion can be identified with an action tendency, despite the 
fact that the tendency may both be inhibited and flexibly manifested in many different ways. 
The discussion of what exactly would satisfy a given urgent action tendency is to be made on a 
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case by case basis. Most commonly, an urgent action tendency will require physical actions for 
being satisfied. For example, sometimes the anger we experience towards someone who 
slighted us requires that we actually do something that will result in harm to them. In other 
cases, however, a tendency may be satisfied merely by mental actions. There are forms of 
anger which are perfectly well satisfied by merely imagining inflicting harm on somebody. Let 
us now turn to what has historically been the least explored of the three functional components 
of umotion, namely that of communication. 
 
10.2.9. Communication 
Under the view I am proposing, an umotion is a system for dealing with situations of 
urgency. These situations commonly emerge when there is a sudden change in the environment. 
Since other organisms represent one of the most important sources of sudden change in the 
environment, we must expect that the dynamic interaction between organisms will play a role 
in the activation and management of urgent action tendencies, and therefore in emotional 
episodes. The appreciation that umotions unfold dynamically through time is my main 
rationale for assimilating them to urgency management systems.  
One of the key aspects of this management is related to communication. As I mentioned 
before, communication in umotion can be to the self or to others. Sometimes umotions deliver 
– at least to human beings - what Peter Goldie (2004) called “introspective knowledge”. By 
getting angry about being denied tenure, for example, one may realize how much one cares 
about an academic career, despite having claimed the contrary for a long time. This form of 
communication to the self is primarily achieved through feelings.  
Often feelings will be feelings of bodily changes, but on occasion feelings will be feelings 
of an emotional appraisal and/or of an urgent action tendency, without involvement of any 
bodily changes (understood as autonomic changes). A feeling of fear, for example, can in 
principle comprise consciousness of appraising something as to be avoided, and consciousness of 
the behavioral tendency of avoidance, without any consciousness of increased heart beat and 
trembling, for the very good reason that these may not occur. This would be the case for example 
in cases of feelings of fear of global warming. In turn, consciousness of the behavioral tendency 
of avoidance may comprise consciousness of preparing for avoidance and consciousness of 
acting, for example through consciousness of one’s expressions (e.g. consciousness of the jaw 
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dropped open), of the physical action of, say, running and of the mental action of imagining what 
it would be like to be hurt. 
Despite its importance, I leave the communication to the self in the background in what 
follows. I am more interested in forms of umotional communication to others, which are not 
much explored in emotion theory, with the exception of social constructionist theories of 
emotion and hybrid programs which take their cue from them (see chapter 6). To understand 
that umotions have a communicative dimension is to peel a further layer away from the picture 
of emotions as happenings which has loomed large in the history of the subject. This is 
because communicating is something one does by umoting. What communication adds to the 
picture sketched so far is a negotiating dimension to emotional phenomena, which is crucially 
related to how others respond to the unfolding of an umotion throughout preparation and 
action.  
The idea that umotions have a negotiating dimension comes from ethology. In section 
6.3.3, I discussed Hinde as a founding figure in the conceptualization of emotions as 
negotiating moves. Hinde (1985a, 1985b) suggested that emotional behaviors lie on a 
continuum between a purely expressive end and a purely negotiating end. This view was 
opposed to a research tradition Hinde associated with Darwin, according to which emotional 
behaviors have a one-to-one correspondence to the motivational states underlying them. Hinde 
argued instead that it makes evolutionary sense for organisms to probe the likely reactions of 
other organisms they interact with by sending out partially ambiguous behavioral signals and 
dynamically gathering information from the way such signals are responded to. By emotional 
behavior, Hinde understood mostly facial and postural expressions, but we need to expand the 
notion to all features of an urgent action tendency that can in principle communicate that the 
tendency is undergoing. Anything which characterizes the phases of preparation and action can 
in principle count as an signal, provided a recipient can use it to reliably infer that a certain 
urgent action tendency has been activated and is being managed.  
Although emotion theorists have mainly focused on emotional expressions, expressions are 
not the only channel through which the activation of an urgent action tendency can be 
communicated. The activity of searching for a weapon in an expressionless fashion is certainly 
as informative of the occurrence of anger as the combination of a fixed stare, eyes widened, 
eyebrows lowered, bared teeth, and compressed lips. Generally, emotional communication 
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comprises several sources of signals working together. Facial, postural and vocal expressions are 
very important signals, but I think it is a mistake to focus on them exclusively when trying to 
understand the dynamics of emotional communication.  
In any event, Hinde’s basic point was that there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
“emotional states” and “emotional behaviors”. This manner of speaking suggests that “emotional 
states” are one thing and “emotional behaviors” another, which raises the question of how we 
can identity one independently of the other (Hinde did not provide an answer to such question). 
In the context of UMS theory, “emotional states” are activations of a system for the management 
of an urgent action tendency, so the dichotomy between “emotional states” and “emotional 
behaviors” has no real grip.   
At the same time, Hinde’s insight on negotiation can still be captured by stating that there is 
no one-to-one correspondence between the activation of a given urgent action tendency, and 
what the emoter does to manifest it. As I argued in the section on emotional action, this is true 
not only in the sense that there are many actions which can be flexibly undertaken, but, more 
radically, that the tendency can be inhibited despite its urgency.33 Hinde’s insight boils down to 
the idea that the system which manages an urgent action tendency, namely umotion as I 
understand it, is sensitive to the relational goal affordances for its advantageous manifestation as 
they are changed throughout the process of emotional communication. Emotional 
communication, it must be emphasized, is not restricted to the preparatory phases of the 
management of an action tendency, but extends to what one communicates by acting upon 
detected affordances. Quite obviously, I receive an emotional signal when I observe the baring of 
teeth, the searching for a weapon, and the physical action of being shot at.  
A possibility worth mentioning is that in some instances of umotion communication may 
even determine what relational goal is being pursued, not only which means to such goal will be 
chosen (if any). Some species of umotion could in principle start with the activation of an urgent 
action tendency whose relational goal is partially undetermined, and will be fully determined 
once responses to early emotional signals are received. For example, Hinde reports that birds 
often display threat expressions and subsequently flee (see my discussion in subsection 6.3.3). 
We can interpret such birds as being in a state of “emotional uncertainty”, in which they manage 
an urgent action tendency which is hanging between the relational goals of avoiding and 
                                                 
33 This is true only when umotion does not work a reflex 
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attacking. Reactions to threat displays will determine if the bird shifts to an urgent action 
tendency of the anger type or of the fear type.  
An empirical question I won’t pursue here is how often emotions begin with appraisals 
which only endow them with a partially undetermined relational goal. For now, I will consider 
this to be a special case of umotion, and assume that the standard case of umotion is that of the 
emergence of a fully formed urgent action tendency with a specific relational goal. 
But what is communicated in the course of the management of an emotional episode? The 
quick answer is: Anything that can reliably be inferred from it. Most importantly, the activation 
of an urgency management system sends signals about its likely cause and its likely effects. The 
former include signals about what kind of emotional appraisal has taken place. For example, 
inferring that someone is managing an urgent attack tendency towards us communicates that they 
have appraised our conduct negatively, and that they most likely consider themselves to have 
been slighted by us. But realizing that someone is engaged in an urgent action tendency also tells 
us about what they are likely to do next, namely choose one of the various actions which fulfill 
the relational goal of damaging us.34  
Receiving such signals is likely to affect our own behavior, for example by generating an 
umotion in us. This umotion will in turn have a communicative dimension, and send signals to 
the original emoter concerning our own evaluation of the situation and behavioral intent. This 
will generate a dynamic interaction familiar to all of us from our personal lives but very little 
studied from a scientific point of view (but see Parkinson et al. 2005 for a welcome exception). I 
conclude with a few examples of the kinds of signals which may be inferred from some possible 
urgent action tendencies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Not all of the signals sent by an umotion, it must be emphasized, are sent purposefully, namely as part of the 
proper functioning of the umotion (more on this shortly). 
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 Urgent action tendency Communicative agenda 
Attack tendency I have appraised your conduct as 
blameworthy, I am going to hurt you 
Avoidance tendency I have appraised my situation as 
dangerous, I am going to fight or flee 
Reparation tendency I have appraised my own conduct as 
blameworthy, I am going to do something 
to make amends to you 
Appeasement tendency I have appraised my conduct as falling 
short of a standard I endorse, I am not 
going to do it again 
Figure 14: The communicative agenda of action tendencies 
 
Let us now work with the account of umotions I have sketched, and tackle the last piece of 
our puzzle, which concerns the issue of emotional intentionality. 
 
 
10.3. THE INTENTIONALITY OF UMOTIONS  
 
The theory I articulated in sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.7 states that umotions are systems for the 
instantiation and management of an urgent action tendency, in brief urgency management 
systems. This theory, however, will not do as it is. What is missing from it is an account of 
portion (b) of the definition of umotion I provided in section 3.2: 
 
An umotion E is a superordinate system, generally activated by an emotional appraisal, 
which:  
(a) controls a cluster of organismic subsystems whose synchronized operation instantiates, 
and manages through time, an action tendency TE with control precedence 
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(b) has a pragmatic object, which describes the conditions of pushmi-pullyu appropriateness 
PPE for E 
 
What we now have to understand is what a pragmatic object is, and what role it plays in the 
individuation of umotion-types. The notion of a pragmatic object is a development of Kenny’s 
notion of formal object, which I described in chapter 4, and discussed again in 10.2.3. Here is a 
passage which can help us identify the problem we have to solve: 
  
If the emotions were internal impressions or behaviour patterns 
there would be no logical restrictions on the type of object which 
each emotion could have…In fact, each emotion is appropriate-
logically, and not just morally appropriate-only to certain restricted 
[formal] objects” (Kenny 1963, 192) 
 
Kenny’s point was that a good theory of emotions must account for the fact that, in order to 
be appropriate, any given emotion must be about a certain restricted formal object. As I said 
before, by qualifying this notion of appropriateness as logical, Kenny meant to emphasize that he 
was talking about a sort of appropriateness which an emotion acquires just by virtue of being 
what it is. The basic idea is that, say, fear is not only inappropriate in the absence of danger, but 
it is the sort of thing which is inappropriate in the absence of danger. This condition of 
appropriateness contributes to identifying what fear is. Philosophers have a number of ways to 
designate entities with constitutive conditions of appropriateness of the kind emotions appear to 
have. They may say for example that emotions are intentional or contentful or that they have 
aboutness or the capacity to represent. I will understand all such notions as being equivalent 
ways of referring to the fact that emotions appear to have constitutive norms of appropriateness. 
The fact that emotions can misrepresent, namely can violate their intentionality-constitutive 
norms of appropriateness, is the central phenomenon I want to explain.  
The idea that emotions have formal objects has always been the biggest albatross around the 
neck of both feeling theory and behaviorism. It is not hard to see why a theory assimilating 
emotions to either mere “internal impressions” or mere “behavior patterns” would have a hard 
time explaining why they have formal objects. If fear were just a feeling of bodily changes, then 
it would be mysterious why having such feeling in the absence of danger ought to be considered 
inappropriate. 
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A version of this problem would also afflict the UMS theory, if all it said was that fear is the 
instantiation and management of an urgent tendency to avoid a certain object appraised as 
dangerous. The question in such case would be: Why on earth would the absence of danger 
make it inappropriate, if it is only a tendency to avoid an object appraised as dangerous?  The 
intuitive answer to this question strikes me as the right one, namely that the absence of danger 
makes fear inappropriate because fear has the proper function of being elicited by danger. But 
what exactly is the proper function of an umotion? And what sort of relation does the function of 
an umotion have to its intentionality? The following section is meant to provide a general 
framework for answering these sorts of questions. 
 
10.3.1. Millikan’s theory of intentionality: a sketch 
One of the problems with developing a theory of emotional intentionality is that the nature 
of intentionality is independently problematic. The theorist is faced with an impressive variety of 
alternative accounts of intentionality, all endowed with some degree of plausibility, but fraught 
with their own domain of substantive problems. In this dissertation, I won’t be able to explore 
alternative theories of intentionality. My strategy is to borrow pretty much whole what I take to 
be one of the most promising theories of intentionality currently available, namely Ruth 
Millikan’s (1984, 1993, 2000, 2004) teleosemantics. I take no position on the controversies 
surrounding Millikan’s theory as a general theory of intentionality. I will work with a “bare 
bones” version of her theory, introducing just enough detail to make use of it with respect to 
emotions, but without worrying about the many layers of philosophical sophistication intended 
for domains of application other than emotions (e.g. the emergence of language).  
My objective is to show that Millikan’s theory offers us a promising framework for making 
sense of emotional intentionality. To illustrate Millikan’s theory, I rely on Millikan (2004), in 
which the theory presented in Millikan (1984, 1993) is complemented with a new theory of 
semantic information. This theory is offered in the context of Millikan’s (2004) articulation of “a 
truce” with the position that intentional representations are purposefully produced natural signs 
that carry natural information (75-76). I will come back to the terms of this truce shortly, but let 
us begin by asking: What are natural signs? Millikan (2004) characterizes them as “vehicles that 
bear natural information”, and offers a new theory of what is required for a vehicle to carry 
natural information. In the past twenty-five years, the standard account of natural information 
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has been Dretske’s (1981). In broad outline, Dretske’s theory states that X carries the 
information that Y insofar as (a) the conditional probability of Y given X is 1, (b) there is a law 
of nature or of logic underwriting the perfect correlation between X and Y.  
The inspiring thought of Millikan’s (2004) new theory of "locally recurrent natural 
information" is instead that “[n]early all of the kinds of information needed by us, and by all 
other organisms as well, for securing what we need in an inclement world, is information that 
cannot possibly be acquired without leaning on certain merely statistical frequencies” (32-33).  
The task for a theory of natural information becomes that of characterizing the properties of the 
statistical frequencies which allow for the transmission of information in the real, inclement 
world actual organisms inhabit.  
The essential difference with Dretske’s theory is that, instead of requiring information 
transmitting correlations to be perfect and nomically underwritten, Millikan (2004) requires them 
to be non-accidental within an appropriate reference class. But what reference class is 
appropriate for a theory of natural information? As Millikan notices, if there were no limitations 
on what counts as an appropriate reference class, we could always find a gerrymandered 
reference class such that, relative to it, a certain natural sign bears natural information about 
anything it correlates with it within such gerrymandered class.35 This notion of information, 
however, would fail to tackle what Millikan (2004) takes to be the central task when developing 
a theory of natural information, namely explaining “why [an organism] might be able to use the 
recurrent sign as an indicator of its signified with some success” (38-39). To do so, Millikan 
suggests that we must consider natural reference classes, where a “natural reference class for a 
sign --the natural domain within which certain A's are "locally recurrent signs" of certain  B's-- is 
a domain within which the correlation of As with Bs extends from one part of the domain to 
other parts for a reason” (40). Such reason will in turn be what explains why organisms learn 
about the signified from encountering the sign that carries information about it in the actual 
environments which they inhabit. As Millikan emphasizes, a correlation (defined relative to a 
natural reference class) does not need to be nomically underwritten or even strong for an 
organism to be able to use it to collect useful information. Her approach can consequently 
accommodate the fact that organisms can learn reliably from correlations with very different 
degrees of strength, as long as there is some reason why they hold in a natural reference class.  
                                                 
35 I owe the clarification of this point to Ruth Millikan’s comments on an earlier draft 
 257
For example, assume that there is a strong correlation between a certain type of sound X and 
a certain type of predator Y in a certain ecological niche N (e.g. X=sound of poisonous snake, 
Y=poisonous snake, N=area of Borneo forest). The correlation is not going to be perfect, and 
there certainly won’t be a law of nature in N which makes the presence of Y nomically required 
given X. For example, it is physically possible and ecologically expectable that some organism 
other than Y may imitate sound X for strategic purposes (e.g. to avoid being attacked by 
predators), although rarely enough to preserve a strong correlation between X and Y in N.  
Dretske’s theory only allows us to conclude that this is not a case in which X carries the 
information that Y is present in N. Nevertheless, X obviously carries some information about Y’s 
presence, namely that it is very likely. Millikan’s (2004) theory has no difficulty accommodating 
this case. For X to carry (locally recurrent) natural information about Y, it is only required that 
the correlation between X and Y is not accidental within a natural reference class, in this case the 
ecological niche N. Such conditions would be fulfilled in case X was produced by snake Y most 
of the time in N. The correlation between X and Y would hold for a reason – X is caused by Y in 
N –, but it would nevertheless not be perfect, and would only hold locally in niche N. This notion 
of information strikes me as the one we need to develop a promising teleosemantic theory of 
emotional representation. From now on, when I speak of information, I will understand it as 
information in Millikan’s (2004) sense.36
Let us now go back to the use Millikan makes of her new theory of information. As I 
mentioned before, the theory is formulated to make a “truce” with standard versions of 
informational semantics (e.g. Dretske 1986). The truce boils down to adopting a working account 
of intentional representations according to which representations (a.k.a. intentional signs) are 
“produced by systems designed to make natural signs for use by cooperating interpreting 
systems” (73). Under this view, representations emerge when some producer and some consumer 
(possibly parts of the same organism) are designed to cooperate in the production and 
consumption of natural signs.  
Millikan does not fully endorse this account, however, but only uses is as a first 
approximation, useful for exploring the relation her theory of intentionality bears to 
                                                 
36 I have argued elsewhere that thinking of information as a graded commodity amounts to capitalizing on one of the 
central lessons of Shannon’s theory of information, and I have tried to offer a new measure of semantic information 
which takes that lesson to heart (Scarantino 2005).  The theory of information I offered in Scarantino (2005) is 
broadly compatible with Millikan’s own, but tries to go beyond it in the attempt to quantify how much information 
statistical correlations carry. 
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informational semantics.37 The reason why intentional signs are not to be assimilated to natural 
signs purposefully produced is that there are some instances of intentional representations that 
fail to be natural signs purposefully produced. Millikan’s (2004) biggest worry concerns 
intentional representations in which the correspondence between the sign and the signified does 
not hold for a reason, thereby not involving the transmission of natural information. Under such 
circumstances, the “correspondence of the sign to a real affair may be brought about by accident 
[and] the sign is not a natural sign of the condition that happens to satisfy it”. Yet, an intentional 
sign mediates the cooperation between a producer and a consumer, and represents by virtue of an 
isomorphism between the sign and the signified (Millikan 1984). 
Although not every intentional sign is also a natural sign, Millikan acknowledges that a great 
many intentional signs are, and that the production of natural signs may in fact be the “normal 
means” by which the producer generates true intentional signs. I will leave these caveats in the 
background, and work with the approximation that intentional signs are purposefully produced 
natural signs that stand midway between a producer and a consumer.  
Millikan’s central teleosemantic hypothesis is that the cooperation between producers and 
consumers of some natural signs exists because it had some beneficial effects on the producer 
and the consumer in a set of past circumstances by virtue of which the sign production-sign 
consumption cooperation was selected for, relative to some selection mechanism. Millikan 
designates such past circumstances of selection with the label “Normal”. As I understand 
Millikan’s (2004) theory, there are no narrow limits to the type of selection mechanism at work 
in Normal circumstances. As she puts it to mention two prominent cases, some mechanisms of 
sign production “have been selected for by natural selection during evolutionary history. Others 
are selected for or tuned for their jobs through processes of learning”.  
What is required for something to count as a beneficial effect is that it must explain why a 
certain producer started generating natural signs and a certain consumer started using them, 
thereby establishing a partnership which was to the advantage of both in Normal 
circumstances.38 This allows for beneficial effects to comprise fitness benefits, the avoidance of 
pain in a conditioning experiment, the fulfillment of social functions, and so on. Complexities 
                                                 
37 I owe the clarification of this points to comments by Ruth Millikan on an earlier version of the chapter  
38 Millikan (2004) seems to hold an even weaker notion of benefit, according to which what counts as a benefit is 
anything which explains why the sign production-sign consumption cooperation was not selected against. I will not 
consider this wrinkle of her theory in what follows.  
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aside, the beneficial effect responsible for selection can be designed as the effect the sign 
production mechanism has when it fulfills its proper function (see Millikan 1984, 1993 for a 
much more nuanced account). According to Millikan, it makes sense to speak of intentional 
representations when the production of natural signs has acquired a proper function.  
I endorse this approach to intentionality under a couple of presuppositions, namely that no 
assumptions are made about the time in which circumstances were Normal, nor about the 
mechanism of selection at work in such circumstances. As far as I am concerned, Normal 
circumstances can be arbitrarily close in time to the current circumstances, as long as it makes 
sense to speak of a selection process as having taken place. Under this liberal understanding of 
proper functions, the acquisition of the ability to represent and the emergence of failures to 
represent need not be separated by evolutionary ages.  
Moreover, I assume that the same mechanism can have different proper functions relative to 
different sets of Normal circumstances. For example, a mechanism may have acquired a certain 
proper function through natural selection relative to Normal circumstances very far in the past, 
and have acquired another proper function through learning relative to a more recent set of 
Normal circumstances. A full articulation of these qualifications would take me too far, but I 
take them to be broadly compatible with Millikan (2004).  
What matters mostly to my project is a distinction Millikan makes between three kinds of 
representations or intentional signs: 
 
[D]escriptive intentional signs…are designed to stand in for world 
affairs, typically affairs outside the organism, and to vary 
according to these world affairs (2004, 80).  
Directive signs guide the consumer in the production of world 
affairs that vary according to how the signs themselves vary.  They 
are blueprints for what is to be constructed or brought about (2004, 
80). 
[Pushmi-pullyu] signs…are signs that are undifferentiated between 
presenting facts and directing activities appropriate to those facts. 
They represent facts and give directions or represent goals, both at 
once (2004, 157). 
 
The distinction is grounded on differences between what natural signs are produced for in 
the context of the producer-consumer partnership. Descriptive signs, Millikan argues, ought to 
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“stand for world affairs”. To use a turn of phrase coined by Austin (1962) and borrowed by 
Searle (1983) to account for differences between classes of propositional attitudes, descriptive 
signs have a mind-to-world direction of fit, in the sense that their constitutive aim is to have a 
content which fits what the world is like. There are many accounts available of the “fitting 
relation”, but the point is that the proper function of a descriptive sign is to offer the consumer a 
sign whose beneficial use in Normal conditions is contingent upon standing for world affairs. 
The responsibility for the fit between the world and the sign, we may also say, is on the 
shoulders of the producer of descriptive signs (Searle 1983).  
Imperative signs, on the other hand, ought to “guide the consumer in the production of world 
affairs”. Their direction of fit is world-to-mind, in the sense that their constitutive aim is to have 
a content which offers a blueprint for what the world is to be made like. In other words, the 
proper function of an imperative sign is to offer the consumer a sign whose beneficial use in 
Normal conditions is contingent upon motivating the consumer to change to world in such a way 
that the fitting relation between the sign and world affairs is brought about. The responsibility for 
the fit between the world and the sign, to carry on with the metaphor, is on the shoulders of the 
consumer in the case of imperative signs.  
Pushmi-pullyu (PP) signs, finally, “are undifferentiated between presenting facts and 
directing activities appropriate to those facts”. They have what we may call a dual direction of 
fit. The constitutive aim of such representations is to offer the consumer a sign whose beneficial 
use in Normal conditions is contingent upon being generated by the producer in circumstances 
in which it motivates the consumer to act as specified by the sign’s content. Such content must be 
understood under the presupposition that there is no separation of the purpose of varying so as to 
fit the world, as descriptive signs do, and the purpose of guiding behavior according to how they 
vary, as imperative signs do. PP signs unify descriptive and imperative dimensions, roughly in 
the sense that their purpose is to guide behavior according to how the world varies. In other 
words, there is no differential allocation of the responsibility for fitting between producer and 
consumer.  
Under this account of the distinction between signs, descriptive and imperative signs must 
work together to generate behaviors, each bringing to the table of their cooperative endeavor its 
own distinct content. For example, to lead someone to go to Paris, the belief that Paris is the 
capital of France and the desire to go to the capital of France must work together. On the other 
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hand, PP signs can generate behavior on their own, without requiring any collaboration between 
a descriptive content which “presents facts” and an imperative content which “gives directions”.  
The distinction between the content of descriptive and imperative signs and the content of 
pushmi-pullyu signs can be appreciated when we try to get a handle on their conditions of 
appropriateness. Whereas descriptive signs are signs whose proper function is to have a true 
content, and imperative signs are signs whose proper function is to have a satisfied content, i.e. a 
made-true content, pushmi-pullyu representations are signs whose proper function is to have a 
content which guides behavior appropriately in the circumstances in which it is produced. To 
emphasize this important distinction, I call the content of descriptive and imperative signs 
semantic, and the content of pushmi-pullyu signs pragmatic. 
Notice that this account does not presuppose that the mechanism producing descriptive, 
imperative and pushmi-pullyu representations will only produce representations which manage 
to achieve what they ought to according to their proper functions. As far as Millikan’s theory is 
concerned, representation failure can be widespread for all kinds of representations. I will call a 
representation which fails to fulfill its proper function false when the representation is 
descriptive, unsatisfied when it is imperative, and pragmatically inappropriate or pushmi-pullyu 
inappropriate when it is a pushmi-pullyu representation.  
Failure for a PP representation amounts to being produced in circumstances in which it does 
not generate the kind of benefit that established the producer-consumer partnership in Normal 
circumstances relative to a certain selection mechanism (e.g. natural selection, learning, etc.). 
This can happen either because the PP representation is produced in circumstances other than the 
ones by virtue of which it was selected for in Normal circumstances,  or because it guides 
behavior in ways other than the ones by virtue of which it was selected for in Normal 
circumstances, or for both reasons at the same time. This is admittedly just a sketch of a very 
complicated theory, but it will hopefully do for my purposes. 
 
10.3.2. Umotions as pushmi-pullyu representations 
There are currently two main accounts of emotional intentionality in contemporary emotion 
theory, and they both seem to me inadequate. One is provided by cognitivists, who argue that 
emotions have intentionality in the same sense in which judgments have intentionality. For 
example, the intentionality of fear is characterized as the intentionality of the judgment that danger 
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is present. In the absence of danger, such judgment is false, and fear consequently inappropriate. 
This popular view either misrepresents or fails to illuminate the phenomenon of emotional 
intentionality (see chapter 7 for a more extended discussion). 
It misrepresents it if we understand judgment as the paradigmatic manifestation of 
linguistic/conceptual abilities, as the expression of a central rather than modular information 
processing system, and as a cognitive attitude with a mind-to-world direction of fit. This is 
because emotions can occur in creatures without language, they can be elicited by modular forms 
of appraisal, and they always have a motivational dimension.  
On the other hand, it fails to illuminate it if we apply to the notion of judgment what in 
chapter 7 I called the Placeholder Strategy, according to which the notion of judgment is 
expanded to accommodate all properties emotions may be taken to have. Under such 
interpretation, to say that an emotion E is the judgment that p is simply to say that p is a 
description of E’s conditions of appropriateness. What remains unaccounted for is the relation 
between the emotion and such conditions of appropriateness, which is what a theory of 
emotional intentionality should explain.  
A promising alternative to the cognitivist understanding of intentionality has recently been 
proposed by Jesse Prinz (2004a, 2004b). According to Prinz’s Neo-Jamesian theory, emotions 
are perceptions of bodily changes which represent by virtue of their function. More precisely, 
Prinz has argued that the vehicle of emotional representation are bodily changes, and what 
grounds the representation relation between emotions and what they are about is that such 
bodily changes have the function of being caused by specific eliciting circumstances they 
consequently come to represent. If Prinz is correct, fear is not a judgment that danger is at hand, 
but rather a (conscious or unconscious) perception of fear-typical bodily changes (e.g. quickened 
heart beats, shallow breathing) whose function is being caused by danger.  
I have three main problems with Prinz’s account of the intentionality of emotions. The first 
is with the assumption that bodily changes are necessarily the vehicle of emotional 
representation. I have argued that there are many cases of emotions which do not involve such 
changes (see chapter 7).  
The second problem concerns the details of Prinz’s theory of mental representation, more 
specifically the theory of information it presupposes. Prinz relies on Dretske’s (1981, 1986, 
1988) theory of mental representation, according to which mental states represent what they have 
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the function of carrying information about. The problem is that the information carrying relation 
between two events is assumed to amount to a nomically underwritten perfect correlation 
between them. But this is not a viable account of how emotions carry information. The sense in 
which, say, fear carries information about dangers is not that there is a law of nature according to 
which whenever fear is instantiated danger is instantiated. Rather, the idea is that there is an 
imperfect but not accidental correlation between fear and danger by virtue of which the former 
carries information about the latter. By relying on Dretske’s theory, Prinz inherits all the 
limitations of Dretske’s (1981) account of information.  
The third and most significant problem is that Prinz’s theory characterizes the emotions as 
descriptive representations, leaving their key directive side in the background. According to the 
theory he proposes, fear represents danger because it has the function of being correlated with 
danger. But the function of fear is not merely to track the presence of danger, as the belief that 
danger is present aims to do, but rather to direct behaviors appropriately when danger is present. 
Under the view proposed by Prinz, the intentionality of emotions is ultimately grounded in the 
idea that emotions are bodily changes with the function of correlating with specific states of 
affairs. But it is unclear what kind of function this sort of correlation could serve. What would be 
the advantages for an organism of undergoing bodily changes as such?   
The three limitations I have singled out in Prinz’s account can all be resolved if we assume 
that the vehicles of emotional representation are umotions, and if we apply to them Millikan’s 
(2004) theory of pushmi-pullyu representations. 
My central thesis is that umotions are urgency management systems endowed with a special 
kind of pushmi-pullyu (PP) intentionality. This is to say that urgency management systems are 
intentional representations with a pragmatic rather than semantic content. Under the premises of 
Millikan’s theory of intentionality, to say that umotions are intentional representations is to 
assume that they stand midway between a producer and a consumer which are designed to 
cooperate. This in turn presupposes that there were Normal conditions such that, relative to some 
mechanism of selection, a producer and a consumer of any umotion E were selected for 
cooperating in the production and use of E. The beneficial effects explaining why selection took 
place in such Normal circumstances account for the proper function of the urgency management 
system that is E (relative to a given selection mechanism).  
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Now, what are the designed producers and consumers of umotions? The designed producer 
of umotion is the mechanism I called appraisal. Although umotions may occasionally be 
produced by mechanisms other than appraisal, it is quite clear that these are not the forms of 
elicitation that led to the establishment of the cooperation between producer and consumer. What 
alternative forms of elicitation such as, say, direct brain stimulation, facial feedback and 
chemical induction lack, as I mentioned before, is the monitoring capacity of appraisal, which is 
key to eliciting umotion E in circumstances in which its characteristic urgent action tendency TE 
is beneficial. The designed consumer of emotion is instead the cluster of subsystems umotion 
controls, and, more distally, the emoter who hosts them. I organized such subsystems into 
functional components, so we may say that the subsystems consume emotions for purposes of 
preparation, action and communication. Since both emotional appraisal and the subsystems 
governed by umotion are part of the emoter, we can refer to umotions as inner intentional 
representations.39  
For the purposes of my analysis, the proper function of an umotion can be due to all sorts of 
advantageous effects, ranging from benefits in terms of evolutionary fitness to benefits in terms 
of learning in a conditioning experiment. An account of the umotions’ intentionality cannot be 
given in general, because there is no reason to suppose that a unique mechanism of selection 
explains why every urgency management system available to an organism was selected for. Just 
to give an example, “fear” and “disgust” are two excellent candidates for being umotions selected 
by natural selection. As I argued in chapter 5, the evidence on the neurobiology and facial 
expressions associated with fear and disgust points to their being biological adaptations. Some 
other umotions, however, are most likely the result of a process of cultural selection. For 
example, guilt may conceivably have been selected for because of the benefits it bestows to 
agents by making them capable of abiding by a system of mutually beneficial social norms.  
The task of this section, however, is not to investigate the proper function of any single 
umotion in depth, but rather to sketch a general theory of emotional intentionality. What makes 
the idea that umotions have proper functions at least prima facie plausible is that urgency 
management systems have properties which are likely to have been (and still be) beneficial in 
                                                 
39 This is compatible with holding that an umotion may also qualify as a non-inner representation with respect to the 
relation between the emoter and another interactant. For example, emotional expressions are used also by organisms 
other than the emoter. Also, holding that umotions are inner representations is compatible with the possibility that 
the benefits to the emoter that explain why the cooperation between producer and consumer was established involve 
other organisms, as for example in kin selection. 
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many classes of circumstances. This is what makes the exploration of what such circumstances 
are for each umotion E worth pursuing, a task I leave for a future time. 
The potential advantages of umotions appear to be related to the peculiar action control 
structure an urgency management system embodies, paradigmatically characterized by a 
combination of speed and flexibility. This sort of combination is exactly what organisms need to 
deal with complex environments. Organisms only capable of the speed of reflexes would in such 
circumstances fare very poorly, because they would be unable to adapt their responses to a 
rapidly changing environment. On the other hand, organisms only capable of the flexibility of 
practical reasoning would also find themselves in trouble, because performing cost-benefit 
analysis in rapidly changing circumstances leads in many circumstances to failing to act quickly 
enough.  
Although speed and flexibility lead us to naturally conceptualize the advantages of umoting 
in terms of the functional components I called preparation and action, we must not forget the 
potential benefits of communication when we explore the proper function of emotions. The UMS 
theory assumes that the proper function of a given umotion E depends upon the combination of 
benefits accruing (in Normal circumstances) from the integrated combination of emotional 
preparation, emotional action and emotional communication. For example, part of the reason 
why fear was selected for will be that there are advantages related to communicating to one's kin 
the presence of danger. Similarly, part of the reason why anger was selected will include that 
angry emoters communicate hostile behavioral intentions to others, often achieving submission 
without actually having to engage in potentially costly fights. 
The main novelty of the account of emotional intentionality I propose, however, is not that 
emotions have proper functions. Rather, the main novelty is that umotions are characterized as 
pushmi-pullyu representations, whose proper function is to present facts and direct behaviors at 
the same time.40 Umotions are clearly not the only forms of pushmi-pullyu representations. For 
example, Millikan describes bee dances as pushmi-pullyu representations, which at the same 
time tell spectator bees where the nectar is and direct action towards getting it. One may think 
that the relevant difference is that umotions are inner representations, in which producer and 
consumer exist within the same organism, whereas bee dances are non-inner representations, in 
which producer and consumer are distinct organisms. But this won’t do, because there are 
                                                 
40 I owe the development of this idea to discussions with Ruth Millikan 
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innumerable inner PP representation other than umotions. For example, Millikan characterizes 
“intentions to act” as PP representations, because they serve “at once to direct action and to 
describe one’s future so that one can plan around it”, and “intentions” are undoubtedly inner. 
 What distinguishes umotions from other kinds of inner pushmi-pullyu representations, I 
argue, is that they have a special way of pushing and a special way of pulling. Concerning the 
pushmi or directive side, umotions are designed to direct behavior in the style of urgency 
management systems, namely with control precedence. Intentions as such do not have control 
precedence, in the sense that they are states of readiness to act, possibly also of the “intention in 
action” variety (Searle 1983), but not endowed with the sort of multi-layered “clamoring for 
attention and execution” which I singled out as the mark of the emotional.  
Concerning the pullyu or descriptive side, umotions are designed to be produced by an 
appraisal. This is what allows us to distinguish them from PP drives such as hunger and thirst, 
which are inner PP representations but not umotions. The designed mechanism of elicitation for 
hunger and thirst, in fact, is a self-regulating biological mechanism that operates in rhythmic 
cycles of detection and stabilization of physiological imbalances. Emotional appraisal, on the 
contrary, monitors sudden changes in the environment, and does not rely on a homeostatic 
internal system.  The pullyu side of umotion, in other words, aims to track events which demand 
prioritized goal pursuit but whose emergence is not cyclical. 
To say that umotions are PP representation, I emphasize, is not to imply that they will 
always manage to achieve what they ought to according to their proper function. What is implied 
is only that there were Normal circumstances in the past such that the mechanism producing and 
consuming umotion E produced tokens of it which guided action in the circumstances in which 
they were produced, and had beneficial effects which explain why the production-consumption 
partnership was selected for with respect to E (by natural selection, by learning, etc.).  
What identifies umotion types, in conclusion, is a conjunction of a certain urgent action 
tendency T and of a certain set of conditions of pushmi-pullyu appropriateness PP, which in 
effect characterize the circumstances in which the urgent action tendency T fulfills its proper 
function. The UMS theory offers a novel identity condition for emotions, and it explains the 
sense in which urgency management systems can acquire a normative dimension. When we 
know the conditions of PP appropriateness, we know what an umotion E is supposed to do, and 
we can speak of misrepresentation when it fails to do it (possibly most of the time). 
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I call the description of such conditions of appropriateness the pragmatic object of an 
umotion E. By speaking of pragmatic objects, I mean to signal that I am referring to conditions 
that are constitutively associated to a given umotion and can contribute to type-identifying it. 
This is Kenny’s (1963) idea of formal objects, with a couple of twists. The first is that the 
constitutive relation between an emotion and its object is grounded in a history of selection. To 
discover the pragmatic object of an emotion, what we need to do is to understand its proper 
function, which tells us under what conditions a given emotion E does what it ought to. The 
second is that the object is to be understood in terms of pragmatic rather than semantic 
conditions of appropriateness. 
Since PP representations do not distinguish between presenting fact and directing activities, 
the idea of pragmatic objects demands a new understanding of emotional content. Emotions 
which do not fulfill their constitutive conditions of appropriateness are generally described as 
being false in emotion theory (e.g. De Sousa 1987), but this manner of speaking has two 
shortcomings. On the one hand, it wrongly suggests that the descriptive content of an umotion is 
represented in the same way in which the content of a belief is represented. This interpretation is 
almost inevitable when emotions are identified with judgments, as in the cognitivist theory of 
emotions. On the other hand, to speak of representational failure for emotions exclusively in 
terms of falsity neglects the directive side of umotion, as if an umotion could tell what is the case 
without at the same time telling what to do about it. 
According to the UMS theory, the proper function of umoting is instantiating the match 
between conditions of elicitation and behavioral guidance that allowed the production-
consumption cooperation of umotions to be selected for (relative to some mechanism of 
selection). Since I allow for the possibility that the same mechanism may have proper functions 
with respect to different selection mechanisms (e.g. natural selection and cultural selection), it is 
possible that an umotion may acquire more than one kind of pragmatic content at different times, 
a complication I will not further explore. 
The intuitive relation between emotions and their formal objects, described by Kenny (1963) 
as being what a theory of emotions as behavioral predispositions could never explain, is now 
perfectly explainable. Under the UMS theory, the reason why fear is inappropriate in the absence 
of danger is that danger is a description of the conditions of PP appropriateness under which the 
superordinate system producing urgent avoidance tendencies was selected for.  Let me 
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emphasize again that these may or may not be the circumstances in which an emoter is 
currently disposed to produce fear. The point is that, even if an emoter is disposed to engage in 
urgent avoidance tendencies with respect to non-dangerous circumstances, the system 
generating tokens of such tendency was selected for doing so when danger was present. This is 
what allows us to conclude that engaging in urgent avoidance tendencies in the absence of 
danger instantiates a form of malfunctioning for the fear system. 
In a nutshell, the pragmatic object of an emotion E, what emotion theorists have tried to 
capture with notions such as formal object (Kenny 1963) or core relational theme (Lazarus 
1991), is a description of the conditions under which E has the proper function of being elicited.  
Characterizing pragmatic objects linguistically is difficult, because their content is both 
descriptive and directive but does not result from a combination of a purely descriptive 
representation (e.g. a belief) and of a purely directive representation (e.g. a desire). The proper 
function of umotions is neither to independently vary so as to fit the world nor to independently 
guide behavior according to how it varies, but rather to guide behavior according to how the 
world varies. There are two ways of failing to achieve this objective. On the pullyu side, an 
umotion may be activated in the wrong circumstances. For example, “fear” may be activated by 
events which are not dangerous. On the pushme side, “fear” may direct action in the wrong way. 
Even though activated by an actual danger, “fear” may bring about behaviors which are not an 
adequate response to it (e.g. excessive trembling).  
At the heart of the idea of pragmatic content as I understand it is the idea that these two 
forms of failure are equivalent as far as the pushmi-pullyu representativeness of an umotion is 
concerned. Failing to PP represent is either failing to be produced in the state of affairs in which 
consumers were historically benefited or failing to guide consumers in the historically beneficial 
production of world affairs or both. Differently from descriptive and imperative representations, 
the responsibility for the fit between intentional signs and world affairs is on the shoulders of 
both producers and consumers of PP representations. 
 
10.3.3. Are all emotions umotions? 
I do not believe that all things we call emotions in ordinary language are umotions, nor that 
all things we call fear, disgust or anger in ordinary language are umotions. Far from being a 
shortcoming of my theory, I take this aspect to be one of its major strengths.  I argued in chapter 
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8 that the domain of vernacular emotions is highly heterogeneous and vague. An emotion 
theorist can either try to capture the family resemblance characteristic of folk emotion categories 
(Folk Emotion Project), or try to develop an explication of them (Explicating Emotion Project). 
As anticipated in the introduction, I offer the UMS theory of emotions in the spirit of an 
explication. Umotion does not make explicit what “emotion” means in ordinary language, but 
rather what is a “good thing to mean” by it when we engage in the intellectual pursuits of 
scientific psychology. 
In other words, my aim has been to transform the folk category of “emotion”, and the folk 
categories of specific emotions such as “fear”, “anger” and “disgust”, to make them suitable for 
scientific psychology while maintaining enough similarity with the folk categories to count as 
explicating them. Minimally, this task requires eliminating some of the vagueness characterizing 
folk emotion categories, and offer fairly exact ground rules for their use. The ultimate objective 
of the UMS theory, however, is more ambitious: it is the substitution of folk emotion categories 
with scientific categories fruitful for the purposes of scientific psychology. This substitution is 
not meant to eliminate “folk emotion” or “folk fear” from ordinary language, a task which is 
both meaningless and unachievable, but rather to eliminate such categories from the language of 
working scientists. 
I will not be able to demonstrate that umotion is a fruitful category, a task which can only be 
achieved once the theoretical construct of umotion begins being used by psychologists, biologists 
and neuroscientists in their own intellectual pursuits. On the other hand, I believe I have clearly 
reduced the vagueness of the folk category “emotion”, and articulated a theoretical concept 
which at the very least carries some promise of being fruitful (for the purposes of scientific 
psychology). Let me just give one example of this potential fruitfulness, comparing the UMS 
theory with cognitivism. 
Two of the most valuable avenues of research in contemporary emotion theory involve 
comparative animal studies and the study of ontogenetic emotional development. One of the 
central puzzles faced by these research programs is that it is unclear in what sense adult humans, 
infants and animals can all experience the same emotions, given their differences in cognitive 
sophistication. In the absence of an account of emotions we can use to make sense of the 
continuity of emotional phenomena across species and stage of ontogenetic development, these 
research programs lie on shaky foundations. 
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The cognitivist account of emotions as judgments fails to offer a theoretical construct usable 
in these scientific studies. It is unclear how pre-linguistic and non-linguistic creatures could 
possibly issue judgments without mastering a language. The standard cognitivist response of 
trivializing the notion of judgment so as to make it available by fiat to infants and animals (see 
7.2.1) fails to shed light on what it is that adults, infants and animals share when it comes to 
emotional phenomena. The construct of umotions offers instead a viable answer, even though 
certainly not the only one (see below). Adults, infants and animals can all emote in the sense that 
they can all engage in urgent action tendencies generated by a superordinate system endowed 
with a proper function.  
Cognitive differences between them will affect what events are appraised in a way that 
brings about an umotion. On the other hand, there is nothing mysterious about the idea that 
creatures of different levels of cognitive sophistication may be able to engage in, say, the urgent 
avoidance tendency of “fear”. I have so far used terms such as “fear”, “anger” and “disgust” to 
illustrate examples of umotions, but it is now time to make explicit that not all items comprised 
in such subordinate folk categories qualify as umotions. From now on, I will speak of “ufear”, 
“uanger” and “udisgust” when I intend to refer to the explicata of subordinate folk emotion 
categories proposed by the UMS theory. 
In section 9.2.1, I reformulated the Carnapian account of explication, arguing that the 
reduction of vagueness and/or the acquisition of fruitfulness (relative to some theoretical 
objectives) are the two fundamental payoffs attached to explication. I also said that no 
explication can be good unless it achieves similarity in use with the explicandum. The question is 
now: Is it the case that “in most cases in which [emotion] has so far been used, [umotion] can be 
used”? In other words, is “umotion” interchangeable with “emotion” (salva veritate) in enough 
linguistic contexts to achieve “similarity in use” with it? It seems to me that umotion passes the 
similarity test with flying colors: in very many linguistic contexts in which the term “emotion” is 
ordinarily used what is being referred to is precisely an umotion. At the same time, it is also clear 
that there are many cases of ordinary emotions which are not captured by the UMS theory.  
In the chart below, I report a few examples of paradigmatic umotions. Umotions are 
identified in the style of the UMS theory, namely by means of a conjunction of an urgent action 
tendency and its conditions of pushmi-pullyu appropriateness. This criterion of identification is 
different from the ones used by cognitivists, according to which emotions are type-identified by 
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judgments, and by Neo-Jamesianism, according to which emotions are type-identified by 
perceptions of bodily changes. In the last column, I give some examples of the sorts of benefits 
which may explain why a given umotion was selected for (relative to some mechanism of 
selection): 
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Umotion Urgency 
management system 
for the management 
of an urgent action 
tendency of… 
…in circumstances of 
PP appropriateness 
characterized by…. 
…with a proper 
function connected 
to… 
 
Uanger … 
attack/obstacle 
removal 
…slight/something 
resisting our getting 
through 
Preparing for 
obstacle removal 
and/or 
Executing actions 
of obstacle removal 
flexibly and quickly 
and/or 
Communicating 
signals of negative 
other-evaluation and 
aggressive behavioral 
intent 
Ufear … avoidance …danger Preparing for 
evasive action and/or 
Executing actions 
of avoidance flexibly 
and quickly and/or 
Communicating 
signals of danger and 
need for help  
Uguilt …reparation …violation of 
important norms of 
conduct 
Preparing for 
reparation and/or 
Executing actions 
of reparation flexibly 
and quickly and/or 
Communicating 
signals of negative 
self-evaluation and 
need for forvigance 
Uembarassement …appeasement …violation of 
relatively unimportant 
norms of conduct 
Preparing for 
appeasement and/or 
Executing actions 
of appeasement 
quickly and flexibly 
and/or 
Communicating 
signals of negative 
self-evaluation and 
need for avoiding 
attention 
 
Figure 15: Some examples of umotions 
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I intend my descriptions of the tendency TE and of the conditions of appropriateness PPE 
of any given E to be only tentative. A thorough analysis would demand a complex study of the 
proper function of each umotion E. This is because we cannot establish what the pragmatic 
object of, say, anger is without having first understood what the proper function of anger is. 
This in turn requires asking under what sorts of circumstances the urgent action tendency 
associated with anger had benefits for the emoter which explain why it was selected for. The 
chart offers a few tentative descriptions of urgent action tendencies, conditions of pragmatic 
appropriateness and benefits that may in principles explain why a given umotion acquired a 
proper function.  
For example, “uanger” is identified with an urgent tendency of attack or obstacle removal, 
pragmatically appropriate in case a slight has been committed or something resists our getting 
through. The benefits associated with “uanger” are related to the three functional components 
of preparation, action and communication that are characteristic of it. For example, it is 
intuitively persuasive that the system producing tokens of anger was selected for because it 
efficiently prepared for vigorous hostile action, because it allowed for a quick yet flexible 
action with respect to an obstacle, and because it sent signals of negative appraisal and hostile 
behavioral intent that helped bringing about submission.  
Similar stories can be told with respect to the possible benefits of “ufear”, an urgent action 
tendency of avoidance pragmatically appropriate in the presence of danger, “uguilt”, an urgent 
action tendency of reparation pragmatically appropriate when an internalized and important 
norm has been violated, and “uembarassment”, an urgent action tendency of appeasement 
pragmatically appropriate when one has made a faux pas involving the violation of relatively 
unimportant norms of conduct. 
It is clear from the simple mastery of the English language that very often when we speak 
of anger, fear, guilt, embarrassment and many other emotions, what we are referring to are 
precisely the sorts of urgency management systems summarized in the chart above. A 
paradigmatic case of anger, say a state of intense anger generated by being denied tenure and 
mocked for it by a colleague who announced us the bad news with a smile, is an urgent attack 
tendency which comprises the preparation of the body for action, the execution of mental, 
physical and expressive hostile actions, and the communication of the appraisal of having been 
unjustly treated and of currently being belligerently disposed. The attack tendency can be 
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flexibly manifested, depending on the circumstances, and it can also be inhibited. It would be 
pragmatically inappropriate if no slight had been committed, or more generally if no obstacle 
had been put by anyone or anything on the path of the emoter.  
At the same time, there appear to be cases of anger which are not “uanger”. For example, the 
sort of mild and self-righteous anger one may experience in the morning while sipping a coffee 
and reading about politicians’ squabbles need not consist of any urgent attack tendency. 
Similarly, there will be cases of fear which are not “ufears”. For example, one may speak of 
unconscious fear of failing in life as a way to explain a complex pattern of avoidance behaviors 
displayed in diverse occasions throughout a number of years. It is unclear in what sense this 
pattern of avoidance may qualify as “urgent” in any interesting sense of the term.  
More radically, there are folk emotion categories that are borderline cases of umotions, and 
folk emotion categories that have no instances that qualify as umotions. The latter case may be 
that of regret and melancholy: they are perfectly legitimate folk emotions, but they most likely 
do not have any tokens that qualify as umotions. A more complex case is that of sadness and joy, 
which I discussed above in the context of Frijda’s (1986) theory of emotions. If we understand 
urgent action tendencies as mechanisms for the urgent pursuit of specific relational goals, neither 
of them fits the bill. This is because they generally occur when a certain goal is either no longer 
achievable (sadness) or has already been achieved (joy). At the same time, if we think of 
control precedence in terms of global control on goal selection, some instances of sadness and 
joy may qualify as urgency management systems. This is because they, respectively, globally 
deactivate and globally activate the pursuit of an open class of relational goals. Whether or not 
this is a good way to include the cases of joy and sadness within the purview of the UMS 
theory is open for debate. 
On the other hand, the notion of umotion comprises items which are not necessarily 
prototypical emotions, and possibly not even emotions, in the folk sense. An example may be 
that of “pain”, which despite not being a prototypical emotion (and arguably not a folk emotion 
at all) appears to have instances that qualify as umotions. At first blush at least, “upain” is the 
urgent action tendency of recoiling and attempting to relieve a body part appraised as 
damaged, and it is PP appropriate in case real damage has been suffered. 
Emotion theorists generally respond to the presence of vernacular emotions that fail to fit 
their favorite account (Type 1 counterexample), and vernacular non-emotions that fit it instead 
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(Type 2 counterexample) by trying to transform their defining notions so as to avoid all 
counterexamples. I could also start playing with the defining ingredients of the theoretical 
construct of “umotion” so as to try to encompass all and only those vernacular items we call 
“emotion” or “fear”. For example, I could characterize “urgency” so broadly it that any form of 
action tendency, no matter how weak, counts as having control precedence if it is associated with 
an emotion. Under this account, even melancholy may count as an umotion.  
I could further stipulate that pain is a bona fide emotion just because it fits my account, and 
that any instance of pain which is not an umotion is not “real” pain. In chapter 7, I documented 
how extensive the use of these ad hoc strategies is among cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians. Once 
we commit to the Explicating Emotion Project, and understand the ground rules of explication, 
these strategies quickly reveal their lack of theoretical payoff. There is nothing to gain for an 
explicative theory such as UMS theory in accommodating the cases of melancholy and regret, or 
excluding the case of pain, unless doing so reduces vagueness, increases fruitfulness or is 
required to achieve similarity in use with the explicandum. None of these desiderata is promoted 
by tweaking with the defining notions of umotion with the only purpose of capturing all and only 
those things we call emotion in ordinary language. 
In order not to take the UMS theory seriously, a critic would have to argue either that it 
wears its lack of potential fruitfulness on its sleeves, or that it fails to achieve similarity in use 
with the ordinary notion of “emotion”. I believe the UMS theory has the resources to counter 
both moves. Importantly, I do not propose the UMS theory as the only fruitful explication of 
folk emotion categories. Given the heterogeneity and vagueness of folk emotion categories, I 
believe there is no viable alternative in emotion theory to what I will call explicative pluralism. 
In my view, emotion theorists not interested in the project of capturing the family resemblance 
of folk emotion categories (Folk Emotion Project) have to explicate them in light of the 
theoretical objectives of their specific discipline. There will be many explicata “similar in use” 
to a given explicandum and fruitful relative to a given set of theoretical objectives, and there will 
be many theoretical objectives of different disciplines relative to which fruitful explicata for folk 
emotion categories can be generated. This approach will bring about a plurality of theoretical 
constructs which need not be considered in competition with one another, as long as they are 
offered in the context of the Explicating Emotion Project.  
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For example, affect program theorists would be mistaken if they thought that the UMS 
theory is an alternative to the notion of a “basic emotion” (see chapter 5). The notion of “basic 
emotion”, which certainly differs from that of “umotion”, has proven very fruitful in the 
sciences of mind. It was used to formulate many interesting inductive generalizations, 
explanations and predictions for example in biology and the neurosciences. Such 
generalizations concern the presence of homologies in facial expressions of basic emotions in 
other primates (e.g. Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1973) and across cultures (e.g. Ekman 1972), and 
homologies in the neural pathways of basic anger, basic fear and basic disgust (e.g. Lawrence 
and Calder 2004). 
Umotion is just another potentially fruitful explicatum for the folk category of “emotion”. 
Differently from the construct of “basic emotion”, according to which nothing counts as a 
basic emotion unless it is automatically elicited, unbidden, short-lived, and with a distinctive 
physiology (see chapter 5), the construct of “umotion” is more suitable to shed light on the so-
called “higher cognitive emotions”, which generally lack such properties. Higher cognitive 
emotions such as guilt, shame, embarrassment, etc. can manifest strategic dimensions, they 
often last for a long time, and they generally lack a distinctive physiology.  
Umotion may help us shed new light on the higher cognitive emotions by offering, among 
other things, a novel understanding of the importance of their communicative dimension and of 
their dynamic development through time. These aspects have largely been ignored by 
cognitivists and Neo-Jamesians, but they may hold the key to understanding the origin and 
current function of many higher cognitive emotions. Since these are the sorts of emotions 
involved in morality, art, mental disorder, etc., I am hopeful that the theoretical construct of 
“umotion” will help us shed light on such phenomena, which are those we are most eager to 
understand but know the least about. To see if the construct of “umotion” can do for the 
understanding of some forms of guilt, shame and embarrassment what the theoretical construct 
of “basic emotion” has done for the understanding of some forms of fear, anger, and disgust, 
what we need is to start using it in the context of theoretical projects involving such emotions. 
This is what I plan to do in the next few years of my academic career, hopefully in 
collaboration with scientists who will find the questions to which thinking of emotions as 
umotions leads us worth pursuing. 
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10.4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have offered a new theory of emotions as urgency management systems, or 
umotions. At the heart of the theory I offered lies the idea that an “umotion” is a special type of 
superordinate system which instantiates and manages an urgent action tendency by coordinating 
the operation of a cluster of cognitive, perceptual and motoric subsystems. Crucially, such 
superordinate system has a proper function by virtue of which it acquires a special kind of 
intentionality I have called pragmatic. The fundamental idea here is that emotions combine 
descriptive and directive purposes, and rely on a system of representation which differs in kind 
from the one involved in the formation of beliefs and desires. 
My theory differs very significantly from both cognitivist and Neo-Jamesianian theories, 
currently the two most popular accounts of emotions. They take the fundamental mark of the 
emotional to be, respectively, the evaluation embodied by an emotion and the way the emotion 
feels. I have instead constructed a theory of emotions around the idea that the fundamental 
mark of the emotional is urgency, understood as priority in the control of action. My theory is 
unlike cognitivism and Neo-Jamesianism also methodologically. I do not claim to have 
captured anything that deserves to be called an emotion in ordinary language. What I have 
claimed is instead that we must divorce the objectives of striving for ordinary language 
compatibility from the objective of striving for theoretical fruitfulness. Achieving the former is 
the project pursued by folk emotion theorists, and achieving the latter is the project pursued by 
theorists interested in explication. I am interested in scientific explication, and I have argued 
that the theoretical construct of umotion offers a good explication for folk emotion categories, 
one which will prove its fruitfulness if adopted by working scientists.  
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11. CONCLUSION 
 
 
The debate between rival research programs in contemporary emotion theory is afflicted 
by two major problems which stand in the way of progress. The first is a lack of appreciation 
for the history of the subject, which has prevented many emotion theorists from learning from 
the insights and mistakes of their intellectual ancestors, often turned into anachronistic 
caricatures. The second is lack of methodological self-consciousness. Emotion theorists ask 
"What is an emotion?" without a clear understanding of what counts as getting the answer 
right. The first two parts of this dissertation have been devoted to trying to solve these 
problems, and at the same time prepare the way for a new theory of emotions built on 
historical understanding and sound methodology. I offered such theory in the third and last part 
of my dissertation. 
In the historical part, I have distinguished between five main traditions that have battled 
for the soul of emotions in the past 2,500 years. I called them the feeling tradition, the 
cognitivist tradition, the behaviorist tradition, the evolutionary tradition and the social 
constructionist tradition. Studying a handful of central figures within each tradition has given 
me an opportunity to understand why emotions have been identified in the course of their long 
intellectual history with items as diverse as perceptions of bodily changes, judgments, 
behavioral predispositions, biologically based solutions to fundamental life tasks, and 
culturally specific social artifacts. This historical investigation has also revealed the existence 
of a significant area of agreement between rival traditions. 
First, due largely to the efforts of cognitivists, the view that emotions have intentionality 
has gained wide currency in emotion theory. Secondly, there is now general agreement that at 
least some emotions are shared by animals, infants and adult humans. A third area of 
agreement concerns what we may call the modularity properties of emotions. It is fairly 
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uncontroversial at this stage that many emotions have a number of the characteristics of 
Fodorian modules. They are elicited at least some of the time by a mechanism which is fast and 
mandatory, and partially insulated from the one involved in the production and manipulation of 
linguistic representations. This insulation manifests itself in a variety of ways. For example, 
the operative principles of the eliciting mechanism are often unavailable to conscious report 
and impenetrable to beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes.  
The fourth area of agreement concerns the basic components associated with emotions, 
either necessarily or contingently. Consider an episode of intense anger directed by a scholar 
towards the colleague who has just informed her that she has been denied tenure. As a first 
approximation, we can distinguish in the complex event that is anger an evaluative component 
(e.g. appraising being denied tenure as a slight), a physiological component (e.g. increased 
heart rate and blood pressure), a phenomenological component (e.g. an unpleasant feeling), an 
expressive component (e.g. fixed stare, loud voice, erected body), a behavioral component 
(e.g. insulting, storming out of the room), a mental component (e.g. focusing attention, 
planning an appeal), and a communicative component (e.g. by getting angry the scholar 
conveys the message that she feels unjustly treated).  
The question that has historically excited emotion theorists more than any other is: Which 
subset of the components I mentioned – evaluative, physiological, phenomenological, 
expressive, behavioral, mental, and communicative – is essential to emotion/anger? It is with 
respect to this question that different research programs part ways, and begin their long-
running and often vicious theoretical disputes. 
The methodological part of this dissertation has tried to expose such disputes as resulting 
in large part from confusion on the aims of theory construction. I argued that there are two 
importantly different ways of getting the answer right to a question of the form “What is an 
emotion?” or “What is anger?’. One is to capture the conditions of application of the folk term 
"emotion/anger" in ordinary language, and the other is to formulate a fruitful explication of it. 
These two objectives are equally legitimate but demand the application of different 
methodologies, neither of which appears to be implemented by contemporary emotion 
theorists. The main task of part two of my dissertation has been to clearly articulate the 
desiderata for what I have called the Folk Emotion Project and the Explicating Emotion 
Project.  
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On the basis of empirical evidence on folk emotion concepts, I have concluded that folk 
emotion categories are characterized by prototypical organization, blurred edges and extreme 
heterogeneity. Trying to capture the condition of membership of such categories with a 
definition, I argued, is an ill-conceived intellectual pursuit. There simply is no set of 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for something to count as either 
“emotion” or “anger” in the ordinary sense of such terms. Providing a cluster account of 
vernacular emotion categories seems to me the best an emotion theorist can ever do in the 
context of the Folk Emotion Project. 
An emotion theorist engaged in explication, instead, must only achieve similarity in use 
between his favored explicatum and "emotion" or “anger”, showing what useful theoretical 
purposes are served by it. Emotion theorists appear instead convinced that any good theory of 
emotions must encompass anything we call emotion in ordinary language, and that one and 
only one such theory can be found. This is because the desiderata of  theoretical fruitfulness 
and ordinary language compatibility are not divorced in the mind of most emotion theorists. 
The implicit assumption is that what emotion terms “mean” in ordinary language coincides 
with what is a “good thing to mean” by them relative to the purposes of a scientific theory.  
I argued that this is a bad assumption, because it is very unlikely that the items belonging 
to folk emotion categories share a scientifically interesting dimension of similarity. To do 
science, I concluded, an emotion theorist must go the way of explication. Since (a) explication 
aims to transform an explicandum category into an explicatum category similar to it but 
endowed with a higher degree of fruitfulness with respect to certain theoretical objectives, and 
(b) there are many ways to instantiate a similarity relation and be fruitful relative to sets of 
theoretical objectives, explication is intrinsically pluralistic. This insight has gone largely lost 
among contemporary emotion theorists, who argue as if there could only be one legitimate 
explication of emotions fruitful with respect to all conceivable theoretical objectives. But this 
is clearly a false assumption. This implies that many of the disputes in which contemporary 
emotion theorists are engaged are, once again, based on lack of methodological self-
consciousness. 
 The constructive part of my dissertation has been devoted to the formulation of a new 
explication of emotion suitable for the theoretical purposes of scientific psychology. At the 
heart of the Urgency Management System (UMS) theory of emotions I proposed is the idea 
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that an “umotion” is a special type of superordinate system which instantiates and manages an 
urgent action tendency by coordinating the operation of a cluster of cognitive, perceptual and 
motoric subsystems. Crucially, such superordinate system has a proper function and a 
teleosemantic intentional content undifferentiated between presenting facts and directing 
activities appropriate to them. Just to give an example, fear does not independently tell us that 
danger is present and that some evasive action must be taken, but both things at the same time. 
I have parted ways with both cognitivists and Neo-Jamesianians, who take the mark of the 
emotional to be, respectively, the evaluation embodied by an emotion and the way the emotion 
feels, and argued instead that the fundamental mark of the emotional is urgency, understood as 
priority in the control of action. 
The account I offered accommodates all the areas of agreement I singled out at the positive 
legacy of many centuries of investigation of the emotions, and it does not make the methodological 
mistakes so detrimental to many contemporary emotion theories. 
The UMS theory explains in what sense umotions have intentionality, by offering an 
account of their pragmatic content and proper function. It explains why some umotions are 
shared by animals, infants and adult humans, as organisms of many different levels of 
cognitive sophistication can equally engage in urgent action tendencies governed by a 
mechanism with a history of selection. It accommodates the fact that some umotions have 
modularity properties, by allowing for appraisal, the main producer of umotions, to range from 
a modular to a central end. Finally, the UMS theory finds a place for all marks of emotionality, 
organizing evaluative, physiological, phenomenological, expressive, behavioral, mental, and 
communicative components in the context of three main functional components of preparation, 
action and communication. Umotions, I have argued, can be instantiated with a variety of 
different forms of preparation, action and communication. 
Methodologically, I have been at pains to emphasize that the UMS theory is an explication 
of folk emotion categories, which does not have the ambition to capture the common ground 
shared by all things we call emotions in ordinary language. I am happy to concede that there are 
things we legitimately call “emotion” in English which are not “umotions”. At the same time, the 
notion of an urgency management system is similar enough in use to “emotion” to count as 
explicating it, it is defined fairly precisely, and, I have argued, it promises to be a fruitful notion for 
scientific psychology.   
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